Suchergebnisse

Antoja, T., et al. (Gaia Collaboration) ; [Aims] We aim to demonstrate the scientific potential of the Gaia Early Data Release 3 (EDR3) for the study of different aspects of the Milky Way structure and evolution and we provide, at the same time, a description of several practical aspects of the data and examples of their usage. [Methods] We used astrometric positions, proper motions, parallaxes, and photometry from EDR3 to select different populations and components and to calculate the distances and velocities in the direction of the anticentre. In this direction, the Gaia astrometric data alone enable the calculation of the vertical and azimuthal velocities; also, the extinction is relatively low compared to other directions in the Galactic plane. We then explore the disturbances of the current disc, the spatial and kinematical distributions of early accreted versus in situ stars, the structures in the outer parts of the disc, and the orbits of open clusters Berkeley 29 and Saurer 1. [Results] With the improved astrometry and photometry of EDR3, we find that: (i) the dynamics of the Galactic disc are very complex with oscillations in the median rotation and vertical velocities as a function of radius, vertical asymmetries, and new correlations, including a bimodality with disc stars with large angular momentum moving vertically upwards from below the plane, and disc stars with slightly lower angular momentum moving preferentially downwards; (ii) we resolve the kinematic substructure (diagonal ridges) in the outer parts of the disc for the first time; (iii) the red sequence that has been associated with the proto-Galactic disc that was present at the time of the merger with Gaia-Enceladus-Sausage is currently radially concentrated up to around 14 kpc, while the blue sequence that has been associated with debris of the satellite extends beyond that; (iv) there are density structures in the outer disc, both above and below the plane, most probably related to Monoceros, the Anticentre Stream, and TriAnd, for which the Gaia data allow an exhaustive selection of candidate member stars and dynamical study; and (v) the open clusters Berkeley 29 and Saurer 1, despite being located at large distances from the Galactic centre, are on nearly circular disc-like orbits. [Conclusions] Even with our simple preliminary exploration of the Gaia EDR3, we demonstrate how, once again, these data from the European Space Agency are crucial for our understanding of the different pieces of our Galaxy and their connection to its global structure and history. ; The Gaia mission and data processing have financially been supported by, in alphabetical order by country: the Algerian Centre de Recherche en Astronomie,Astrophysique et Géophysique of Bouzareah Observatory; the Austrian Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF) Hertha Firnberg Programme through grants T359, P20046, and P23737; the BELgian federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO) through various PROgramme de Développement d'Expériences scientifiques (PRODEX) grants and the Polish Academy of Sciences - Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek through grant VS.091.16N, and the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS); the Brazil-France exchange programmes Fundaçãode Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) and Coordenação de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) - Comité Français d'Evaluation de la Coopération Universitaire et Scientifique avec le Brésil (COFECUB); the National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) through grants 11573054 and 11703065 and the China Scholarship Council through grant 201806040200; the Tenure Track Pilot Programme of the Croatian Science Foundation and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne and the project TTP-2018-07-1171 'Mining the Variable Sky', with the funds of the Croatian-Swiss Research Programme; the Czech-Republic Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports through grant LG 15010 and INTER-EXCELLENCE grant LTAUSA18093, and the Czech Space Office through ESA PECS contract 98058; the Danish Ministry of Science; the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research through grant IUT40-1; the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme through the European Leadership in Space Astrometry (ELSA) Marie Curie Research Training Network (MRTN-CT-2006-033481), through Marie Curie project PIOF-GA-2009-255267 (Space AsteroSeismology and RR Lyrae stars, SAS-RRL), and through a Marie Curie Transfer-of-Knowledge (ToK) fellowship (MTKD-CT-2004-014188); the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme through grant FP7-606740 (FP7-SPACE-2013-1) for the Gaia European Network for Improved data User Services (GENIUS) and through grant 264895 for the Gaia Research for European Astronomy Training (GREAT-ITN) network; the European Research Council (ERC) through grants 320360 and 647208 and through the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation and excellent science programmes through Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant 745617 as well as grants 670519 (Mixing and Angular Momentum tranSport of massIvE stars – MAMSIE), 687378 (Small Bodies: Near and Far), 682115 (Using the Magellanic Clouds to Understand the Interaction of Galaxies), and 695099 (A sub-percent distance scale from binaries and Cepheids – CepBin); the European Science Foundation (ESF), in the framework of the Gaia Research for European Astronomy Training Research Network Programme (GREAT-ESF); the European Space Agency (ESA) in the framework of the Gaia project, through the Plan for European Cooperating States (PECS) programme through grants for Slovenia, through contracts C98090 and 4000106398/12/NL/KML for Hungary, and through contract 4000115263/15/NL/IB for Germany; the Academy of Finland and the Magnus Ehrnrooth Foundation; the French Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) through grant ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02 for the 'Investissements d'avenir' programme, through grant ANR-15-CE31-0007 for project 'Modelling the Milky Way in the Gaia era' (MOD4Gaia), through grant ANR-14-CE33-0014-01 for project 'The Milky Way disc formation in the Gaia era' (ARCHEOGAL), and through grant ANR-15-CE31-0012-01 for project 'Unlocking the potential of Cepheids as primary distance calibrators' (UnlockCepheids), the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and its SNO Gaia of the Institut des Sciences de l'Univers (INSU), the 'Action Fédératrice Gaia' of the Observatoire de Paris, the Région de Franche-Comté, and the Programme National de Gravitation, Références, Astronomie, et Métrologie (GRAM) of CNRS/INSU with the Institut National Polytechnique (INP) and the Institut National de Physique nucléaire et de Physique des Particules (IN2P3) co-funded by CNES; the German Aerospace Agency (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., DLR) through grants 50QG0501, 50QG0601, 50QG0602, 50QG0701, 50QG0901, 50QG1001, 50QG1101, 50QG1401, 50QG1402, 50QG1403, 50QG1404, and 50QG1904 and the Centre for Information Services and High Performance Computing (ZIH) at the Technische Universität (TU) Dresden for generous allocations of computer time; the Hungarian Academy of Sciences through the Lendület Programme grants LP2014-17 and LP2018-7 and through the Premium Postdoctoral Research Programme (L. Molnár), and the Hungarian National Research, Development, and Innovation Office (NKFIH) through grant KH_18-130405; the Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) through a Royal Society – SFI University Research Fellowship (M. Fraser); the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) through grant 848/16; the Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI) through contracts I/037/08/0, I/058/10/0, 2014-025-R.0, 2014-025-R.1.2015, and 2018-24-HH.0 to the Italian Istituto Nazionale di Astrofisica (INAF), contract 2014-049-R.0/1/2 to INAF for the Space Science Data Centre (SSDC, formerly known as the ASI Science Data Center, ASDC), contracts I/008/10/0, 2013/030/I.0, 2013-030-I.0.1-2015, and 2016-17-I.0 to the Aerospace Logistics Technology Engineering Company (ALTEC S.p.A.), INAF, and the Italian Ministry of Education, University, and Research (Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca) through the Premiale project 'MIning The Cosmos Big Data and Innovative Italian Technology for Frontier Astrophysics and Cosmology' (MITiC); the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through grant NWO-M-614.061.414, through a VICI grant (A. Helmi), and through a Spinoza prize (A. Helmi), and the Netherlands Research School for Astronomy (NOVA); the Polish National Science Centre through HARMONIA grant 2018/30/M/ST9/00311, DAINA grant 2017/27/L/ST9/03221, and PRELUDIUM grant 2017/25/N/ST9/01253, and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MNiSW) through grant DIR/WK/2018/12; the Portugese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BPD/74697/2010 and SFRH/BD/128840/2017 and the Strategic Programme UID/FIS/00099/2019 for CENTRA; the Slovenian Research Agency through grant P1-0188; the Spanish Ministry of Economy (MINECO/FEDER, UE) through grants ESP2016-80079-C2-1-R, ESP2016-80079-C2-2-R, RTI2018-095076-B-C21, RTI2018-095076-B-C22, BES-2016-078499, and BES-2017-083126 and the Juan de la Cierva formación 2015 grant FJCI-2015-2671, the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports through grant FPU16/03827, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) through grant AYA2017-89841P for project 'Estudio de las propiedades de los fósiles estelares en el entorno del Grupo Local' and through grant TIN2015-65316-P for project 'Computación de Altas Prestaciones VII', the Severo Ochoa Centre of Excellence Programme of the Spanish Government through grant SEV2015-0493, the Institute of Cosmos Sciences University of Barcelona (ICCUB, Unidad de Excelencia 'María de Maeztu') through grants MDM-2014-0369 and CEX2019-000918-M, the University of Barcelona's official doctoral programme for the development of an R+D+i project through an Ajuts de Personal Investigador en Formació (APIF) grant, the Spanish Virtual Observatory through project AyA2017-84089, the Galician Regional Government, Xunta de Galicia, through grants ED431B-2018/42 and ED481A-2019/155, support received from the Centro de Investigación en Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (CITIC) funded by the Xunta de Galicia, the Xunta de Galicia and the Centros Singulares de Investigación de Galicia for the period 2016-2019 through CITIC, the European Union through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) / Fondo Europeo de Desenvolvemento Rexional (FEDER) for the Galicia 2014-2020 Programme through grant ED431G-2019/01, the Red Española de Supercomputación (RES) computer resources at MareNostrum, the Barcelona Supercomputing Centre - Centro Nacional de Supercomputación (BSC-CNS) through activities AECT-2016-1-0006, AECT-2016-2-0013, AECT-2016-3-0011, and AECT-2017-1-0020, the Departament d'Innovació, Universitats i Empresa de la Generalitat de Catalunya through grant 2014-SGR-1051 for project 'Models de Programació i Entorns d'Execució Parallels' (MPEXPAR), and Ramon y Cajal Fellowship RYC2018-025968-I; the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA/Rymdstyrelsen); the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research, and Innovation through the ESA PRODEX programme, the Mesures d'Accompagnement, the Swiss Activités Nationales Complémentaires, and the Swiss National Science Foundation; the United Kingdom Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC), the United Kingdom Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC), and the United Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA) through the following grants to the University of Bristol, the University of Cambridge, the University of Edinburgh, the University of Leicester, the Mullard Space Sciences Laboratory of University College London, and the United Kingdom Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL): PP/D006511/1, PP/D006546/1, PP/D006570/1, ST/I000852/1, ST/J005045/1, ST/K00056X/1, ST/K000209/1, ST/K000756/1, ST/L006561/1, ST/N000595/1, ST/N000641/1, ST/N000978/1, ST/N001117/1, ST/S000089/1, ST/S000976/1, ST/S001123/1, ST/S001948/1, ST/S002103/1, and ST/V000969/1.

