Suchergebnisse

Recent efforts undertaken by game theorists cannot satisfactorily cope with the role of communication in explaining the emergence of international cooperation. The claim that game theory can model altruistic behavior is largely irrelevant, as altruists rarely appear in international politics. Communication is handled in game-theoretical approaches as a simple exchange of signals concerning facts -- the state of the world & the state of actors' preferences -- guided by individual strategic goals, while communicative action theory treats discourse as an exchange of arguments, whereby discussants risk having to make fundamental alterations to their own definition of preferences. The bias inherent in game theory's analytical instrument leads to a distortion of empirical facts & grave misunderstandings of the terms of communicative action theory. To explain international cooperation, we must specify actors' capabilities as containing the capacity for both strategic & communicative action. Adapted from the source document.

The future of the International Criminal Court (icc) is uncertain. The system established by the Rome Statute of the icc ensures that priority is given to domestic prosecutions, while at the same time, it imbues international values into national systems. The approach of the Court to the rights of the accused and victims' rights poses challenges. In the Al Senussi complementarity decision, the icc refused to act as a human rights court and rendered the case inadmissible, notwithstanding the death penalty threatening the accused if tried in Libya. Does the same reasoning hold true in other circumstances? The article explores the relationship between human rights law and international criminal law with specific reference to the principle of complementarity and argues that judicial discretion is central in the assessment of the degree of human rights protection at the icc.

SummaryThe exercise of civil jurisdiction by a national court over a foreign sovereign has been a perennial source of controversy in international relations. It resulted in the development of the doctrine of state immunity, founded on the notion of the comity of nations. The doctrine at some point was considered an absolute rule. With time, exceptions to the rule were accepted, notably in the area of commercial activities. In recent times, there has been a movement to recognize a further exception involving violation ofjus cogensnorms in order to limit the tendency of certain state agents to engage in gross violations of human rights and humanitarian norms. Yet this movement has encountered strong resistance. The resistance is apparent in three decisions rendered respectively by the European Court of Human Rights, the Ontario Court of Appeal, and the British House of Lords. In this article, it is contended first that the resistance noted in these cases is largely founded on fundamental misconceptions. It is further contended that the comity of nations is no longer sustainable as a rational basis for the doctrine of state immunity, especially in the face ofjus cogensas a peremptory norm of international law.