Suchergebnisse

Волна революции 1905 года, вызванная нерешенностью актуальных вопросов развития государства и общества, вынудила власть встать на путь диалога. Свободы, дарованные Николаем II, придали оппозиции правовой характер, однако авторитарная практика монархического правительства, будучи всецело ориентированной на нейтрализацию общественных сил, отсутствие традиции сотрудничества порождало взаимное непонимание, политическую близорукость, агрессию. Низкий уровень политического сознания не только общей народной массы, но и в среде интеллигенции, чиновников, проявился в период легализации политических партий: сказалось отсутствие демократических традиций, общий низкий уровень образования среди населения, включая многих представителей служилого класса. В то же время на фоне участившихся правонарушений, совершаемых членами леворадикальных партий, убийства представителей власти, хищения государственного имущества и т. д., приобретших чудовищные размеры по стране в целом и на Урале в частности, Оренбуржье было относительно спокойно. Несмотря на это, репрессии обрушились не только на леворадикальные организации и объединения, но и на представителей Конституционно-демократической партии. Хотя по сравнению с крайне левыми, «кадетская» оппозиция вела себя по отношению к государству лояльно и достаточно корректно, однако все это для правительства было сомнительно. Власть, установив правовые рамки для оппозиции, подчас нарушала их в угоду сиюминутной политической выгоды, а иной раз и головотяпства на местном уровне. В целом, приписывая всей оппозиции одинаково внеправовые тенденции, не желая разобраться во всех оттенках, нюансах, притеснялись и недооценивались по настоящему нужные стране либералы. Более того, отношения властей к партиям оппозиции принципиально не различалось. Неслучайно привлеченные к суду против «кадетов» в качестве свидетелей полицейские по «привычке» заявляли, что «нашли во время обыска документы социал-демократов». Таким образом, взаимоотношения партий и власти и до, и после манифеста 17 октября 1905 года, можно охарактеризовать как обоюдно неприязненные (за исключением разве что крайне правых). С одной стороны, власть не желала прислушиваться к интересам большинства населения России, выразителем волеизъявления которых были, в том числе легальные политические партии. С другой стороны, неискушенное в политике общество было единодушно в неприятии самодержавия и нежелании компромиссов. Подобное обоюдное непонимание и породило в конечном итоге Февральскую революцию 1917 года и последовавшие за этим страшные социальные потрясения. ; Wave of the revolution of 1905 caused by the failure to resolve the pressing issues of development of the state and society, has forced the government to embark on the path of dialogue. Freedom given by Nicholas II gave the opposition a legal matter, however, the authoritarian practices of the monarchical government, being entirely focused on the neutralization of the social forces, the lack of tradition of collaboration gave rise to mutually. The low level of political consciousness is not only the common masses, but also among intellectuals, officials, appeared in the period of the legalization of political parties: affected by the lack of democratic traditions, the General low level of education among the population, including many members of the military class. At the same time on the background of frequent offences committed by members of the leftist parties, the assassination of government officials, theft of state property, and so on, acquired monstrous proportions in the country in General and in the Urals, in particular, the region was relatively quiet. Despite this repression has fallen not only on the radical left organizations and associations, and representatives of the Constitutional-democratic party. Although compared to the very left, «cadet» opposition behaved in relation to the state loyally and quite correctly, however, all of this for the government was doubtful. Power, establishing the legal framework for the opposition, sometimes broke them, for the sake of immediate political gain, and sometimes bungling at the local level. In General, attributing all the opposition is equally unlawful tendencies, not wanting to understand all the nuances, nuances, been oppressed and was underestimated truly necessary for the country liberals. Moreover, the attitude of authorities to the parties of the opposition did not differ. It is no coincidence that brought to trial against the "cadets" as witnesses police "habit" claimed "found during a search of the documents of the social Democrats". Thus, the relationship of the parties and the authorities on the national level and in the Orenburg province in particular, both before and after the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, can be described as mutually hostile (except the far right) that gave rise eventually 1917.

ÖZETİkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra yeni bir dinamizm kazanan bölgesel ekonomik entegrasyonlar 1980'lerden sonra büyük bir artış göstermiştir. Bu oluşumlar içinde gümrük birliğinin yeri ve önemi büyüktür ve bunu pratikte başarıyla uygulayan en önemli örneklerden biri Avrupa Birliği (AB)'dir. Birlik üyeleri arasındaki ticaret hacmi genişlerken, Birlik dışı ülkelerle olan ticaret bazı özel anlaşmalar ve uygulamalar çerçevesinde ve sınırlı düzeyde devam etmektedir.AB'nin ticari ilişkilerini devam ettirdiği önemli ülkelerden biri Türkiye'dir. İki taraf arasındaki ilişki hukuki çerçevede 1963 yılındaki Ankara Anlaşmasıyla başlamış, 1971'deki Katma Protokol ve 1995'deki 1/95 Ortaklık Konseyi Kararı (OKK) ile devam etmiştir. OKK'nin gereği olarak iki taraf arasında endüstriyel malların ticaretinde tüm engeller kaldırılmış, Türkiye yeni gümrük kodu sistemini kabul etmiş, rekabet politikası, fikri-sınai haklar, devlet yardımları konularında gerekli düzenlemeleri başlatmış, üçüncü ülkelerle serbest ticaret anlaşmalarını imzalamaya başlamıştır. Türkiye için önemli olan Gümrük Birliği kararı, bazı avantaj ve dezavantajlar içermektedir. Türkiye topluluk müktesebatını tanımış, topluluk politikaları hakkında bilgi edinmiştir. Kararın kabul edilmesinden itibaren gösterdiği performansla üyeliğin şartlarından biri olan "topluluk müktesebatına uyum" konusunda sorunu olmadığını göstermiştir. Ancak, Türkiye'nin dış ticaret açığı sürekli büyümüş, ihracatın ithalatı karşılama oranını düşmüş ve Türkiye'nin üçüncü ülkelerle ticaretinde Avrupa Birliği lehine bir sapma ortaya çıkmıştır. Hepsinden önemlisi Türkiye kayıplarını telefi edebilmek için gerekli mali yardımlarıı alamamıştır.Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü Türkiye'nin üye olarak bulunduğu iki önemli oluşumdur. Ancak, 1/95 OKK'nin gereği olarak Türkiye, üçüncü ülkelerle yapacağı ticaret anlaşmalarındaki inisiyatifini Birlik organlarına devretmiştir. 15 üyenin belirlediği ortak ticaret politikaları çerçevesinde, Türkiye'nin dahil olacağı bölgesel entegrasyonlar Avrupa Birliği kontrolüne tabi olacak, bu girişimler ancak üye ülkelerin çıkarları doğrultusunda ise devam edebilecektir. AB'ye üye olmadan; Birliğin karar alma süreçlerine, hukuk mekanizmalarına ve ortak bütçesine katılamadan, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği ile böyle bir angajmana girmesi bir ilktir, ancak kendisi için büyük sakıncalar doğurmaktadır. Yine de iki taraf arasındaki ilişkilerde bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilmesi bakımından, gümrük birliği kararının politik önemi azımsanmamalıdır.ABSTRACTTHE EFFECTS OF THE CUSTOMS UNION ON THE TRADE RELATIONS OF TURKEY WITH THIRD COUNTRIESThe regional integration movements have shown a rapid increase after the 1980s. Customs union is a specific form of these types of movements and the European Union (EU) is the best example for a successful customs union, which increased the intra-trade among the members.Turkey is one of the most important partner countries for the EU. Three important cornerstones for the relations between two sides are the Ankara Agreement in 1963, the Additional Protocol in 1971 and the EU Turkey Association Council 1/95 Decision in 1995. After the 1/95 decision, all the customs duties, quantitative restrictions and all other measures having equivalent effects were eliminated in the trade of the industrial goods. Turkey committed the acceptance of the new customs code and related regulations about the competition policy, intellectual and property rights, and started to sign free trade agreements with third countriesThe customs union decision has brought advantages and disadvantages for Turkey who learnt a lot about the acqui communataire. It becomes clear that Turkey does not have any difficulty in terms of the acqui communataire, one of the three criteria for the membership. But on the other hand, foreign trade deficit of Turkey has increased, the export-import ratio has decreased and trade has diverted from third countries to the EU. More importantly, Turkey could not get financial support, necessary to compensate the losses of the customs union decision.The Black Sea Economic Organisation and the Economic Cooperation Organisation are two important regional cooperation movements in which Turkey participates as a member. However, after the EU-Turkey Association Council 1/95 Decision Turkey lost the power of initiation in those kinds of movements and in trade relations with third countries. Since, those arrangements become subject to the EU's control and they will continue only if they are compatible with the interests of the EU, which are defined, by the 15 member states in the framework of the common commercial policy.The practices of the customs union decision has been very difficult for Turkey without being a member to the EU, and without participating in the decision-making procedures, dispute settlement mechanisms and financial affairs, but despite them the political importance of this decision, as a turning point in the relations between Turkey and the EU should not be undermined.