 David Leonhardt's pean to investment in the Sunday NY Times Magazine starts well:A cross-country trip today typically takes more time than it did in the 1970s. The same is true of many trips within a region or a metropolitan area....Door to door, cross-country journeys often last 10 or even 12 hours.Compare this stagnation with the progress of the previous century. The first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869... revolutionizing a journey that had taken months. People could suddenly cross the country in a week. Next came commercial flight... Finally, the jet age arrived: The first regularly scheduled nonstop transcontinental flight occurred on Jan. 25, 1959, from Los Angeles to New York, on a new long-range Boeing jet, the 707....In the more than 60 years since then, there has been no progress. Instead, the scheduled flight time between Los Angeles and New York has become about 30 minutes longer.  Aviation technology has not advanced in ways that speed the trip, and the skies have become so crowded that pilots reroute planes to avoid traffic. Nearly every other part of a cross-country trip, in airports and on local roads, also lasts longer. All told, a trip across the United States can take a few more hours today than in the 1970s(If you want to skip to the snark, it's in "review" below. You may wonder why I bother fussing about a New York Times piece. I do because it starts so unusually well, but then falls apart at taking obvious inferences from useful facts. ) On the surface too, In 1969, Metroliner trains made two-and-a-half-hour nonstop trips between Washington and New York. Today, there are no nonstop trains on that route, and the fastest trip, on Acela trains, takes about 20 minutes longer than the Metroliner once did. Commuter railroads and subway lines in many places have also failed to become faster. When I ride the New York City subway, I don't go from Point A to Point B much faster than my grandparents did in the 1940s. For drivers — a majority of American travelers — trip times have increased, because traffic has worsened. In the California metropolitan area that includes Silicon Valley, a typical rush-hour drive that would have taken 45 minutes in the early 1980s took nearly 60 minutes by 2019. Why?Why has this happened? A central reason is that the United States, for all that we spend as a nation on transportation, has stopped meaningfully investing in it.... Historically, the most successful economic growth strategy has revolved around investment. It was true in ancient Rome, with its roads and aqueducts, and in 19th-century Britain, with its railroads. During the 20th century, it was true in the United States as well as Japan and Europe. The latter is not quite true. The most successful economic growth strategy is productivity, gained from new ideas embodied in new products and new companies. But it would be quite useful to get from place to place faster. Leonhardt makes a decent case for government investment in basic research and public goods: Investments are expensive for a private company, and only a fraction of the returns typically flows to the original investors and inventors. Despite patents, other people find ways to mimic the invention. Often, these imitators build on the original in ways that are perfectly legal but would not have been possible without the initial breakthrough. Johannes Gutenberg did not get rich from inventing the printing press, and neither did Tim Berners-Lee from creating the World Wide Web in 1989....The earliest stages of scientific research are difficult for the private sector to support. In these stages, the commercial possibilities are often unclear. An automobile company, for example, will struggle to justify spending money on basic engineering research that may end up being useful only to an aerospace company. Yet such basic scientific research can bring enormous benefits for a society. It can allow people to live longer and better lives and can lay the groundwork for unforeseen commercial applications that are indeed profitable.True but overstated. We might see a lot more private investment if we didn't tax its returns after all. A perfectly logical case for eliminating corporate income taxes and individual taxes on investment returns follows, but of course you won't hear it in the pages of the NYT.He goes on to laud military spending for its speeding of technical progress. A perfectly logical case for much larger military spending also follows. Yes, Without a doubt, government officials make plenty of mistakes when choosing which projects to fund. They misjudge an idea's potential or allow political considerations to influence decisions..He excuses these, a bit too quickly I think:Yet these failures tend to be cheap relative to the size of the federal budget, at least in the United States. (The risks of overinvestment are more serious in an authoritarian system like the old Soviet Union or contemporary China.) Even more important, a few big investment successes can produce returns, in economic growth and the resulting tax revenue, that cover the costs for dozens of failures. IBM and Google can pay for a lot of Solyndras.Without a Cold War it is easy to throw immense down ratholes. More on that coming. Just as important, government can reduce its involvement as an industry matures and allow the market system to take over. After the government creates the initial demand for a new product, the sprawling private sector — with its reliance on market feedback and the wisdom of crowds — often does a better job allocating resources than any bureaucratic agency.I'm grateful for the acknowledgement, but though the government can, will it do so? Car companies are headed down an infernal abyss of crony-capitalism. Energy subsides do not seem headed for free market Nirvana. Tech companies are becoming government controlled. Education also fits the definition of a program that requires spending money today mostly to improve the quality of life tomorrow. In the middle of the 20th century, education was the investment that turbocharged many other investments.Yes. An eloquent case for education follows.  And education seems the poster child for how the government can send endless money down larger and larger ratholes to no effect. The stagnation of investment does not stem only from the size of government. It also reflects the priorities of modern government, as set by both Republicans and Democrats. The federal government has grown — but not the parts oriented toward the future and economic growth. Spending has surged on health care, Social Security, antipoverty programs, police and prisons. (Military spending has declined as a share of G.D.P. in recent decades.) All these programs are important. A decent society needs to care for its vulnerable and prevent disorder. But the United States has effectively starved programs focused on the future at the expense of those focused on the present.  ...This great American stagnation has many causes, but the withering of investment is a major one.  Yes. Review:At this point, the essay could easily have segued straight in to a techno-optimist manifesto, like the eloquent one posted by Mark Andreesen. Certify supersonic planes! Hyperloop. A rapid push for self-driving cars. Repeal Davis-Bacon, and other measures that drive up costs. Reform zoning laws and environmental review. Sure, increase federal research and R&D spending, but reform it as well. Driving it all, get back to energy abundance with a vastly deregulated nuclear regulatory commission. Focus transportation on speed. (It's a tragedy that we build light rail and subway lines with no express trains, so they take longer than totally jammed freeways. Could it all be just for show?) It did not. Instead, too predictably for The New York Times, it went on to cheer "Bidenomics," President Biden has made investment the centerpiece of his economic strategy — even if that isn't always obvious to outsiders. He has signed legislation authorizing hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild the transportation system, subsidize semiconductor manufacturing and expand clean energy. These are precisely the kinds of programs the private sector tends not to do on its own. All told, Biden has overseen the largest increase in federal investment since the Eisenhower era. Notably, the infrastructure and semiconductor bill both passed with bipartisan support, a sign that parts of the Republican Party are coming to question the neoliberal consensus. As was the case during the 1950s, the threat from a foreign rival — China, this time — is focusing some policymakers on the value of government investment.Just about every word of this epitomizes why we are in the sorry state we are. The Biden Administration's Federal Highway Administration declared (see previous blog post)  that none of the "infrastructure'' money would be used to expand road capacity, or, most scandalously, "have significant impacts to travel patterns!"  Rebuild, perhaps, but not if it solves any of the problems in the first paragraph. No, the private sector will not "subsidize semiconductor manufacturing." Wasn't that exactly the sort of activity that Leonhardt just said is best for the private sector to do? Semiconductor manufacturing is doing just fine abroad. The massive money is earmarked to bring it to the US, where we will do it more expensively. This is simple protectionism on steroids; do to chip manufacturing what the Jones Act did for the Merchant Marine and sugar subsidies do to them. "Expand clean energy" with mind-boggling subsidies and protection -- on the order of a Trillion dollars, largely for current generation battery powered electric cars, which save no carbon, and which China can also make more cheaply if you care about the environment. And most deeply, US chips and green energy subsidies don't make anything cheaper, faster, or better. They  just do what we already do in the US, at vastly greater cost, and in a different way. Even if electric cars did save carbon, they would not get you to the airport any faster. The problem with US public investment is not just lack of money. It is that the money we do spend goes down ratholes, so not spending is wise. Public teacher unions that deliver generations of children, mostly already disadvantaged, who cannot read or count. $4 billion dollar per mile subways. Leonhardt mentions other countries' success with high speed trains, without mentioning the poster child for all that is wrong with US public investment: the California railroad. 15 years and counting, $100+ billion dollars, not a mile of track laid yet. SNCF, the French state railroad company smelled so much rot it wouldn't touch the project.  If it were not so perfectly obvious to voters that money will be wasted, they might support a lot more investment. 

Adam N. Michel and Vanessa Brown Calder


First introduced by Republicans as part of the Contract with America, the child tax credit (CTC) has won wide bipartisan support as an income‐​transfer program to fight poverty, a subsidy to middle‐​class families, and a tool to boost declining fertility, yet it is poorly suited to meet each of these goals.
Republicans doubled the CTC in their 2017 tax reform, and Democrats temporarily expanded it again in their 2021 COVID package, increasing the dollar value and removing the de facto work requirements. Republicans and Democrats agree that the CTC should be larger, the only disagreement is on how much the credit should be enhanced. There are bipartisan efforts in the House and the Senate to expand the CTC, while some states have moved forward with their own child tax credit programs.
The CTC is a costly transfer program for taxpayers with kids who do not need government handouts and who do not meaningfully change their fertility decisions in response to larger payments. As an anti‐​poverty program, the CTC is poorly targeted, and without income requirements, regular no‐​strings‐​attached payments from Washington are counterproductive for the most vulnerable families.
There are better ways to support families by reducing the regulations and other barriers that increase the costs of core child‐​related goods and services. Without substantial deregulation, increasing direct government payments to families will simply lead to higher prices rather than expanded supply.
By making payments through the tax code, the CTC allows Republicans to support spending they would otherwise oppose since tax credits operate outside the annual Congressional appropriations process. Democrats support the CTC because they recognize it for what it is, a subsidy program administered through the tax code. Congress should repeal the CTC and use the savings to lower tax rates for Americans broadly. It certainly should not be expanded.
History of the CTC
The child tax credit was first introduced in 1997 as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act. It quickly increased from $400 to $1,000 while lowering the earned income requirement from $10,000 to $3,000. The credit was further expanded in 2017 as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which increased the credit to $2,000 per child, lowered the earned income threshold, and raised the beginning of the income phaseout from $110,000 to $400,000 for married taxpayers ($75,000 to $200,000, single). The 2017 reform also eliminated the child and dependent exemption, which was more than offset by the $1,000 increase in the CTC for a taxpayer at or below the 25 percent income tax bracket (about $150,000). Along with a majority of the other changes enacted in 2017, the CTC and additional exemptions return to their previous values in 2026.
In 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act temporarily increased the CTC for just one year to $3,600 for children under 6 years old and $3,000 for children under 18 years old. The full credit was also made temporarily fully refundable by removing the earned income requirements, and half of the credit was delivered as advance payments directly into taxpayers' bank accounts each month. Figure 1 shows the maximum CTC amount from its introduction through 2026 for 0–5‑year-olds, including the scheduled reduction under current law.











