The domestic household service sector of contract gardening dominated by Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles constitutes an important and under-examined component of the city's informal economy. Mexican immigrant gardeners, like Latina domestic workers and Latino day laborers, represent an important and undervalued labor source in this global city and other U.S. cities and suburbs. While domestic help has historically been a privilege of the affluent, the middle-class, since the World War II era, has also acquired the financial means to hire immigrants and racial minorities to perform traditional household duties. Due primarily to the American obsession with the front lawn, the increased influx of low-wage immigrants to the U.S. since the mid-1960s and the structural shift from a manufacturing-dominated industrial complex to a new, service-dominated economic complex during the past several decades, the demand for contract gardeners has become an integral part of local neighborhoods. Although this informal niche provides positive benefits to local neighborhoods--i.e., the (re)production of greener, healthier and aesthetically pleasing communities--scholars and urban planners have traditionally ignored this group. Moreover, scholarly publications and popular narratives commonly frame Mexican immigrants, including paid gardeners, domestic workers and day laborers, as a homogenous group of marginalized individuals who occupy low paying jobs associated with low social status and lack of upward mobility (i.e., "immigrant jobs"). To address the scholarly shortcomings in the social science literature and debunk the pejorative popular views of Mexican immigrant gardeners, this dissertation provides a complex and nuanced interpretation of this informal niche. This dissertation re-conceptualizes this informal service sector from a homogenous group of immigrant workers to a heterogeneous group (i.e., immigrant workers and petty-entrepreneurs). It also re-frames the popular narratives of Mexican immigrant gardeners as ignorant, passive agents who perform simplistic, labor-intensive activities to intelligent, social agents with agency who engage in complex social relations and economic transactions in the informal economy. My main finding, and contribution to the social science literature, centers on how the two sub-groups that I examine in this dissertation--immigrant workers and petty-entrepreneurs in an informal economic niche, with similar low socio-economic backgrounds--differ in their outcomes because they self-organize in different economic models based on the availability of their strong social ties or migrant networks and the hierarchical nature of these webs of social relations. Migrant networks refer to co-ethnic ties that link and bond immigrants in the receiving and sending countries. These inter-personal networks consist of immediate family, extended family, friends and hometown associates.Specifically, my main finding and contributions to the literature consist of four important, interrelated components. First, this dissertation focuses on an understudied group in the academic fields of immigration and ethnic economies: Mexican immigrant entrepreneurs. While much research has been conducted on specific immigrant groups with high rates of entrepreneurship in the U.S., such as Koreans, Chinese, Japanese and Cubans, less research has been conducted on Mexican immigrant entrepreneurs. Secondly, this dissertation focuses on an understudied sector in the academic fields of the informal economy and urban planning: informal, small-scale enterprises in U.S. cities. While recent scholarly studies in this country's informal economy explore many economic sectors and industries, such as construction, garment, electronics and retail, few research projects focus on immigrant-owned, small enterprises as economic vehicles for upward mobility. Thirdly, by developing and coining a typology of informal economic models and markets in Los Angeles' contract gardening niche, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of how an understudied immigrant group creates informal institutions to pursue upward mobility opportunities in U.S. cities. This typology includes the following models and markets: (1) Informal Petty-Capitalism (IPC) model; (2) Informal Master-Apprentice (IMA) model; and (3) Informal Gardener Markets (IGMs). Fourthly, this dissertation also uncovers how these social actors utilize their migrant networks in a hierarchical or rank order manner for differentiated outcomes (i.e., immigrant workers and petty-entrepreneurs). Moreover, it reveals how Mexican immigrant gardeners who migrate from low socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds organize and govern themselves in the informal economy, providing a paradigm for similar immigrant groups to emulate and improve upon throughout American cities and suburbs.By better understanding the existing social capital, rich resources and sophisticated forms of organization that Mexican immigrant gardeners possess, scholars, policy makers, planners, civic and community leaders will be better informed to assist this group and other immigrant groups in a collaborative and strategic manner to improve the working and living conditions of all historically disenfranchised groups in American cities. Thus, in lieu of formalizing the contract gardening service sector with high entry costs, strict government regulations and coercive laws, which inevitably lead to the criminalization and further marginalization of this informal niche, as a society, we need to support and provide informal immigrants with the tools, resources and incentives they need to better incorporate them into American society.
ORDA, L´Ordinaire des Amériques. Revista del Institut Pluridisciplinaire pour les Etudes sur les Amériques à Toulouse (Université Toulouse 2 Le Mirail). La revista es una continuidad de L´Ordinaire du Mexicaniste (1974 à 1988), L´Ordinaire Mexique-Amérique Centrale (hasta 1994) y L´Ordinaire Latino-américain (hasta 2010). Indexada en Catálogo Latindex El presente trabajo analiza el proceso social de construcción del fenómeno de las inundaciones en Buenos Aires como problema público. Poniendo el foco en la vulnerabilidad institucional, analizamos el modo en que las políticas públicas contribuyen a la construcción del riesgo, aquí nos interesa establecer de qué modo se pone a prueba la decisión e intervención institucional cuando las inundaciones se transforman en eventos políticos. Tomando como caso de estudio el desastre ocasionado por las precipitaciones extremas ocurridas en abril de 2013, desarrollamos una contextualización del problema considerando las acciones y omisiones de la política pública. Por otro lado, hacemos un análisis crítico de los discursos de funcionarios a cargo del gobierno, expertos y vecinos afectados, tal como se han expresado en diferentes debates públicos. Nos interesa mostrar qué conocimientos y argumentos se movilizan y de qué manera califican el riesgo en referencia a su componente institucional. Nuestra estrategia metodológica se apoya en el análisis de fuentes secundarias para la descripción del contexto histórico y en un abordaje cualitativo (entrevistas, observaciones participantes, análisis de fuentes periodísticas y sitios web) que toma en cuenta la interpretación de los eventos y la calificación del riesgo desde el punto de vista de los actores sociales. ; This paper deals with the social process through which flooding in Buenos Aires is understood as a question of public policy. By focusing on institutional vulnerabilities, it will show how public policies contribute to risk perception, and how decisions regarding institutional intervention are made when flooding becomes a political event. Through the case study of the catastrophic April 2013 precipitations, this paper will contextualize the problem by looking at the actions and the mistakes of local authorities. It will also offer a critical reading of the statements coming from government workers, experts, and local residents during that period: what their arguments are, the facts they stress, how they assess risks and how they relate them to public institutions. Secondary sources will be used to describe the historical context; a qualitative approach (interviews, participant observation, print and digital sources) will highlight how events and risks are interpreted by social actors. ; Le présent travail analyse le processus social de construction