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In order to cope with the economic fall-out from the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU countries hit hardest by the virus requested fiscal support from the other EU member states. Likewise, the Eurozone arguably depends on some form of a fiscal union. This international redistribution critically depends on citizens' support. Do politically knowledgeable citizens develop preferences for fiscal redistribution that are different from those of ignorant citizens? Based on the 2014 European Election Study, this article argues that knowledge plays a limited and conditional role. It hardly exerts a systematic independent effect. Rather, it helps crystallize party cues and basic European integration values. My findings are consistent with a theory, according to which knowledge eases the process of rationalizing preferences that originate in previous basic orientations.

Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number of analytical issues, especially in unusual circumstances such as the Eurozone crisis. Our article discusses these issues in the light of existing theory and informed by the empirical analyses assembled in this special issue. 'National preferences' or ideal points of the governments involved are driven by their domestic socio-economic and political conditions and institutions, the dimensionality of the negotiations, and strategic considerations. We then discuss how national preferences, states' bargaining power, the strategic and institutional bargaining context, and the bargaining dynamics jointly influence the bargaining outcome. Examples from European negotiations in the context of the Eurozone crisis illustrate both the complexity of the process and the value of serious, theoretically informed, empirical analysis.

When do parliaments debate European Union policies? Normative arguments suggest that debates enhance government accountability. Others warn of government bias, declining debate near elections, and parties avoiding Eurosceptic publics. Our conclusions are more differentiated. We argue that rank-and-file parliamentarians rather than leaders initiate debates. Political incentives guide their debate selection towards salient policies in the countries in which voters care most. However, where the motivation Eurosceptic publics provide and institutions facilitating rank-and-file agenda-setting are lacking, EU law-making and European Council priorities will raise little parliamentary attention. Analysis of original data, using a Bayesian and multilevel framework, lends credibility to our views. Claims of a government bias, election effects, or trends towards more debate are unlikely to hold in all countries.

Against democratic deficits of European Union (EU) governance, recent literature emphasizes the communicative function of national parliaments. Yet, arguments from the broader EU politicization literature have been only rarely applied to public parliamentary debates. This article integrates arguments about supranational authority and partisan competition as key drivers of debates on the EU and tests respective implications by an automated text analysis that retrieves EU references in all 1,393 plenary debates of the German Bundestag during 1991–2013. A panel analysis identifies authority transfers as the strongest predictor for EU salience in the plenary. EU references furthermore increase with supranational policy output, public EU visibility, and a differentiating public opinion. With regard to partisan emphasis, mainstream and particularly governing parties push European issues in the German Bundestag.

Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union issues is attitudes towards immigrants. Two arguments are given to explain this effect. We contend that these arguments are both built on the idea that people with anti-immigrant attitudes frame other Europeans as an out-group. We then test the validity of these arguments by measuring how respondents in a voter survey frame the issue of Turkish membership. We find that framing the issue in terms of out-groups indeed mediates the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support for Turkish membership. This finding offers new insights into why levels of public support vary over different EU issues, because opposition is likely to increase when an issue is more easily framed in terms of out-groups.

"This book explains why the European Union member states - in response to the Euro crisis - agreed to establish banking union, despite previous objections, and why they chose its hybrid institutional design. Analysing its establishment from 2012 to 2020, the book offers a comprehensive view of the preferences of the member states and EU institutions, as well as of the negotiation dynamics and latest developments in the three pillars of banking union, namely; the single supervisory mechanism, the single resolution mechanism and the common backstop, and the European deposit insurance scheme. Furthermore, empirically, the book looks beyond the usual focus of the northern and southern coalition of states to underline the influence of powerful smaller member states in the intergovernmental bargaining process. Adopting a range of theoretical perspectives, it questions the solidity of the northern versus southern camps and reveals distinctive and particular positioning from individual countries during the process. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of European financial market regulation, European economic governance, EU institutions, European integration theory and European Union politics more broadly."

This book presents an analysis of the main traits of the Turkish political culture and articulates some of the most important deeply embedded social qualifications of political life in Turkey. It reveals that when water management is historically and socially shaped by heavily technical knowledge systems of engineering it becomes a particularly useful tool for various political interests. The book analyses how Turkish freshwater management is socially constructed as both an engineering discourse and a paternalistic bureaucratic transaction. Such a construction stands in stark contrast to the water management discourse of the European Water Framework Directive (WFD), the European Union's common water policy. Of all the issues faced in Turkish water management, none are as important and problematic as the issue of complying with European Union (EU) accession criteria. Not only is water socially, economically and environmentally important; its water management is a useful prism through which the EU accession process can be viewed as a whole. It showcases the complementarities and divergences between Turkish and EU bureaucratic constructs and value systems

Europe and the European Union -- Back to the future -- Belonging without believing -- Leading from behind : opt-outs, opt-ins and red lines -- Party games and politics -- Devolution and European Union membership -- The press and the European Union -- The pound, the euro and the City -- Britain, the European Union and the wider world -- 'Banging on about Europe' : the Conservatives and the European Union 2010-2015 -- Hallmarks of British membership of the EU -- The Referendum of 2016 : the campaign -- The Referendum of 2016 : the result -- The May government and Brexit 2016-2019 : decline and fail -- The Brexiter government, 2019-2020.