Is the Child Tax Credit an effective subsidy?
The CTC provides a large subsidy to families with children. Unlike the earned income tax credit (EITC), cash aid (TANF), food aid (WIC, SNAP), and public health care (Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program), the CTC is primarily a subsidy for middle‐ and upper‐​income Americans. As currently designed, the CTC is not primarily an anti‐​poverty program. Only 19 percent of child tax credit expenditures are claimed by the lowest quintile of income earners. Jacob Goldin and Katherine Michelmore find that 87 percent of filers in the bottom income decile of AGI are completely ineligible for the CTC, and "the majority of filers in the bottom thirty percent of the distribution are only eligible for a partial credit."
Arguments for expanding the CTC usually assume that the cost of raising a child has increased and affordability has broadly declined. Relatedly, some proponents worry that U.S. fertility is below the replacement rate and believe that expanding government subsidies will meaningfully increase women's lifetime fertility. Still, others focus on how larger income transfers could reduce poverty. The CTC is poorly targeted to meet each of these goals.
Poverty
Because the CTC phases in for filers with income over $2,500 at a 15 percent rate, the credit creates an incentive to work by adding a 15‐​cent subsidy to each additional dollar earned, until the full credit is reached. As is the case with the EITC, the work incentives are often partly or fully offset by the "income effect," under which the subsidy allows a worker to meet his material needs with fewer hours worked.[1] Expanding the dollar value of the credit will have income effects that at least partially offset the work incentive.
To better target the lowest income families, others propose permanently increasing the credit and eliminating the earned income requirement, as was temporarily done in 2021 during the pandemic. Proponents claim that such a permanent change would reduce child poverty by more than 40 percent. Such estimates fail to account for how newly eligible families will change their behavior.
Taking behavioral effects into account, Kevin Corinth, Bruce Meyer, Matthew Stadnicki, and Derek Wu estimate that the larger CTC without income requirements would lead 1.5 million workers to stop working (83 percent of whom would be the sole earner in the household). The net effect of expanding the CTC would reduce overall child poverty by 22 percent and would not reduce deep poverty (50 percent of the poverty line). Results from the Joint Committee on Taxation found that the expanded CTC would result in similar reductions in labor supply.
Corinth and Meyer estimate that any reductions in poverty from a larger CTC that is targeted at families without market income would come at a fiscal cost that is almost double that of other programs, such as food stamps. The CTC is neither an efficient nor an effective policy tool to reduce child poverty.
Cost of raising a child
Although Americans frequently cite affordability concerns as an obstacle to fertility, analysis indicates that family costs have not outpaced incomes and that the cost of raising a child has fallen, not grown, over time.
For example, Angela Rachidi compares family incomes to family‐​related costs and finds that family incomes have grown steadily since the 1980s and costs have generally not outpaced them. Instead, Rachidi suggests that family's increasing expectations around—and consumption of—various goods and services (home size, vehicle ownership, clothing) drive perceptions of affordability decline. Moreover, various measures of social support and community support have declined in ways that may make it more difficult to raise a family.
Economist Jeremy Horpedahl similarly finds that the annual cost of raising a child in the United States has fallen from 21.8 percent of median family income in 1960 to 12.6 percent of median family income in 2020 for two‐​earner families, with the 2020 figure constituting the lowest cost yet (Figure 2). For single‐​earner families, the annual cost of raising a child in the United States fell from 27 percent of median family income in 1960 to 23.7 percent of median family income in 2020.[2]











Some proponents of the CTC argue that the presence of children reduces a family's ability to pay and thus deserves an offsetting subsidy, regardless of whether the cost of raising a child is increasing or decreasing. While children do come with additional costs, so do many other decisions individuals and families make, such as living in a high‐​cost area for economic or educational reasons.
Lastly, subsidies could be counterproductive as they will tend to be captured as higher prices of child‐​related services without supply‐​side reforms to expand access. Although evidence indicates that family affordability is not broadly in decline, the price of core child‐​related goods and services could certainly be lower with regulatory reforms.
Fertility
U.S. fertility is below‐​replacement level and converging with the low fertility rates of other countries. Subsidies for families with children, including the CTC, have been proposed as one way to mitigate this decline. Such financial transfers or cash benefits are especially ineffective at reducing fertility decline.
A review of studies with experimental or quasi‐​experimental designs finds that financial transfers result in a short‐​term increase in births while leaving the long‐​term total unaffected. A United Nations working paper finds that financial transfers' "impact on completed fertility is rather small… Furthermore, the effects of financial transfers usually have the biggest influence on fertility of the low educated, low‐​income, or jobless for whom public transfers are of higher value."
As stated elsewhere, these low‐​income households rarely qualify for the CTC's middle‐ and upper‐​income benefit. The CTC is thus doubly ineffective at increasing fertility: not only do financial transfers have a small or insignificant effect to begin with—altering fertility timing rather than total births—but the CTC does not target the demographic that would be most influenced to increase their fertility behaviors in the presence of financial benefits. Targeting low‐​income households comes with other costs to labor force participation and more fundamental questions about the prudence of governments' involvement in fertility decisions.
A better way?
Although the CTC fails at many objectives, there are numerous options for state, local, and federal policymakers interested in supporting families and making family life easier. To increase affordability, reforms to housing, food, formula, and childcare policy should be enacted. To reduce stress, increase opportunity, and reduce the cost associated with buying a home in the "right" neighborhood, further reforms to educational choice must be adopted.
Parents typically have limited financial resources, but just as importantly, limited time. Enacting reasonable independence laws and reforming home supervision laws would reduce the time cost of parenting while providing growth opportunities for school‐​age kids. Overly burdensome car seat requirements, with little associated safety benefit, should also be reconsidered.
Adopting these reforms would do much more for parents and children than expanding the CTC. On the other hand, expanding CTC spending without deregulating the goods and services that parents demand would be counterproductive and regressive. Ultimately, Congress should repeal the CTC entirely.


[1] Incentives depend on whether a person is not working or working to begin with, and whether the worker's earnings place them on the phase‐​in, plateau, or phase‐​out region of the benefit schedule. See here.


[2] Where single‐​earner families includes both single parent families and married couples where one parent is in the labor force.

The United States has cast a values veil over its multifaceted match of punishments and restrictions with China. When he dismisses Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a "dictator," the Cold War veteran is making a pointed value judgement that puts a moral spin on the relationship. According to many in Washington, there is a new "axis of evil" out there, and China is the fallen angel, supported by Russia, North Korea, and Iran.If global diplomacy was a morality play, there would surely be no actor more devoted to principles and the fight for good over evil than the Vatican, arguably the consummate values-driven state, despite its own cardinal sins in the human resources department. Of course, in the past, the Roman Catholic church has strayed from the straight and narrow and made soul-wrenching deals with the devil — consider Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, the juntas in Chile and Argentina, and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. With China, the Holy See is not trying to drive the Communist "Satan" away or turn it into a paragon of religious freedom. The main mission has been to find ways to build trust and gain confidence. Religious affairs and China specialists have drawn parallels between the Vatican and the Chinese Communist Party in the way they are organized, function and exercise authority, leading some to consider the similarities a source of affinity if not mutual understanding. For example, the city-state's diplomatic efforts have remained consistent and persistent from one papal administration to the next, starting arguably with the progressive world-traveling Paul VI back in the 1970s and through the conservative reigns of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, to the liberal non-judgmental crowd-sourcing faith of Francis. Today, there may be no need to pray to Saint Jude for a papal visit to China. It could happen, although the incumbent shepherd, who requires a wheelchair to meet his flock, would seem physically unable to take on such a pilgrimage — there are some 20 cathedrals and basilicas in the mainland. In September, however, he came close, spending five days in neighboring Mongolia, which has only about 2,000 Catholics, compared to about 12 million in China. If, as many papal succession oddsmakers who try to divine the mysterious ways of the Holy Spirit believe, the next pope is from Asia, then hopes for a China trip will surge. And the momentum of goodwill and history could bring the bishop of the Eternal City to the Forbidden City.The Holy See's diplomatic agenda with China is less complicated than Washington's. The Vatican has simple objectives — to unify the Roman church so there is coherence in its management and in catechism and theology, and to protect Catholics everywhere so that they are free to worship in churches and practice their faith openly. The missionary work here is not as much of a priority, though in other parts of the world, the Church is battling to keep souls on pews and recruit priests.In 2018, the Vatican signed an agreement with Beijing on a process for appointing bishops in the patriotic Chinese church — the open part of the church that pays allegiance to the state. In the order of the mass in the patriotic church, the pope does get mentioned, along with the bishop of the diocese, while the state does not, exactly as is the practice in churches around the world. Catholics in China who are loyal to the pope have worshipped underground in secret, or at least discreet, locations. The Vatican-Beijing agreement on bishops, with the pope having the last word on Chinese-approved candidates, essentially recognizes the spiritual authority of the Holy Father, with the state nominally a regulator or monitor of religious affairs. The hopeful prayer is that if the selection process works smoothly, this would make it possible for underground Chinese Catholics to surface and eventually allow the Vatican to establish formal relations with Beijing. For now, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with and representation in Taiwan as the Republic of China, with a nunciature or embassy in Taipei. There has been no nuncio appointed since 1971; a chargé d'affaires is the highest-ranking resident official. Meanwhile, the Holy See maintains a "study mission" in Hong Kong — a de facto consulate — that is manned by a Vatican diplomat, typically a monsignor, or clergyman of stature.These diplomatic missions are by no means the only means of engagement. Two Chinese bishops, both of whom Pope Francis nominated from a list put forward by Beijing, participated in the October synod convened by the pope to discuss church issues and policy. After the Holy See complained that China had appointed a bishop earlier this year who had not received the papal imprimatur, no Chinese prelates were on the initial list of synod participants. But on the eve of the gathering, the two were included on the final roster. While they turned up, they left midway through the three-week conference. Francis has also reached out to Beijing in other ways. Hong Kong archbishop Stephen Chow, whom the pope recently made a cardinal, visited Beijing in the spring before receiving his red biretta. In November, the head of the Chinese Catholic church, Bishop Joseph Li Shan paid a return visit to Chow's archdiocese. When his plane entered Chinese airspace en route to Mongolia, Francis issued a message of greetings. "I ask Chinese Catholics to be good Christians and good citizens," he said days later to the congregation at a stadium mass in Ulaanbaatar, which Catholics from China and around the region attended. That same month, the Vatican sent its envoy on the Ukraine conflict to China. Cardinal Matteo Zuppi, who had been to Kyiv, Moscow and Washington prior to Beijing, was received by the special envoy for Eurasian affairs, the first-ever meeting in the Chinese capital between the Holy See and a senior Chinese official. This effort was reminiscent of the Holy See's behind-the-scenes efforts to reconcile the U.S. and Cuba. Contrary to its crusading past, the Vatican has been brokering peace among nations since even before the establishment of the city-state in 1929. It was involved in the negotiations to end both world wars and sought to mediate between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.China and the Vatican have engaged in high-level talks before. In 2020, at the Munich Security Conference, Archbishop Paul Gallagher, the Vatican secretary for relations with states, considered to be the Holy See's foreign minister, met Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. The two discussed the agreement on bishops, which has been renewed twice despite disputes over certain appointments, increasing restrictions on religious freedom, and reports of the destruction of churches in parts of China. The pope, who, as his predecessors did, faces criticism, including from his own cardinals for engaging Beijing, acknowledged in a Reuters interview last year that the deal was "slow going," but stressed that the Church had to take a long view and that imperfect dialogue was better than nothing. The diplomacy lesson offered by the world's chief values-card player is that pragmatism, patience and consistency are the best tools for doing the godly work of peace and security building. With China, there will be setbacks to endure and sacrifices to make. A workable deal requires painstaking negotiation and may not be ironclad. But with faith and perseverance, an understanding can be reached — and eventually a miracle might happen.

