Suchergebnisse

Since the publication of Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) behavioural public policies and nudge units have been widely adopted right across the world, which has resulted in many improvements to the delivery of public policies, such as better tax collection, increased access of young people to education opportunities, and more charitable giving. This paper asks what explains the adoption of nudge units and related initiatives. In particular, are Anglo–American or West European countries the focus for adoption? Are these interventions more likely to appear under left, right, or centre-dominated governments? Ascertaining the origins of nudge can adjudicate the extent to which nudge is partial project, based on the dominance of liberal economies and the preferred programme for centre governments and/or right political ideologies, or whether it has more universal appeal. Using data from OECD and OECD-partner countries, event history models reveal Anglo–American countries to be the drivers, with nudge not favoured by left-controlled governments. Nonetheless, with the interest and level of policy transfer not abating, in future years nudge is likely to appear in a wide variety of contexts, including China.

AbstractWe study the problem of how citizens should punish or reward a leader's choices during international crises. Audiences should impose costs rooted in citizens' preferences over policy outcomes, but that need not mean that these costs directly reflect the citizens' preferences over actions. Instead, rewards and punishments are valued for their equilibrium consequences. To understand how citizens' policy preferences shape electoral accountability, we characterize the retention strategies that maximize citizen welfare. In the optimal strategy, citizens always punish leaders who initiate crises and then back down. This is a robust finding, and true even though the citizens have no intrinsic preferences for policy consistency. Whether they punish leaders for backing down rather than going to war, on the other hand, depends on the status quo and on the costs of war. Importantly, these strategies of rewarding and punishing leaders need not have any immediate connection to voter's ex ante preferences over war and peace, even if preferences over policy outcomes ultimately motivate citizen behavior. This has important implications for interpreting empirical and experimental results related to audience costs.

The growth of inequality over the past half century is closely connected to the rise of neoliberal policies and institutions, the latter of which shield capital from state actions that might limit wealth accumulation. Economic nationalism since the global financial crisis has slowed or even reversed this, yet this same era has seen the emergence of a new form of instrument in the neoliberal mold, in a stronghold of state sovereignty: taxation. Under mandatory binding tax arbitration, states cede sovereignty over the interpretation of international tax agreements to panels of transnational tax adjudicators. Focusing on the pivotal role of the United States, we use historical documents, including from the congressional archive and interviews with key actors to ask why tax arbitration emerged late in the neoliberal era, and at a counterintuitive time. We demonstrate that this outcome is the result of instrumental business power driving a process of incremental change through layering, to overcome states' preference to retain sovereignty. This experience sheds light on the historically structured ways that business power constrains sovereignty in an era of high inequality.

Bellicist theories of comparative development predict increases in taxation as the result of military rivalries. Others claim that this causal relationship is contingent on particular geographical, institutional, and historical conditions. In this paper, we explore the conditional effects of military rivalries on taxation during the 19th and 20th centuries using time-series cross-section models. We hypothesize that international norms of territoriality, inter-state military alliances, and regime type will condition the direction and magnitude of the effect of rivalries on taxation. Our models suggest that from 1815 to 1945 the effects of rivalry on taxation were insignificant independently of these systemic, dyadic, and institutional factors. However, after 1945 when norms of territorial integrity consolidated, democracies with strong military allies responded to military pressures by lowering taxes in the short-term, reoriented public expenditures towards social spending, and ultimately increased taxes in the long run through a reconfiguration of the fiscal contract. Conversely, autocracies with strong allies responded to military pressures by increasing taxes in the short-term, capturing as much wealth as possible but failing to consolidate durable fiscal institutions.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Testing on 28 December 2012, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15305058.2012.741085. ; Criterion-referenced assessments have become more common around the world, with performance standards being set to differentiate different levels of student performance. However, use of standard setting methods developed in the United States may be complicated by factors related to the political and educational contexts within another country. In this article, experience gained from conducting several standard setting studies in South Africa is shared. The legacy of the apartheid era, in which segregation and discrimination were institutionalized, affects the attitudes of South Africans toward assessment and placing students into performance levels. These issues played out as panelists were asked to make judgments related to students' likely performance in higher education. Although the instantiation of panelists' reluctance to label students may be different in South Africa compared to the United States or other countries, lessons can be learned about how the effects of these beliefs and anxieties may be addressed during standard setting activities.