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Vol. 1: 1919-1932 / Langer, William L. ; Armstrong, Hamilton F. (Eds.); Vol. 2: 1932-1942 / Woolbert, Robert G. (Ed.); Vol. 3: 1942-1952 / Roberts, Henry L. (Ed.). - 1955. - XXII,727 S. - ISBN 0-8352-0212-7; Vol. 4: 1952-1962 / Roberts, Henry L. (Ed.). - 1964. - XXI,752 S. - ISBN 0-8352-0046-9; Vol. 5: 1962-1972 / Kreslins, Janis A. (Ed.) - 1976. - XXI,921 S. - ISBN 0-8352-0784-6

AbstractThe Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment toward the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than simply by economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains ofrecognition strugglesagainst the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semiperiphery, fueled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically, and organizationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed outfrom withinat a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.

Through an analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), one of the most visible and ambitious governance exercises undertaken by African states, this paper considers the ways in which an African international society and global international society have interacted. The presence of regional international societies implies the presence of difference in global international society, and therefore the possibility of a breakdown in global consensus and the fragmentation of global international society, a perennial concern of the English School. However, while divergences between African and global international societies on democracy and political governance result in tensions, the APRM can be seen as a way to negotiate between these divergent positions. The APRM is an uneasy and unstable compromise, indicating a highly ambivalent relationship between African and global international societies. This relationship has to be understood in the context of an unequal global international society, dominated by a number of core states with an increasingly solidarist governance agenda, as well as the attempts of a largely pluralist African international society to manage its demands.

As the world moves on from the climate agreement negotiated in Paris, attention is turning from the identification of emissions reduction trajectories—in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)—to crucial questions about how these emissions reductions are to be delivered and reported within the future international accounting framework. The experience to date shows that, if well designed, emissions trading systems (ETS) can be an effective, credible, and transparent tool for helping to achieve low-cost emissions reductions in ways that mobilize private sector actors, attract investment, and encourage international cooperation. However, to maximize effectiveness, any ETS needs to be designed in a way that is appropriate to its context. This Handbook is intended to help decision makers, policy practitioners, and stakeholders achieve this goal. It explains the rationale for an ETS, and sets out a 10-step process for designing an ETS – each step involves a series of decisions or actions that will shape major features of the policy. In doing so, it draws both on conceptual analysis and on some of the most important practical lessons learned to date from implementing ETSs around the world, including from the European Union, several provinces and cities in China, California and Québec, the Northeastern United States, Alberta, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Tokyo, and Saitama.

This article develops a model for analysing international regime formation in the environmental domain. It is argued that current approaches to understanding how regimes emerge and develop are too narrow, and fail to account for the dynamic interplay between states and markets which induce the emergence of 'tipping points' leading to more extensive and stringent international institutions. The article demonstrates the central role of tipping points in regime formation using the example of international climate change.