Is the Ukraine really in a 'stalemate'? Experts warn that it is worse than that.Ukraine's summer counteroffensive, heralded by Kyiv and some Western observers as a turning point in the war, has failed to deal anything approaching a decisive blow to Russian forces in Ukraine. By most measures, Ukraine's Armed Forces (AFU) have made only modest progress in dislodging Russian troops from their entrenched positions in the country's south. When compared against assessed Russian advances in the same period, Ukraine's counteroffensive appears even less impactful. Further still, as observed by Foreign Affairs, "Russia has actually gained more territory over the course of 2023 than Ukraine has." The AFU appears no closer to achieving one of its potential victory conditions — namely, retaking the southern city of Melitopol with the aim of making Russia's presence in Crimea untenable — in late November 2023 than it was at the beginning of summer. The Ukrainians' lack of meaningful battlefield progress, coupled with the war's mounting costs to the country and its Western backers, has increasingly spurred conclusions that the war is headed for — or is already in — a stalemate. These views were lent credence by as authoritative a figure as Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the AFU's Commander-in-Chief, who bluntly stated in an interview with the Economist earlier this month that the war has entered a "stalemate" and warned observers not to expect a "deep and beautiful breakthrough."Yet the widespread view that the war has entered a stalemate, and many of the policy prescriptions stemming from this notion, have invited a growing degree of expert scrutiny. "I see no durable or stable stalemate at this stage," said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The present inability of either side to establish a decisive advantage is not structural. Extrapolating from the present phase of the war into the future is an exercise fraught with error in my view," Kofman added. George Beebe, Director of Grand Strategy at QI, highlighted the perils of extrapolating a "stalemate" from the current lack of significant battlefield movements in Ukraine. "Those who believe this war has settled into a long-term stalemate make the mistake of measuring the relative progress of each side with maps. They see that the frontlines have not moved significantly over the last year and conclude that the sides are stalemated," Beebe told me. "But other metrics, though, paint a different picture. Ukraine is using up its quite limited supplies of men, weapons, and ammunition, and the West cannot provide what Ukraine needs. That is not a formula for stalemate; it's a formula for Ukraine's eventual collapse or capitulation," he continued. A purely cartographical view of the Ukraine war neglects key military factors, including differentials in manpower and resources, attrition rates, and logistics challenges, that many experts say are not unfolding in Ukraine's favor. "Despite everything that's happened, despite all the stuff we have given, the Bradley's, the M1 [Abrams] tanks, Patriot air defense systems, the Challenger tanks, the Leopard [tanks], all those things, nothing changed at all except the casualty count," said former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, Senior Fellow and Military Expert at Defense Priorities and host of the Daniel Davis Deep Dive. "While the lines haven't changed, I don't call it a stalemate because I think time is continuing to work against Ukraine," he said in an interview, noting the stark year-on-year decline in U.S. military aid to Ukraine. He added:"Biden is only shooting for $60 [billion dollars] for the whole FY [fiscal year] instead of $113 billion, so even if gets every penny that he's asking for, it's going to be half what it was last year, and we've given all the excess equipment that we have. Anything we give now comes out of the muscle, out of the bones, and I don't think we're going to give up that much more stuff, certainly not at the level they need to replace all their losses"Davis noted that the continued lack of sufficient output in Western ammunition production means that Ukrainian troops will face mounting munitions shortages. "They're not going to have the ammunition to continue to wage a stalemate," he added. Davis compared dwindling Ukrainian stocks with Russia's expanded domestic production of critical munitions and drones. Kyiv's munitions woes were recently compounded by the diversion of up to tens of thousands of 155mm shells, originally slated for Ukraine, to Israel in the weeks following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War. "The next year, and probably into this winter, I don't think it's unreasonable to expect the Ukrainian army, at some point along the front, to actually buckle," warned Davis. The battlefield trends working in favor of Russia and against Ukraine were likely exacerbated by the AFU's costly counteroffensive. "It does seem like Russia has solidified their terrible personnel, morale, and supply problems enough that you think they have an advantage over time now. I'd say Ukraine had the advantage due to superior morale and support before their predictably ineffective offensive exhausted their manpower and undercut their Western support somewhat," said Ben Friedman, Policy Director at Defense Priorities. "Time is probably on Russia's side, although I wouldn't rule some hidden source of Russian dysfunction that changes things," he added.Though it appears that the initiative is gradually shifting back to Russia, it remains unclear whether Moscow will try to capitalize on Ukraine's setbacks with a major offensive of its own. "I think they are preparing for something larger, but I bet they would wait until the winter to continue to build up," said Davis, noting that Russia appears to be accumulating massive manpower reserves and munitions stockpiles for what may be a "big push" at a later time. "Every category is in Russia's favor and will continue to tilt in Russia's favor, so I just don't think it can continue to stay a stalemate, [but] I just can't say with any confidence whether Russia will choose the strategic path of a WWI model, overwhelming them with enough volume until they buckle, or if they're going to try to bust through somewhere with a big maneuver," he added. Russian forces have launched a renewed push since early October to encircle the heavily fortified city of Avdiivka as a key step on the path to consolidating control over the eastern Donetsk region, but it is too early to assess whether these operations are a prelude to a larger offensive campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, despite the reported reservations of his advisors and the dire concerns publicly voiced by his own Commander-in-Chief, has not backed down from his maximalist vision of victory, defined as the complete expulsion of Russian troops from Ukraine's 1991 borders. Recent suggestions in the West of a stalemate and looming "frozen conflict," though a stark change in tone from the kind of rhetoric that characterized the war as late as the summer of 2023, still does not reflect what experts describe as the severity of challenges facing the Ukrainian war effort. Whether the Kremlin continues to bleed Ukraine white or opts for large-scale offensives, there is a salient threat that, in the absence of diplomatic off-ramps, Russia's growing advantages may eventually reach a critical mass and translate into the ability to impose a grim fait accompli on Kyiv and its Western partners.