The article suggests an explanation for seemingly diverse patterns of change in domestic economic institutions following the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that EMU participants redesigned ill-fitting domestic fiscal and wage-setting institutions in order to counter the anticipated destabilizing effects of the 'one size fits all' monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). After outlining the argument, the article identifies general economic and institutional conditions that are required for the use of fiscal and wage-setting institutions as effective stabilizers in a monetary union. It then undertakes a comparative assessment to detect country-specific mismatches between anticipated needs and the available domestic economic institutions. Finally, the article surveys institutional changes in 10 member states between the mid 1990s and 2002 and shows that the observed institutional adjustments largely correspond to the expected correction of initial mismatches.

This article maps and investigates public support for different types of differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. We examine citizens' preferences for DI using novel survey data from eight EU member states. The data reveals substantive differences in support for different types of DI. Factor analyses reveal two dimensions that seem to structure citizens' evaluations of DI. The first dimension relates to the effect of DI on the European integration project, the second concerns the safeguarding of national autonomy. Citizens' attitudes on this second dimension vary substantively across countries. General EU support is the most important correlate of DI support, correlating positively with the first and negatively with the second dimension. Our results underline that while citizens generally care about the fairness of DI, balancing out their different concerns can be a challenging political task.

Here, I introduce a novel approach towards data collection for comparative research and present a new data infrastructure on parties, elections and governments, the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov). This data infrastructure combines a database, data presentation in webpages and software scripts in order to generate more dynamic datasets and to facilitate cooperation. So far, it includes information about more than 1000 parties, around 600 elections (national and European Parliament) and almost 1000 governments with their party composition. These observations are linked to a wide set of information about party positions and make it possible to derive various datasets for studies in political science. To provide a first glance into the potential of this new data infrastructure, I map the political space of the European Union (EU) by drawing on this source.

Since the 1990s, multilateral European security institutions have gone through profound changes. None of the existing institutions like the European Union (EU) or NATO can assume full responsibility for security, because of Russia's inclusion in Europe. EU expansion and its policies affect Russia and visa-versa, so a strategic partnership is beneficial. In 2003, Russian and the EU agreed to create four common spaces--economic, freedom and security, external security, and research and education; activities to build those spaces are described. The EU's New Neighborhood Initiative is criticized as conceptually flawed because of the diversity of these "neighborhoods" and conflicts with existing regional cooperation forums. Issues with the admission of new members to the EU are discussed.

In a world where attitudes towards immigration and the European Union are at the forefront of political and economic agendas across the continent, this Special Issue is highly relevant and well timed. This Forum article reviews the Special Issue and summarizes lessons learned and identifies open, remaining and new, questions. As a future research agenda, it is advised to pay attention to (a) differentiation in EU attitudes, (b) the role of national political elites, (c) the changing communications environment, and (d) the role of religion and religious attitudes.

Although many interest groups work together perpetually, most academic studies agree that coalition formation does not lead to more influence. In this article, we try to explain these puzzling findings. While former research generally tends to frame the decision of forming an interest group coalition as a strength, in this paper, we argue that coalition building should be considered as a 'weapon of the weak'. Interest groups fearing that they are insufficiently influential, and whose very existence as an organisation is at risk, are more likely to coalesce. This theoretical framework is tested on a sample of around 3000 interest groups in six European countries – Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden – and the European Union. Empirical findings clearly demonstrate that perceived fears – oriented towards both organisational survival and policy influence – have an effect on how likely it is that an interest group will decide to build a coalition.

The Central and East European (CEE) countries that had applied for membership in the European Union were confronted with far-reaching requirements in order to bring domestic policies in line with EU standards. Notwithstanding these rather uniform pressures emerging from conditionality, there is considerable variety in alignment performance across the candidate countries and over time. To account for this, we use time series cross-sectional data on the implementation performance of 13 EU candidate countries between 1999 and 2003. Our results indicate that the bureaucratic strength and effectiveness of a country positively influence its ability to adjust domestic arrangements to EU requirements. By contrast, we find no support for veto-player theories of political constraints on legislative change. We hence conclude that the implementation of the acquis communautaire in candidate countries prior to accession has been a question of bureaucratic problems rather than of political veto-manoeuvres.