Book reviewed in this article:A HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War. By Renato ConstantinoSOCIAL ENDS AND POLITICAL MEANS. Edited by Ted HonderichTHE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS. By Richard E. FlathmanTHE EEC AND AUSTRALIA. By J.D.B. MillerBRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1945–1973. By Joseph FrankelGERMAN FOREIGN POLICIES, WEST AND EAST: On the Threshold of a New European Era. By Peter H. MerklCUTLASS AND CRESCENT MOON: A Case Study of Social and Political Change in Outer Indonesia. By Douglas MilesSTABILITY AND CHANGE IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. By Don AitkinAMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR: Change and Stability. Edited by Samuel A. KirkpatrickJAPAN: Beyond the Headlines. By George Caiger and John Godwin CaigerSERVANTS OF THE SWORD French Intendants of the Army 1630–70. By Douglas Clark BaxterWALTER NASH. By Keith SinclairREFORMING AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: The Coombs Report and Beyond. Edited by Cameron Hazlehurst and J.R. NethercoteTHE SPOILED CHILD OF THE WESTERN WORLD: The Miscarriage of the American Idea in Our Time. By Henry FairlieSTUDIES ON INDIA AND VIETNAM. By Helen B. Lamb. Edited by Corliss Lamont. Foreword by Paul M. SleezyTHE LAST DOMINO Aspects of Australia's Foreign Relations. By Malcolm BookerUNEQUAL ALLIES Australian‐American Relations and the Pacific War. By Roger J. BellTHE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGO CRISIS. By Ram Chandra PradhanSTATE POLITICS IN INDIA. Edited by Iqbal NarainTHE RURAL ELITE IN AN INDIAN STATE: A Case Study of Rajasthan. By Iqbal Narain, K.C. Pande and Mohan Lal SharmaTREASURY CONTROL IN AUSTRALIA: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics. By Patrick Weller and James CuttAUSTRALIA'S NORTHERN NIEGHBOURS: Independent or Dependent? Edited by Edward P. WolfersCOMMONWEALTH ELECTIONS 1945–1970: A Bibliography. By Valerie BloomfieldINDONESIA: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830–1942. Edited and translated by Chr. L.M. PendersBEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: European Society and Economy 1000–1700. By Carlo M. CippolaTHE DYNAMICS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. By Allan ThompsonCAMBODIA: Starvation and Revolution. By George C. Hildebrand and Gareth PorterCOLONIAL SELF‐GOVERNMENT: The British Experience 1759–1856. By John Manning WardSCALING THE IVORY TOWER: Merit and its Limits in Academic Careers. By Lionel S. LewisTHE MODEL OMBUDSMAN: Institutionalizing New Zealand's Democratic Experiment. By Larry B. HillTHE ORIGINS OF THE POPULAR PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1855–1914. By Alan J. LeeDOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1937–49STRATEGY WITHOUT SLIDE‐RULE: British Air Strategy 1914–1939. By Barry D. PowersELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR IRISH POLITICAL PARTIES 1927–1973. By Michael GallagherAUSTRALIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Edited by J.D.B. MillerTHE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL—1973. Edited by Asher ArianTHE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR SPHERES OF INFLUENCE: The United States and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America. By Edy KaufmanDREAM AND DISILLUSION: A Search for Australian Cultural Identity. By David WalkerDEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS. By Anthony CarewTHE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Charles CatiGERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1871–1914. By Imanuel GeissBRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW EUROPE 1914–1918. By Kenneth J. CalderCITIES FOR SALE: Property, Politics and Urban Planning in Australia. By Leonie SandercockSOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by Martin Kolinsky and William E. PatersonA TIME FOR BUILDING: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951–1963. By Paul HasluckTHE SAVIOURS: An Intellectual History of the Left in Australia. By Patrick O'BrienTHE MAKING OF POLITICIANS: Studies from Africa and Asia. Edited by W.H. Morris‐JonesPOLITICS AND CLASS FORMATION IN UGANDA. By Mahmood MamdaniK'ANG HSI AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF CH'ING RULE 1661–1684. By Lawrence D. KesslerYEH MING‐CH'EN: Viceroy of Liang Kuang 1852–8. By J.Y. WongTHE PREMIERS' CONFERENCE: An Essay in Federal State Interaction. By Campbell SharmanTHE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS IN BRITAIN, 1870–1914. Edited by Geoffrey CrossickGOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF ONTARIO. Edited by Donald C. MacDonaldREVOLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A Study in the Breakdown of International Stability. By Kyung‐Won KimABWEHRSCHLACHT AN DER WEICHSEL 1945: Vorbereitung, Ablauf, Erfahrungen. By Heinz MagenheimerTOBRUK 1941: Der Kampf in Nordafrika. By Adalbert von TaysenWORKING CLASS RADICALISM IN MID‐VICTORIAN ENGLAND. By Trygve TholfsenINDIVIDUAL AND STATE IN ANCIENT CHINA: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers. By Vitaly A. Rubin, translated by Steven I. LevineMAP OF MAINLAND ASIA BY TREATY. By J.R.V. PrescottPOLICY MAKING IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT: An Analysis of Power and Rationality. By Brian SmithTHE DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A Comparative Analysis. Edited by Richard RoseCAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT. By Hugh StrettonENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIA, 1788–1914. Guardians, Improvers and Profit: An Introductory Survey. By J.M. PowellINTERWAR BRITAIN: A Social and Economic History. By Sean Glynn and John Oxborrow

The adoption of 4IR technology enables apparel manufacturers to cater to the rapidly evolving, demand driven global fashion market. The industry is shifting from a 'push' model, where customer demand was set by promotional campaigns of manufacturers and brands, to a 'pull' model where demand is being set by customers themselves. Today, customer demand is determined by exposure to fashion trends and customer insights through social media, while the industry has to respond rapidly to instant changes in customer demand through shorter production cycles. The automation of the apparel production process through 4IR technologies is crucial in responding to such shorter turnaround cycles. For instance, automated finishing technology cuts the finishing time of a pair of Levi's jeans made using manual processes from 20 minutes, to just 90 seconds.

Jack Solowey and Jennifer J. Schulp


While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) leans into regulating crypto by enforcement, lawmakers in the House are looking to lay a foundation for rationalizing U.S. crypto policy—releasing a Digital Asset Market Structure Discussion Draft last Friday and holding a pair of hearings this past Tuesday and next.
The Discussion Draft, while in early days, gets the big question right: it would determine whether crypto tokens are securities or commodities largely based on whether the networks over which they operate are decentralized. In addition, the Discussion Draft would help provide regulatory clarity to crypto marketplaces through long‐​sought pathways for lawfully registering certain crypto exchanges. While the draft would benefit from some modifications—including to the process for certifying network decentralization and the treatment of decentralized marketplaces—this legislative effort would bring much‐​needed clarity to U.S. crypto policy by tackling its thorny questions.
In a microcosm of the SEC's years long effort to use the inexact fit between legacy securities laws and modern crypto markets to declare most U.S. crypto activity unlawful, the SEC on Tuesday filed a complaint alleging that U.S.-based crypto exchange Coinbase operates an unregistered securities exchange. Congressman French Hill (R‑AR) dryly dubbed it "an interesting coincidence" that the complaint was filed on the same day the House Agriculture Committee held a hearing on the Discussion Draft. Coinbase maintains the tokens it lists are not securities and that it would be happy to register with the SEC if only the Commission would let it.
The poor fit between existing rules and reality stems from the challenge of squaring securities laws designed for centralized firms and financial intermediaries with a crypto ecosystem that includes tokens generated by decentralized networks and traded via disintermediated protocols. Compounding this challenge is the fact that centralized crypto projects can decentralize over time.
The Discussion Draft, to its credit, grasps these nettles. Understanding how is a matter of understanding the security versus commodity debate. A classic security is a share of stock—a partial ownership stake in a company and claim on assets and profits. A stock's value typically depends on how well a company and its managers perform, so securities regulation seeks to make managers share information relevant to that performance. A classic commodity, by contrast, is a piece of produce (like, say, an orange) that's standardized and interchangeable. Its value typically depends on supply and demand.
Those arguing crypto tokens are securities analogize them to stocks: they can be sold to raise funds to build out projects and also can be viewed as proxies for those projects' value.
Those arguing crypto tokens are commodities analogize them to produce. In a famous Supreme Court case on the nature of securities—which is tediously but unavoidably recounted in any crypto regulation discussion—the Court assessed whether an orange grove seller's scheme to contract with land purchasers to manage orange sales and give them a cut constituted a securities arrangement. It was a securities scheme, the Court reasoned, because the seller's efforts to manage the operation were essential. Those who argue crypto tokens are commodities point out that while certain token sales may resemble the contract in the orange grove case, the tokens themselves are best analogized to the oranges, which remained commodities notwithstanding the securities scheme.
The Discussion Draft enters this fray by identifying that crypto tokens are neither inherently like stocks nor oranges, but rather resemble one or the other depending on whether there are managers—like the executives at a company or citrus enterprise—controlling the token network.
The Discussion Draft does this through a legal test for whether a crypto project's network is decentralized. At a high level, it defines a decentralized network as one where no person could unilaterally control, materially change, or restrict general users' use of the network. In addition, the definition requires that within specific lookback periods, certain persons closely related to the network project have not held or controlled over 20 percent of the network's outstanding tokens or voting power, contributed intellectual property that materially changed network functionality, or marketed the network or its tokens or issued those tokens, and that certain token issuances were nondiscretionary.
Although it's possible to quibble over certain details—such as the arbitrariness of a 20 percent holdings cut off and who qualifies as a closely related person—the definition incorporates some key decentralization features, namely the absence of: unified and discretionary control, reliance on or susceptibility to closely related parties' material contributions or changes, and gatekeeping that excludes general users.
Decentralization is key to the regulatory framework proposed in the Discussion Draft because it is a core component (along with a network becoming "functional") of the definition of a "digital commodity." Digital commodities, as laid out by the Discussion Draft, do not require the same ongoing disclosures by issuers as other digital assets (though they are subject to listing disclosures on registered digital commodity exchanges) and may generally be offered and sold by any person other than a closely related party. Importantly, such digital commodities are expressly excluded from the definition of securities and are generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
While the Discussion Draft framework is complex, this is largely an unavoidable consequence of the existing "byzantine" U.S. capital markets regulatory regime. Moreover, the framework is appropriately premised on the presence, or lack, of core risks that securities laws seek to address: information asymmetries from managerial bodies.
Even with a legal definition of decentralization that gets to the heart of managerial control, though, there's the challenge of identifying decentralization in the wild. To address this, the Discussion Draft proposes a process where any person can seek to certify to the SEC that a network is decentralized. Certification will occur by default within 30 days unless the SEC issues a stay or rebuttal explaining its decision. Notably, the SEC will be able to reconsider certifications annually and, where appropriate, cancel them. The certifying party may appeal both initial SEC rebuttals, as well as later cancellations.
It's probably inevitable that the process for certifying decentralization before a regulator is going to be an intellectually unsatisfying exercise in Gordian knot cutting. Helpfully, the certification process would allow "any person" to initiate a certification, which recognizes that in the case of a truly decentralized network, there's no single party that must be the one to provide relevant information. For that same reason, the proposed appeals process should similarly allow any person—not just the initial certifying party—to appeal an SEC rebuttal or cancellation. This is particularly important in the case of the cancelled certification of a genuinely decentralized network, where the initial certifier may no longer be in a prime, or any, position to appeal.
Another wrinkle is that leaving the process to the SEC assumes crypto projects are properly subject to SEC jurisdiction unless proved otherwise. While some projects would appropriately begin life under SEC jurisdiction, others, like Bitcoin, would not. One way to resolve this would be to involve the SEC only where the network's digital asset previously was part of a securities transaction, such as a traditional private offering or the novel exempt digital asset offering provided for in the Discussion Draft, and otherwise leave the process to the CFTC.
The Discussion Draft also grapples with the fact that, like tokens themselves, the marketplaces over which they trade also may be decentralized. And similar to how a lack of managers makes applying traditional securities regulation inappropriate, the lack of a financial intermediary in the case of a crypto marketplace makes applying traditional exchange regulations inappropriate as well.
Importantly, the Discussion Draft recognizes that decentralized finance (DeFi) is different from intermediated finance, and, in addition to defining DeFi, provides for the SEC, CFTC, and Government Accountability Office to provide DeFi studies to Congress. Further, the Discussion Draft expressly exempts from both securities and digital commodities exchange requirements certain "ancillary activities" related to operating a blockchain network, including compiling and validating transactions; operating a pool; providing computing and incidental transaction services; providing a user‐​interface to interact with a blockchain network; and developing, publishing, and maintaining a blockchain network or digital wallet software or hardware systems.
These provisions could be read to cabin off the activities of decentralized exchanges (DEXs), yet reasonable minds may disagree. For one, while SEC rule revisions under the Discussion Draft must permit disintermediated trading in covered assets, that such rules must be "consistent with what is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors" suggests that at least disintermediated exchange of digital asset securities would likely face some degree of regulation. In addition, although the ancillary activities are broad enough and incorporate enough DEX‐​related concepts to be read to create exemptions for DEX activity, the fact that the definition of DeFi and listed ancillary activities are not coterminous leaves the question open to debate. To head off some of this ambiguity, the DeFi definition could, for example, state that it should not be construed to mean that DeFi is not otherwise covered by ancillary activities.
Finally, residual sources of potential regulatory landgrabs in the Discussion Draft's framework should continue to be limited and clarified. In particular, there are several points where the framework would give the SEC and CFTC the authority to set standards or impose requirements on any basis that the agencies determine to be in the public interest.
Judging by SEC Chair Gensler's recent remark that "we don't need more digital currency," one such landgrab would seem to be transforming the SEC into the merit regulator it never was meant to be. To borrow a line from House Agriculture Committee Chairman GT Thompson (R‑PA) at Tuesday's hearing, the SEC's current approach is no way "to govern a market, adequately protect customers, or promote innovation." The Discussion Draft offers an opportunity to reverse this course and bring clear thinking to crypto policy.

