It is generally accepted that the development of a Union of law is largely due to the judicial decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter, CJEU). With its judicial pronouncements, the CEJEU aims to achieve the same legal effects in every language version of its judgments and, through them, to ensure the uniform application and interpretation of European Union law. Nevertheless, such judicial pronouncements, with normative and binding force, are the result of collegial decisions and drafted by jurists in a language that is usually nottheir mother tongue. In addition, they are also the result of various permutations associated with the necessary legal translation from and to (and vice versa) the working language of the Court and the official languages of the European Union. The published judgments presented as authentic are, in most cases, translations. To understand the construction of decisions of the CJEU is to understand the construction of the European Union law, and by consequence, the European project itself.
This case study of late-nineteenth century federal courts in the United States sheds light on two seemingly unrelated questions of general interest to political scientists: What tools are available to party leaders who seek to institutionalize their policy agendas or insulate those agendas from electoral politics? and How do we account for expansions of judicial power? Using an historical–interpretive analysis of partisan agendas, party control of national institutions, congressional initiatives relating to federal courts, the appointment of federal judges, judicial decision making, and litigation patterns, I demonstrate that the increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a policy of economic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable to electoral politics. In addition to offering an innovative interpretation of these developments, I discuss the implications arising from this case study for our standard accounts of partisan politics, political development, and the determinants of judicial decision making.
This case study of late-nineteenth century federal courts in the United States sheds light on two seemingly unrelated questions of general interest to political scientists: What tools are available to party leaders who seek to institutionalize their policy agendas or insulate those agendas from electoral politics? and How do we account for expansions of judicial power? Using an historical-interpretive analysis of partisan agendas, party control of national institutions, congressional initiatives relating to federal courts, the appointment of federal judges, judicial decision making, and litigation patterns, I demonstrate that the increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a policy of economic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable to electoral politics. In addition to offering an innovative interpretation of these developments, I discuss the implications arising from this case study for our standard accounts of partisan politics, political development, and the determinants of judicial decision making. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
Front Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Author -- Chapter 1: History of DNA Profiling Evidence in the Judicial System -- Chapter 2: Context -- Chapter 3: Transfer -- Chapter 4: Interpretation of DNA Profiles -- Chapter 5: Statistics -- Chapter 6: Low Template, Low Level or Low Copy Number DNA -- Chapter 7: Y-STR Profiling and Mitochondrial DNA Typing -- Chapter 8: Frontiers -- Chapter 9: Quality -- Glossary -- Back Cover
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On 6 November 2003 the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms,1 which involves multiple aspects of international law, most notably the issues of treaty interpretation, use of force, hierarchy of norms and the nature of international judicial competence. The case arose out of forcible action by US naval forces in the Persian Gulf against certain Iranian oil platforms.
In In re Estate of O'Brien, the Supreme Court of Washington held that intent to pass a deed title at death fulfills the inter vivos delivery requirement and that the will substitute statute removes ineffective conveyances from the will statute requirement. This Note concludes that the O'Brien interpretations of delivery and the will substitute statute are misguided, and recommends judicial reversal of the delivery ruling and a legislative rewording of the statute.
46States as international persons — Recognition of acts of foreign States and Governments — Exchange control legislation — Articles of Agreement of International Monetary Fund (Article II) — Interpretation by Fund — Whether court may refuse recognition to foreign judicial decision as contrary to ordre public international or conflict of laws rules — Article VIII (2) — Whether sale in Netherlands of shares in French company for French currency is an "exchange contract" — The law of France.