du phénomène des inondations à Buenos Aires comme problème public. En mettant le focus sur la vulnérabilité institutionnelle, nous analysons la manière dont les politiques publiques contribuent à la construction du risque. Il est intéressant d'établir de quelle manière se font la prise de décision et l'intervention institutionnelle quand les inondations se transforment en évènements politiques. En prenant comme étude de cas la catastrophe occasionnée par les précipitations extrêmes observées en avril 2013, nous développons une contextualisation du problème en considérant les actions et les omissions de la politique publique. Par ailleurs, nous établissons une analyse critique des discours des fonctionnaires du gouvernement, des experts et des résidents affectés, en fonction de ce qu'ils ont exprimé dans différents débats publics. Nous voulons montrer quelles connaissances et quels arguments sont mobilisés et de quelle manière ils qualifient le risque en référence à sa composante institutionnelle. Notre stratégie méthodologique s'appuie sur l'analyse de sources secondaires pour la description du contexte historique et sur une approche qualitative (entrevues, observations participantes, analyse des sources journalistiques et sites Web) qui prend en compte l'interprétation des évènements et la qualification du risque du point de vue des acteurs sociaux ; Este artigo analisa o processo de construção social do fenômeno de inundações em Buenos Aires como um problema público. Ao colocar o foco sobre a vulnerabilidade institucional, analisamos como as políticas públicas contribuiem para a construção do risco. É interessante estabelecer a forma como são tomadas as decisões e a resposta institucional quando as cheias se transformam em eventos políticos. A partir do estudo de caso do desastre causado pelas intensas chuvas registradas em abril de 2013, desenvolvemos uma contextualização do problema, considerando as ações e omissões da politica pública. Além disso, estabelecemos uma análise do discurso dos funcionarios do governo, dos péritos e dos moradores afetados, da maneira como eles se expressaram em vários debates públicos. Queremos mostrar que conhecimentos e que argumentos são mobilizados e como eles descrevem o risco em referência a sua componente institucional. Nossa estratégia metodológica baseia-se na análise de fontes secundárias para a descrição do contexto histórico e numa abordagem qualitativa (entrevistas, observação participante, análise de fontes jornalísticas e sites) que leva em conta a interpretação dos eventos e a qualificação do risco do ponto de vista dos atores sociais. ; Fil: Merlinsky, Maria Gabriela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina ; Fil: Tobias, Melina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Indigenes Wissen und Landnutzungsplanung am Beispiel eines Dorfes in Nordchina 1. Probleme der Landnutzungsplanung im heutigen China Die Planung der Landnutzung in der Volksrepublik China der neunziger Jahre ist nach der erfolgreichen Einführung des Familienverantwortlichkeitssystems mit Problemen konfron¬tiert, die eine nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung der ländlichen Ressourcen und damit eine aus¬reichende Nahrungsmittelversorgung der immer noch wachsenden Bevölkerung gefährden. Das bebaubare Land hat seit der Gründung der VR China im Jahre 1949 etwa um 10 % abgenommen, während die Bevölkerung um 100 % gewachsen ist, so dass 1996 nur noch 0,08 ha kultivierbare Fläche pro Kopf zur Verfügung stehen. Die für das Landmanagement wichtigen Ressourcen Boden und Wasser sind in den letzten Jahren nicht nur knapper ge¬worden, sondern sind auch zunehmend verschmutzt bzw. degradiert. Erosion und Deserti¬fizierung bedrohen mehr als 40 % der bebaubaren Landfläche. Die zunehmende Wasser¬knappheit in Nordchina verursacht Versorgungskrisen in großen Städten, aber auch auf dem Land. Es wird geschätzt, dass ein Viertel der Bauern in China nicht genügend Wasser für Feldbewässerung und Trinkwasserversorgung zur Verfügung hat. Die sich verschlechternden Möglichkeiten für die Bauernfamilien, landwirtschaftliche Ak-tivitäten als Haupteinnahmequelle zu nutzen, haben vor allem in Gebieten, die mit gerin¬gen Möglichkeiten zur Entwicklung nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Einkommensquellen ausge¬stattet sind, zu einer Verarmung der Landbevölkerung geführt. Die Mitte der neunziger Jahre eingeführten Erleichterungen des Aufenthaltsrechts führten wiederum dazu, dass Millionen verarmter Bauern nun in den Städten nach Arbeit suchen. Die zurückbleibenden Familienangehörigen, meist Alte, Frauen und Kinder, haben kaum noch Interesse und Möglichkeiten, die Landbewirtschaftung zu intensivieren und nachhaltig zu verbessern. Dadurch liegen in vielen Gebieten Felder brach, die zwar landwirtschaftlich genutzt wer¬den könnten, aber von den in den Dörfern/vor Ort gebliebenen Familienangehörigen nicht bewirtschaftet werden können. Die Gründe für diese Probleme Chinas im ländlichen Raum liegen vor allem in den fol¬genden Bereichen: • Die rechtliche Situation der Landbesitzverhältnisse ist ungeklärt. Im ländlichen Raum gehört der Boden zwar de jure den Kollektiven, diese wurden aber nach der Ein-führung des Familienverantwortlichkeitssystems aufgelöst und haben keinen klar defi-nierten Rechtsnachfolger. Die Bauernfamilien können das Land zwar nutzen, aber die Entscheidungen über die Nutzungsdauer und Nutzungsart werden nach wie vor von lo-kalen Kadern gefällt. Wie groß die Entscheidungsbefugnis der einzelnen Bauernfami¬lien ist, ist von Region zu Region, oft sogar von Gemeinde zu Gemeinde sehr unter-schiedlich. Generell haben in Gebieten im Osten und Süden, die industriell weiterent-wickelt sind und in denen die Landwirtschaft eine geringere Rolle spielt, lokale Ent-scheidungsträger weniger Einfluss auf Maßnahmen im Bereich der Landnutzung und – -bewirtschaftung. Die durchgeführte Fallstudie in einem Dorf in Nordchina zeigt jedoch, dass hier Entscheidungen lokaler Kader noch ein sehr großes Gewicht haben. Oft wird die von ihnen vertretene Politik kurzfristig geändert. So wurde z.B. innerhalb von fünf Jahren zweimal angeordnet, die Bewirtschaftung von Obstbäumen im Dorf von indivi-duellem Management zu kollektiven Management zu verändern. Das Vertragsland des Dorfes Liudu wird laut Unterlagen des Dorfkomitees alle drei bis fünf Jahre neu verteilt, um die Landgröße an die veränderten Familien¬größe anzupassen. Es ist dabei für die Bauernfamilien nicht klar, ob sie dasselbe Stück Land nach dieser Frist weiter bewirtschaften dürfen. So führen die rechtlichen und planerischen Unsicherheiten zu Prozessen, die durch Korruption und beliebige Machtausübung lokaler Entscheidungsträger geprägt sind. Die individuellen Landnutzer/-innen empfinden diese Prozesse als willkürlich und sind verunsichert, denn sie sehen für sich keine Einflussmöglichkeiten, die Anordnungen der Machthaber zu beeinflussen. Somit haben sie nur noch wenig Interesse an einer nachhaltigen Landbewirtschaftung. • Die Zuständigkeiten der mit Landnutzungsplanung befassten Behörden sind nicht geklärt. Die staatliche Institution für Landmanagement (SLA), die 1986 gegründet wurde, ist eine Behörde, die sich Aufgaben der Landnutzungsplanung mit anderen Fachministerien teilen muss. Das Forstministerium (SFA) ist z.B. für Landnutzungsplanung in Berg- und Waldgebieten verantwortlich, das Landwirtschaftsministerium ist für die ökologische Zonierung und Versteigerung von Grenzertragsflächen, das Bauministerium für Flächennutzungsplanung in Städten und das Ministerium für Wasserkontrolle für die Planung von Wasserflächen zuständig. Dabei kommt es zu Überlappungen, bei de¬nen dann zwei oder mehr Institutionen für ein bestimmtes Gebiet zuständig sind, bei landwirtschaftlich genutzten Bergregionen oder bei Agroforstsystemen sind z.B. sowohl das Landwirtschafts- als auch das Forstministerium für die Landnutzungsplanung zu¬ständig. Beide Institutionen verfolgen dabei unterschiedlichen Konzepte. Auf nationaler Ebene werden durch diese Fachministerien Quoten für Landflächen, die den verschiedenen Nutzungsarten zugeschrieben werden sollen, an den Staatsrat gege-ben; dieser leitet sie an die Provinzbehörden der SLA weiter. Die regionalen und loka¬len Landnutzungsplanungsbehörden sind nun dafür verantwortlich, Landnutzungskar¬ten und – -pläne zu erstellen. Sie müssen dabei zwischen nationalen Quoten und lokalen Interessen und Bedürfnissen vermitteln. Diese Aufgabe wird von vielen lokalen Mitar-beiter/-innen