The e-mail allegedly attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto (supposedly a pseudonym) was transmitted 14 years ago, describing the development of an electronic currency (Nakamoto, 2008). The design of this electronic currency represented the solution of the general Byzantine problem, a well-known problem in computing, which, in general terms, defines that one of the parts of a system can intentionally fail, and with that, make the entire network unavailable. Therefore, the premise is that part of the system is corrupt (Dolev et al., 1982). In the few lines of the email, Satoshi Nakamoto described such a solution and published an article with the details made available on the same date. The article describes how to transmit information within a chain of blocks that are: synchronized with date and time (time stamp); combined with code that depends on a previous block (hash code); can be validated with public and private key cryptography framework anonymously and decentrally; but highly resilient to any tampering attempt and with public record. The concept of digital currency, in this case Bitcoin, consisted at that time of a code or token resulting from encryption and that could be included in these blocks. Blocks registered definitively in the ledgers distributed along the blockchain network that could be traced. The digital framework developed by Satoshi Nakamoto, although it emerged to make Bitcoin viable as a digital currency, has been separated over the last 14 years. Blockchain can be understood as a decentralized communication technology that gave rise to a family of other technological structures of encrypted communication such as ecosystems, public blockchain, private blockchain and blockchain networks, mainly (Mazumdar Ruj, 2022). Digital currencies, on the other hand, have also developed in variety and quantity, so much so that as we write this editorial there are over 10,000 digital currencies in operation. The total capitalization value of digital currencies rose from USD 18 billion at the beginning of 2017, surpassing USD 1.4 trillion by mid-2021 (Su et al., 2022). Currently, there is no technological impediment for companies to create their own digital currencies using a Bitcoin network or an Etherium network, for example, as well as many other networks available.Obviously, even today, there are technical challenges related, mainly, to the scalability of these networks and currencies. Bitcoin, when created, had a capacity of 7 transactions per second, currently, as we write this editorial, the transaction capacity of the Bitcoin network (BTS) is 14 transactions per second. The Etherium (ETH) network was born with a capacity of 20 transactions per second and currently has a capacity of 35 transactions per second. For comparison purposes, the VISA network has a capacity of 1700 transactions per second, which shows that there is still some way to make blockchain networks the new communication backbone, scalable for more mass uses (Chauhan Patel, 2022). There are implementations of the Solana network, for example, which promises to reach 50,000 transactions per second, still in the confirmation phase from a practical point of view, which could allow running Internet of Things (IoT) applications on this blockchain network (Duffy et al., 2021).At the same time, since 2013, the reorganization of the TCP IP structure from IPv4 (4.2 billion IP addresses) to IPv6 (79 octillion IP addresses or 7.9 x ) more than the total number of IPv4 addresses) has been implemented. Such implementation made it possible to expand connectivity to a level sufficient for the world demand, which is 56 octillion (56 x ) addresses per human being on earth. In terms of addressing, the possibilities of connecting new and future elements on the internet/blockchain communication network are guaranteed, making the IoT (Internet of Things) a real possibility.In addition to the traditional applications dedicated to making digital currency viable, especially in the last 5 years, certain works resulting from the combination of information technology and human creativity (also known as creative economy) brought NFT (Non-Fungible Token) to the management field. NFT are tokens (produced through encrypted code, subscribed in some blockchain network) that express the ownership of their author. Whoever acquires an NFT, has his/her record recorded in a ledger and, therefore, can exercise the rights or benefits related to the possession of that NFT. There are two main origins of an NFT, digital games and works of art or graphic expressions (Vasan et al., 2022). In the case of digital games, NFT can be used to record permanently and nominally the "achievements achieved" within a given game. Its owner now takes possession of a certain item that, previously, would only exist within the game itself, a virtual (digital) environment. In the case of graphic, artistic expressions, and other works of art, it is possible to make your possession digital. Works from the natural environment (physical), the result of expressions of human creativity, are now registered in an NFT-type token, coming to exist in the virtual world (digital). In this way, the works, and the data of their authorship and ownership, are permanently registered in the ledger of a blockchain network specialized in transacting NFT. As in the game, the possession of an NFT of a work of art allows the author to trade or use the benefits related to the possession of this NFT.From the convergence of connectivity technologies such as cloud computing, the advent of IPV6 and technologies based on tokens (blockchain, crypto assets and NFT not exhaustively) the concept of Web 3.0 becomes viable. Web 3.0 can be understood as a network of people and physical objects, making the integration between the natural world and the virtual world more intense (augmented, virtual and mixed reality). The idea of a Metaverse (Web 3.0 Application) depends on the technological availability that we describe here very succinctly and on the realization of new social behaviors that are underway (Korkmaz et al., 2022).The context described is not new to most practitioners and academics involved with innovation. However, by describing it in general terms, we can identify different research objects that may be of interest to the community working in the field of innovation management. Evidently, within the research perspectives, especially in innovation management, parallel logics can be established with the more established theories or concepts, which allow an approximation with the new technological objects available to people and companies. Such technologies have permeated traditional companies and startups that have a specific focus on these connectivity technologies described as core business or as business support.The idea of this editorial comment is to recognize the possibility of receiving more technological articles or scientific articles, perspectives and book reviews that consider connectivity and tokenization technologies as research objects. Such technologies can be positioned in research both as objects of analysis and as contextual and organizational objects. Whether contextual and organizational can bring research involving routines, capabilities, competencies and business models, whose core business process is innovation at different scales, natures, degrees of novelty, stages of diffusion or adoption. To cite just one possibility, as an example, the model by Tidd and Bessant from 2009, which describes the construct of orientation to innovation strategy, used in several research in the field of innovation since then, can be revised in the new contexts or in the face of new technologies (Ferreira et al., 2015). If such technologies are positioned as objects of analysis, research can involve every part of the innovation management process such as searching for innovations, selecting innovations, implementing innovations, generating value with innovations, and capturing value with innovations in analysis of single level or multilevel. In addition to the direct positioning of token and blockchain-based technologies, as an object or as a contextual aspect, adjacent effects are expected, for instance, involving intellectual property, environmental and social sustainability, technological governance, people management and other consequences that may be the focus of research, considering the emerging technologies mentioned above. There is also the field of research that is dedicated to the development of new products, both defining new models of digital product development and methods derived from these models, without forgetting all the implications related to the issues of information security management involved in these contexts of token transactions (Baudier et al., 2022). Although the possibilities for theoretical and managerial development for the area of innovation research, involving technologies based on tokens and blockchain, are broad, there is research that can be very relevant, but that would be better received in journals in mathematics, computer science or even software engineering and not in journals dedicated to innovation. Research that develops a new way of doing encryption, or even a more efficient algorithm that allows increasing the capacity of transactions per second, the design of a new network or a new ecosystem based on blockchain or even research that develops improvements in consensus protocols of blockchain undoubtedly has great value but would be expected in engineering or math journals. On the other hand, there are studies that bring reports of implementations of a business application on a blockchain basis, either as a business support application, or in the form of designing a blockchain-based product that will be taken to the market (Wan et al., 2022). In these cases, applied research, from the point of view of innovation research, what is expected to be found in the article is the development of knowledge that demonstrates how, why or to what extent the innovation processes were sensitized, or in what way the process of innovation contributed or presented limitations to support the reported implementation. In this way, such research can be received as technological articles, since the theoretical elements that relate the innovation process, or the management of the innovation process with the implementation based on token or blockchain, will be present, which are the bases of analysis used to support the expansion of innovation theories, innovation management or management practices in innovation contexts.Finally, we invite the entire community to submit papers with theoretical discussions related to paradigm shifts, involving the dematerialized nature of new products and their tendency towards a service-oriented view (Jain et al., 2022).As it should be clear, this editorial comment did not explore all the possibilities of research in innovation management involving technologies based on tokens and blockchain, but only a few examples that can help to obtain insights. We intend, in some way, to encourage the innovation community to develop studies considering new technologies, developing, or expanding theories and knowledge of innovation.

