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The present document studies the political and juridical problem that the independence proposals of the catalonian nationalism represents for the Spanish State. Our thesis, beginning with de absolute compatibility between International Law and Constitutional Law, is that the answer to the question if a territorial entity can decide by itself to become independent, in a democratic Constitutional State, is necessarily negative. To sum up, we maintain that when it is not possible to appeal to the Humanitarian International Law, the seccesion is a merely internal problem of a State and, so that, it is not in the European Union Law, but in the Spanish Constitutional Law, and the democratic Theory of the Pouvoir Constituant, where you must look for a solution to the problem set up by the catalonian nationalism. ; El presente escrito aborda el problema político y jurídico que representan para el Estado las propuestas independentistas del nacionalismo catalán. Nuestra tesis es, partiendo de la compatibilidad absoluta del Derecho Internacional y del Derecho Constitucional, que la respuesta a si una entidad territorial puede decidir unilateralmente independizarse del Estado es, en un Estado Constitucional democrático, necesariamente negativa. En concreto, mantenemos que cuando no es posible apelar al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, el problema de la secesión es un problema puramente interno de un Estado que, por lo tanto, no es en el Derecho de la Unión Europea, sino en el Derecho Constitucional español, y la Teoría democrática del Pouvoir Constituant, donde habrá de buscarse la solución al problema que plantea el nacionalismo catalán.The present document studies the political and juridical problem that the independence proposals of the catalonian nationalism represents for the Spanish State. Our thesis, beginning with de absolute compatibility between International Law and Constitutional Law, is that the answer to the question if a territorial entity can decide by itself to become independent, in a democratic ...

AbstractThis article recommends six improvements in regard to women's equality rights in Canadian constitutionalism. They are: 1) detail the harms; 2) advocate women's equality; 3) delete formal equality; 4) make equality absolute; 5) stop comparing women; and 6) recognize intersectionality. Some of these recommendations are directed to legislators; others to judges. It is premature for women to celebrate. Canada's constitutional guarantees of women's equality rights are inadequate to the task of protecting us. RésuméCet article recommande six améliorations en ce qui concerne les droits à l'égalité des femmes dans le constitutionnalisme canadien. Il s'agit des suivantes : 1) préciser les préjudices; 2) prôner l'égalité des femmes; 3) supprimer l'égalité formelle; 4) rendre l'égalité absolue; 5) cesser de comparer les femmes; et 6) reconnaître l'intersectionnalité. Certaines de ces recommandations s'adressent aux législateurs; d'autres aux juges. Il est trop tôt encore pour crier victoire. Les garanties constitutionnelles des droits à l'égalité des femmes au Canada sont insuffisantes pour nous protéger.

Modern Chinese law evolved under the direct impact of peculiarities of the revolutionary process which led to the formation of the People's Republic of China. Provisional constitutional acts determining the legal foundations of the state adopted in 1949. Nihilistic tendencies in the field of legality on the eve of the 'cultural revolution'. Emergent legal foundations shattered during this 'revolution'. Adoption of a new constitution after the ouster of the 'gang of four' in 1978 and 1982

To date, no study has found evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court is constrained by Congress in its constitutional decisions. We addressed the selection bias inherent in previous studies with a statute‐centered, rather than a case‐centered, analysis, following all congressional laws enacted between 1987 and 2000. We uncovered considerable congressional constraint in the Court's constitutional rulings. In particular, we found that the probability that the Rehnquist Court would strike a liberal congressional law rose between 47% and 288% as a result of the 1994 congressional elections, depending on the legislative model used.

The relevance of the topic is due to the social and legal significance of guarantees of the institution of marriage in the humanities and in law in particular. Previously, in the constitutional branch of science, the guarantees of the institution of marriage were not the subject of independent research. In the applied aspect, the relevance is confirmed by changes at the constitutional level, when the Basic Law of Russia in 2020 was supplemented by paragraph J.1 of Part 1 of Article 72 on the protection of the institution of marriage as a union of a man and a woman. The authors consider the retrospective aspect of the constitutional and legal guarantee of the institution of marriage in the Russian state and reveal it based on the analysis of normative legal acts since 1918.

After setting the originalism "stage" and discussion of some of its tribulations, the article turns to the problem of constitutional silences. These come in many shadings, and the article concentrates on three that illustrate different sorts of problems: 1) the failure of the Guarantee Clause to provide a more precise definition of a "republican form of government"; 2) the deafening silence about any role for political parties in the nation's politics and governance; and 3) the absence of guidance about "discretion" to be exercised by presidential elections, which surfaces these days as the problem of the "faithless elector," one who votes in the electoral college contrary to pre-election commitment. These help illustrate how scant are the resources originalism will often bring to the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. The article is an adaptation of the 2008 Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture at the University of San Diego Law School.