als unlösbar eingestuft. Außerdem verfügen die Behörden über nicht aus-reichend qualifiziertes Personal, das nicht in der Lage ist, angepasste Landnutzungs¬pläne zu erarbeiten. • Bauern und Bäuerinnen werden an Entscheidungen im Bereich Landnutzungs-planung nicht beteiligt. In den chinesischen Planungsabläufen ist eine Beteiligung der lokalen Nutzer/-innen nicht vorgesehen. Die einzige Möglichkeit, lokale Politik zu be-einflussen, besteht zur Zeit darin, an den Wahlen für die Dorfkomitees teilzunehmen. Aber auch durch dieses Instrument werden alte Machtstrukturen meist nicht beseitigt. Deshalb befinden sich die chinesischen Bauern und Bäuerinnen in der Situation, die für sie oft willkürlichen Anordnungen der lokalen Kader zu befolgen oder Nischen zu finden, in denen Strategien für ein besseres (Über)leben entwickelt werden können. Dazu ge¬hören z.B. die Entwicklung nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Einkommensmöglichkeiten oder auch Migration in die größeren Ballungszentren. Beides kann dazu führen, dass die Landbewirtschaftung vernachlässigt oder gar aufgegeben wird. 2. Die Vernachlässigung von indigenem Wissen in Entwicklungsansätzen Ein weiteres Problem im Bereich Ressourcenmanagement und Landnutzungsplanung ist, dass weltweit und auch in China die Konzepte vor allem naturwissenschaftlich-technische oder ideologische Grundlagen haben. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass Planer/-innen und Wissenschaftler/-innen ein an Universitäten entwickeltes und damit überlegenes Wissen haben, und dieses Wissen an die "unwissenden" Landnutzer/-innen weitergegeben werden muss. Scheitern diese Entwicklungsansätze, liegt es an der "Unfähigkeit der Bau¬ern/Bäuerinnen", diese Methoden richtig anzuwenden. Die lokalen Wissenssysteme wer¬den bei diesen Konzepten nicht berücksichtigt, oft sogar zerstört. In China bildete sich während der kollektiven Phase (Anfang der fünfziger bis Mitte der achtziger Jahre) ein Wissenssystem heraus, dass sich weder an Naturwissenschaft und Technik noch an lokalem oder indigenem Wissen orientierte, sondern vor allem der kommunistischen Ideologie zu dienen hatte. Es wird deshalb in der Arbeit ideologisches Wissen genannt. Dazu gehört z. B. die Anordnung der chinesischen Führungsspitze während der Kulturrevolution, überall Getreide anzupflanzen, auch wenn die natürlichen Bedingungen dies eigentlich nicht zu¬ließen. Hier wurden die chinesischen Bauern und Bäuerinnen mit einem "Wissen" kon¬frontiert, dass weder auf Wissenschaft noch auf lokalem Know-how basierte. Die Misserfolge der technologisch-orientierten Ansätze, z.B. das Scheitern der Grünen Re-volution in vielen Teilen der Welt führte in den 80er Jahren zu einem Paradigmenwechsel, mit dem Konzepte aktuell wurden, die explizit das Wissen der Landnutzer/-innen in den Mittelpunkt des Planungsprozesses stellen (indigenes Wissen, lokales Wissen, Bauernwissen). Das Konzept von "Indigenous Technical Knowledge" stellt die Nützlich¬keit von lokalen Produktionstechniken heraus, während der Ansatz "Indigenous Knowledge Systems" versucht, lokales Wissen in einen Zusammenhang zu bringen, der kulturelle und institutionelle Aspekte sowie das Management von Wissen miteinbezieht. Der von Robert Chambers vertretene "Farmer First"-Ansatz vertritt die Ansicht, dass Bauernwissen allen anderen Wissenssystemen übergeordnet ist und deshalb die größte Rolle im Entwicklungsprozess spielt. Die vorliegende Arbeit folgt zwei in den letzten Jahren entwickelten Vorgehensweisen zum Umgang mit indigenem Wissen: der "Leiden Ethnosystems Perspective" und dem akteursorientierten Ansatz. Die Definition von indigenem Wissen hat dabei drei Komponenten: die historische Dimen¬sion, also Erforschung von geschichtlichen Prozessen, die zu der heutigen Situation geführt haben; die Untersuchung von Sichtweisen der beteiligten Akteure; und die Analyse, wie dieses Wissen außerhalb von wissenschaftlichen und ideologischen Institutionen entwickelt wurde. Die Akteure werden dabei differenziert in Hinblick auf ihre gesellschaftliche Stellung und die Relevanz ihres Wissens. Indigenes Wissen in dieser Arbeit beinhal¬tet deshalb das vorhandene Wissen der an der Landnutzungsplanung beteiligten Akteure sowie indigener Techniken der Landbewirtschaftung, die nicht durch offizielle Institutionen transportiert wurden und die in der Region bereits vor 1949 angewendet wurden (historische Komponente). Wichtig ist hierbei, dass das indigene Wis¬sen nicht als per se gut und nützlich eingestuft wird, wie es teilweise in den früheren Un¬tersuchungen über lokales Wissen geschah. Vielmehr wird untersucht, welche Relevanz das heute vorhandene indigene Wissen für Ressourcenmanagement und Landnutzungspla¬nung im heutigen China hat. Die historische Komponente des indigenen Wissens ist in China seit etwa zwei Jahrtausen¬den gut dokumentiert - im Gegensatz zu den meisten afrikanischen und südasiatischen Ge-sellschaften. Bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts hatten sich viele Landnutzungstechni¬ken kaum verändert und versetzten die chinesischen Bauern und Bäuerinnen in die Lage, dem knappen Gut Boden vergleichsweise hohe Erträge abzugewinnen. In den Zeiten der kollektiven Landbewirtschaftung von 1958 bis 1978 wurde jedoch zentral verordnet, wie das Land zu nutzen sei und welche Kulturfrüchte anzubauen waren. Dies galt auch für Fälle, wo die lokalen Bedingungen diese Nutzung gar nicht zuließen. Dadurch gerieten viele der traditionellen Methoden in Vergessenheit. Mit der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung in den 80er Jahren erhielten die lokalen Entschei-dungsträger und Landnutzer/-innen zwar einen größeren Einfluss auf die Planung der loka¬len Ressourcen; sie setzen nun aber andere Prioritäten, wie z.B die Erschließung nicht-landwirt-schaftlicher Einkommensmöglichkeiten. Deshalb wird das im Hinblick auf Landbewirt-schaftung vorhandene indigene Wissen immer weniger angewendet. Der offizielle chinesische landwirtschaftliche Beratungsdienst setzt seit Mitte der achtziger Jahre explizit auf Konzepte, die Wissenschaft und Technik propagandieren (tuiguang = durch Druck verbreiten) und traditionelle Denkweisen verdrängen sollen. Dadurch sowie durch die oben erwähnten Rechtsunsicherheiten wird ein Prozess, bei dem das indigene Wissen immer mehr in Vergessenheit gerät, beschleunigt. 3. Die Feldforschung: Lokales Wissen in einem nordchinesischem Bergdorf Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wurde von 1993 bis 1997 in dem Bergdorf Liudu an der Grenze zwi-schen dem administrativen Gebiet Beijings zur Provinz Hebei eine Feldforschung mit par-tizipativen Erhebungsmethoden durchgeführt, bei der untersucht werden sollte, welche Formen von indigenem Wissen vorhanden sind, welche Rolle sie für die Landnutzungspla¬nung spielen können und wer die beteiligten Akteure sind. Dabei wurden die folgenden historischen Wissensbestände gefunden, die heute noch ange-wendet werden und die für eine dörfliche Landnutzungsplanung relevant sein können: • landwirtschaftliche Techniken, die eine optimale Raumausnutzung ermöglichen, z. B. Mischkulturen und Agroforstsysteme, werden nach wie vor angewendet, • geomantische Leitlinien (feng shui) werden als Indikatoren für Landnutzungsentschei-dungen genutzt, • die Prinzipien von yin und yang werden auf landwirtschaftliche Flächen angewendet und die Nutzung entsprechend ausgerichtet, • die Dimensionen von Landverteilung entsprechend der legalistischen und konfuzianischen Auffassung von entweder Landkonzentration oder egalistischer Landvertei¬lung sind in den Denkansätzen der Entscheidungsträger nach wie vor vorhanden. Es wurden außerdem lokale Akteure identifiziert, die im Management und Transport von indigenem Wissen eine besondere Rolle spielen: • lokale Expert/-innen (xiangtu rencai) als Träger und Übermittler von traditionellem Wissen im Bereich Landbewirtschaftung. Sie ergänzen und ersetzen teilweise den staatlichen Beratungsdienst, • der Geomantikexperte (feng shui shifu). Er wurde vor der Kulturrevolution und wird nun wieder verstärkt von der Dorfbevölkerung konsultiert, um Ratschläge bei der An¬lage von neuen Wohn- und Nutzgebäuden und dem Standort von Grabanlagen zu ge¬ben, • lokale Innovator/-innen, die neue Techniken der Landbewirtschaftung entwickeln, ohne dass diese durch offizielle Beratungsdienste initiiert wurden, • lokale Institutionen, z.B. das Dorfkomitee, das von den Dorfbewohner/-innen als ihre wichtigste Institution angesehen wird. Die Institution "Dorfkomitee" wurde zwar in