Power shifts: leading, following, sharing, solidarity, sponsorship, mentoring… Organisations, whether working in the public, private or third sector, are increasingly being pushed to have their leaders more closely reflect the demographic profiles of the communities in which they work. The discussion started with women on boards, and in many ways that remains the dominant focus, but there are increasing calls for broader understandings of board diversity than solely gender (Sealy et al., 2009a). However, while the challenge is not new, progress remains slow, even in terms of women's representation (as a majority minority), let alone in terms of other minority groups, and the question remains – how to change the demographics of the leaders of organisations. Drawing from the work done on women and leadership we can see how the arguments for gender equity in organisational leadership are well-rehearsed, from those arguing on the basis of human rights and sensible talent management (World Economic Forum, 2014) to those who argue that gender-balanced boards outperform those which include none, or very limited numbers of women (Wiley and Monllor-Tormos, 2018). While the strategies for change have ranged from individual development, through equality policy measures (Ely and Meyerson, 2000), to recognising the need to transform organisations, or society (Martin, 2003) and a slightly separate, but vibrant set of conversations about the need to challenge and change practices of leadership and leadership development (Chetkovich and Kunreuther, 2004, Ganz, 2010, Western, 2008). My doctoral research looked at a practice named by the global women's organisation which was being studied as "intergenerational-shared leadership". A concept developed within the organisation to support their constitution requirement that 25% of board members should be young women (defined as 30 years of age or younger). However, like many other organisations with an intention to make their boards more reflective of their political commitments and the communities they serve, there is a gap between goals and outcomes. In considering how the more progress could be made in not only realising the young women's quota, but ensuring those young women were then able to exercise the powers associated with being a board member, the question of followership arose. In particular, whether developing an understanding of followership as an active and critical process that deliberately engaged established women leaders to support the emergence of new, and particularly young, women leaders within the organisation through not only sharing leadership, but being willing to follow (Lewis, 2017). This idea relies on an understanding that leadership development is a collective organisational practice involving both leaders and follows, rather than solely focused on individual leaders (Day, 2000). A practice of active and critical followership would acknowledge the power of followers, particularly within democratic organisations, to help shape a collective practice of leadership within an organisation. However, the idea of labelling this as a practice of followership or in fact suggesting people consider themselves followers is neither wholly uncontested within the organisation, nor amongst other leadership scholars (Ford and Harding, 2018). Responding to a call for papers for another conference the practice of active and critical followership was reshaped as an expression of solidarity (Oosterlynck et al., 2016, Segal, 2013), and that has led to a wondering of how else the work of established organisational leaders in helping new organisational leaders to emerge, particularly from under-represented groups could be framed. Particularly, whether there were other concepts that might be more acceptable and potentially less confrontational, without losing the sense of a shift in power that the idea of active and critical followership was meant to imply – not a loss of power, but a shift. Thus the central idea to be developed and explored through this paper is to identify other concepts that have been developed to facilitate established organisational leaders supporting the emergence and progression of newer leaders, such as mentoring or sponsorship and to consider how they might differ from the idea of offering followership or shared leadership, and particularly consider how the underlying approaches to power (Lukes, 1974, Veneklasen and Miller, 2002) differ across those concepts. Mentoring has long been called upon as a practice whereby established organisational leaders can either lend their experience to help under-represented groups rise through the organisation (Chao et al., 1992, Sealy et al., 2009b). Within my research organisation mentoring is often discussed as a practice within "intergenerational-shared leadership", however there is also a recognition that mentoring can often serve to reinforce age and power hierarchies. So, if mentoring isn't suitable, then perhaps sponsorship (Ibarra et al., 2010), as a practice distinct and perhaps more recognising of power and more outward facing than mentoring. Or returning to the work of activists, in addition to the idea of solidarity, there is also a concept of allyship (Droogendyk et al., 2016), which importantly for this discussion explicitly recognises the role of privilege. As this abstract is drafted the outcome of the intended exploration is not known. However, it is hoped that by considering the role of power within practices such as mentoring, sponsorship, solidarity and allyship that some useful ideas can be offered in reflection on both theory and practice. CHAO, G. T., M., W. P. & GARDENER, P. D. 1992. Formal and informal mentorships: A comparison on mentoring functions and contrast with nonmentored counterparts. Personnel Pscyhology, 45, 619-636. CHETKOVICH, C. & KUNREUTHER, F. 2004. Changing the World from the Bottom Up: Leadership in Grassroots Social-Change Organizations. Center for Public Leadership Working Paper Series [Online], 04-02. Available: http://18.7.29.232/handle/1721.1/55924. DAY, D. V. 2000. Leadership development: A review in context. The Leadership Quarterly, 11, 581-613. DROOGENDYK, L., WRIGHT, S. C., LUBENSKY, M. & LOUIS, W. R. 2016. Acting in solidarity: Cross‐group contact between disadvantaged group members and advantaged group allies. Journal of Social Issues, 72, 315-334. ELY, R. J. & MEYERSON, D. E. 2000. Advancing gender equity in organizations: The challenge and importance of maintaining a gender narrative. Organization, 7, 589-608. FORD, J. & HARDING, N. 2018. Followers in leadership theory: Fiction, fantasy and illusion. Leadership, 14, 3-24. GANZ, M. 2010. Leading change: leadership, organization, and social movements. In: NOHRIA, N. & KHURANA, R. (eds.) Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. IBARRA, H., CARTER, N. M. & SILVA, C. 2010. Why men still get more promotions than women. Harvard Business Review, 88, 80-85. LEWIS, E. 2017. Encouraging leaders to be followers too: strengthening young women's leadership in an intergenerational organisation. PhD, Lancaster University. LUKES, S. 1974. Power : A Radical View, London, Macmillan. MARTIN, J. 2003. Feminist Theory and Critical Theory: Unexplored Synergies. In: ALVESSON, M. & WILLMOTT, H. (eds.) Studying Management Critically. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. OOSTERLYNCK, S., LOOPMANS, M., SCHUERMANS, N., VANDENABEELE, J. & ZEMNI, S. 2016. Putting flesh to the bone: looking for solidarity in diversity, here and now. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39, 764-782. SEALY, R., DOLDOR, E. & VINNICOMBE, S. 2009a. Increasing diversity on public and private sector boards - Part 1 - How diverse are boards and why? London, UK: International Centre for Women Leadership - Cranfield School of Management. SEALY, R., DOLDOR, E. & VINNICOMBE, S. 2009b. Increasing diversity on public and private sector boards. Part 2 - What is being done to improve diversity on boards and how effective is this? London, UK: International Centre for Women Leaders, Cranfield School of Management. SEGAL, L. 2013. Today, Yesterday & Tomorrow: Between Rebellion and Coalition Building. In: ROWBOTHAM, S., SEGAL, L. & WAINWRIGHT, H. (eds.) Beyond the fragments: Feminism and the making of socialism. London: Merlin Press. VENEKLASEN, L. & MILLER, V. 2002. Power and Empowerment. In: VENEKLASEN, L. & MILLER, V. (eds.) A New Weave of Power, People & Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation. Warwickshire, UK: Practical Action Publishing. WESTERN, S. 2008. Leadership [electronic resource] : a critical text, London, SAGE Publications Pty Ltd. WILEY, C. & MONLLOR-TORMOS, M. 2018. Board gender diversity in the STEM&F sectors: the critical mass required to drive firm performance. 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This thesis is focused on inland sand ecosystems, which are among the most threatened grassland types in Central Europe. These landscapes are highly fragmented and are inhabited by many endangered species in spatially isolated habitats. Recently, populations of the rare site-specific plant species decreased, the vegetation density increased and the typically open habitats became more and more ruderalised. As a reason, an enhanced nitrogen deposition and the abandonment of former extensively used grassland were discussed. Consequently, spontaneous succession can appear. To maintain community structure and population dynamics, different nature conservation management methods were introduced; in particular extensive sheep-grazing regimes became a suitable management tool in dry open habitats. The aim of this thesis was to elucidate the impact of crucial abiotic and biotic factors on succession in threatened inland sand ecosystems in a successional gradient. The main study site was the "Ehemaliger August-Euler-Flugplatz von Darmstadt", a nature protection area in the northern Upper Rhine Valley of Germany. The characteristic plant communities of this site are considered highly threatened types in Central Europe according to the EU Habitats directive. The vegetation complex consists in the eastern part of early-successional stages of a pioneer Koelerion glaucae community, while in the western part mid-successional stages of Armerio-Festucetum trachyphyllae vegetation can be found. The substrates are primarily calcareous sands (Koelerion glaucae) with slight acidification of the topsoil (Armerio-Festucetum). The pre-grazing state in this system was characterised by a mowing regime during the military use and afterwards only by very extensive mowing and mulching. Sheep grazing was established in the area in the years 1999/2000. Nutrient increase, e.g. by atmospheric nitrogen deposition or transfer of soil particles, is a major threat for many types of endangered open vegetation. As a model system we used threatened sandy grassland, where a nutrient addition experiment in a five-fold replicated randomised block design was started in the year 2000. We analysed the whole data set for a nine-year period and ran extended approaches in the years 2007 to 2009. We added nitrogen in low dose (n) to simulate an enhanced atmospheric deposition, nitrogen in high dose (N), nitrogen in high dose in combination with different micro- or macronutrients (NP, NPK, NPKM), phosphorus (P), and a carbon source (C) to immobilise plant-available nitrogen to our experimental plots. Additionally, seed limitation was tested by assessing the local seed rain. The data set was analysed by means of detrended correspondence analysis (DCA) and linear mixed models. The DCA revealed two successional pathways: one line typical for threatened sandy grassland, and another one which was accelerated and clearly separated from the typical one. These separations were only detectable after a "lag phase" of about five years. As a general trend phytodiversity diminished on all plots, but the decrease was significantly stronger on plots with high-dose N, which have also shown higher turnover ratios. Site-specific species from pioneer stages (strategy type "stress-tolerators" and "ruderals") and "Red Data" species decreased with nutrient addition. Additionally, we observed an increase in cover of tall plants, geo- and hemicryptophytes, "competitors/stress-tolerators/ruderals" and competitive grasses on plots with high-dose N. The above-ground phytomass production of phanerogams was up to 3-fold higher following N, NP, NPK or NPKM treatment, but it was significantly lower in the case of cryptogams. In contrast, low-dose nitrogen and phosphorus only had no impact on any species except legumes, which were facilitated predominantly by P. The extended approach has shown that most plants were responsive to nutrient addition and grew taller or set more fruits or seeds. In the local seed rain many autochthonous and allochthonous species were found. Anyhow, most abundant species were non-target species and even Calamagrostis epigejos caryopses were found. It could be shown by a field experiment that floristic structure, successional lines, phytodiversity and plant strategies of the studied system changed after a five-year period and a threatened vegetation type was gradually replaced by one with dominant and/or competitive species. These findings emphasise the importance of long-term observations for the study of effects caused by nutrients. I used a long-term field experiment lasting 10 years for further investigations concerning the effects of sheep grazing as a type of moderate disturbance. As "experiments by nature" happened during this time period, we were also able to study severe biotic (rabbit grazing) and abiotic (drought) disturbances, examining the recovery and resilience of the system after these severe disturbances. Within a six-fold replicated randomised split-plot design, 25-m² plots of Armerio-Festucetum trachyphyllae vegetation were studied from 2000-2009 in the northern upper Rhine valley (Germany). We analysed sheep-grazed and non-grazed plots (both with very low rabbit impact until the first half of 2005). In 2005 we established an additional plot type without rabbit and sheep grazing. Severe rabbit impact was studied in detail from 2006 to 2008 concerning flower resources, seed production, endozoochorous seed dispersal and phytomass extraction. Data were analysed by ordination methods and mixed linear models. Moderate disturbance by sheep grazing maintained species diversity in times of low rabbit densities. Severe drought in 2003 resulted in a marked decrease of species numbers, but the system recovered already in 2004. The subsequently analysed "high rabbit impact" resulted in decreases of species numbers, cover of bryophytes, flower quantities and seed content in faeces. Species numbers also declined on plots without rabbit grazing, but for different reasons. Shifts in phenological phases due to rabbit grazing were not observed, but the sum of flowers and number of flowering species decreased. After the decline of the rabbit population, species numbers slightly increased in 2009. Non-grazed plots showed an increase of litter. Despite severe disturbances by rabbits or drought, the community structure was relatively stable, especially in the case of non-ruderalised plots, and showed only slight changes. We developed a conceptual model showing the high potential of recovery and resilience even in the case of severe disturbances. Besides direct grazing effects like the creation of gaps by extensive livestock grazing, previous studies have shown benefits of seed dispersal (endo-, epizoochory), but little was known about post-dispersal processes such as trampling effects. We investigated the role of sheep trampling for the post-dispersal fate of dung-embedded seeds in sheep and rabbit dung and hypothesised a positive impact for the establishment of seedlings as a consequence of cracking the dung pellets. Sheep and rabbit dung was collected from threatened sandy grassland, and its seed potential was tested in a climate room. In a factorial field experiment we assessed the effects of trampling (using sheep-hoof replicas) and dung type on seedling emergence and fruiting success. For both dung types seedling emergence in the field was only 5 or 7 % of the potential without trampling but 18 or 14 % with trampling. Plots with trampled sheep or rabbit dung both showed significantly more seedlings (3.6- or 2.1-fold), more species (2.4- or 1.9-fold) and more fruiting seedlings (3.9- or 2.6-fold) and fruiting species (2.1- or 1.9-fold) compared to non-trampled dung plots. However, not only target species profited from trampling, but also non-target species. This is disadvantageous regarding nature conservation aims, but the proportion of target species was clearly increased by trampling. Sheep play a multifaceted role in dispersal processes: after endozoochoric transport they act as a sort of "gardener" not only for sheep-dispersed seeds, but also for those dispersed by rabbits.

A substantial debate about the approaches employed by courts to interpret statutes and regulations has developed during the last decade. Some have argued that the search for a statute's meaning and purpose should focus on the text, itself, and should not include consulting legislative history. In contrast, others have argued that it is difficult to determine the meaning of a statute without consulting legislative history to determine the legislature's purpose for the statute. The debate about the appropriate method for interpreting statutes underlies a crisis in the administration of tax law. The recent proliferation of tax shelters has at least in part been facilitated by the ascendancy of textualism. Our conversations with practitioners indicate that tax advisors have become more aggressive in structuring transactions that comply with the form of the tax statutes even though the transactions may be highly questionable in light of the legislation's history or underlying purpose. The result has been a cottage industry where investment banks and accounting firms market tax shelters that triumph in form, but not substance, at the expense of the fisc. Because most tax shelter activity is hidden, it is difficult to ascertain its revenue impact. It is estimated that tax shelters reduced tax revenues by approximately $10 to $24 billion in 1999. In addition, practitioners and government officials worry that the use of shelters is eroding confidence in the tax system. Although the majority of courts have not adopted textualism, the legal community's acceptance of textualism as a plausible method of interpretation has dramatically affected the practice of tax law. Taxpayers often invest in tax shelters based upon the opinion of counsel assessing the probability that the desired tax results from the transaction, if challenged, will be sustained. These opinion letters are essential to attract investors because they protect taxpayers from various penalties that otherwise might be imposed if the Service successfully challenges the transaction. Under the textualist approach, it is much easier for an attorney to write a favorable opinion for transactions that are designed to comply with the letter of the law, but not its spirit, for at least two reasons. First, the attorney is permitted to ignore, or at least downplay, any legislative history that would argue against, or undercut, the desired tax results. Second, under a textualist approach, it is arguable that various well-accepted judicial doctrines, such as the business purpose doctrine, are suspect. At the extreme, a textualist might argue that these doctrines are the product of judicial activism and either should no longer be followed, or at a minimum should not be extended into new areas of the law. Tax shelter promoters have exploited the move towards textualism by designing transactions that comply with the letter of the law, but that generate results clearly never contemplated by Congress or the Treasury. Some promoters believe that the more detailed and complex the underlying law is, the more likely it is that a transaction complying with the letter of the law will be respected. One area in tax law that is particularly detailed and complex is Subchapter K, the partnership tax provisions. Subchapter K also has several special rules not otherwise available in the Internal Revenue Code. It is, therefore, not surprising that Subchapter K has become the vehicle of choice for a wide variety of abusive transactions. Transactions are designed so that a partnership is created or joined just to take advantage of these special rules (reverse engineered transactions). In an attempt to stem the tide, the IRS adopted a general anti-abuse rule for Subchapter K. This rule requires that the provisions of Subchapter K be interpreted consistent with the intent of subchapter K. Oversimplified, the regulations assert that there is an overall legislative intent underlying Subchapter K, and if a partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a transaction to substantially reduce federal taxes in a manner inconsistent with this intent, the transaction may be recast. The regulations make clear that for a transaction to pass muster, doctrines that originated with the judiciary, i.e., the requirements of a business purpose, economic substance, and substance over form, must be taken into account. In addition, the regulations require that the purposivist method of statutory interpretation be used to interpret Subchapter K. The anti-abuse regulations caused an unprecedented furor within the tax bar. They have been severely criticized by academics and practitioners alike on a variety of bases, the most damning of which is that Treasury lacked the authority to promulgate the rules and that therefore they are not valid. Indeed, it is fair to say that there is a general consensus that the partnership anti-abuse regulations are an extreme example of administrative overreaching. We disagree. Although we do not endorse all the policy choices in the anti-abuse regulations, we believe that they are not only valid, but suggest a way in which transactions that are the product of reverse engineering can and should be attacked, both within and without Subchapter K. Initially, it may seem inappropriate for Treasury to instruct the judiciary on how and when the courts should apply judicial doctrines and what tools they should use in interpreting statutes. After all, as every law student knows, [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Where does Treasury get the authority to instruct a court as to which method of interpretation it should use to interpret a tax statute? On reflection, however, we believe that Treasury acted well within its authority under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and was simply filling a gap in the statute left by Congress. The judicial doctrines that are implicit in the intent of subchapter K were well-developed when Subchapter K was first enacted in 1954 and continue to be applied in a variety of contexts by the courts. At that time, however, it was not clear exactly how and when these doctrines should be applied in the context of Subchapter K. There is little doubt Congress could have clarified this issue by statute. It could have insisted that these doctrines (or variations thereof) be applied with full force, or it could have forbidden their application altogether. Congress, however, chose not to address this issue, leaving a gap in the statute. Under current administrative law principles, this silence constitutes an implied delegation of authority by Congress to Treasury to fill that gap. In addition to being valid, we also believe that, as a general proposition, it is sound tax policy to use broad standards to administer the tax law. Historically this had been accomplished by the courts through the use of these judicial doctrines. Although the ascendancy of textualism cast doubt on the continuing viability of the doctrines, Treasury eliminated that doubt by promulgating these regulations (if valid), and requiring lawyers and courts to consider the intent of subchapter K. This approach allows the IRS to use broad standards to administer the tax law in place of a collection of narrow rules that must be constantly changed in a hopeless attempt to keep pace with the latest tax gimmick. To assure proper consideration of these doctrines by tax advisors, we recommend that the IRS amend its standards for practice to require advisors opining on the validity of tax shelters to apply the doctrines to the specific facts of the tax shelter in their opinion letter.