In: International law reports, Band 163, S. 329-568
ISSN: 2633-707X
329Governments — Separation of powers — Roles and responsibilities of executive, legislative and judicial branches of government — Rule of law — Policy — "The chameleon doctrine"Jurisdiction — Original jurisdiction of High Court — Issuing courts — Chapter III courts — Validity of federal legislative provisions — Australian Constitution — Defence power — Whether defence power purposive — Whether "defence" limited to defence against external threats or threats from foreign nations — Whether "defence" limited to defence of community and several states as bodies politic — External affairs power — Relevance of combating terrorism to comity between nations — Referral power — Implied power to protect nation — Presumption against alteration of common law rights — Constitutional facts — Consideration of policy in judicial determinations — Exercise of judicial power — Judicial controversy — Determination of rights or obligations — Requirement of discernible standards and norms — Non-justiciability — Burden of proof — Balancing exercises — Ex parte proceedingsRelationship of international law and municipal law — Criminal Code (Cth) — Part 5.3 — Division 104 — Section 104 — Section 105 — Section 51(xxix) of Australian Constitution — Interpretation of Australian law — International law ratified by and binding on Australia — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) — Extent to which Security Council Resolutions binding on Australia — Whether Division 104 of Criminal Code validly enacted under external affairs power — Promotion of comity with foreign governments — Preservation of integrity of foreign StatesTerrorism — Criminal Code (Cth) — Interpretation and application — Part 5.3 — Division 104 — Section 104 — Section 105 — Definition of "terrorist act" — Interim control orders — Obligations, prohibitions and restrictions upon an individual to protect public from a terrorist act — Public interest — Whether obligations, prohibitions and restrictions "reasonably necessary" and "reasonably appropriate and adapted" to protect public — Section 51(vi) of Australian Constitution — Whether Division 104 of Criminal Code validly enacted under defence power330War and armed conflict — Armed conflict — Terrorism — Applicability of defence powers to threat posed by terrorism — The law of Australia
Justice Wilson was a serious scholar of the Charter who confronted its flashpoints, including social change, the proper relationship between the individual and the state, and judicial deference. Her engagement with the Charter is an exemplar for our own. She, along with other key members of the early Court, constructed a framework of Charter interpretation which constitutes a lasting legacy. There was an active commitment to judicial review of legislation in light of Charter rights. The common law, the rights jurisprudence of other countries and framers' intent were not determinative of Charter rights. Instead, interpretation was driven by a purposive approach to rights grounded in social reality as demonstrated by the effect of the law and evidence. Where Justice Wilson states that section 7 requires the judiciary to protect individuals' choices from government interference, her approach amounts to judicial colonization of a country's decision-making. However, elsewhere she sounds a quieter note, restricting section 7 to important decisions intimately affecting private lives, notably parent-child relations and health and medical decisions. This quieter note has resonated in subsequent Supreme Court judgments which have relied on her work when protecting important and fundamental life choices in these areas. She held the government to a high standard for justifying the breach of rights under section 1. While she was not an Oakes absolutist and was prepared to allow the government to protect the vulnerable, generally she felt that deference to the legislature and judicial review were incompatible and that justifications based on pragmatic considerations, cost and administrative convenience must fail. Her strict approach to section 1 meant that she failed to fully grapple with the full Charter equation which requires us both to protect rights and to identify what we value in a democracy other than rights.
Исследуется отношение учёных к законотворческой деятельности высшего судебного органа страны -Верховного Суда Российской Федерации. Предлагается однозначно решить вопрос о границах полномочий органов, призванных осуществлять судебную власть в государстве. Приводятся примеры не просто расширительного толкования закона или восполнения пробелов в праве, но даже внедрение норм, прямо противоречащих действующему закону. Предпринята попытка анализа внесенного проекта закона, направленного на существенное изменение сложившейся системы уголовного судопроизводства. Обосновывается необходимость внедрения восстановительного подхода в осуществление правосудия по уголовным делам. ; The article investigates the ambiguous attitude of researchers to the legislative activity of the highest judicial body of Russia the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The author believes that it is necessary to clearly define the limits of powers of Russian judicial bodies, which implies not just a broad interpretation of the law or filling gaps in the law, but even the introduction of provisions that are contrary to the applicable law. The author makes an attempt to analyse the submitted draft law aimed at significant changing the current criminal legal proceeding and substantiates the necessity to introduce the restorative approach in the administration of justice in criminal cases. It is often the case when the highest judicial authority abuses the right and relies on the broad interpretation of the law to prepare recommendations for law enforcers. Since the Soviet era the researchers have been pointing to the need for restricted right of the highest courts to use the broad interpretation of the criminal procedure law; however, nowadays, the Supreme Court often goes beyond the limits of its competence and, instead of interpreting, creates the law, which is totally unacceptable. It got a negative assessment by the domestic researchers of the procedure, who, among other things, pointed out that the Supreme Court Plenum can give an explanation of the provisions enshrined in the Code, but cannot fill the gaps in it (though practicing lawyers sometimes expect it), as this is beyond the scope of its powers and refers to the competence of the legislature. Unfortunately, it did not have a proper impact on the current practice of filling the gaps. We can increasingly observe not only cases of a broad interpretation of the law or filling gaps in the law, but even the introduction of provisions contrary to the applicable law. Another argument against the preservation and dissemination of this practice is an unstable position of the Plenum of the Supreme Court. This is aggravated by the variability of the normative regulation in the domestic judicial procedures. Thus, over fifteen years of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2001, it has been amended 190 times through federal laws (as of March 1, 2016).
