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We model monetary policy decisions as being taken by a group of heterogeneous policy makers, organized in a committee. Intuitively, when MPC members disclose and discuss the arguments behind their view on the interest rate, the quality of the collective decision should be higher compared to merely taking a simultaneous vote. We show that in some cases this intuition need not be correct. We also find that communication is a relatively effective way to implement the "knowledge pooling" argument in favor of collective decision-making, compared to expanding the size of a committee. Moreover, decision-making with internal communication appears generally more robust in situations when heterogeneity of members is not adequately captured by decision-making rules. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

Since the 1960s, voting behaviour in advanced democratic states has undergone substantial changes. From this period, the transformation of social structures, increased education, and the expansion of new technologies in the field of mass media, among other things, are evident. The transformation factors that affect the voter and his choice are sooner or later reflected in new theoretical concepts describing electoral behaviour, whether it was the theory of party identification, voter choice based on issues or rational choice. So far, however, none of the theories have adequately reflected the effect of consumer-style thinking on electoral behaviour. A new trend in political marketing – political branding – aims to correct precisely this deficiency. Due to the fact that the relevant research in the field of political branding and its impact on the voting behaviour of individuals is still in its infancy, we are faced with a lack of robust theoretical foundations. The text thus aims to clarify this situation by gathering and analysing existing branding concepts, pointing to their strengths and weaknesses. Also, it contributes to the theoretical discussion by linking research on political branding to existing theories of voting behaviour, asking whether the related branding concepts are able to explain the voting behaviour of voters as well as whether they are open to further amendments and modifications.

Several of the articles in this volume criticize the use of DW-NOMINATE in historical work in American politics and suggest alternative approaches to the use of roll call voting data. While many of criticisms are certainly valid, their practical implications are often overstated. Moreover, the suggested alternatives are either impractical for most historically oriented scholars and or do not adequately address the underlying problems. Almost all of the criticisms can be addressed by correct application of DW-NOMINATE results or those of other closely related measures.

Lambastes Jeffrey M. Stonecash's "Reconsidering the Trend in Incumbent Vote Percentages in House Elections" (2003). It is contended that his alternative measure of the average incumbent's vote share, designed to correct a distortion generated by omitting uncontested incumbents, creates a far more serious distortion. Rerunning Stonecash's analysis leads to results that contradict his central argument & suggest that there is no need to abandon the prevailing view that incumbent vote margins have increased since 1946. Previous research on the rising incumbency advantage is noted, & a particular inaccuracy in Stonecash's article related to David Mayhew's (1974) assertions identified. 1 Figure, 11 References. J. Zendejas

In the 'post-truth era', political fact-checking has become an issue of considerable significance. A recent study in the context of the 2016 US election found that fact-checks of statements by Donald Trump changed participants' beliefs about those statements—regardless of whether participants supported Trump—but not their feelings towards Trump or voting intentions. However, the study balanced corrections of inaccurate statements with an equal number of affirmations of accurate statements. Therefore, the null effect of fact-checks on participants' voting intentions and feelings may have arisen because of this artificially created balance. Moreover, Trump's statements were not contrasted with statements from an opposing politician, and Trump's perceived veracity was not measured. The present study (N = 370) examined the issue further, manipulating the ratio of corrections to affirmations, and using Australian politicians (and Australian participants) from both sides of the political spectrum. We hypothesized that fact-checks would correct beliefs and that fact-checks would affect voters' support (i.e. voting intentions, feelings and perceptions of veracity), but only when corrections outnumbered affirmations. Both hypotheses were supported, suggesting that a politician's veracity does sometimes matter to voters. The effects of fact-checking were similar on both sides of the political spectrum, suggesting little motivated reasoning in the processing of fact-checks.

I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about jurors' preferences. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that the unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the price of acquitting the guilty.

