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Free trade in commodities typically leads to gains for all participating countries. These gains can be augmented by trade in productive factors if returns differ between countries. But such trade would not exhaust potential gains if technological knowledge, not embedded in productive factors, differs between countries. Using a Ricardian model this paper shows how a country which has an absolute advantage based on technology in both commodities in a two‐commodity world can gain by selling, giving, or even bribing the other country into using the advanced technology in the other country's export sector. If each country has an absolute advantage in the single commodity it produces, an exchange of technology for the other commodity can nonetheless lead to extra gains for both countries.

ABSTRACTRent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.