der kollektiven Zeit gegründet, kann nun aber relativ frei gewählt werden und fällt wich¬tige Entscheidungen im Bereich der dörflichen Landnutzungsplanung, • Bauern und Bäuerinnen, die ihren Geschlechterrollen entsprechend die Landbewirtschaftung durchführen. Alle Informanten und Informantinnen gaben an, dass sie ihr landwirt¬schaftliches Wissen zum größten Teil mit ihren Verwandten und Nachbarn austauschen und nicht durch den offiziellen Beratungsdienst erhalten. Die Erhebungen haben allerdings gezeigt, dass die historischen Wissenssysteme und ihre Träger auch nach der Auflösung des kollektiven Bewirtschaftungssystems weiterhin an Bedeutung verloren haben. Z.B. konnte beim letzten Feldaufenthalt 1997 beobachtet werden, dass Mischfruchtsysteme und die Prinzipien von yin und yang kaum noch angewendet werden. Sie wurden hauptsächlich im traditionellen Trockenfeldbau eingesetzt, und die Bearbeitung dieser Felder wird von der Dorfbevölkerung als zu mühsam und ineffektiv angesehen, weil sich einerseits die dort angebauten Produkte nicht vermarkten lassen und andererseits genügend Le¬bensmittel auf lokalen Märkten zu teilweise subventionierten Preisen gekauft werden kön¬nen. Das Interesse richtet sich deshalb nun auf nicht-landwirtschaftliche Einkommens¬möglichkeiten. Es ist deshalb schwierig einzuschätzen, inwieweit das indige¬ne Wissens zu einer nachhaltigen Landnutzung beitragen kann, da sie in den Augen der lokalen Bevölkerung immer mehr an Bedeutung verliert. Außerdem sind die Gegen¬wartsprobleme im Bereich Ressourcenmanagement so massiv, z. B. die Wasser- und Bo¬denverschmutzung durch Industrieemissionen und Agrochemikalien, dass historische An¬sätze hier keine Lösung bieten können. Es wurde jedoch festgestellt, dass Bauern und Bäuerinnen in der Lage sind, neue Landbe-wirtschaftungsstrategien zu entwickeln, wenn sie merken, dass ihre Lebensumwelt z.B. durch die Verknappung natürlicher Ressourcen unmittelbar bedroht ist und ihre bisherigen Wirtschaftsweisen keine Perspektiven mehr bieten. Dabei spielten die naturwissenschaft¬lich-technisch und ideologisch geprägten Institutionen wie z. B. der offizielle landwirt¬schaftliche Beratungsdienst oder andere staatliche Institutionen keine Rolle. Es handelt sich also um endogene Innovationen. 4. Schlussfolgerungen Es wird deshalb vorgeschlagen, dass die Definition von indigenem Wissen erweitert wird um die Komponente der Fähigkeit zu Innovationen, die Antworten auf die Gegenwartspro¬bleme beinhalten. Dabei werden die entsprechenden Lösungsansätze von den Betroffenen selbst entwickelt, die entsprechenden Planungsinstitutionen können dann aber die Fortfüh¬rung und Umsetzung der Ansätze unterstützen. Gegebenenfalls werden sie erweitert und verbessert; z. B. kann die Verbesserung trockenheitsresistenter Getreidesorten in For¬schungslaboren durchgeführt werden, wenn sie auf Experimenten der Bauern beruht und diese an der Fortführung der Entwicklung beteiligt werden. Im Bereich Landnutzungsplanung können neue Ideen der Landnutzer/-innen aufgegriffen und in einen übergeordneten Planungszusammenhang gebracht werden. Dabei bietet das Instrument der Geographischen Informationssysteme (GIS), ursprünglich ein rein techni¬sches Instrument, Möglichkeiten, die Landnutzer/-innen in den Planungsdialog miteinzu¬beziehen. Dazu wurde ein Konzept entwickelt, das eine Integration von wissenschaftlich-technischem Wissen und indigenem Wissen in der Landnutzungsplanung ermöglicht. Gegliedert in 15 Schritte wird eine Planung dargelegt, die zwei Feldaufenthalte, bei denen partizipative Methoden angewendet werden, den Dialog mit den entsprechenden Planungsbehörden, partizipative Planungsaktivitäten auf höheren Ebenen, die Einbettung der partizipativ erhobenen Informationen in ein GIS, Vorschläge für die Implementierung sowie partizipative Monitoringaktivitäten beinhaltet. Die Schwerpunkte liegen dabei auf der Einschätzung des spezifischen Wissens der unterschiedlichen Akteure, der Verbesse¬rung von schwachen Schnittstellen der beteiligten Institutionen und der Konzentration auf die spezifischen Probleme der Landnutzungsplanung in China. ; The thesis analyses the need for the integration of indigenous knowledge into rural land use planning concepts, based on an example from a mountainous region in rural Northern China. The definition of indigenous knowledge comprises three components: research on the historical dimension, investigation of the present views of the people concerned with land use planning and the analysis about knowledge generation outside scientific institutions. The historical component in China is well documented with traditional cultivation techniques and ancient visions of nature. Many of these techniques remained unchanged until the beginning of the 20th century and enabled the land users to receive relatively high yields in a sustainable way. During the time of collective land management 1958-1978, however, it was centrally planned and ordered how land should be used and which crops should be cultivated following the socialist ideology and without considering local and historical perspectives. This promotion of this "ideological" knowledge with its top-down approaches has thus resulted in neglecting traditional techniques and the application of indigenous knowledge. Following the economic liberalization at the beginning of the 1980s, land users and local decision makers could then have a wider influence on the use of land resources and on how to cultivate their fields. However, in many regions in China, agricultural activities have been no longer economically viable and this leads to a non-agricultural use of land which is often not sustainable. The official agricultural extension service focuses now on modern science and technology, but still follows a top-down approach (tuiguang= push and spread). The legal situation of land tenure is still unclear so that many land users are not motivated to use sustainable and traditional methods on their land plots. In this process, indigenous knowledge has been further losing its importance. The second part of the thesis presents the views of the land users in the case study of Liudu Village, Fangshan County on the border between Beijing and Hebei Province. Using participatory appraisal methods it was revealed that some traditional techniques such as mixed cropping and agro-forestry systems are still applied; that geomantic principles (feng shui) sometimes influence land use decisions; that the principle of yin and yang are used on agricultural fields and that decision makers still follow the historical conflict of Confucian and legalist land distribution. However, these applications remain sporadic and cannot significantly contribute to solutions of modern problems i.e. water and soil pollution through massive chemical emissions. Nevertheless the findings show that local people are able to carry out their innovations outside the official scientific extension service and different from traditional techniques if their own environment is threatened. This includes breeding of larger animals which is both ecomically attractive and sustainable because the night soil can be used as manure. Especially old people have concepts on how to use land in a sustainable way. Newly generated knowledge can therefore provide answers to the present problems, if they are integrated into scientific and official approaches of land use planning and land management. In order to achieve a sustainable use of land, the ideas of the land users should be considered and put into a higher level planning context. Useful instruments for this are Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Originally purely technical, they offer a range of possibilities to integrate the views of local actors. The thesis develops a concept of 15 planning steps for participatory land use planning based on a combination of indigenous and modern knowledge.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This CIDOB briefing summarises the key findings of the international seminar "The dark side of urban artificial intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms", held on June 19th, 2023 at CIDOB and organised by CIDOB's Global Cities Programme with support from Barcelona City Council. Scholars, experts and practitioners convened to deliberate and offer recommendations for the efficient governance and deployment of algorithmic tools in urban settings, with a view to mitigating the environmental, social and political challenges associated with AI.
