Suchergebnisse

Die Gründung von Zwischengesellschaften zum Zwecke des Treaty Shopping steht unter dem Verdacht des Gestaltungsmissbrauchs. Hiergegen richten sich spezielle Missbrauchsnormen wie 50d Abs. 3 EStG und die "Limitation on Benefits" Klausel des Art. 28 DBAUSA, die in jüngerer Zeit fortentwickelt wurden. Das Buch untersucht diese Missbrauchsvorbehalte grundlegend und beleuchtet dabei ganz besonders, nach welchen Maßstäben sich überhaupt eine Gestaltung als "missbräuchlich" bezeichnen lassen muss. Dies umfasst nicht nur die Ebene des nationalen Rechts nach der Neufassung des 42 AO, sondern erfordert eine rechtskreisübergreifende Betrachtung unter Einbeziehung des europäischen Steuerrechts und des internationalen Steuerrechts im engeren Sinne. Insoweit ergibt sich gerade für das Treaty Shopping ein vielgestaltiges Bild des Missbrauchs und es lassen sich unterschiedliche Konzeptionen und Maßgaben abstrahieren, die als Maßstäbe zur Bestimmung des Missbrauchscharakters fungieren. Der Autor identifiziert zahlreiche Kollisionen zwischen den einzelnen Maßstäben und zeigt allgemeine Zuordnungskriterien zur Bewältigung dieser Kollisionen auf, sowohl innerhalb der jeweiligen Rechtskreise als auch übergreifend zwischen diesen. Für diejenigen Maßnahmen, die sich spezifisch gegen Treaty Shopping richten, ergibt sich damit zugleich ein Prüfungsmaßstab, an dem sich diese Missbrauchsvorbehalte messen und bewerten lassen. Auf diese Weise möchte dieses Buch nicht nur ihr Verhältnis untereinander und zu 42 AO klären, sondern auch die Frage nach deren Verfassungsmäßigkeit und Unionsrechtskonformität einem Lösungsvorschlag zuführen. Auch auf die jüngste Änderung des 50d Abs. 3 EStG durch das Beitreibungsrichtlinie- Umsetzungsgesetz wird hierbei eingegangen.

This paper aims to explain the legal, political and moral obligation of the European Union institutions in the promotion, advancement, respect, and implementation of human rights and freedoms as a universal value, and above all as binding legal- political principles during their efforts in relations with actors both inside and outside the EU. This research work simultaneously analyzes and interprets international legal rules that regulate human rights. Moreover, the cases and means in promoting the human rights used by the European Union in different cultural regions have been compared and analyzed as well as the possibility of changing the approach of EU policy towards countries where the highest level of resistance exist in the accepting of such values.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of illustrations -- Acknowledgements -- List of abbreviations and acronyms -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Theoretical debates and conceptualisation -- Chapter 3 Background to the involvement of the EU and other international actors in the process of state-building in Kosovo (1999-2008 and 2008-2020) -- Chapter 4 Immediate economic reconstruction and free-market economy in the process of state-building in Kosovo (1999-2008) -- Chapter 5 Institution-building in the process of state-building in Kosovo (1999-2008) -- Chapter 6 Ethnic accommodation (through the principle of multi-ethnicity) in the process of state-building in Kosovo (1999-2008) -- Chapter 7 The EU's norm diffusion in post-independence Kosovo (2008-2020) -- Chapter 8 Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index.

The recent years witnessed the emergence of international investment agreements (iias), such as the u.s. model bit in 2012, and more prominently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) in 2015, which often embody provisions for state-owned enterprises (soes). The soe rules, as well as their predecessor, the oecd Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, aim to impose strict regulations on the soes and to exert great influence on the state-led economies. China has been seen in constant reform of its soes, and is now in the midst of negotiating a bit with, and the u.s., and a bit with the European Union. Against this backdrop, China's soe reform will be relevant to the emerging investment rules governing soes.

International environmental cooperation is difficult because states disagree on burden sharing and have incentives to free ride. However, interested countries can promote future cooperation through unilateral action that induces technological change in and, thereby, shapes the preferences of foreign countries. How can the effectiveness of such unilateral action be improved? This article offers a game-theoretic analysis of the value of combining unilateral action with trade sanctions, or policies that force foreign exporters to comply with domestic environmental regulations. Trade sanctions can significantly improve the effectiveness of unilateral action, but only when (1) they induce clean technology adoption by exporters in targeted countries and (2) this reduces the cost of clean technology elsewhere in the economy through intersectoral technology spillovers.