Rational retrospective voting models have dominated the literature on election forecasting and the economic vote since they were first proposed by Anthony Downs in 1957. The theory views voters as appraisers of incumbent government's past performance, which acts as the principal source of information individuals use when making their vote. Pure retrospective voting requires far less of the electorate in order to hold a government accountable and empirical work based on this theory has been very adept at predicting election outcomes and explaining individual voting decisions. In terms of the time period assessed to form judgements on past performance however, there is a surprising disconnect between the theoretical line of thought and actual testing. The sensible assumption of retrospective voting models is that voters, looking to judge a government's past performance, should assess changes in their own welfare over an entire term of office, with little or no discounting of past events. The majority of empirical studies however, focus on economic performance over shorter time horizons, usually within a year of an election. There have only been a handful of studies attempting to empirically test the correct temporal relationship between changes in economic indicators and election outcomes, despite its importance for retrospective voting models and democratic accountability. This working paper empirically tests over which time horizons changes in macroeconomic fundamentals continue to have a significant bearing on election outcomes in Post War Britain. It finds that longer-term measures of economic change, over entire government terms, are better at predicting changes in incumbent's vote shares than shorter-term measures, closer to the election period. This has important consequences for future voting models and is a promising result for democratic accountability.

12 Pág. (This article belongs to the Section Forest Economics, Policy, and Social Science) ; The correct aggregation of stakeholders' preferences is a vital aspect of solving problems associated with natural resources. In fact, there is no one solution that permits the incorporation of those preferences into techniques that, in turn, address multiple objectives in the management of those resources. In this context, this work aims to assign, analyse, and compare the weights of importance to groups of stakeholders (representativity) starting from different approaches and methodologies: pairwise comparison matrices (using a subjective approach) and the voting power notion (when an objective approach is deployed). For the latter, a variant of the extended goal programming model is employed. The results show different weight values and, therefore, scenarios, in which the social groups defined acquire diverse importance. It is also observed that there are scenarios determined by different values of the control parameter, in which the results of the two above-mentioned approaches are similar. Finally, it is demonstrated how the affiliation of stakeholders to other social groups (different identities) affects the results obtained. ; This research was funded by predoctoral support: Grant for Predoctoral Contracts for the Training of Doctors 2016 (BES-2016-079402) of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain. This research was partially financed by the European Union's H2020 Research and Innovation Pro gramme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions, grant agreement No. 101007950—D ; Peer reviewed

Management buyouts have been seen by some commentators as restoring the owner-manager to the commercial and industrial scene. If correct this presents a novel twist to the long-running sociological debate on ownership and control which sees ownership as separated from control at the individual level. This paper reports results from a study of Scottish-based buyouts which occurred between 1982 and 1989. Only a small proportion of the total buyout finance is raised in the form of voting shares, which does indeed enable the buy-out team, albeit at the personal risk of considerable sums of money, to obtain majority control of the voting equity. However, in firms formerly in private hands, it is often the case that, while the management team retain formal control, they hold a smaller proportion of the voting shares than the previous owners. Crucially, however, the financial institutions, in exchange for providing equity and debt finance, enforce conditions which potentially constrain the owner-managers severely. In the last analysis the overall strategy of the company is too often in the hands of its financiers to allow the conclusion that the management buyout represents the reversal of the separation of ownership and control.

In the 'post-truth era', political fact-checking has become an issue of considerable significance. A recent study in the context of the 2016 US election found that fact-checks of statements by Donald Trump changed participants' beliefs about those statements-regardless of whether participants supported Trump-but not their feelings towards Trump or voting intentions. However, the study balanced corrections of inaccurate statements with an equal number of affirmations of accurate statements. Therefore, the null effect of fact-checks on participants' voting intentions and feelings may have arisen because of this artificially created balance. Moreover, Trump's statements were not contrasted with statements from an opposing politician, and Trump's perceived veracity was not measured. The present study (N = 370) examined the issue further, manipulating the ratio of corrections to affirmations, and using Australian politicians (and Australian participants) from both sides of the political spectrum. We hypothesized that fact-checks would correct beliefs and that fact-checks would affect voters' support (i.e. voting intentions, feelings and perceptions of veracity), but only when corrections outnumbered affirmations. Both hypotheses were supported, suggesting that a politician's veracity does sometimes matter to voters. The effects of fact-checking were similar on both sides of the political spectrum, suggesting little motivated reasoning in the processing of fact-checks. Keywords: voting behaviour; fact-checking; political attitudes; misconceptions; misinformation; belief change