The variety of presently occurring economic and political processes and phenomena contribute to continuous changes in world economy, affecting its subjective structure and the changes in the relations and co-dependencies between its subjects. Globalisation is undoubtedly one of such processes, as it affects the positions of countries and international organisations within global economy. It is a multidimensional process, connected to the intensifi cation of relations both on the economic grounds, resulting from accelerated fl ow of goods and services, technologies, capital, workforce, and on the political grounds. The dynamic development of globalisation has been happening under the infl uence of ICT technologies, facilitating the reduction of the costs of production factors movement and increasing their mobility. The distribution of benefi ts resultant from this process is disproportional, as it strengthens the position of some countries and regions, at the same time weakening the importance of economic and political centres functioning to date as its leaders. A growing importance of new centres can be observed on the global scene – Asian countries, including China, are coming into strength and affecting the positions of the economic powers to date, such as the European Union and the USA. A complicated pattern of economic and political relations is being formed, and it is necessary to ensure that proper balance is kept. A new global order is being introduced, resultant from these particular relations, the existing connections and interferences occurring among its actors. Apart from that, the process of globalisation facilitates the intensifi cation of the economic integration processes. The international groups aiming at strengthening their positions in the global economy, as well as their spheres of infl uence, are implementing new inter-state agreements of economic and political character, thus affecting the global structure of power and co-dependencies, together with the changes occurring within these structures. The European Union must continually take up actions to provide stability and European security in the increasingly more complicated global order. Ensuring stability in the neighbouring regions through the European Neighbourhood Policy is of particular importance. This multithreaded issue was undertaken in the research carried out by Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics – CEWSE on European Union's Security and Stability in a new Economic, Social & Geopolitical Settlement and its partners, scientists representing a wide range of scientifi c centres, including international ones. The research focuses on challenges regarding: uniting or divisive history, transformations of contemporary European countries, European culture, national cultures, innovativeness and creativity of economy, science, migration crisis, refugee crisis, the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation, the crisis in Ukraine, energy security, public security, sustainable growth, social solidarity, demographic changes, Brexit, institutional crisis in the EU, the future of the EU, and more. As a signifi cant actor in global economic and political relations, the EU holds an important economic position, intensifying the pre-existing relations with third countries, organisations and groupings. It is very active in external contacts, negotiating and forming transatlantic agreements, with Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada as an example. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), whose intended aim was to create a free trade zone between the biggest players – the EU and the USA – previously under negotiations, has been suspended for the time being. Nevertheless, talks are being held as regards deepening the relations between the EU and MERCOSUR, and creating a free trade zone. The new transatlantic agreements, signed or undergoing negotiations, surpass the traditionally accentuated trade relations, covering also the issues of investment, intellectual property rights, legal regulations and standards, as well as regulating other spheres of socio-economic life, which in turn causes the process of negotiating and fi nalising such agreements is prolonged and complicated. The EU also intensifi es its relations with the dynamically developing African continent, hoping to mark its presence there next to other, for example Chinese, investors. Another dimension of external economic and political relations are the developing alliances with Asian countries, which constitute another strategic aim of the EU. The EU undergoes transformations from its very beginning, due to both the processes of expanding and deepening. The latest expansion of the EU took place on 1st July 2013, when Croatia became a new Member State. At the same time, the process of deepening mutual relations was advancing. Thus, the structure of the EU is very dynamic. Currently, the EU is facing numerous challenges of economic, political and social character. However the common values which accompanied the establishment of this organisation and which constitute the foundation of its unity should be supported through realizing agreed-upon operations. Some countries constitute the Eurozone, while other remain outside this hub of enhanced economic co-operation. This creates the so-called "multi-speed" Europe, with diversifi ed economic dimensions, and – as highlighted in the White Paper on the future of Europe1 – the scenarios for further EU development are also diverse. The EU also shapes its external relations in the international arena, economic and political relations with non-member countries on the European continent. Actions are being taken to provide protection and security in the area, which experiences numerous confl icts and crises. After the accession of 10 new countries to the European Union, it was necessary to develop relevant forms of co-operation and relations with the organisation's neighbouring countries. One of the dimensions of implemented policy is the European Neighbourhood Policy, as the neighbouring countries, as well as those maintaining deepened relations with the EU, have been offered the opportunity to develop co-operation and mutual connections within the areas of politics, security, economy and culture. In its original formula, it put forward a list of priorities to be met by the countries covered by the Policy and which have to be included in the Action Plans for numerous key areas, including political dialogue and reforms, trade, justice system, energy, transport, information society. The neighbouring countries deepen their relations with the EU while respecting mutual values. The fi nancial support for this policy is provided by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the introduction of which is supposed to create the framework conditions for deepening further regional co-operation, at the same time enhancing stability and security in the region2. The present publication, as a product of the research carried out, approaches the subject of the EU's role in providing security and stability in the global order, with particular focus on the Neighbourhood Policy. The hereby publication consists of four thematically integral and interconnected parts.Part 1, entitled "The Concept of European Integration and the Role of the EU in the Global Order", consists of papers concentrating on the presentation of the effects of the European integration to date and the challenges which the EU is currently facing, the issues related to the system for protection of human rights. The diversifi cation of the integration process is highlighted.The importance of the EU as a global partner is also emphasized, indicating the activities dedicated to the least-developed countries. Part 2, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Need for Evolution or Revolution?" concentrates around the issues regarding diverse dimensions of integration. It discusses the questions related to the mechanisms of monitoring and solving disputes within the framework of association agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Attention has been paid to threats and opportunities for Europe due to new eastern neighbourhood. Institutional aspects of the transformation of the eastern countries have also been indicated, as well as its fi nancial aspects. This brings about new quality and opportunities in the context of EU cohesion policy, where new subjects have a chance to be sanctioned and obtain certain liberties. The third part, "EU Trade & Investment Policy: Engine for Growth and Job Creation?; The Economic Effects of New FTAs Generation – How to Assess Their Effects?", concerns the non-trade effects of DC-FTAs. The connections between the EU and China within the framework of multilateral WTO system have been indicated. Trade relations with MERCOSUR, integration processes in Africa have been discussed, with emphasis on the EAC – EU Economic Partnership Agreement. The trade and investment policies in the countries of the Visegrad Group have also been discussed. Nowadays, trade relations are growing in importance as compared to the past. Due to lasting, long-term co-operation, a tendency to tighten relations can be observed. The last, fourth part "The EU External Policy at a Crossroads Facing New Challenges and Threats from the East and Mediterranean Region" concentrates on the issues regarding external relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean and Eastern regions. Issues related to the foreign policy of Turkey in the context of its relations with the EU are also raised in this part. The structure adopted in this publication introduces the reader to a review of the newest issues regarding mostly the external challenges facing the EU and the actions taken in order to overcome them and provide stability. Papers included in the publication refl ect their authors' own opinions and it is the authors who take full responsibility for their texts. We would like to express our gratitude to all the people and institutions who, through their expertise and fi nancial support, have contributed to the commencement of the present publication. Hereby, we would like to express our most sincere gratitude to the Jean Monnet Chair of European Union, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, University of Warsaw (Centre for Europe), University of Gdańsk (Research Centre on European Integration),University of Economics in Katowice, New Vision University, Tbilisi, Faculty of Administration and National Security of the Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski, College of Economics and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the worldwide networks of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA-World), including Polish European Community Studies Association (PECSA), ECSA Moldova, ECSA Ukraine, ECSA Georgia. The present publication presents the outcomes of research and is supposed to enable the reader to identify the role of the EU in providing stability and security and shaping effective co-operation not only with the neighbouring countries, on the political and economic platform. It is also supposed to inspire further scientific research. ; Centre of Excellence at Warsaw School of Economics (CEWSE); European Commission within the Erasmus+Programme – Jean Monnet Activities.