Résumé La stabilité et la sécurité du continent africain semblent toujours aussi difficiles à atteindre. Dix ans après le génocide rwandais, en dépit d'indéniables efforts diplomatiques et d'accords de paix bien souvent aussi rapidement oubliés que signés, de très larges abcès de fixation demeurent (la Côte d'Ivoire, la RDC et les Grands lacs, les conflits désormais imbriqués du Soudan et du Tchad). Plusieurs événements majeurs, dégageant peu à peu un chemin identifiable de redressement, ont permis d'esquisser une pratique s'appuyant sur des principes généraux en vue du traitement international de ces crises africaines multipliées. Le Document final du Sommet mondial de New York (16 septembre 2005) en est une illustration. C'est aussi la vocation de la Peace-Building Commission (PBC) des Nations unies lancée en 2006.

For FDI to help achieve the international development goal of halving absolute poverty, two conditions have to be met. First, poor developing countries need to be attractive to foreign investors. Second, the host-country environment in which foreign investors operate must be conducive to favourable FDI effects with regard to overall investment, economic spillovers and income growth. This paper argues that it is much more difficult to benefit from FDI than to attract FDI. Weak markets and institutions typically prevailing in poor countries tend to seriously constrain the growth-enhancing and povertyalleviating effects of FDI. The crux is that creating an environment in which FDI may deliver social returns will take considerable time exactly where development needs are most pressing.

The outburst of the Polish insurrection and its evolution attracted the attention of the European Powers, due to the international political context in which it started, that of the liberal-bourgeois revolutions in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and of the implications that were expected to occur due to power balance on the continent and in the Eastern Question. Russia's position in the political systems mentioned above depended on how the Polish Question would be solved. By subordinating all the Kingdom of Poland, whose political individuality, in the Russian political and institutional system, in which the decisions of the "Final Act" of the Peace Congress in Vienna (June 9th 1815) placed it, was about to be abolished by the Tsar, opened to the Russian Empire the path towards the consolidation of its positions in the Baltic region, strategically, political an economical, thus upsetting the other Powers in the European political system, on one hand. And secondly, because it would have relieved it of the necessity to divide its forces to oversee the evolution of the embarrassing Polish Question and would have been capable to focus its attention on a solution to the other problem, the Eastern one. This perspective was likely to happen, especially in the conditions of the peace Treaty that Russia had imposed to Turkey, at Adrianople, on September 14th 1829, which ensured the latter's "passivity" towards the Oriental policy of its victor.
These perspectives affected, in particular, Great Britain and France, the secular rivals of Russia in that area, so they tried, using only diplomatic means because of the very complicated international situation at the beginning of the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, to determine Russia to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Polish insurgents.
The rivalries that aggravated the Franco-British relations, especially in Western Europe, prevented the two Powers to adopt a unitary position towards Russia, a fact that allowed the latter to dictate the law in the Kingdom of Poland.
A position, in some way singular, towards the Polish Question was adopted by another state, with direct interests in the Baltic sea area and with more specific ones in the Eastern Question. It is the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, created in the letter and the spirit of the Swedish-Norwegian Convention from Moss, on August 14th 1814.
Sweden's internal and external political circumstances in which, in 1810, the famous marshal of Napoleon I, Jean Baptiste Sebastien Bernadotte, prince of Pontecorvo, was proclaimed crown prince under the name Karl Johan, King Karl XIV Johan, from 1818, as the creation of the Swedish-Norwegian personal Union, determined the Swedish-Norwegian diplomacy favor the Russian interests in the Polish Question as well as in the Eastern Question. In the Polish Question, the one under our analysis, this was also because the insurrection of November 1830 started in the international conditions mentioned above and due to the fact that the liberal internal opposition to the conservative and absolutist monarchical policy of King Karl XIV Johan was becoming more active and could have constituted a reason for the Norwegians to evade the personal Union, which they did not favor and against which they fought, first through arms then by institutional means.
The forms in which Great Britain, France and Sweden took position in regard to the reprisal of the Polish insurrection of November 1830, very well documented by the diplomatic reports of the British diplomats in St. Petersburg and of the Swedish ones, accredited in Petersburg and in London, which we had the opportunity to consult in the funds of manuscripts of British Library, in London, and those of the National Archives of Sweden, in Stockholm, constitute, in our opinion, a contribution to the knowledge of the history of European diplomacy, on one hand, and to the research of the international relations in the first half of the nineteenth century, on another. This is the reason why we intend to approach them in this study.
All the documents selected from Sveriges Riksarkivet, in Stockholm and cited in these pages are included in the volume X, part I, of the Collection "Europe and the Porte", which is still in manuscript, for this reason we indicated the archive quotations.