Suchergebnisse

Creating appropriate conditions for a stable development of the individual, society and state, and simultaneously providing a high level of protection of national interests, has been identified as a priority of the Ukrainian national security policy. The Ukrainian state ought to review all challenges and threats and adopt a new national security strategy. Current circumstances require the National Security Strategy of Ukraine of 2015 to become an integral functional element of the security and defence sector. The National Security Strategy has to become an open and mandatory document developed solely for the practical purpose of comprehensive protection of national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The implementation of these priorities is to be ensured through the restoration of peace and state sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, by implementing a complex set of international, legal, political, diplomatic, security, humanitarian, and economic measures. The key implementation goal should focus on the establishment of the principles of safe and legal country, free in its choice of domestic and foreign political options and development tendencies. External threats are rather more dangerous than internal, but the content of geopolitical security is primarily based on the organic combination of external and internal security. The imperfection of national security legislation and the low efficiency of its implementation are the reason for malfunctioning of the defence sector, which makes ensuring the full realization of national interests impossible.

The article examines the definitions of the country's food security and the criteria for its assessment. Highlighted common problems of ensuring food security in Ukraine, as evidenced by international rating estimates. Analyzed the quantitative parameters of consumption food. The balance of consumption of basic foodstuffs, the indicator of sufficiency of consumption and the caloric content of the consumer ration are defined and it is established that Ukraine occupies the last places among the EU countries and the world. It has been established that ensuring food security of the country is associated with the following risks: natural and man-made, technological, environmental, social, trade and economic; political. It outlined a strategy for food security, which should provide an overwhelming amount of food (85-90%) through its own production. Keywords: food security, national security, food, the indicator of sufficiency of consumption, caloric intake, the share of expenditure on food, risks.

On the afternoon of September 11 2001 the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach), Bertie Ahern ordered the ?heads of the security services of key government departments? to undertake a complete re-evaluation of measures to protect the state from attack. Hence, underway within hours of the 9/11 outrage in the United States was potentially the most far-reaching review of Irish national security in decades. This book, the first major academic investigation of Irish national security policy as it has operated since 9/11, provides a theoretically informed analysis of that re-evaluation and the decisions

This article analyzes the development of the national security system in the United Kingdom, focusing on the impact of external factors relating to the preparation and conduct of war and internal factors such as industrial conflict and terrorism. It goes on to discuss the challenges that the system must confront in the post-Cold War context. Chief among these are the problems of managing the tension between the operational requirement of secrecy and the imperative of democracy—the right of the public to know about and control what is being done in their name. It is argued that the traditionally highly secretive national security state in the United Kingdom is changing in the context of an increasingly "information hungry" and less deferential society. In addition, in a climate of "risk uncertainty" the United Kingdom will have to decide on the relative balance between military and nonmilitary instruments of security as it redefines its role in the world, and on how best to obtain value for money from the resources it commits to its redesigned national security system.

AbstractResilience features prominently in the new German National Security Strategy. But the strategy does not give an explicit definition of the term. In this commentary, I analyze the use of resilience in the strategy and show the links to prominent findings from resilience research. I use a disaster resilience point of view and show that the unspecific usage of resilience in the strategy could lead to undesirable consequences when implementing the strategy. Thus, in the implementation process the German government and the relevant public administration bodies should follow three recommendations resulting from resilience research. First, they should understand resilience as adaptive capacity and not as resistance. Second, they need to address conflicting goals, like efficiency versus resilience, explicitly. Third, they should give greater attention to social aspects of resilience, because empowering people but also taking their vulnerabilities seriously is decisive for making a society more resilient.

In August 2018, the government of Australia concluded its review of the national security risks of the telecom sector with the new 5G networks. The review provides new guidance to telecom carriers, implicitly restricting Chinese vendors. It concludes that 5G changes how the networks operate and increase the potential security risks to the point today's safeguards are insufficient. The government must therefore intervene, as foreign powers may exploit these risks by coercing vendors. The current rise in national security restrictions in the telecom sectors are different from the typical run-of-the-mill economic protectionism as they are imposed by countries that have no domestic suppliers to protect. Instead, the root of these measures is fundamentally about distrust between governments with conflicting geopolitical agendas, rather than just trustworthiness of the vendors. The situation is not too dissimilar to the US online services after the NSA revelations in 2013. In effect, future security screenings will assess other governments - i.e. the ability of a foreign state to exercise control over its vendors, rather than assess the vendors themselves. Some legal frameworks, such as the US reforms of Cfius or the EU's proposed new FDI screening framework, already point towards such directions.