Tina C. Ambos (" How Do New Ventures Evolve? An Inductive Study of Archetype Changes in Science-Based Ventures ") received her Ph.D. from Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria, where she is currently an assistant professor, after holding positions at the London Business School and the University of Edinburgh. Her research interest centers on strategic management, knowledge management, and corporate evolution. Address: Vienna University of Economics and Business, Institute for International Marketing and Management, Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria; e-mail: tina.ambos@wu.ac.at . Jaideep Anand (" Alliance Activity as a Dynamic Capability in the Face of a Discontinuous Technological Change ") is a professor of corporate strategy and international business at the Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University. He received his Ph.D. from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He studies the redeployment of capabilities by firms across businesses, countries, and technologies. Address: Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, 2100 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210-1144; e-mail: anand.18@osu.edu . Matthew Bidwell (" Relationship Duration and Returns to Brokerage in the Staffing Sector ") is an assistant professor in the Wharton School's Management Department. He received his Ph.D. from the MIT Sloan School. His research interests include contingent work, the management of firm boundaries, and the development of careers within and between organizations. Address: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2031 Steinberg Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19014; e-mail: mbidwell@wharton.upenn.edu . Christopher B. Bingham (" Crossroads—Microfoundations of Performance: Balancing Efficiency and Flexibility in Dynamic Environments ") is an assistant professor of strategy and entrepreneurship at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He received his Ph.D. in strategy and organization from the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. His research interests center on microfoundations of organization and strategy, learning, capabilities, cognition, change, and strategy process in the context of entrepreneurial firms and firms in unpredictable markets. Address: Kenan-Flagler Business School, 4209 McColl Building, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599; e-mail: cbingham@unc.edu . Julian Birkinshaw (" How Do New Ventures Evolve? An Inductive Study of Archetype Changes in Science-Based Ventures ") is a professor of strategic and international management at the London Business School, and cofounder of the Management Innovation Lab (Mlab). His research focuses on the strategy and management of multinational firms, corporate entrepreneurship, and innovation. Address: London Business School, Regents Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom; e-mail: jbirkinshaw@london.edu . Henri C. Dekker (" Organizational Learning and Interfirm Control: The Effects of Partner Search and Prior Exchange Experiences ") is a professor of management control at VU University Amsterdam. His research interests include contracting and control in interfirm relationships, and the influence of strategy on management control design. Address: VU University Amsterdam, Department of Accounting, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: hdekker@feweb.vu.nl . Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (" Crossroads—Microfoundations of Performance: Balancing Efficiency and Flexibility in Dynamic Environments ") is the Stanford W. Ascherman, M.D. Professor at Stanford University and codirector of the Stanford Technology Ventures Program; she is also a visiting professor at INSEAD's Entrepreneurship and Family Enterprise area. She received her Ph.D. in organizational behavior from the Graduate School of Business at Stanford. Her research interests focus on the nexus of strategy and organization theory with an emphasis on shaping technology-based markets, creating entrepreneurial firms, and organizing multibusiness corporations in high velocity environments. Address: Department of Management Science and Engineering, 415 Terman Building, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: kme@stanford.edu . Isabel Fernandez-Mateo (" Relationship Duration and Returns to Brokerage in the Staffing Sector ") is an assistant professor of Strategic and International Management at the London Business School. She received her Ph.D. from the MIT Sloan School. Her research focuses on the sociology of markets and organizations, with a particular emphasis on the mechanisms and outcomes of brokerage in the labor market. Address: London Business School, Regent's Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom; e-mail: ifernandezmateo@london.edu . Nathan R. Furr (" Crossroads—Microfoundations of Performance: Balancing Efficiency and Flexibility in Dynamic Environments ") is an assistant professor of entrepreneurship and strategy at Brigham Young University. He received his Ph.D. in strategy and organization from the Stanford Technology Ventures Program at Stanford University. His research interests are focused on issues of change, innovation, cognition, and strategy in entrepreneurial and dynamic environments. Address: Marriott School of Business, 617 Tanner Building, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84604; e-mail: nfurr@byu.edu . Donald E. Gibson (" Women's and Men's Career Referents: How Gender Composition and Comparison Level Shape Career Expectations ") is a professor of management at the Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University. He received his Ph.D. from the Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA. His research interests include anger in the workplace, conflict management and communication, and organizational role models and mentors. Address: Charles F. Dolan School of Business, Fairfield University, 1073 North Benson Road, Fairfield, CT 06824-5195; e-mail: dgibson@fairfield.edu . Francesca Gino (" Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help ") is an associate professor at Harvard Business School and was previously an assistant professor of organizational behavior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's Kenan-Flagler Business School. She received her Ph.D. from the Santa Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa (Italy) and was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and at Carnegie Mellon University. Her research focuses on interpersonal influences in various areas, including advice giving and taking, decision making and negotiation, ethics, and creativity. Address: Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Boston, MA 02163; e-mail: fgino@hbs.edu . Barbara S. Lawrence (" Women's and Men's Career Referents: How Gender Composition and Comparison Level Shape Career Expectations ") is a professor of human resources and organizational behavior at the Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. She received her Ph.D. from the Sloan School of Management at MIT. Her current research examines organizational reference groups; the evolution of organizational norms; and the impact of perceptual differences on employee expectations, careers, and implicit work contracts. Address: Gold Hall, B506, Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481; e-mail: barbara.lawrence@anderson.ucla.edu . Raffaele Oriani (" Alliance Activity as a Dynamic Capability in the Face of a Discontinuous Technological Change ") is an associate professor of corporate finance and venture capital at LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome. He received his Ph.D. in management from the University of Bologna in Italy. His current research focuses on real options, economics and management of intellectual property, and finance of innovation. Address: Department of Economics and Business, LUISS Guido Carli University, Viale Romania 32, 00196 Rome, Italy; e-mail: roriani@luiss.it . Lamar Pierce (" Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help ") is an assistant professor of strategy at the Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. His research focuses on how incentives and interpersonal interactions among employees and customers influence corrupt and unethical behavior. Address: Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130; e-mail: pierce@wustl.edu . Jeffrey J. Reuer (" Experience Spillovers Across Corporate Development Activities ") is the Blake Family Endowed Chair in Strategic Management and Governance at the Krannert School of Management, Purdue University. His research is in the area of corporate strategy, and his current projects focus on alliance governance and the performance implications of firms' external corporate development activities. Address: Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056; e-mail: jreuer@purdue.edu . Georg Schreyögg (" Crossroads—Organizing for Fluidity? Dilemmas of New Organizational Forms ") is a professor of organization and leadership at the School of Business and Economics of Freie Universität Berlin. He received his doctorate and habilitation from Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. His current research addresses path dependence, innovation management, and organizational capabilities. Address: Department of Management, School of Business and Economics, Freie Universität Berlin, Garystr. 21, 14195 Berlin, Germany; e-mail: georg.schreyoegg@fu-berlin.de . Jörg Sydow (" Crossroads—Organizing for Fluidity? Dilemmas of New Organizational Forms ") is a professor of management at the School of Business and Economics of Freie Universität Berlin. He received his doctorate and habilitation from Freie Universität. His current research focuses on organization and management theory, interfirm networks and strategic alliances, project and innovation management, and industrial relations. Address: Department of Management, School of Business and Economics, Freie Universität Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195 Berlin, Germany; e-mail: joerg.sydow@fu-berlin.de . Alexandra Van den Abbeele (" Organizational Learning and Interfirm Control: The Effects of Partner Search and Prior Exchange Experiences ") is an assistant professor of management accounting and control at the Catholic University of Leuven (K.U. Leuven). Her main research interests include learning, fairness, trust, and control in interorganizational relationships. Address: Department of Accounting, Finance and Insurance, K.U. Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; e-mail: alexandra.vandenabbeele@econ.kuleuven.be . Roberto S. Vassolo (" Alliance Activity as a Dynamic Capability in the Face of a Discontinuous Technological Change ") is an associate professor of strategy at IAE Business School in Argentina. He received his Ph.D. in strategy from Purdue University. His core research examines competitive strategy in turbulent environments, with a focus on disruptive technology and emerging economies. Address: IAE Business School, Universidad Austral, Pilar, Buenos Aires (1629), Argentina; e-mail: rvassolo@iae.edu.ar . Maurizio Zollo (" Experience Spillovers Across Corporate Development Activities ") is a dean's professor of strategy and corporate responsibility at Bocconi University and director of the Center for Research in Organization and Management (CROMA) at Bocconi University. He is also coeditor of the European Management Review, the official journal of the European Academy of Management (EURAM). His research interests include organizational learning and change applied to corporate development processes and sustainability issues. Address: Management Department, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen, 1, 20136 Milan, Italy; e-mail: maurizio.zollo@unibocconi.it .