There is increasing evidence suggesting that climate change will negatively impact agricultural production in South Asia. Decreased domestic production may make South Asian countries more dependent on imports. The extent to which South Asia will need to increase its imports as a result of climate change will presumably depend on the degree to which the latter will affect domestic output. The effects of climate change on agriculture may well differ substantially for individual South Asian countries and indeed for regions within a given country which can be approximated by food production units. This calls for an analysis of climate change effects on trade flows under alternative trade policy regimes both for agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. The specific objectives of the paper include the following: analyze the extent to which agricultural production in South Asia and elsewhere in the world may be affected by different scenarios regarding climate change; analyze the extent to which changes in domestic production in South Asia resulting from climate change will lead to increased demand for imports by South Asian countries; analyze the effects of increased import demand in South Asia and changing exportable surpluses elsewhere on world market prices of major agricultural commodities consumed in South Asia; to the extent that South Asian governments allow transmission of changes in world market prices to domestic prices, analyze the potential welfare effects of changes in the latter; analyze if, and to what extent, worldwide trade liberalization and implementation of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) will dampen the effects of climate change on domestic agricultural prices in South Asia. In this context, the report is organized as follows: chapter one gives introduction. Chapter two describes the methodology used - with particular attention to how different models and modeling techniques are linked to produce an as accurate as possible assessment based on state-of-the-art knowledge. Chapter three provides an up-to-date analysis of trade flows and policies, and production patterns for key food products in South Asia to explain the context in which climate change is taking place. Chapter four describes the climate change scenarios and illustrates their consequences for crop yields at a global level and for South Asia - and in particular shows the vulnerability of the region to these changes. Baseline design, simulations, and results are discussed in chapter five. The final chapter six provides a short summary, discusses the limitations of the analysis, and derives suggestions and guidelines for future research.

In El Salvador, the banking safety net emergency liquidity assistance, resolution and deposit insurance- faces particular challenges given it operate in the context of official dollarization. The economy was officially dollarized in 2000 with the adoption of the law on financial integration and of the United States (US) dollar as legal tender. Dollarization constrains a central bank's ability to act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) and provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). This note discusses the weaknesses of the current framework and recommendations to ensure the safety net functions more effectively and efficiently. To address systemic liquidity risk in the context of official dollarization, the Banco Central de Reservas (BCR) should be provided with more powers and funds to provide emergency liquidity assistance to banks. The bank resolution scheme, which has not been tested, and the deposit insurance fund, which has insufficient funds, both need to be strengthened. Appropriate roles and formal mechanisms to monitor and manage systemic risk and events should be put in place. However the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions involved in the safety net are not always consistent with their objectives, powers, and mandates, while a well-specified strategy to preserve the stability of the system (e.g., with clear responsibilities for monitoring systemic risks and taking macro prudential decisions) and definition or formal measurement of systemic risk have not yet been established. Furthermore, coordination with foreign supervisors of international banks does not include designing contingency plans to address a possible cross-border event. This paper is divided into following four parts: part one is introduction; part two gives systemic liquidity management and emergency liquidity assistance; part three is bank resolution and deposit insurance; and part four gives crisis management arrangements.

Borders and mobility in arts, history, and well-being -- Comparison of curcumin content and antioxidant activity of turmeric samples collected from Indonesia and Thailand: Considerations for the future sharing of the natural resource A. Dechakhamphu, J. Junlatat, M. Agil, B. Prajogo and N. Pursariwati -- Efficiency of household accounting: A case study of a model village in Thailand N. Thongprasert and S. Mala -- Forecasts for trans-border mobility: A case study of agricultural products imported from Laos to Thailand via the Chong-Mek border N. Nanthasamroeng -- Social class representation: FoodTruck Culinary Surabaya community R. Rahartika -- The Bawean ethnic language: Attitude and diglossic community culture S.W.B. Utami -- Multi-ethnic and religious conflicts in media reported by international online media: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/statue-of-chinese-god-guan-yu-stokestension-in-indonesia P. Wibawanto -- Demystifying Nusantara A. Bahroni -- Commercial activities and development of the towns in the west side of Banda Sea Indonesia, early twentieth century L.O. Rabani -- Borders and mobility in literature and culture -- Remixed Javaneseness: Lyrics of levelling adiluhung non-adiluhung E.D. Riyanto -- The expression of cultural values in Sundanese manuscripts of the Mandala period H.M. Lyra, D. Indira and T. Muhtadin -- Criticisms of the depiction of freedom of characters in Dewi Lestaris novel entitled Supernova: Kesatria, Putri dan Bintang Jatuh M.N.A.T. Gemilang -- Translation ideology recommendation for translating cultural issues in children comics from English into Indonesian: Crossing the borders between language and culture of SLT and TLT Nurlaila, M. Nababan, Djatmika and R. Santosa -- The directors responses and the shaping of Indonesias identity in the European film festival funding R. Ihwanny and M. Budiman -- Children in Indonesian cinema during colonialism: The border of cross-identity S. Wibawa -- Mimicking East Asian popular culture products: Temporality of urban global culture in Indonesia S.M.G. Tambunan -- Representation of nostalgia for home in diasporic poetry: An analysis of selected poems of mahtem shiferraw S. Elias -- Returned participants Perception of the Sarjana Mengajar di Daerah Terluar, Terdepan dan Tertinggal (SM-3T) program Y.S. Amalia, C.S. Budiono and R. Andini -- Capital reconversion practices by Srintil in the novel Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk T.W. Iswara -- Borders and mobility in language and multilingualism -- Morphological system of Javanese verbs in the border area of East Java (Tapal Kuda) A.S. Rohmah, Mahdar and W.A. Sari -- Javanese Unggah-Ungguh level used in some rubrics of the Jaya Baya and Panjebar Semangat magazines B.D.Y. Puteri -- The role of language in border relations (Desa Tajungan Kec Kamal, Kab Bangkalan, Madura) D.R. Sugiharti, Miladiyah and Y.S. Amalia -- Indirect criticism in the ethnic Madurese community: Its various semantic formulas, lingual markers, and context of use E. Jauhari and D. Purnanto -- Multilingualism and mobility: Defining borders within Surabaya city through the linguistic cityscape E. Rusnaningtias -- Border or beyond: Dangdut jazzs reception and liminality analysis in the ITS Jazz community F.Z. Putri and B.A. Sansoko -- Culture shifting from wearing sarong to wearing trousers amongst the people of Bangkalan Madura I. Husna -- Linguistic landscapes: A study of human mobility and identity change K. Artawa and N.W. Sartini -- Language transfer in Javanese video clips on YouTube: A sociolinguistic analysis of Cak Ikins Culoboyo videos S.D.S. Tungga and T. Suhardijanto -- Linguistic landscape as a social identity construction of the public space: The case of Batu District Y. Indarti -- Borders and mobility in education and policies -- Policy implementation for fulfilling 30% quota of womens representation in the 2014 legislative member election: A study on the PDI-P and the PPP in Palangka Raya R.S. Tulis -- Empowering SMEs and cooperatives: Export capacity building in the era of AEC trade liberalisation Koesrianti, D. Puspitawati and N.A. Kurniasari -- Development of an exercise program to enhance the ability of students in Thai massage classroom: Considerations for promoting traditional medicine education at national and international levels K. Peng-ngummuang, K. Noiming, P. Promsit, S. Srisanga and J. Junlatat -- Gaming is learning: No more border between children with and without autism spectrum disorder L.H. Suryawardhani and Y.S. Amalia -- Homeschooling as an alternative education system in Surabaya Wulansary -- Borders and mobility in gender, identity, and behaviorism -- Environmentalism and consumerism: The contradiction of globalization in behavior consumption of the urban middle class in Surabaya, Indonesia D.A. Arimbi, N. Wulan and F. Colombijn -- The enforcement of state territoriality and shifting on borderlanders mobility: The case of IndonesiaMalaysia border in Sebatik Island L. Puryanti -- Civil society and the model of Dayak identity struggle in Central Kalimantan: A framework of neo-GramscianTocquevillian analysis A. Haridison and J.R.A. Sandi -- Girl marriage and marginalisation of women in the cities of East Java E. Susanti -- Ajhemo practice among Madurese women and its correlation with independently healthy life behaviour S. Ratnawati -- Muslimah identity on the Wardah Muslim-segmented cosmetic products N.C. Fajri -- Borders and mobility in maritime, spatial movement and locality -- Movements around island and waterfront reclamation projects T. Kerr -- Maintaining expressions of prohibition (pamali) as signaling the existence of tengger communitys culture D. Handayani and M. Lutfi -- Multiculturalism and local wisdom in the Gilimanuk-Bali community I.B.P. Manuaba -- Cultural capital of traders on Pahing Sunggingan market in Boyolali J.S. Gumilang, M. Wijaya, B. Haryono and M. Si -- The Legend of Nusantara: Disguising the boundary between locality and globality in Indoeskrim Nusantaras commercial advertisement Milawaty -- Urban environmental quality and human well-being assessment: Towards walkable neighborhood (A case study of Dr. Soetomo Hospital, Surabaya) E.T. Sunarti, A.B. Tribhuwaneswari, O.E. Rachmalisa and R.P. Kurniasanti -- Trialectic city space based on an immigrant view through urbanisation: A study on settlement migrants in Surabaya city I.Y.A. Rohmah -- The influence of social mobility on cultural values: A case study on Chinese-Indonesians in Surabaya, Indonesia preliminary research R.A. Saputra -- Local government capacity in managing fishery conflict in the IndonesiaMalaysia maritime border zone M.A.P. Sari, M.R.K. Muluk and Sujarwoto -- Coffee stall: Politics identity of Cangkrukan L. Santoso and M.G.R. Pandin -- Borders and mobility in media, technology and global research -- Awareness and preparation for cross-border future careers under the one belt, one road initiative proposed by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC): A case study of students majoring in Chinese at UBRU, Thailand and HUFL, Vietnam S. Songsukrojiroad and L.L. Chuyen -- Articulating Indonesian migrant domestic workers activism in Hong Kong and the use of communication technology I. Wahyudi -- Interagency collaborative team in broadcasting management at the border area of Sintang Regency, Indonesia L.H. Kurnia, I.W. Midhio and T.B. Prasetyo -- Border broadcasts and national identity representation in Entikong, West Kalimantan L. Tjahjandari, T.I. Setyani and L.H. Kurnia -- The slut-shaming phenomenon in social media: A case study on female English literature students of Binus University P. Ayuningtyas and A.A.T. Kariko -- Mobile life, communication technology, and disreputable literacy S. Herminingrum.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is currently in Pyongyang for a summit with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, marking their second visit in just nine months and Putin's first trip to North Korea in 24 years. Not just symbolic, the summit is anticipated to bring noteworthy advancements in Russia-North Korea strategic cooperation. According to various reports, Putin and Kim will be seeking to elevate their bilateral relationship to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," enhancing the overall military, economic, and diplomatic ties between their two countries. While the details of the summit's agenda and outcomes remain unclear, both sides' situational needs and interests provide some hints. Ever since its negotiations with the United States fell through at the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea has prioritized meeting the necessary conditions to endure a prolonged confrontation with the United States. Pyongyang has viewed the ruptured relations between Washington and Moscow following the latter's invasion of Ukraine, alongside the heightened geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, as opportunities to pull Moscow and Beijing closer to its side and to resist U.S.-mobilized containment. Indeed, Pyongyang has frequently framed the current state of international relations as a "new Cold War," emphasizing greater cooperation with Moscow and Beijing to resist Washington. Besides attaining more Russian food and energy aid to alleviate his country's chronic resource shortages, Kim would be particularly interested in gaining substantially greater military support from Putin. Since Beijing remains reluctant to cooperate with Pyongyang militarily — perhaps wanting to avoid provoking the U.S. and its regional allies — Kim may be especially determined to make progress with Putin in the military dimension. As some observers have suggested, it would be ideal for Kim to get Putin to agree on a mutual defense treaty with an automatic military intervention clause. Kim would also surely want Putin's commitment to assisting North Korea's development of advanced military capabilities, such as reconnaissance satellites and tactical nuclear submarines. However, it is uncertain to what extent Putin would be willing to accommodate Kim's demands. Moscow has an interest in forging closer military ties with Pyongyang, but there are limits. Russia is entering its third year of prosecuting what is largely an attritional war in Ukraine, characterized by heavy artillery expendage rates. Though its domestic munitions industry is outproducing the West by a considerable degree — Russian troops fire around 10,000 shells per day, which is roughly five times more than Ukraine's shell usage — Russia's military finds itself in constant need of rounds to maintain and potentially grow its current firepower advantage over Ukrainian forces. It is therefore unsurprising that Moscow seeks to accompany its domestic production ramp with concerted efforts to procure munitions from willing foreign partners. According to estimates by the South Korean Defense Ministry, North Korea has provided Russia with an estimated 7,000 containers of munitions and other military equipment to date. Putin stressed ahead of the trip that Moscow and Pyongyang are committed to fighting Western sanctions that he described as "illegal, unilateral restrictions" and to develop commercial systems "that are not controlled by the West." These joint efforts complement Russia's earlier efforts to degrade the international sanctions regime on North Korea, coming on the heels of Moscow's decision to veto the renewal of a UN Panel of Experts (PoE) responsible for monitoring the enforcement of sanctions and to block the imposition of additional sanctions on North Korea over its previous ballistic missile tests. Russia's burgeoning relations with North Korea also provide Moscow with an opportunity to make good on Putin's earlier threat to retaliate against the West for aiding Ukraine by supplying third parties with weapons that can be used to strike Western targets. But such a move risks upsetting Russia's stable relationship with South Korea, which would see its core security interests suffer in the event of a North Korean strike on U.S. assets in South Korea. Russia supplying North Korea with advanced missile and nuclear technologies, which would pose consequential threats to South Korean security, would also be considered crossing a red line for Seoul, prompting it to take actions that would undermine Russian security interests, such as providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. Provoking Seoul in this way contradicts what has so far been the Kremlin's approach of deepening the Russia-North Korea relationship without pushing Moscow into an overtly hostile footing with South Korea, which has refrained from directly supplying Ukraine with weapons despite Western pressure. "Just like in our relations with Italy, we do not see any Russophobic stance when working with the South Korean government. Neither are there any weapons supplies to the conflict zone. We highly appreciate that," Putin said earlier this month. China is North Korea's largest economic and geopolitical partner, and does not necessarily want to see North Korea diversify its trade, diplomatic, and security portfolio in ways that reduce its influence over Pyongyang. Moscow, which has become increasingly dependent on China in the face of continued Western sanctions and attempts at diplomatic isolation, has an interest in signaling its diplomatic clout to Beijing by engaging a traditional Chinese partner without China's explicit approval.But there are clear limits to this kind of posturing. Moscow is keenly aware it is in no position to overtly antagonize China, which poses an additional reason why Russia, as noted by South Korea's Defense Minister earlier this week, is unlikely to take the step of transferring its more advanced military technologies to North Korea. Putin's visit to Pyongyang will presumably serve to reinforce Russia and North Korea's comprehensive strategic ties, potentially introducing new joint efforts by the two countries to cooperate on navigating their strategic challenges, including overcoming U.S.-mobilized sanctions and filling each other's military deficiencies to some extent. It remains to be seen if Moscow will bear the risks and costs associated with pursuing a deeper form of Russia-North Korea security cooperation, which notably include drawing Beijing's ire. If the Kremlin goes down this path, it could pose a new regional challenge for Washington and its allies that is distinct from the China-U.S. rivalry in the Asia-Pacific and may spark calls for additional American reassurances to South Korea.