We are seeing a surge in global efforts to establish governance frameworks for Artificial Intelligence (AI): from the United States' Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI (October 2023), to the AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom (November 2023); taking in a consolidated working draft Convention by the Council of Europe on AI, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (July 2023); not to mention the political agreement reached in December 2023 (to be ratified in 2024) between the negotiators at the European Parliament and the Council to adopt the EU AI Act. According to the Council of Europe's compendium of AI Initiatives, there are currently more than 600 ongoing initiatives aimed at governing AI. However, what is to be governed when it comes to algorithms? According to a recent piece in The Economist, any AI regulation should first aim to answer three key questions: What should the world worry about? What should any rules target? And how should they be enforced? It is far from clear whether any of the above initiatives will hit the nail on the head in terms of AI's impact on the environment and society. The issue becomes even thornier if we take into account the multi-stakeholder dimension of AI governance: it is not just national or local governments, or intergovernmental organisations who are involved. Private players – and especially companies – play a growing role, if not the leading one, in some of these initiatives. This CIDOB briefing expands upon the findings of the international seminar "The dark side of urban artificial intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms", held on June 19th, 2023. We delve into two crucial aspects of AI and algorithmic governance: firstly, the environmental consequences of AI, and secondly, the wider social and political implications of algorithms. The briefing wraps up by offering insights and recommendations for the effective governance of AI in urban contexts.1. The environmental impact of algorithms: "AI for sustainability" and "sustainable AI" There are two interconnected perspectives on the relationship between AI and environmental sustainability, broadly referred to as "AI for sustainability" and "sustainable AI" (van Wynsberghe, 2021).1 The former involves using algorithmic tools in areas that contribute to ecologically desirable developments, such as climate protection. Examples of AI applications in this field include counting trees, providing precise estimates of biodiversity in various areas, monitoring real-time weather patterns, or forecasting energy consumption, air quality and CO₂ emissions, as well as enhancing efficiency in resource allocation. These illustrate how AI serves as a robust tool for swift and informed decision-making, facilitating progress towards more sustainable cities. Given this, "AI for sustainability" accounts for the enthusiastic adoption of AI solutions by many cities. The AI4Cities project is a good illustration of this trend, representing one of the most significant initiatives showcasing how cities are actively seeking AI-driven solutions in the energy and mobility domains to support their transitions to carbon neutrality. Yet, as more resources are dedicated to the development and use of urban AI solutions, it becomes increasingly crucial to consider the environmental impact of these technologies. Indeed, designing, producing and employing AI technologies requires a physical infrastructure that calls for extensive amounts of material resources, including water, metals, energy and human labour. Consequently, not only their computational power but their very material existence gives rise to significant ethical issues from a sustainability standpoint. After all, and as Falk and van Wynsberghe (2023, p.7) put it: "How useful can the impact of an AI system be towards sustainable ends if its development and use defeat the purpose of its existence in the first place?" In this context, the term "AI for sustainability" should be distinguished from "sustainable AI". The latter is about "developing, implementing, and using AI in a manner that minimises the adverse social, ecological and economic impacts of the applied algorithms" (Rohde et al., 2021, p.1). However, the environmental impact is not easy to analyse, let alone estimate. One key aspect involves grounding the discussion in the relationship between the benefits of AI systems and their environmental cost in factual data. The problem is that at present developers and operators of these systems are not furnishing the necessary data, hindering the formulation and implementation of effective policies. The most recent iterations of the EU's AI Act represent a potential breakthrough. For the first time they may compel companies to measure and disclose information regarding the environmental impact of specific high-risk systems. This might entail incorporating data collection methods into these systems, drawing inspiration from already-established approaches for monitoring energy consumption, CO₂-equivalent emissions, water usage, mineral use for hardware, and electronic waste generation. This would streamline the assessment of the sustainability of AI systems (Mollen and Vieth-Ditlmann, 2023). Yet, considering that the evaluation of the sustainability of AI is still a developing and nascent area, the SustainAI index can be regarded as another notable stride in this direction. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for assessing and improving the sustainability of AI systems. This initiative proposes evaluating the environmental sustainability of algorithms through different stages (planning and design, data, development and implementation) based on four criteria:2 energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, sustainability in use and indirect resource consumption. Among these, energy consumption (intertwined with greenhouse gas emissions) is acknowledged as the primary source of concern. Granted, all Internet-related activities rely heavily on substantial electricity, primarily sourced from fossil fuels. However, when compared with other technologies, AI, especially applications like ChatGPT, stands out for its extraordinary power usage. To start with, training a large language or other AI model requires huge amounts of power. Furthermore, large language models rank among the biggest in the realm of machine learning, incorporating as many as hundreds of billions of parameters. The training process demands several weeks of GPU hours, contributing to carbon emissions. As an illustration, the energy consumption for training BLOOM, an open-access multilingual language model, equated to the amount needed to power an average American home for 41 years (Falk and van Wynsberghe, 2023, p.5). Moreover, the chatbot or any other end product needs electricity every time it is used. Recently, some proposals have emerged to address this concern, including the idea of affixing a label to algorithms that discloses the amount of CO₂ emissions and computing power used in their creation. For a city administration, prioritising these types of algorithms may be a good way of improving the ecological sustainability of their digital initiatives, as most urban technologies are not developed in-house. Likewise, local governments could give precedence to employing algorithms trained with small and conscientiously curated datasets. Although this approach may take more time, it not only contributes to sustainability but also enhances fairness and accuracy, thereby contributing to the reduction of "data pollution". Secondly, it is crucial to take into account the broader infrastructure that supports and links hardware, encompassing the energy consumption of networking systems, maintenance of data centres and cooling systems (Falk and van Wynsberghe, 2023, p.5). This includes the production of computer chips and the establishment of data centres where AI operates. Fortunately, there are existing initiatives aimed at rendering urban data centres more eco-friendly, such as Stockholm Data Parks (see box 1) or a Paris project using server energy to heat swimming pool water. However, there is a pressing need for broader efforts at the urban level, as these measures remain more anecdotal than standard practice.
2. The social impact of algorithms As is the case for the environmental impact of AI, two main views prevail when it comes to the political dimensions of algorithms, which could be labelled "AI for democracy" and "democratic AI" (see box 2). Likewise, and while the political and social impact of AI may have been researched for longer (e.g., disinformation and misinformation or algorithmic discrimination), its actual implications for politics and societies are still far from clear. In this regard, most concerns seem to focus on the possibility of the singularity, i.e., the point in time at which AI surpasses human intelligence. However, and as Shazade Jameson put it during the seminar, "the real revolution in AI will be mundane". Indeed, probably the most problematic aspect of (generative) AI is that it hides in plain sight.
Algorithms are already embedded in many of our daily habits, from searching for directions on maps or mobile navigation apps to voice assistants. Not to mention that most online services rely on AI: generally, what we see online is the result of classification and association algorithms (such as search engines or online advertising), and we may be filtered by an algorithm without us even knowing (when applying for a job, a mortgage, or enrolling for medical and insurance programmes). Public administrations also use algorithms extensively, for example, for medical diagnosing, policing, to find eligible persons for public subsidies, or to decide on whether to provide police protection to survivors of gender violence. At the local level, many municipalities are using generative AI models to gain insights from unstructured data, improving the understanding of what is happening in the city, as well as using algorithmic tools to enable public services delivery to be more accessible and efficient (typically taking the form of chatbots).There are several shortcomings in each of these cases, and they all usually boil down to issues of discrimination, transparency, accuracy and trustworthiness. Examples abound. In 2013, it was found that Google searches using "black-sounding" names were more likely to turn up ads for services such as criminal background checks; in 2015, Amazon realised its new system was not rating candidates for software developer jobs and other technical posts in a gender-neutral way; in 2018, it was found that setting a user's gender to female in Google resulted in being shown fewer ads for high-paying jobs. However, private corporations are not alone when it comes to the use of algorithms that discriminate based on gender and/or race. There are also several cases where policing algorithms have been found to discriminate against people based on where they lived, such as in Chicago in the United States and Durham in the UK. More recently, Eticas Foundation and Fundación Ana Bella-Red de Mujeres Supervivientes found that the algorithm used in the Spanish Ministry of the Interior's system to assess the risks of survivors from gender violence, VioGén, falls short of delivering on its promise. Some 80% of interviewed survivors raised issues with the use of the algorithm. In the Dutch city of Rotterdam, an algorithm used to rank welfare recipients based on their fraud risk was found to discriminate against single mothers. These shortcomings are magnified because algorithms are usually in the hands of a small number of private companies, in what has been referred to by Aviv Ovadya as "autocratic concentration". These private, for-profit actors cannot by themselves address the costs and drawbacks of AI. In many cases, not even AI researchers fully understand the recommendations made by algorithms.