My first post described a few anecdotes about what a warm person Bob Lucas was, and such a great colleague. Here I describe a little bit of his intellectual influence, in a form that is I hope accessible to average people.The "rational expectations" revolution that brought down Keynesianism in the 1970s was really much larger than that. It was really the "general equilibrium" revolution. Macroeconomics until 1970 was sharply different from regular microeconomics. Economics is all about "models," complete toy economies that we construct via equations and in computer programs. You can't keep track of everything in even the most beautiful prose. Microeconomic models, and "general equilibrium" as that term was used at the time, wrote down how people behave — how they decide what to buy, how hard to work, whether to save, etc.. Then it similarly described how companies behave and how government behaves. Set this in motion and see where it all settles down; what prices and quantities result. But for macroeconomic issues, this approach was sterile. I took a lot of general equilibrium classes as a PhD student — Berkeley, home of Gerard Debreu was strong in the field. But it was devoted to proving the existence of equilibrium with more and more general assumptions, and never got around to calculating that equilibrium and what it might say about recessions and government policies. Macroeconomics, exemplified by the ISLM tradition,  inhabited a different planet. One wrote down equations for quantities rather than people, for example that "consumption" depended on "income," and investment on interest rates. Most importantly, macroeconomics treated each year as a completely separate economy. Today's consumption depended on today's income, having nothing to do with whether people expected the future to look better or worse. Economists recognized this weakness, and a vast and now thankfully forgotten literature tried fruitlessly to find "micro foundations" for Keynesian economics. But building foundations under an existing castle doesn't work. The foundations want a different castle. Bob's "islands" paper is famous, yes, for a complete model of how unexpected money might move output in the short run and not just raise inflation. But you can do that with a half a page of simple math, and Bob's paper is hard to read. It's deeper contribution, and the reason for that difficulty, is that Bob wrote out a complete "general equilibrium" model. People, companies and government each follow described rules of behavior. Those rules are derived as being the optimal thing for people and companies to do given their environment. And they are forward-looking. People think about how to make their whole lives as pleasant as possible, companies to maximize the present value of profits. Prices adjust so supply = demand. Bob said, by example, that we should do macroeconomics by writing down general equilibrium models. General equilibrium had also been abandoned by the presumption that it only studies perfect economies. Macroeconomics is really about studying how things go wrong, how "frictions" in the economy, such as the "sticky" wages underlying Keynesian thinking, can produce undesirable and unnecessary recessions. But here too, Bob requires us to write down the frictions explicitly. In his model, people don't see the aggregate price level right away, and do the best they can with local information. That is the real influence of the paper  and Bob's real influence in the profession. (Current macroeconomic modeling reflects the fact that the Fed sets interest rates, and does not control the money supply.) You can see this influence in Tom Sargent's textbooks. The first textbook has an extensive treatment of Keynesian economics. It's about the most comprehensible treatment there is — but it is no insult to Tom to say that in that book you can see how Keynesian economics really doesn't hang together. Tom describes how, the minute he learned from Bob how to to general equilibrium, everything changed instantly. Rational expectations was, like any other advance, a group effort. But what made Bob the leader was that he showed the rest how to do general equilibrium. This is the heart of my characterization that Bob is the most important macroeconomist of the 20th century. Yes, Keynes and Friedman had more policy impact, and Friedman's advocacy of free markets in microeconomic affairs is the most consequential piece of 20th century economics. But within macroeconomics, there is before Lucas and after Lucas.  Everyone today does economics the Lucas way. Even the most new-Keynesian article follows the Lucas rules of how to do economics. Once you see models founded on complete descriptions of people, businesses, government, and frictions, you can see the gaping holes in standard ISLM models. This is some of his stinging critique, such as "after Keynesian macroeconomics." Sure, if people's income goes up they are likely to consume more, as the Keynesians posited. But interest rates, wages, and expectations of the future also affect consumption, which Keynesians leave out. "Cross equations restrictions" and "budget constraints" are missing. Now, the substantive prediction that monetary policy can only move the real economy via unexpected money supply growth did not bear out, and both subsequent real business cycles and new-Keynesianism brought persistent responses. But the how we do macroeconomics part is the enduring contribution. The paper still had enduring practical lessons. Lucas, together with Friedman and Phelps brought down the Phillips curve. This curve, relating inflation to unemployment, had been (and sadly, remains) at the center of macroeconomics. It is a statistical correlation, but like many correlations people got enthused with it and started reading it as stable relationship, and indeed a causal one. Raise inflation and you can have less unemployment. Raise unemployment in order to lower inflation. The Fed still thinks about it in that causal way. But Lucas, Friedman, and Phelps bring a basic theory to it, and thereby realize it is just a correlation, which will vanish if you push on it. Rich guys wear Rolexes. That doesn't mean that giving everyone a Rolex will have a huge "multiplier" effect and make us all rich. This is the essence of the "Lucas critique" which is a second big contribution that lay readers can easily comprehend. If you push on correlations they will vanish. Macroeconomics was dedicated to the idea that policy makers can fool people. Monetary policy might try to boost output in a recession with a surprise bit of money growth. That will wok once or twice. But like the boy who cried wolf, people will catch on, come to expect higher money growth in recessions and the trick won't work anymore. Bob showed here that all the "behavioral" relations of Keynesian models will fall apart if you exploit them for policy, or push on them, though they may well hold as robust correlations in the data. The "consumption function" is the next great example. Keynesians noticed that when income rises people consume more, so write a consumption function relating consumption to income. But, following Friedman's great work   on consumption, we know that correlation isn't always true in the data. The relation between consumption and income is different across countries (about one for one) than it is over time (less than one for one). And we understand that with Friedman's theory: People, trying to do their best over their whole lives don't follow mechanical rules. If they know income will fall in the future, they consume a lot less today, no matter what today's current income. Lucas showed that people who behave this sensible way will follow a Keynesian consumption function, given the properties of income overt the business cycle. You will see a Keynesian consumption function. Econometric estimates and tests will verify a Keynesian consumption function. Yet if you use the model to change policies, the consumption function will evaporate. This paper is devastating. Large scale Keynesian models had already been constructed, and used for forecasting and policy simulation. It's natural. The model says, given a set of policies (money supply, interest rates, taxes, spending) and other shocks, here is where the economy goes. Well, then, try different policies and find ones that lead to better outcomes. Bob shows the models are totally useless for that effort. If the policy changes, the model will change. Bob also showed that this was happening in real time. Supposedly stable parameters drifted around. (This one is also very simple mathematically. You can see the point instantly. Bob always uses the minimum math necessary. If other papers are harder, that's by necessity not bravado.) This devastation is sad in a way. Economics moved to analyzing policies in much simpler, more theoretically grounded, but less realistic models. Washington policy analysis sort of gave up. The big models lumber on, the Fred's FRBUS for example, but nobody takes the policy predictions that seriously. And they don't even forecast very well. For example, in the 2008 stimulus, the CEA was reduced to assuming a back of the envelope 1.5 multiplier, this 40 years after the first large scale policy models were constructed. Bob always praised the effort of the last generation of Keynesians to write explicit quantitative models, to fit them to data, and to make numerical predictions of various policies. He hoped to improve that effort. It didn't work out that way, but not by intention. This affair explains a lot of why economists flocked to the general equilibrium camp. Behavioral relationships, like what fraction of an extra dollar of income you consume, are not stable over time or as policy changes. But one hopes that preferences, — how impatient you are, how much you are willing to save more to get a better rate of return — and technology — how much a firm can produce with given capital and labor — do not change when policy changes. So, write models for policy evaluation at the level of preferences and technology, with people and companies at the base, not from behavioral relationships that are just correlations. Another deep change: Once you start thinking about macroeconomics as intertemporal economics — the economics that results from people who make decisions about how to consume over time, businesses make decisions about how to produce this year and next — and once you see that their expectations of what will happen next year, and what policies will be in place next year are crucial, you have to think of policy in terms of rules, and regimes, not isolated decisions. The Fed often asks economists for advice, "should we raise the funds rate?" Post Lucas macroeconomists answer that this isn't a well posed question. It's like saying "should we cry wolf?" The right question is, should we start to follow a rule, a regime, should we create an institution, that regularly and reliably raises interest rates in a situation like the current one? Decisions do not live in isolation. They create expectations and reputations. Needless to say, this fundamental reality has not soaked in to policy institutions. And that answer (which I have tried at Fed advisory meetings) leads to glazed eyes. John Taylor's rule has been making progress for 30 years trying to bridge that conceptual gap, with some success.  This was, and remains, extraordinarily contentious. 50 years later, Alan Blinder's book, supposedly about policy, is really one long snark about how terrible Lucas and his followers are, and how we should go back to the Keynesian models of the 1960s. Some of that contention comes back to basic philosophy.  The program applies standard microeconomics: derive people's behaviors as the best thing they can do given their circumstances. If people pick the best combination of apples and bananas when they shop, then also describe consumption today vs. tomorrow as the best they can do given interest rates. But a lot of economics doesn't like this "rational actor" assumption. It's not written in stone, but it has been extraordinarily successful. And it imposes a lot of discipline. There are a thousand arbitrary ways to be irrational.  Somehow though, a large set of economists are happy to write down that people pick fruit baskets optimally, but don't apply the same rationality to decisions over time, or in how they think about the future. But "rational expectations" is really just a humility condition. It says, don't write models in which the predictions of the model are different from the expectations in the model. If you do, if your model is right, people will read the model and catch on, and the model won't work anymore. Don't assume you economist (or Fed chair) are so much less behavioral than the people in your model. Don't base policy on an attempt to fool the little peasants over and over again. It does not say that people are big super rational calculating machines. It just says that they eventually catch on. Some of the contentiousness is also understandable by career concerns. Many people had said "we should do macro seriously like general equilibrium." But it isn't easy to do. Bob had to teach himself, and get the rest of us to learn, a range of new mathematical  and modeling tools to be able to write down interesting general equilibrium models. A 1970 Keynesian can live just knowing how to solve simple systems of linear equations, and run regressions.  To follow Bob and the rational expectations crowd, you had to learn linear time-series statistics, dynamic programming, and general equilibrium math. Bob once described how tough the year was that it took him to learn functional analysis and dynamic programming. The models themselves consisted of a mathematically hard set of constructions. The older generation either needed to completely retool, fade away, or fight the revolution. Some good summary words: Bob's economics uses"rational expectations," or at least forward-looking and model-consistent expectations. Economics becomes "intertemporal," not "static" (one year at a time). Economics is "stochastic" as well as "dynamic," we can treat uncertainty over time, not just economies in which everyone knows the future perfectly. It applies "general equilibrium" to macroeconomics. And I've just gotten to the beginning of the 1970s. When I got to Chicago in the 1980s, there was a feeling of "well, you just missed the party." But it wasn't true. The 1980s as well were a golden age. The early rational expectations work was done, and the following real business cycles were the rage in macro. But Bob's dynamic programming, general equilibrium tool kit was on a rampage all over dynamic economics. The money workshop was one creative use of dynamic programs and interetempboral tools after another one, ranging from taxes to Thai villages (Townsend). I'll mention two. Bob's consumption model is at the foundation of modern asset pricing. Bob parachuted in, made the seminal contribution, and then left finance for other pursuits. The issue at the time was how to generalize the capital asset pricing model. Economists understood that some stocks pay higher returns than others, and that they must do so to compensate for risk. The understood that the risk is, in general terms, that the stock falls in some sense of bad times. But how to measure "bad times?" The CAPM uses the market, other models use somewhat nebulous other portfolios. Bob showed us that at least in the purest theory, that stocks must pay higher average returns if they fall when consumption falls. (Breeden also constructed a consumption model in parallel, but without this "endowment economy" aspect of Bob's) This is the purest most general theory, and all the others are (useful) specializations. My asset pricing book follows. The genius here was to turn it all around. Finance had sensibly built up from portfolio theory, like supply and demand: Given returns, what stocks do you buy, and how much to you save vs. consume? Then, markets have to clear find the stock prices, and thus returns, given which people will buy exactly the amount that's for sale and consume what is produced. That's hard. (Technically, finding the vector of prices that clears markets is hard. Yes, N equations in N unknowns, but they're nonlinear and N is big.)  Bob instead imagined that consumption is fixed at each moment in time, like a desert island  in which so many coconuts fall each day and you can't store them or plant them. Then, you can just read prices from people's preferences. This gives the same answer as if the consumption you assume is fixed had derived from a complex production economy. You don't have to solve for prices that equate supply and demand. Brilliantly, though prices cause consumption to individual people, consumption causes prices in aggregate. This is part of Bob's contribution to the hard business of actually computing quantitative models in the stochastic dynamic general equilibrium tradition. Bob, with Nancy Stokey also took the new tools to the theory of taxation. (Bob Barro also was a founder of this effort in the late 1980s.) You can see the opportunity: we just learned how to handle dynamic (overt time, expectations of tomorrow matter to what you do today) stochastic (but there is uncertainty about what will happen tomorrow) economics (people make explicit optimizing decisions) for macro. How about taking that same approach to taxes? The field of dynamic public finance is born. Bob and Nancy, like Barro, show that it's a good idea for governments to borrow and then repay, so as to spread the pain of taxes evenly over time. But not always. When a big crisis comes, it is useful to execute a "state contingent default." The big tension of Lucas-Stokey (and now, all) dynamic public finance: You don't want any capital taxes for the incentive effects. If you tax capital, people invest less, and you just get less capital. But once people have invested, a capital tax grabs revenue for the government with no economic distortion. Well, that is, if you can persuade them you'll never do it again. (Do you see expectations, reputations, rules, regimes, wolves in how we think of policy?) Lucas and Stoney say, do it only very rarely to balance the disincentive of a bad reputation with the need to raise revenue in once a century calamities. Bob went on, of course, to be one of the founders of modern growth theory. I always felt he deserved a second Nobel for this work. He's absolutely right. Once you look at growth, it's hard to think about anything else. The average Indian lives on $2,000 per year. The average American, $60,000. That was $15,000 in 1950. Nothing else comes close. I only work on money and inflation because that's where I think I have answers. For us mortals, good research proceeds where you think you have an answer, not necessarily from working on Big Questions. Bob brilliantly put together basic facts and theory to arrive at the current breakthrough. Once you get out of the way, growth does not come from more capital, or even more efficiency. It comes from more and better ideas. I remember being awed by his first work for cutting through the morass and assembling the facts that only look salient in retrospect. A key one: Interest rates in poor countries are not much higher than they are in rich countries. Poor countries have lots of workers, but little capital. Why isn't the return on scarce capital enormous, with interest rates in the hundreds of percent, to attract more capital to poor countries? Well, you sort of know the answer, that capital is not productive in those countries.  Productivity is low, meaning those countries don't make use of better ideas on how to organize production.  Ideas too are produced by economics, but, as Paul Romer crystallized, they are fundamentally different from other goods. If I produce an idea, you can use it without hurting my use of it. Yes, you might drive down the monopoly profits I gain from my intellectual property. But if you use my Pizza recipe, that's not like using my car. I can still make Pizza, where if you use my car I can't go anywhere. Thus, the usual free market presumption that we will produce enough ideas is false. (Don't jump too quickly to advocate government subsides for ideas. You have to find the right ideas, and governments aren't necessarily good at subsidizing that search.) And the presumption that intellectual property should be preserved forever is also false. Once produced it is socially optimal for everyone to use it. I won't go on. It's enough to say that Bob was as central to the creation of idea-based growth theory, which dominates today, as he was to general equilibrium macro, which also dominates today.Bob is an underrated empiricist. Bob's work on the size distribution of firms (great tweet summary by Luis Garicano) similarly starts from basic facts of the size distribution of firms and the lack of relationship between size and growth rates. It's interesting how we can go on for years with detailed econometric estimates of models that don't get basic facts right. I loved Bob's paper on money demand for the Carnegie Rochester conference series. An immense literature had tried to estimate money demand functions with dynamics, and was pretty confusing. It made a basic mistake, by looking at first differences rather than levels and thereby isolating the noise and drowning out the signal. Bob made a few plots, basically rediscovered cointegration all on his own, and made sense of it all. And don't forget the classic international comparison of inflation-output relations. Countries with volatile inflation have less Phillips curve tradeoff, just as his islands model featuring confusion between relative prices and the price level predicts. One last note to young scholars. There is a tendency today to value people by the number of papers they produce, and how quickly they rise through the ranks. Read Bob's CV. He wrote about one paper a year, starting quite late in life. But, as Aesop said, they were lions. In his Nobel prize speech, Bob also passed on that he and his Nobel-winning generation at Chicago always felt they were in some backwater, where the high prestige stuff was going on at Harvard and MIT. You never know when it might be a golden age. And the AER rejected his islands paper (as well as Akerlof's lemons). If you know it's good, revise and try again. I will miss his brilliant papers as much as his generous personality. Update: See Ivan Werning's excellent "Lucas Miracles" for an appreciation by a real theorist. 