Scratch the fantasy that Louisiana big government
advocates had that recent new spending commitments wouldn't put the state into future
fiscal distress, exacerbated by wasteful Medicaid policy decisions designed more
to expand the number of people on this dole rather than to help the state's
most vulnerable citizens.

Last
month, the Division of Administration presented updated financial numbers
reflecting trends in revenue collection and spending since the Revenue
Estimating Conference last set such numbers in stone in May. These will go into
one of the two recommendations for revenues and expenses certified by the REC close
to year's end.

While this report
predicted a surplus of nearly $150 million for the next fiscal year of 2024-25,
the bottom drops out in the next two, where both FY 2026 and FY 2027 are
forecast to produce each nearly a half a billion dollar deficits. The end of
the 2016 and 2018 sales tax increase of 0.45 percent mainly drives the new gap.
Worse, tax changes from the 2023 legislative session have yet to be factored in,
which could have a further negative impact.

This wasn't music to the ears of a number of legislative
leaders who recklessly
drove new commitments into the FY 23 budget, rather than bank funds for the
well-known rougher period ahead as a subset of House members had advocated Some
had fantasized openly that the false economy that had produced surpluses courtesy
of federal government hyper debt-fueled Wuhan coronavirus pandemic transfer
payments would continue to an extent to prevent this hard landing, perhaps
masking an agenda of locking in this spending to goad future legislators into
having to renege on termination of the tax increase.

Yet if that revenue loss proves most problematic –
in fact, combining the tax rollback with the withering of the false economy
leaves the state with half a billion fewer bucks in revenues in FY 27 as
compared to the recently-completed FY 23 – another huge expenditure rise is a
close second. Medicaid spending, with increases largely driven by Democrat Gov.
John Bel Edwards'
decision (with authority granted to him by the previous Legislature) to expand it
beyond the truly needy, is forecast to cost nearly a quarter of a billion
dollars higher this fiscal year than previously thought and will increase
steadily to nearly $700 million more by FY 27. And this after an ongoing
process to unwind otherwise-ineligible recipients allowed to stay on the rolls
as a result of the pandemic that should reduce costs by hundreds of millions of
dollars annually.

Medicaid costs continue to soar, with the latest FY
21 figures showing 42 percent of the state's population enrolled in it to
the tune of $6,649 each, meaning then over a third of every budgetary dollar
spent or $14 billion went to the program – and in terms of state dollars, about
a fifth. The rush to squeeze in as many people as possible – optional expansion
alone has ballooned state costs $451 million more annually as of two years ago
where a third to a half of those taking advantage of that previously paid for
their own health insurance through other means – has been a hallmark of the
Edwards Administration and shortchanged the state's ability to fund other
needed priorities.

And the appetite to redistribute wealth by this
mechanism has gone so viral with Edwards that, as the Louisiana
Legislative Auditor recently reported, it includes indifference towards enrollment
of noncitizens of the state into Medicaid. From Sep., 2016 – three months after
expansion began – through this February, an audit
identified $112.6 million was paid out to 13,771 holders of driver's licenses
in other states, a number of out-of-state providers, and 380 clients verified
as living out of state.

Like most states, Louisiana's Department of Health
chooses lax verification requirements for residency. Some of the waste was
exacerbated by the pandemic regulations that allowed ineligible recipients to
continue to take part in the program, and although the audit doesn't break down
the wasted amounts by years, the narratives described clearly indicated a significant
portion occurred prior to the 2020 rules relaxations.

Most ironically and tragically, these wasted
resources could have ameliorated a crisis that has grown throughout Edwards'
terms in office affecting the state's most vulnerable Medicaid recipients:
those utilizing waiver services designed largely to aid people with
disabilities. Nationwide,
an escalating shortage of nursing care and other lesser service interventions
has put this service provision increasingly into jeopardy.

Although the pandemic intensified the problem of
too few personnel to provide services in homes or community settings (and in
nursing homes as well, although waiver services don't normally apply in that
setting), it had been ongoing prior to that. Essentially, wage inflation, which
skyrocketed because of increased demand during the pandemic but also pushed
higher by the debt binge courtesy of Washington Democrats that unleashed
general price inflation, has left states much less capable of enticing care
workers into home and community settings.

Louisiana's disabled have been hard hit in this
fashion, but aside from a couple of tepid funding boosts trying to entice contractors
to hike wages the Edwards Administration has put far more effort into throwing
services at the able-bodied and generally healthy population than in trying to
address the needs of the most vulnerable. Imagine the huge difference that devoting
even a fraction of the money currently unnecessarily being blown on expansion
towards paying more competitive nursing wages could make for the state's disabled
where an inadequate amount of care makes a difference not just in quality of
life of, but also in the survival of people with disabilities.

But that's the legacy Edwards will leave with state
spending rising 45 percent while he has been in office while inflation, even
with Democrats' boosting of it, increased only 27 percent, and leaving the state's
most vulnerable citizens worse off. That's because relative to the population
there aren't many disabled and few who vote, as opposed to the masses the political
left tries to buy votes from through policies of wealth redistribution, like
expansion. And the fiscal state in which he will leave the state looks to make
life even worse for those most vulnerable.