In: International law reports, Band 67, S. 594-609
ISSN: 2633-707X
The individual in international law — In general — Human rights and freedoms — Protection of individual rights — Purpose of human rights treaties — American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 — Advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights — Integration of universal and regional human rights agreementsTreaties — In general — Conception and function of treaties — Purpose of human rights treaties — American Convention on Human Rights, 1969Treaties — Conclusion and operation of treaties — Effect of treaties on third parties — American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Article 64 — Possible effect of interpretation on States outside inter American systemTreaties — Interpretation of treaties — Principles and rules of interpretation — Traditional international law methods — Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Articles 31 and 32 American Convention on Human Rights, 1969Treaties — Interpretation of treaties — Bilingual treaties — American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 — Reference to preparatory work of the Convention — Relevance of Spanish textTreaties — Interpretation of treaties — Consideration of preparatory work — American Convention on Human Rights, 1969594Disputes — Other international courts — Inter-American Court of Human Rights — Advisory jurisdiction — Scope of — American Convention on Human Rights, 1989, Article 64 — Power of Court to interpret Convention — Power to interpret other treaties — Purpose of Convention — Nature of judicial function — Effect on contentious jurisdiction — Whether interpretation consistent with Article 29 — Possibility of conflicting interpretations from organs outside Inter-American system
The judicial review of government actions is often used as a bellwether of the government's attitude towards the rule of law in China. Accordingly, in gauging the direction of legal reform in the Xi era, media reports have highlighted changes in litigation against government agencies as evidence of positive movement towards greater rule of law. We provide a selective review of changes in China's administrative litigation system in the last few years, giving special attention to the amendment in 2014 of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), and a 2018 Supreme People's Court Interpretation of the same statute. In our view, the question of whether lawsuits might be brought against the government has arguably been superseded in importance by the question of how courts will decide such lawsuits. And the generic notion of judicial independence itself no longer sheds sufficient light on actual and possible judicial responses. Using the purportedly expanded scope of review of informal policy directives as an example, we show that symbolism-motivated advocacy to improve the administrative litigation in China may come at the expense of protecting the non-symbolic functions of judicial review, e.g., the coherence of law and consistency in the delivery of justice. (China Perspect/GIGA)
AbstractThe purpose of this chapter is to explore selected aspects of the relationship between the general principles of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The chapter first looks at the expansion of fundamental rights in EU law and the importance of general principles by reference to three principles which have provided fruitful grounds for judicial activism: the right to judicial protection, the principle of non-discrimination, and the right to personal data. It then examines the sources of fundamental rights under Article 6 TEU and the relationship between Charter rights and general principles. Finally, it explores a pivotal issue in EU constitutional discourse, namely, the scope of application of the Charter and the general principles of law. The chapter concludes by observing that, far from declining in importance, the general principles of law continue to be an integral part of judicial methodology; that, following the introduction of the Charter, the CJEU applies a heightened level of judicial scrutiny; and that it favours a centralised approach opting for an autonomous interpretation of the Charter, granting it precedence over national constitutional norms, and understanding broadly its scope of application.
The current health crisis caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus has revived interest in inheritance law in general, and disinheritance in particular. The delicate situation to which old people have been subjected throughout the world, has introduced into the public debate undesirable situations, such as family abandonments. Disinheritance, in response to situations against the testator, has traditionally been a rigid institution, whose causes have been interpreted restrictively in accordance with a well-established line of jurisprudence. However, this rigidity seems to be changing to a more flexible disinheritance causes, in line with other regional and foreign laws, which raises the need for a legislative reform that harmonizes social reality and code. Throughout this graduation project we will learn about disinheritance and its basis, enter into its causes and also its effects. Because of the diversity of regulations in Spain, it's necessary to take a look at the Spanish regional regulations and of course, foreign regulations. In a second part, we will address the judicial interpretation of the causes of disinheritance, especially in relation to a new jurisprudential turn occurred in 2014 and confirmed in 2015 about psychological abuse. Finally, we will try to know people's opinion by analyzing a survey of more than 2,100 answers about disinheritance and other related elements, where seems to be a general need about its reform. ; La actual crisis sanitaria causada por el virus SARS-CoV-2 ha hecho resurgir el interés por el derecho sucesorio en general, y la desheredación en particular. La delicada situación a la que se han visto sometidos los mayores en todo el mundo, ha introducido en el debate público situaciones que la población califica como indeseables, tales como su abandono por parte de familiares. La desheredación, como respuesta ante situaciones que atentan contra el propio testador, ha sido tradicionalmente una institución rígida, cuyas causas han debido interpretarse de forma restrictiva acorde con una asentada línea jurisprudencial. Sin embargo, esta rigidez parece ir cediendo el camino hacia una flexibilización de las causas de desheredación en línea con otros ordenamientos forales y foráneos, lo que hace plantearse la necesidad de una reforma legislativa que armonice realidad social y código. A lo largo de este trabajo conoceremos la desheredación y su fundamento, nos adentraremos en sus causas y también en sus efectos. Dada la diversidad normativa española, se hace necesario asomarse a los ordenamientos forales españoles y cómo no, a algunos extranjeros. En una segunda parte abordaremos la interpretación judicial de las causas de desheredación, especialmente en relación con el maltrato de obra y el giro jurisprudencial al respecto ocurrido en 2014 y confirmado en 2015. Por último, tomaremos el pulso a la sociedad mediante el análisis de una encuesta realizada a más de 2.100 personas acerca de la desheredación y otros elementos relacionados, donde parece existir un consenso acerca de la necesidad su reforma.