The World Bank legal review gathers this input from around the world and compiles it into a useful resource for all development practitioners and scholars. The subtitle of this volume, legal innovation and empowerment for development, highlights how the law can respond to the chal-lenges posed to development objectives in a world slowly emerging from an economic crisis. The focus on innovation is a call for new, imaginative strategies and ways of thinking about what the law can do in the development realm. The focus on empowerment is a deliberate attempt to place the law into the hands of the poor; to give them another tool with which to resist poverty. This volume shows some of the ways that the law can make an innovative and empowering difference in development scenarios. Development problems are complex and varied, and the theme of innovation and empowerment naturally has a broad scope. Consequently, this volume reaches far and wide. It considers the nature, promise, and limitations of legal innovation and legal empowerment. It looks at concrete examples in places such as Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, and Latin America. It considers developments in issues with universal application, such as the rights of the disabled and the effectiveness of asset recovery measures. The theme of legal innovation and empowerment for development complements substantive and institutional sensibilities in current development policy. Substantively, development policy discourse seems to have moved away from tacking hard toward statist policy or neoliberal policy. Although this brief introduction cannot do justice to the richness and complexity of these contributions, it does consider each focal point in turn.

Since we introduced the term "middle-income trap" in 2006, it has become popular among policy makers and researchers. In May 2015, a search of Google Scholar returned more than 3,000 articles including the term and about 300 articles with the term in the title. This paper provides a (non-exhaustive) survey of this literature. The paper then discusses what, in retrospect, we missed when we coined the term. Today, based on developments in East Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe during the past decade, we would have paid more attention to demographic factors, entrepreneurship, and external institutional anchors. We would also make it clearer that to us, the term was as much the absence of a satisfactory theory that could inform development policy in middle-income economies as the articulation of a development phenomenon. Three-quarters of the people in the world now live in middle-income economies, but economists have yet to provide a reliable theory of growth to help policy makers navigate the transition from middle- to high-income status. Hybrids of the Solow-Swan and Lucas-Romer models are not unhelpful, but they are poor substitutes for a well-constructed growth framework.

La cátedra Jean Monnet es una cátedra universitaria otorgada por la Comisión Europea en el marco de su plan de acción. Tienen como objetivo reforzar la docencia y la investigación sobre la integración europea en las universidades, tanto de los Estados miembros como de terceros países. Su nombre hace honor a quien fuera un político francés que, como asesor de Robert Schuman, contribuyó decisivamente a poner los cimientos de las entonces Comunidades Europeas. -- La primera etapa de esta publicación concluyó en el año 2018, comenzó una segunda época en el año 2019 con el nombre Revista "Integración Regional y Derechos Humanos". -- Apéndice jurisprudencial.

Introduction. The mass artifi cial famine of 1921–1923 in Crimea arose as a result of a combinationof the military-communist policy of Soviet Russia, which seized the Crimean peninsula in November 1920, withthe consequences of several years of wars and revolutions and unfavorable natural and climatic conditions.Without the policy of the Russian communist regime, the losses among the Crimean people and in the agriculturalsector of Crimea would not have been so catastrophic. As a result of the famine, approximately 100,000 peopleor almost 14% of Crimeans died. The vast majority of victims were Crimean Tatars.Purpose of the study is to study the struggle with Soviet farms (state farms) at the fi nal stage of the massartifi cial famine of 1921-1923 of the Crimean Tatar peasantry of the Southern coast of Crimea on the basis ofanalysis of the case of the "counterrevolutionary organization "Milli Firka"".Results. The communist regime in the late 1920s and early 1921s actively planted state farms in thenationalized lands of Crimea, but due to their ineffi ciency and resistance of the peasantry, the number of suchfarms decreased by almost 10 times in a year. The exception was the southern coast of Crimea, where most statefarms continued to operate in the former lands of the imperial family, aristocracy and imperial dignitaries. Thisled to a deepening catastrophe during the famine among the peasants of the southern coast, the vast majority ofwhom were landless Crimean Tatars and suffered from the inability to rent land. The analysis of the materialsof the case «Milli-Firka», which in 1928-1930 was conducted by the punitive and repressive bodies of theUSSR against the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia and activists, shows the active actions of the Crimean Tatarintelligentsia and peasants to seize land and distribute state farms near Yalta.Conclusions. Analysis of information from the case "Milli-Firka" clarifi es the notions present inhistoriography about the «passivity» of Crimean Tatars during the mass artifi cial famine in Crimea in 1921-1923, from which the Crimean Tatar people suffered the most among all Crimean ethnic communities. Materialscontained in the cases of punitive and repressive bodies of the USSR testify to the active attempts in 1923 byCrimean Tatar peasants and intellectuals to resolve the issue of landlessness and scarcity of land on the southerncoast of Crimea by seizing the lands of state farms. This region was characterized by a noticeable concentrationof state farms, while in other parts of the Crimea most of them were liquidated in 1921. At least one case isknown when an anti-farm action was carried out in the village of Kyziltash, Yalta district, formed a «national»artel, uniting peasants regardless of property status. It seems that the organizers and participants of such actionstried to give their attempts to protect the interests of the Crimean Tatar peasantry forms externally loyal to theSoviet government. This is evidenced, in particular, by the use of red fl ags and artel forms of self-organization.The success of these anti-state farm`s actions could have been facilitated by the political situation when, in thecontext of the proclamation of the RCP (B) policy of indigenization, representatives of the nationally orientedCrimean Tatar political militia ("millifi rkivtsi") cooperated with the National Communists among the CrimeanTatar ; Метою дослідження є вивчення боротьби кримськотатарського селянства Південногоберега Криму з радянськими господарствами (радгоспами) на завершальному етапі масового штучногоголоду 1921–1923 рр. на підставі аналізу матеріалів справи «контрреволюційної організації «Міллі-Фірка»,яка зберігається у Галузевому державному архіві Служби Безпеки України. Висновки. Дослідженняздійснено із застосуванням загальнонаукових і спеціально-історичних методів. Комуністичний режимнаприкінці 1920 – на початку 1921 рр. активно насаджував радгоспи на націоналізованих земляхКриму, втім через їхню неефективність та спротив селянства кількість таких господарств вжеза рік скоротилася майже у 10 разів. Винятком став Південний берег Криму, де більшість радгоспівпродовжували функціонувати на колишніх землях царської фамілії, аристократії та царських сановників.Це призвело до поглиблення катастрофи в роки голоду серед селян південнобережжя, більшість ізяких була малоземельними і безземельними кримськими татарами та страждала від неможливостіорендувати землю. Аналіз матеріалів «справи «Міллі-Фірка», яку у 1928 –1930-х рр. вели каральнорепресивні органи СРСР проти кримськотатарської інтелігенції та активістів, свідчать про активнідії кримськотатарських інтелігенції та селян із захоплення земель та розподілу майна радгоспів в районіЯлти. Аналіз інформації із справи «Міллі-Фірка» дозволяє уточнити уявлення, які присутні в історіографіїпро «пасивність» кримських татар під час масового штучного голоду в Криму 1921–1923 рр., від якогокримськотатарський народ постраждав найбільше серед всіх кримських етноспільнот. Матеріали,що містяться у справах карально-репресивних органів СРСР, свідчать про активні спроби у 1923 р.кримськотатарських селян та інтелігенції вирішити на Південному березі Криму питання безземелля імалоземелля шляхом захоплення земель радгоспів.