ABSTRAK Tesis ini membahas tentang Peran Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat Dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Ranham) Tahun 2015 – 2019 Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden Nomor 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode penelitian hukum normatif dan sosiologis. Kesimpulan dari tesis ini adalah: Berdasarkan uraian dalam pembahasan dan analisis hasil penelitian, maka dikemukan kesimpulan sebagai berikut : 1.Peran Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi manusia Kalimantan Barat dalam pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) tahun 2015 – 2019 berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Menkumham menginstruksikan kepada seluruh Kakanwil Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia untuk melaksanakan dan menerapkan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) di wilayah kerjanya masing-masing.Menkumham menilai, Kantor Wilayah (Kanwil) memiliki peran yang sangat penting di dalam mengimplementasikan RANHAM di daerah. Menkumham menambahkan, Kakanwil diharapkan dapat membantu Pemerintah Daerah, Sekretaris Daerah, dan Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) beserta jajaran untuk dapat menjelaskan bagaimana pentingnya melaksanakan RANHAM. "Saudara perlu mengingatkan institusi di daerah untuk bersinergi dan berkoordinasi dalam mengimplementasikan dan mensukseskan RANHAM. Sebagaimana yang tertuang dalam pasal 6 Perpres Nomor 75 Tahun 2015 ini menyebutkan bahwa dalam melaksanakan RANHAM, kementerian, lembaga, dan pemerintah daerah wajib menyusun Aksi HAM yang ditetapkan setiap 1 (satu) tahun.Dalam menyusun Aksi HAM tersebut, kementerian, lembaga, dan pemerintah daerah wajib melakukan koordinasi dengan Sekretariat Bersama RANHAM. 2. Permasalahan Yang Dihadapi Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat Dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (RANHAM) Tahun 2015 – 2019 Berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Permasalahan tersebut dihadapi Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat utama yang dihadapi penyandang disabilitas adalah keterbatasan akses terhadap pelayanan pendidikan, pekerjaan, kesehatan, transportasi, dan partisipasi politik atau keadilan. Mereka sering menghadapi hambatan untuk berpartisipasi dalam setiap aspek kehidupan bermasyarakat. Hambatan dapat terjadi dalam berbagai bentuk, termasuk dalam kaitan dengan lingkungan fisik, teknologi informasi dan komunikasi, legislasi dan kebijakan yang belum sepenuhnya berpihak, sikap masyarakat dan diskriminasi. 3. Upaya yang dilakukan Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Kalimantan Barat dalam Pelaksanaan Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi manusia (RANHAM) tahun 2015 -2019 berdasarkan Peraturan Presiden No. 75 Tahun 2015 Tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia. Upaya yang ditempuh oleh penyelenggara Negara untuk memenuhi kewajiban dan tanggung jawabnya. Negara terutama Pemerintah diharuskan dapat mengambil tindakan yang memadai, dengan seluruh sumber daya yang ada padanya, memenuhi dan melindungi Hak Asasi Manusia warga negaranya tanpa terkecuali. Negara harus mencegah pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia, termasuk memastikan individu dan organisasi untuk menghormati hak-hak orang lain, serta memberikan sanksi terhadap pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia.Kata Kunci : Peran, Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum Dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Pelaksanaan dan RANHAM. ABSTRACT This thesis discusses the role of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the National Action Plan on Human Rights (Ranham) of 2015 – 2019 based on Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. The method used in this research is a normative and sociological legal research method. The conclusions of this thesis are: Based on the description in the discussion and analysis of the research results, the following conclusions are drawn: 1.The role of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the implementation of the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) 2015 – 2019 Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights, the Minister of Law and Human Rights instructs all Heads of Regional Offices of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to implement and implement the National Action Plan on Human Rights (RANHAM) in their respective working areas. Menkumham assessed that Regional Offices (Kanwil) have a very important role in implementing the RANHAM in the regions.Menkumham added, Kakanwil is expected to assist the Regional Government, Regional Secretaries, and the Regional Planning and Development Agency (Bappeda) and their ranks to be able to explain how important it is to implement RANHAM. "You need to remind institutions in the regions to synergize and coordinate in implementing and succeeding RANHAM. As stated in article 6 of the Presidential Regulation Number 75 of 2015 it is stated that in implementing the RANHAM, ministries, institutions, and local governments are required to draw up human rights actions that are set every 1 (one) year. In preparing the Human Rights Action, ministries, institutions, and local governments are obliged to coordinate with the Joint Secretariat of RANHAM. 2. Problems Faced by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the 2015 – 2019 National Action Plan for Human Rights (RANHAM) Based on Presidential Regulation No. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. The problems faced by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in West Kalimantan are the main problems faced by persons with disabilities are limited access to education, employment, health, transportation, and political participation or justice services.They often face barriers to participating in every aspect of social life. Barriers can occur in various forms, including in relation to the physical environment, information and communication technology, legislation and policies that do not fully take sides, public attitudes and discrimination. 3. The efforts made by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of West Kalimantan in the Implementation of the 2015-2019 National Action Plan for Human Rights (RANHAM) based on Presidential Regulation no. 75 of 2015 concerning the National Action Plan for Human Rights. Efforts taken by state administrators to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities. The state, especially the government, is required to take adequate action, with all available resources, to fulfill and protect the human rights of its citizens without exception. The state must prevent human rights violations, including ensuring individuals and organizations respect the rights of others, as well as providing sanctions for human rights violations.Keywords: Role, Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Implementation and RANHAM.

According to the results of generalization and critical study of existing scientific achievements, it is found that the vast majority of them are limited to the need to improve the effectiveness of social policy or identify general approaches to its evaluation based on living standards. This led to the goal of this study, which is to specify the essence and development of methodological principles for evaluating the effectiveness of the national social policy. According to the results of the research, the essence is specified and the structural and logical model of evaluation of social policy efficiency is determined. It is substantiated that the primary in assessing the effectiveness of the social policy should be an objective approach, in which quantitative measures can be: 1) effectiveness (the ratio of the result to the resources used to achieve it); 2) the degree of achievement of goals (compliance of the result with certain goals). The author's position is that it is advisable to assess the effectiveness of the social policy in terms of its structural components according to the relevant system of indicators, the list of which is formed taking into account their ability to reflect the results of a particular structural component of the JV and information availability of relevant data. The novelty of this study is to substantiate the procedure for evaluating the effectiveness of the national social policy by the criterion of achieving the goals. They are determined at the level of maximum / minimum values of reference indicators, respectively, for stimulants / disincentives for the entire period of Ukraine's Independence. Approbation of the author's methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of the national joint venture for 2014-2019 showed the unavailability of reference values (on average by 0.12-0.18). Such structural components of the social policy as the policy of social protection, labor market, and distribution and redistribution of the social product have a relatively low level of efficiency in Ukraine. It indicates the priority vector of the Government's activity. The proposed and tested author's method of evaluating the effectiveness of the social policy is not without drawbacks in terms of the formation of the resulting indicators and disregard for the importance of structural components (individual indicators) in ensuring the effectiveness of the social policy. Nevertheless, it offers a specific approach to quantifying the effectiveness of the social policy, which can be improved and changed depending on changes in objectives, information availability, sufficient justification of the importance of the components of the social policy. ; По результатам обобщения и критического изучения имеющихся научных достижений выявлено, что подавляющее их большинство ограничиваются констатацией необходимости повышения эффективности социальной политики или определением общих подходов к ее оценке на основе показателей уровня жизни. Это обусловило постановку цели данного исследования, которая заключается в конкретизации сущности и развития методологических основ оценки эффективности национальной социальной политики. По результатам исследования конкретизированы сущность и определена структурно-логическая модель оценки эффективности социальной политики. Обосновано, что первичным при оценке эффективности социальной политики должен быть объективный подход, в рамках которого количественными измерителями могут быть: 1) результативность (отношение полученного результата к использованным ресурсам для его достижения); 2) степень достижения целей (соответствие результата определенным целям). Авторская позиция заключается в том, что оценивать эффективность социальной политики целесообразно в разрезе ее структурных составляющих за соответствующей системой показателей, перечень которых сформирован с учетом их способности максимально содержательно отображать результаты реализации конкретной структурной составляющей социальной политики и информационной доступности соответствующих данных. Новизна данного исследования заключается в обосновании порядка оценки эффективности национальной социальной политики по критерию достижения целей, которые определены на уровне максимальных/минимальных значений эталонных показателей соответственно для стимуляторов/дестимуляторов за весь период независимости Украины. Апробация авторской методики для оценки эффективности национальной социальной политики с 2014-2019гг. показала недосягаемость эталонных значений (в среднем на 0,12-0,18). Сравнительно низкий уровень эффективности в Украине имеют такие структурные составляющие социальной политики как политика социальной защиты, рынка труда, распределения и перераспределения общественного продукта, что указывает на приоритетный вектор деятельности Правительства. Предлагаемая и апробированная авторская методика оценки эффективности социальной политики не лишена недостатков в части формирования результирующих показателей и не учета значимости структурных составляющих (отдельных показателей) в обеспечении эффективности социальной политики. Несмотря на это, она предлагает конкретный подход для количественного измерения эффективности социальной политики, которую можно совершенствовать и изменять в зависимости от изменения целей, информационной доступности, достаточного обоснования значимости составляющих социальной политики. ; За результатами узагальнення та критичного вивчення наявних наукових надбань виявлено, що переважна їх більшість обмежуються констатацією необхідності підвищення ефективності соціальної політики або визначенням загальних підходів до її оцінювання на основі показників рівня життя. Це обумовило постановку мети даного дослідження, яка полягає в конкретизації сутності та розвитку методологічних засад оцінювання ефективності національної соціальної політики. За результатами дослідження конкретизовано сутність та визначено структурно-логічну модель оцінювання ефективності соціальної політики. Обґрунтовано, що первинним при оцінюванні ефективності соціальної політики повинен бути об'єктивний підхід, в рамках якого кількісними вимірниками можуть бути: 1) результативність (відношення отриманого результату до використаних ресурсів для його досягнення); 2) ступінь досягнення цілей (відповідність результату визначеним цілям). Авторська позиція полягає в тому, що оцінювати ефективність соціальної політики доцільно в розрізі її структурних складових за відповідною системою показників, перелік яких сформований з урахуванням їх здатності максимально змістовно відображати результати реалізації конкретної структурної складової соціальної політики та інформаційної доступності відповідних даних. Новизна даного дослідження полягає в обґрунтуванні порядку оцінювання ефективності національної соціальної політики за критерієм досягнення цілей, які визначенні на рівні максимальних/мінімальних значень еталонних показників відповідно для стимуляторів/дестимуляторів за весь період незалежності України. Апробація авторської методики для оцінювання ефективності національної соціальної політики за 2014-2019рр. засвідчила недосяжність еталонних значень (в середньому на 0,12-0,18). Порівняно низький рівень ефективності в Україні мають такі структурні складові соціальної політики як політика соціального захисту, ринку праці та розподілу і перерозподілу суспільного продукту, що вказує на пріоритетний вектор діяльності Уряду. Запропонована та апробована авторська методика оцінювання ефективності соціальної політики не позбавлена недоліків в частині формування результуючих показників та неврахування вагомості структурних складових (окремих показників) у забезпеченні ефективності соціальної політики. Попри це, вона пропонує конкретний підхід для кількісного виміру ефективності соціальної політики, яку можна вдосконалювати та змінювати залежно від зміни цілей, інформаційної доступності, достатнього обґрунтування вагомості складових соціальної політики