3. Lessons learned and challenges ahead for local governments a) Regulation and governance come with their own challenges It is widely acknowledged that addressing the challenges posed by AI often involves seeking solutions through regulatory measures. However, regulating AI comes with its own set of difficulties, including dealing with the rapid pace of AI advancements, dissecting the elements to be regulated and deciding who regulates and how. At the global level, the current geopolitical conditions add an extra layer of complexity to the task of regulation.From a European standpoint, the continent is facing the consequences of excessive regulation, which has led to gaps in investment in research and development as well as capacity-building. Similarly, the seminar's participants expressed concerns that AI requirements imposed by Europe can pose significant challenges to small businesses and open-source projects. Hence, while acknowledging the positive aspects of the EU's AI Act, such as its human rights-based approach, it is essential to recognise the potential long-term negative impacts of the act and address them. While many countries have already released national guidelines on AI, most local governments are still lagging behind on the development of regulatory frameworks for AI in a technical and policy capacity. While governance may certainly be a challenging task, four essential lessons to guide progress emerged from the seminar: Focus on processes: while most governance initiatives address AI outcomes, it is crucial to recognise that (machine) learning is a continuous process, and it is as part of these processes that policies should step in.Governing uncertainty is a constant practice: effectively governing uncertainty requires ongoing efforts, with feedback mechanisms and a supportive culture playing vital roles in enabling organisations, including local governments, to adapt over time.Accountability for algorithmic decisions should be established.Aim big, start small: optimal governance is built through projects, exemplified by initiatives like the Data Governance Clinics project. This innovative approach aligns data governance with the public interest in cities and underscores the importance of adopting an ambitious yet gradual approach to achieve broader goals. b) Human resources: capacity-building and talent attraction Decision-makers need to assess the available human resources capable of designing, implementing, deploying and overseeing urban AI systems. To fully reap the benefits of digital transformation, public sector leaders must acquire new skills that equip them to tackle the intricate challenges of the digital era. Artificial Intelligence is no exception to that, and the effective adoption and regulation of algorithmic tools require digital literacy among civil servants. These competencies encompass the ability to create enabling frameworks, foresee technological trends, implement measures to address ethical and human rights risks, comprehend the development of digital platforms, and collaborate effectively with third parties, including vendors. In essence, talent and digital skills are indispensable, underscoring the importance of enhancing the government's digital capacity as a prerequisite for ambitious local AI projects. In the context of an urban AI strategy, capacity-building refers to the process of cultivating and reinforcing the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that a local community requires to plan, design and deploy AI applications. Interestingly, most local governments perceive capability constraints as a significant obstacle to both the adoption and regulation of AI applications. More specifically, cities commonly encounter two types of limitations: the availability of a local workforce with the requisite skills for constructing and managing the AI system (human capacity), and the proficiency of this workforce in interacting with and supervising the AI system (AI literacy). These limitations are linked to a scarcity of locally accessible skills and a global shortage of AI talent. It is worth noting that in the global race for IT talent and specific AI skills, the private sector has traditionally surpassed governments in their ability to attract specialised human resources. Consequently, many cities lack the financial resources to develop urban technologies in-house, leading them to rely on outsourcing and procurement to access the technical expertise essential for AI development and governance. The skills gap is not inconsequential. In the first place, poor knowledge among decision-makers responsible for funding AI solutions and those tasked with implementing the technology renders system monitoring very difficult. From a geographical perspective, the global competition for talent aggravates the imbalance between small and large cities. It should be noted that in secondary cities, the lack of capacity is often not solely technical but also legal, as they may lack the competences to develop technology. This heightens the risk of creating disparities between first and second-class cities. While the global digital divide and a city's socioeconomic situation may exacerbate the shortage of AI skills in public administrations, this issue is a concern for affluent and economically challenged cities alike. Cities can implement a series of measures to address these constraints. Foremost among these is the need to make capacity-building a central component of any effective local AI strategy. This involves investing in developing both technical capabilities (such as digital literacy) and interdisciplinary skills (such as AI regulation and law, AI ethics and AI business development). Ultimately, local governments must ensure that staff directly involved in implementing an AI system in an urban sector are adequately trained and informed about the specific AI system they are employing. This means they should have a comprehensive understanding of how AI may impact their responsibilities and be capable of interpreting the system's output to identify potential failures. Moreover, any capacity-building strategy should also include specific efforts to educate the public about AI, its transformative effects on current practices, and the opportunities, challenges and risks it presents. Nevertheless, capacity-building initiatives alone may prove insufficient, prompting local governments to formulate strategies for attracting and retaining talent. In the immediate term, they can tackle budget and skills shortages by forging cross-sectoral collaborations with local stakeholders to offset the scarcity of public capacities. c) Procurement is key As argued above, most cities lack the internal capacity to develop AI solutions on their own, leading them to acquire urban AI primarily through procurement channels. In fact, AI procurement serves as a powerful governance tool that can be leveraged to address some of the harmful effects that AI use may have on citizens, especially those in vulnerable communities. However, throughout the procurement process, cities must possess the ability to assess the AI solutions presented to them. One effective method to ensure that private providers adhere to the city's standards regarding digital rights and ethical principles is by incorporating procurement clauses. For instance, in 2021 the City of Amsterdam formulated a set of contractual terms outlining the specific information required from suppliers. Municipal governments can keep control over the technology they adopt by seeking three types of information: technical transparency (the code), procedural transparency (the algorithm's purpose and how it reaches its outcomes), and "explainability" (the rules that apply if an algorithm impacts someone personally). The value of these contractual terms lies in their ability to help local governments operationalise standards, create obligations and define responsibilities for trustworthy, transparent and accountable development and procurement of AI technologies. Unsurprisingly, other local governments, including Barcelona, are emulating Amsterdam's approach by crafting their own AI procurement clauses. d) Citizen participation and co-creation to enhance diversity A fourth element that is crucial to address the adverse effects of AI is to engage civil society in both the development and use of algorithmic tools. The concerns surrounding AI extend beyond the principle of "public money, public ownership" to encompass public intelligence and citizen data. In that sense, seminar participants concurred that involving civil society in AI initiatives is essential to prevent biases from being ingrained in AI and to ensure that AI regulations are understandable to the general public. Additionally, it was emphasised that when public entities use algorithms, consideration should be given to governance and institutional frameworks, recognising that the current state of data governance in public governance is far from optimal. Similarly, some participants underscored the importance of transparent research and public repositories, advocating for the implementation of mechanisms that hold public administrations accountable to their citizens when using automated decision systems. References Rohde, Friederike; Gossen, Maike; Wagner, Josephin and Santarius, Tilman (2021) "Sustainability challenges of Artificial Intelligence and Policy Implications". Ökologisches Writschaften, 36. van Wynsberghe, Aimee (2021) "Sustainable AI: AI for sustainability and the sustainability of AI". AI Ethics, 1, 213-218. Falk, Sophia and van Wynsberghe, Aimee (2023) "Challenging AI for Sustainability: what ought it mean?". AI Ethics Mollen, Anne and Vieth-Ditlmann, Kilian (2023) "Just Measure It: The Environmental Impact of AI". SustainAI Magazine, number 3. Autumn, 2023.Notes:The notion of sustainability is a complex one. It is often understood as comprising three distinct dimensions: an environmental, a social, and an economic one. In this section, we limit the analysis to the environmental dimension of sustainability.For a more detailed account of the different criteria, see: https://sustain.algorithmwatch.org/en/step-by-step-towards-sustainable-ai/For more examples on the use of algorithms in cities, refer to the Atlas of Urban AI curated by the Global Observatory of Urban Artificial Intelligence (led by CIDOB's Global Cities Programme).
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This CIDOB briefing summarises the key findings of the international seminar "The dark side of urban artificial intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms", held on June 19th, 2023 at CIDOB and organised by CIDOB's Global Cities Programme with support from Barcelona City Council. Scholars, experts and practitioners convened to deliberate and offer recommendations for the efficient governance and deployment of algorithmic tools in urban settings, with a view to mitigating the environmental, social and political challenges associated with AI. We are seeing a surge in global efforts to establish governance frameworks for Artificial Intelligence (AI): from the United States' Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI (October 2023), to the AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom (November 2023); taking in a consolidated working draft Convention by the Council of Europe on AI, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (July 2023); not to mention the political agreement reached in December 2023 (to be ratified in 2024) between the negotiators at the European Parliament and the Council to adopt the EU AI Act. According to the Council of Europe's compendium of AI Initiatives, there are currently more than 600 ongoing initiatives aimed at governing AI. However, what is to be governed when it comes to algorithms? According to a recent piece in The Economist, any AI regulation should first aim to answer three key questions: What should the world worry about? What should any rules target? And how should they be enforced? It is far from clear whether any of the above initiatives will hit the nail on the head in terms of AI's impact on the environment and society. The issue becomes even thornier if we take into account the multi-stakeholder dimension of AI governance: it is not just national or local governments, or intergovernmental organisations who are involved. Private players – and especially companies – play a growing role, if not the leading one, in some of these initiatives. This CIDOB briefing expands upon the findings of the international seminar "The dark side of urban artificial intelligence: addressing the environmental and social impact of algorithms", held on June 19th, 2023. We delve into two crucial aspects of AI and algorithmic governance: firstly, the environmental consequences of AI, and secondly, the wider social and political implications of algorithms. The briefing wraps up by offering insights and recommendations for the effective governance of AI in urban contexts.1. The environmental impact of algorithms: "AI for sustainability" and "sustainable AI" There are two interconnected perspectives on the relationship between AI and environmental sustainability, broadly referred to as "AI for sustainability" and "sustainable AI" (van Wynsberghe, 2021).1 The former involves using algorithmic tools in areas that contribute to ecologically desirable developments, such as climate protection. Examples of AI applications in this field include counting trees, providing precise estimates of biodiversity in various areas, monitoring real-time weather patterns, or forecasting energy consumption, air quality and CO₂ emissions, as well as enhancing efficiency in resource allocation. These illustrate how AI serves as a robust tool for swift and informed decision-making, facilitating progress towards more sustainable cities. Given this, "AI for sustainability" accounts for the enthusiastic adoption of AI solutions by many cities. The AI4Cities project is a good illustration of this trend, representing one of the most significant initiatives showcasing how cities are actively seeking AI-driven solutions in the energy and mobility domains to support their transitions to carbon neutrality. Yet, as more resources are dedicated to the development and use of urban AI solutions, it becomes increasingly crucial to consider the environmental impact of these technologies. Indeed, designing, producing and employing AI technologies requires a physical infrastructure that calls for extensive amounts of material resources, including water, metals, energy and human labour. Consequently, not only their computational power but their very material existence gives rise to significant ethical issues from a sustainability standpoint. After all, and as Falk and van Wynsberghe (2023, p.7) put it: "How useful can the impact of an AI system be towards sustainable ends if its development and use defeat the purpose of its existence in the first place?" In this context, the term "AI for sustainability" should be distinguished from "sustainable AI". The latter is about "developing, implementing, and using AI in a manner that minimises the adverse social, ecological and economic impacts of the applied algorithms" (Rohde et al., 2021, p.1). However, the environmental impact is not easy to analyse, let alone estimate. One key aspect involves grounding the discussion in the relationship between the benefits of AI systems and their environmental cost in factual data. The problem is that at present developers and operators of these systems are not furnishing the necessary data, hindering the formulation and implementation of effective policies. The most recent iterations of the EU's AI Act represent a potential breakthrough. For the first time they may compel companies to measure and disclose information regarding the environmental impact of specific high-risk systems. This might entail incorporating data collection methods into these systems, drawing inspiration from already-established approaches for monitoring energy consumption, CO₂-equivalent emissions, water usage, mineral use for hardware, and electronic waste generation. This would streamline the assessment of the sustainability of AI systems (Mollen and Vieth-Ditlmann, 2023). Yet, considering that the evaluation of the sustainability of AI is still a developing and nascent area, the SustainAI index can be regarded as another notable stride in this direction. It provides a comprehensive blueprint for assessing and improving the sustainability of AI systems. This initiative proposes evaluating the environmental sustainability of algorithms through different stages (planning and design, data, development and implementation) based on four criteria:2 energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, sustainability in use and indirect resource consumption. Among these, energy consumption (intertwined with greenhouse gas emissions) is acknowledged as the primary source of concern. Granted, all Internet-related activities rely heavily on substantial electricity, primarily sourced from fossil fuels. However, when compared with other technologies, AI, especially applications like ChatGPT, stands out for its extraordinary power usage. To start with, training a large language or other AI model requires huge amounts of power. Furthermore, large language models rank among the biggest in the realm of machine learning, incorporating as many as hundreds of billions of parameters. The training process demands several weeks of GPU hours, contributing to carbon emissions. As an illustration, the energy consumption for training BLOOM, an open-access multilingual language model, equated to the amount needed to power an average American home for 41 years (Falk and van Wynsberghe, 2023, p.5). Moreover, the chatbot or any other end product needs electricity every time it is used. Recently, some proposals have emerged to address this concern, including the idea of affixing a label to algorithms that discloses the amount of CO₂ emissions and computing power used in their creation. For a city administration, prioritising these types of algorithms may be a good way of improving the ecological sustainability of their digital initiatives, as most urban technologies are not developed in-house. Likewise, local governments could give precedence to employing algorithms trained with small and conscientiously curated datasets. Although this approach may take more time, it not only contributes to sustainability but also enhances fairness and accuracy, thereby contributing to the reduction of "data pollution". Secondly, it is crucial to take into account the broader infrastructure that supports and links hardware, encompassing the energy consumption of networking systems, maintenance of data centres and cooling systems (Falk and van Wynsberghe, 2023, p.5). This includes the production of computer chips and the establishment of data centres where AI operates. Fortunately, there are existing initiatives aimed at rendering urban data centres more eco-friendly, such as Stockholm Data Parks (see box 1) or a Paris project using server energy to heat swimming pool water. However, there is a pressing need for broader efforts at the urban level, as these measures remain more anecdotal than standard practice. 2. The social impact of algorithms As is the case for the environmental impact of AI, two main views prevail when it comes to the political dimensions of algorithms, which could be labelled "AI for democracy" and "democratic AI" (see box 2). Likewise, and while the political and social impact of AI may have been researched for longer (e.g., disinformation and misinformation or algorithmic discrimination), its actual implications for politics and societies are still far from clear. In this regard, most concerns seem to focus on the possibility of the singularity, i.e., the point in time at which AI surpasses human intelligence. However, and as Shazade Jameson put it during the seminar, "the real revolution in AI will be mundane". Indeed, probably the most problematic aspect of (generative) AI is that it hides in plain sight. Algorithms are already embedded in many of our daily habits, from searching for directions on maps or mobile navigation apps to voice assistants. Not to mention that most online services rely on AI: generally, what we see online is the result of classification and association algorithms (such as search engines or online advertising), and we may be filtered by an algorithm without us even knowing (when applying for a job, a mortgage, or enrolling for medical and insurance programmes). Public administrations also use algorithms extensively, for example, for medical diagnosing, policing, to find eligible persons for public subsidies, or to decide on whether to provide police protection to survivors of gender violence. At the local level, many municipalities are using generative AI models to gain insights from unstructured data, improving the understanding of what is happening in the city, as well as using algorithmic tools to enable public services delivery to be more accessible and efficient (typically taking the form of chatbots). There are several shortcomings in each of these cases, and they all usually boil down to issues of discrimination, transparency, accuracy and trustworthiness. Examples abound. In 2013, it was found that Google searches using "black-sounding" names were more likely to turn up ads for services such as criminal background checks; in 2015, Amazon realised its new system was not rating candidates for software developer jobs and other technical posts in a gender-neutral way; in 2018, it was found that setting a user's gender to female in Google resulted in being shown fewer ads for high-paying jobs. However, private corporations are not alone when it comes to the use of algorithms that discriminate based on gender and/or race. There are also several cases where policing algorithms have been found to discriminate against people based on where they lived, such as in Chicago in the United States and Durham in the UK. More recently, Eticas Foundation and Fundación Ana Bella-Red de Mujeres Supervivientes found that the algorithm used in the Spanish Ministry of the Interior's system to assess the risks of survivors from gender violence, VioGén, falls short of delivering on its promise. Some 80% of interviewed survivors raised issues with the use of the algorithm. In the Dutch city of Rotterdam, an algorithm used to rank welfare recipients based on their fraud risk was found to discriminate against single mothers. These shortcomings are magnified because algorithms are usually in the hands of a small number of private companies, in what has been referred to by Aviv Ovadya as "autocratic concentration". These private, for-profit actors cannot by themselves address the costs and drawbacks of AI. In many cases, not even AI researchers fully understand the recommendations made by algorithms. 