Сегодня в самых разных социальных группах нарастает разочарование и ощущение бесперспективности, ощущение того, что последние 20 лет со всеми их потрясениями и жертвами привели страну в тупик. Последствия недавнего экономического кризиса никак не причина, а только некоторый частный «усилитель вкуса» этого господствующего ощущения. Это ощущение, которое русский культуролог и публицист Евгений Трубецкой в начале прошлого века описывал словами: «Попытка подвести итоги первому десятилетию XX в. переносит нас в атмосферу известной народной сказки. Сиденье над разбитым корытом всегда предрасполагает к философским размышлениям. Естественно, возникает вопрос, почему оно разбито, почему вообще рухнули одна за другой все наши радужные мечты? Еще так недавно терема и дворцы были близки к осуществлению. Почему же теперь даже светлая и просторная изба кажется нам недосягаемым счастьем?» [Трубецкой 1911, с. 190]. То, что обсуждается в СМИ в качестве «проектов будущего», на деле обращено в прошлое. Это либо возвращение к той или иной форме советской модели («кремниевая долина» в Сколково воспроизводство советского опыта от «шарашек» до наукоградов), либо мечтания о 90-х как о «времени возможностей».The article deals with the key features of the socio-economic system that has developed in Russia for the past two decades. The reforms, which were initially declared as market-oriented and democratic, have led to a result that sharply differed from public expectations, as well as was contrasted to the goals proclaimed by the initiators and supporters of social changes. Thus, Russia failed to create an environment for efficient competition and a mechanism for market concentration and accumulation of capital by efficient firms, as well as generate the necessary incentives for efficient productive use of resources and build a system of transparent rules of the economic games respected by all the key economic actors. Instead, in Russia there has been established a political and economic system that was different from the classical concepts of market democracy and the principles of its functioning. It should be noted that we deal with a special type of economy with its own inner logic, rather than only a transitional period from the planned to the market economy. The relations and institutions incompatible with the modern concepts of an efficient market economy represent a full-fledged element of a functioning economic system rather than the relic of the past. The system defined as Peripheral Capitalism has its internal logic and is capable of not only self-reproduction, but also of self-development. However, the Peripheral Capitalism of the Russian type does not allow and will not allow for a radical improvement of the situation in such vital areas as employment, modern standards of living, demographic situation and ensuring security. The reasons conditioning the failure of the economic reform of 1990s are: the lack of clear vision of the nature of the Soviet economy; the errors made in determining the content and sequence of measures of economic and social policies; disconnection between the declared goals of the reform and the real interests and incentives of those in power; negligence, and sometimes purposeful disregard of not only the specifics of the object of reform (the economy), but also its subject (the historical, cultural and psychological component). The authors note that the obstacles for the reforms targeted at Russia's modernisation lie in a historically deep alienation between the people (the society) and the government (the state), and elimination and disengagement of the society from government. Such a gap makes it extremely difficult or even impossible in the present situation to reveal the intellectual and creative potential of the nation. Instead, a specific reaction to the actions of the state a so called 'escape'is observed. The 'escaping' people neither resist the state, nor render support to it. The fundamental failure of the reforms of 1990s from the socio-cultural point of view is that Russia has not managed to overcome this gap. As a result, despite of positive modernisation potential in the society accumulated throughout decades, the reforms in the form in which they were made destroyed the pivots for modernisation and boosted archaic complexes. Today's policy of the Russian government still appeals to the most destructive elements of social consciousness, its most backward and conservative forms and behavior patterns, determines the motion vector towards degradation and mental sluggishness. At the same time, the authors make a conclusion that a social base for an alternative programme of reforms still exists in Russia. If the society can perceive different activating signals equality before the law, independence of the judiciary system, inviolability of property, accountability of the authorities, etc. the people can become a conscientious supporter and actor of the reform

Nell'articolo si narra la vicenda relativa al rientro dei manoscritti ashburnhamiani in Italia, tutta ricompresa nella Relazione alla Camera dei Deputati, che servì al giovane Parlamento italiano per mettere a disposizione un'ingente somma di danaro per riportare nel luogo da cui, attraverso varie vicende, quella importante raccolta era stata allontanata.Alla morte del lord, avvenuta nel giugno del 1878, la biblioteca passò, unitamente alle altre proprietà, al figlio maggiore, il nuovo Lord Ashburnham, il quale mise in vendita la biblioteca. Essa fu ceduta in tre blocchi: la collezione "Libri" e l'"Appendice" furono comprate dal governo italiano che poteva contare sulla cifra di 585.000 lire d'oro. Per l'Italia le operazioni d'acquisto furono fatte, per incarico del governo, da Pasquale Villari che volle accanto a sé numerosi uomini di cultura, in particolare il Carducci, il quale ritenne l'occasione che si presentava importantissima per la ricostruzione della storia letteraria italiana antica. Il 4 dicembre del 1884 il fondo venne depositato presso la Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana.Tra coloro che ebbero modo di consultare la raccolta londinese prima che fosse smembrata v'è Salomone Morpurgo, che fu colpito dall'enorme quantità di codici (per la maggior parte italiani) posseduti da Lord Ashburnham, molti dei quali autografi e ricercati da tanti intellettuali in Italia.Di fronte all'immensità della collezione, lo studioso si rese immediatamente conto del valore culturale di quei testi e, venuto a conoscenza del desiderio dell'Ashburnham di vendere l'intera biblioteca, cercò attraverso una serie di lettere di muovere intellettuali e studiosi per forzare il giovane Parlamento italiano a mettere a disposizione la cifra necessaria per raggiungere un tale risultato:Egli aveva percepito immediatamente che l'acquisto dei preziosi manoscritti avrebbe costituito un'occasione unica per la corretta rielaborazione dell'intera storia letteraria italiana. Le lettere dirette a Salomone Morpurgo sono per la gran parte andate disperse; quelle da lui scritte, anche a causa delle leggi razziali, hanno subito la medesima sorte, tranne pochi nuclei presenti in archivi pubblici o privati, non ordinati, per i quali non è stata possibile da parte degli organi governativi fascisti procedere all'eliminazione. Così, corpose raccolte sono presenti nel fondo Monaci di Roma, nell'Archivio di Casa Carducci, nel fondo D'Ancona e in quello Barbi di Pisa. Nell'appendice a fondo articolo si presentano alcune lettere inedite a Ernesto Monaci e a Giosuè Carducci. ; The article tells about the return to Italy of the Ashburnham manuscripts, all included in the Report to the Chamber of Deputies, that was needed by the young Italian Parliament to provide a large sum of money to bring back that important collection to the place from which it had been subtracted through various events.On the death of the Lord, in June 1878, the library, together with other property, passed to the eldest son, the new Lord Ashburnham, who put the library up for sale. It was sold in three blocks: the"Books" and"Appendixes" collection was bought by the Italian government which was able to count on the sum of 585,000 golden lire. For Italy the purchases were made, on behalf of the government, by Pasquale Villari who wished to be accompanied by numerous men of culture, especially Carducci, who considered the occasion of the greatest importance for the reconstruction of ancient Italian literary history. On 4th December 1884 the collection was brought to the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana (Laurentian Medicean Library).Among those who were able to consult the London collection before it was dismembered was Salomone Morpurgo. He was struck by the incredible number of manuscripts (most of which Italian) in Lord Ashburnham's possession. Many of these were autographed and sought after by scholars in Italy. When faced with the vastness of the collection, the scholar understood immediately the cultural value of those texts and, when he discovered that Ashburnham wished to sell the entire library, through a series of letters he tried to move intellectuals and scholars to convince the young Italian Parliament to provide the money necessary to achieve this result. He had grasped immediately that the purchase of the precious manuscripts would have formed a unique occasion for the correct processing of all Italian literary history. Most of the letters addressed to Salomone Morpurgo have been lost; those written by him, due also to the racial laws, suffered the same destiny, except for some small nuclei in public and private archives, that had not been put in order and as a result the Fascist government bodies were unable to eliminate them. There are therefore some good collections in the Monaci Collection in Rome, in the Archive of Casa Carducci in Bologna, in the Ancona collection and in the Barbi collection of Pisa. In the appendix at the end of the article there are some unpublished letters to Ernesto Monaci and to Giosuè Carducci.