A review essay of key works and trends in the political thought of Central and Eastern Europe, before and after 1989. The topics examined include the nature of the 1989 velvet revolutions in the region, debates on civil society, democratization, the relationship between politics, economics, and culture, nationalism, legal reform, feminism, and "illiberal democracy." The review essay concludes with an assessment of the most recent trends in the region.
The transition of Central and Eastern European post-communist countries followed different sets of reforms with different degrees of success which generated a monolithic debate attitude for decades. From shock-therapy and intermediary to gradualist approaches, I stress the superiority of Bing-Bang reforms to market-based economies from economic, political and social perspectives. In this paper, after identifying the structural reforms started after 1989, I emphasize several variables that demonstrates the superiority of shock-therapy reforms for 22 countries grouped in four specific categories. After the examination that leads to the result that the radicalists won the battle with the gradualists, from epistemological to "numerical" point of views, we tried to propose an explanation for this historical fact and we consider this is due to the superiority of the extended order over the holistic one. Future work is needed to analyse the role of geographical proximity with the Western world and of historical legacies in the advancement of the debate.
Liberal humanitarian utopia and Eastern and Central Europe -- Exclusions "east" and "west" : population discourses and the civilizational slope -- Floating east : Eastern and Central Europe on the map of global institutional actors -- I am suspicious of myself : east-west narratives at the turn of the millenium -- Conclusion.
In: L' Europe en formation: revue d'études sur la construction européenne et le fédéralisme = journal of studies on European integration and federalism, Band 364, Heft 2, S. 111-127
Résumé Les références au « syndrome méditerranéen », décrivant un non-respect flagrant des normes européennes, ont pris une importance croissante après l'adhésion d'États d'Europe du Sud à l'Union européenne, dans les années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix. Les explications de ce syndrome se concentrent sur un « décalage » entre l'Europe du Sud et les politiques de l'Union européenne, sur les faibles capacités administratives des Etats, et sur la piètre nature de la société civile dans ces pays. Parmi les plus importantes réserves contre l'élargissement de l'Union européenne, on s'est référé à des considérations similaires sur la capacité des pays candidats d'Europe centrale et orientale à appliquer l'acquis communautaire après l'adhésion. Cependant, il semble que l'Union européenne ait appris de son expérience avec les États membres du Sud de l'Europe, et elle a institutionnalisé un système d'une haute complexité pour gérer l'adhésion, quand les dix nouveaux candidats à l'Union ont frappé à sa porte. En se concentrant sur le rôle de l'administration publique, cet article s'interroge si une approche fondée sur la conditionnalité européenne a conduit à une mise en conformité soutenable après l'adhésion. Cet article démontre que, plutôt que de considérer les nouveaux États membres comme un groupe cohérent, on trouve de nombreux signes de divergences concernant la performance après l'accession.
In this policy note, we explore the nature, strength and tensions of the contemporary US-Central Eastern Europe relationship. We describe the expanding US-CEE 'brotherhood in arms': growing trade relations, intensified military cooperation, and rekindled diplomatic ties. Further, we unpack the striking and largely ignored dimensions of the US-CEE 'brotherhood in faith': the many ways in which the United States and Central and Eastern Europe are tied together by overlapping ideologies of national conservatism and a particular version of Christian 'family values'. This involves addressing the complexities of an increasingly influential and ambitious Visegrád Group, whose key players – Poland and Hungary – may be brothers, but are by no means twins. It also means raising some broader, burning discussions about the future of NATO and the meaning of 'Europe'. Universalist, multicultural and postnational? Or conservative, Christian and sovereigntist? ; publishedVersion
Since 2008, Hungary and Poland have developed a distinctive populist economic program, which has begun to spread to other Central and East European Countries (CEECs). This article develops a theory of the political economy of populism in CEECs, arguing that these countries' dependence on foreign capital constrained them to follow (neo)liberal economic policies. After the global financial crisis, populist parties began to break from the (neo)liberal consensus, 'thickening' their populist agenda to include an economic program based on a conservative developmental statism. Case studies of Hungary, Poland, and Serbia describe these policies and show that they exhibit a particular form of economic nationalism that emphasizes workforce activation, natalism, and sovereignty. This shift has gone hand-in-hand with attempts to attract investments from Eastern authoritarian states, illustrating the connection between CEEC development strategies and sources of foreign capital.