3. Lessons learned and challenges ahead for local governments a) Regulation and governance come with their own challenges It is widely acknowledged that addressing the challenges posed by AI often involves seeking solutions through regulatory measures. However, regulating AI comes with its own set of difficulties, including dealing with the rapid pace of AI advancements, dissecting the elements to be regulated and deciding who regulates and how. At the global level, the current geopolitical conditions add an extra layer of complexity to the task of regulation.From a European standpoint, the continent is facing the consequences of excessive regulation, which has led to gaps in investment in research and development as well as capacity-building. Similarly, the seminar's participants expressed concerns that AI requirements imposed by Europe can pose significant challenges to small businesses and open-source projects. Hence, while acknowledging the positive aspects of the EU's AI Act, such as its human rights-based approach, it is essential to recognise the potential long-term negative impacts of the act and address them. While many countries have already released national guidelines on AI, most local governments are still lagging behind on the development of regulatory frameworks for AI in a technical and policy capacity. While governance may certainly be a challenging task, four essential lessons to guide progress emerged from the seminar: Focus on processes: while most governance initiatives address AI outcomes, it is crucial to recognise that (machine) learning is a continuous process, and it is as part of these processes that policies should step in.Governing uncertainty is a constant practice: effectively governing uncertainty requires ongoing efforts, with feedback mechanisms and a supportive culture playing vital roles in enabling organisations, including local governments, to adapt over time.Accountability for algorithmic decisions should be established.Aim big, start small: optimal governance is built through projects, exemplified by initiatives like the Data Governance Clinics project. This innovative approach aligns data governance with the public interest in cities and underscores the importance of adopting an ambitious yet gradual approach to achieve broader goals. b) Human resources: capacity-building and talent attraction Decision-makers need to assess the available human resources capable of designing, implementing, deploying and overseeing urban AI systems. To fully reap the benefits of digital transformation, public sector leaders must acquire new skills that equip them to tackle the intricate challenges of the digital era. Artificial Intelligence is no exception to that, and the effective adoption and regulation of algorithmic tools require digital literacy among civil servants. These competencies encompass the ability to create enabling frameworks, foresee technological trends, implement measures to address ethical and human rights risks, comprehend the development of digital platforms, and collaborate effectively with third parties, including vendors. In essence, talent and digital skills are indispensable, underscoring the importance of enhancing the government's digital capacity as a prerequisite for ambitious local AI projects. In the context of an urban AI strategy, capacity-building refers to the process of cultivating and reinforcing the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that a local community requires to plan, design and deploy AI applications. Interestingly, most local governments perceive capability constraints as a significant obstacle to both the adoption and regulation of AI applications. More specifically, cities commonly encounter two types of limitations: the availability of a local workforce with the requisite skills for constructing and managing the AI system (human capacity), and the proficiency of this workforce in interacting with and supervising the AI system (AI literacy). These limitations are linked to a scarcity of locally accessible skills and a global shortage of AI talent. It is worth noting that in the global race for IT talent and specific AI skills, the private sector has traditionally surpassed governments in their ability to attract specialised human resources. Consequently, many cities lack the financial resources to develop urban technologies in-house, leading them to rely on outsourcing and procurement to access the technical expertise essential for AI development and governance. The skills gap is not inconsequential. In the first place, poor knowledge among decision-makers responsible for funding AI solutions and those tasked with implementing the technology renders system monitoring very difficult. From a geographical perspective, the global competition for talent aggravates the imbalance between small and large cities. It should be noted that in secondary cities, the lack of capacity is often not solely technical but also legal, as they may lack the competences to develop technology. This heightens the risk of creating disparities between first and second-class cities. While the global digital divide and a city's socioeconomic situation may exacerbate the shortage of AI skills in public administrations, this issue is a concern for affluent and economically challenged cities alike. Cities can implement a series of measures to address these constraints. Foremost among these is the need to make capacity-building a central component of any effective local AI strategy. This involves investing in developing both technical capabilities (such as digital literacy) and interdisciplinary skills (such as AI regulation and law, AI ethics and AI business development). Ultimately, local governments must ensure that staff directly involved in implementing an AI system in an urban sector are adequately trained and informed about the specific AI system they are employing. This means they should have a comprehensive understanding of how AI may impact their responsibilities and be capable of interpreting the system's output to identify potential failures. Moreover, any capacity-building strategy should also include specific efforts to educate the public about AI, its transformative effects on current practices, and the opportunities, challenges and risks it presents. Nevertheless, capacity-building initiatives alone may prove insufficient, prompting local governments to formulate strategies for attracting and retaining talent. In the immediate term, they can tackle budget and skills shortages by forging cross-sectoral collaborations with local stakeholders to offset the scarcity of public capacities. c) Procurement is key As argued above, most cities lack the internal capacity to develop AI solutions on their own, leading them to acquire urban AI primarily through procurement channels. In fact, AI procurement serves as a powerful governance tool that can be leveraged to address some of the harmful effects that AI use may have on citizens, especially those in vulnerable communities. However, throughout the procurement process, cities must possess the ability to assess the AI solutions presented to them. One effective method to ensure that private providers adhere to the city's standards regarding digital rights and ethical principles is by incorporating procurement clauses. For instance, in 2021 the City of Amsterdam formulated a set of contractual terms outlining the specific information required from suppliers. Municipal governments can keep control over the technology they adopt by seeking three types of information: technical transparency (the code), procedural transparency (the algorithm's purpose and how it reaches its outcomes), and "explainability" (the rules that apply if an algorithm impacts someone personally). The value of these contractual terms lies in their ability to help local governments operationalise standards, create obligations and define responsibilities for trustworthy, transparent and accountable development and procurement of AI technologies. Unsurprisingly, other local governments, including Barcelona, are emulating Amsterdam's approach by crafting their own AI procurement clauses. d) Citizen participation and co-creation to enhance diversity A fourth element that is crucial to address the adverse effects of AI is to engage civil society in both the development and use of algorithmic tools. The concerns surrounding AI extend beyond the principle of "public money, public ownership" to encompass public intelligence and citizen data. In that sense, seminar participants concurred that involving civil society in AI initiatives is essential to prevent biases from being ingrained in AI and to ensure that AI regulations are understandable to the general public. Additionally, it was emphasised that when public entities use algorithms, consideration should be given to governance and institutional frameworks, recognising that the current state of data governance in public governance is far from optimal. Similarly, some participants underscored the importance of transparent research and public repositories, advocating for the implementation of mechanisms that hold public administrations accountable to their citizens when using automated decision systems. References Rohde, Friederike; Gossen, Maike; Wagner, Josephin and Santarius, Tilman (2021) "Sustainability challenges of Artificial Intelligence and Policy Implications". Ökologisches Writschaften, 36. van Wynsberghe, Aimee (2021) "Sustainable AI: AI for sustainability and the sustainability of AI". AI Ethics, 1, 213-218. Falk, Sophia and van Wynsberghe, Aimee (2023) "Challenging AI for Sustainability: what ought it mean?". AI Ethics Mollen, Anne and Vieth-Ditlmann, Kilian (2023) "Just Measure It: The Environmental Impact of AI". SustainAI Magazine, number 3. Autumn, 2023.Notes:1- The notion of sustainability is a complex one. It is often understood as comprising three distinct dimensions: an environmental, a social, and an economic one. In this section, we limit the analysis to the environmental dimension of sustainability.2- For a more detailed account of the different criteria, see: https://sustain.algorithmwatch.org/en/step-by-step-towards-sustainable-ai/3- For more examples on the use of algorithms in cities, refer to the Atlas of Urban AI curated by the Global Observatory of Urban Artificial Intelligence (led by CIDOB's Global Cities Programme).
The twentieth century (characterized by the gruesome and haze of horror of two World Wars, the Cold Wars-CW, dictatorships, civil wars, genocides, etc.) has seen a great transformation in warfare but to the expense of the innocent civilians and yet in the full view of regulatory internationally recognized war-laws. So, if at one point in history, civilian populations hardly suffered war directly, the order of the state of affairs has now changed. Many civilians perish simply because warlords so desire; extremes of violence, killings and destruction of property is predominantly preferred. As if that is not enough, the indifference of the majority of the public in tranquil zones of the world towards the fate of the civilians in zones under by fire kind of provide implicit licenses to violence planners to do whatever it takes to "win". Consequently, great numbers of survivors are seen trying to escape from situations of assured death to that of probable death. It is against this background that we feel moved to take on this dissertation. Bearing in mind the generally complex and challenging contemporary conflicts that acutely breeds volatile security environments (for civilians), our thesis is that there needed to be an increased, noteworthy and continued applicable innovation of approaches to civilian protection. To be precise, as a strategy to sustainable peace, we have aspired after a world where the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (UNPKD) is not singly considered the sole custodian of the concept of civilian protection but (based on contexts and cases) as one but a leader among other stakeholders (local and foreign) able and ready to contribute to the common-pool of operational arenas. Thinking about these other stake holders, we have in this work stood by those that: firstly, move towards more civilian-centered operations that are; secondly, carried out by (a mixture of grassroots and international) unarmed civilians by means of; thirdly, engages nonviolent approaches and practices that in themselves anticipate the basic constituents of successive bottom-up Peacemaking (PK) and Peacebuilding (PB) in the hic et nunc of their Peacekeeping (PK) initiatives and applications. All these basics, in our view, do not just add up to drawing a continuous line that intersects the just mentioned Three Approaches to Peace (PK, PM, PB) coined by Johan Galtung way back in 1975; they also open avenues to sustainability. The thesis is taken on through three different parts; each subdivided into two chapters. With due attention to intrastate contemporary violent conflicts, the first part tries to demonstrate the reason why in PK there has been indeed need for rethinking the protection of civilians (PoC) and/or for enriching the methods until now employed in bringing it about. In the first chapter of the part, we kind of gave a sketchy attention to the historical journey that the patterns of violent conflicts in relation to the fate of non-combatants have made. It emerges that, unlike in the past, the pattern of contemporary violent conflict, especially with reference to the CW (especially in third-world countries) and post-CW periods, have become severely complex to handle. Wars have continued and proved to be very hot especially on the populations on the periphery; on those who are minimally directly concerned with and honestly ignorant of its objectives. In the period in question, these innocent men, women and children are more than ever struck hard not just by its direct consequences but also the indirect ones and their hopes are constantly put at the brink of mere survival and of the grave. Mores so the lucky ones who manage to escape these snares, continue to unwaveringly hope for bread, freedom, justice and peace, instead of iron that kills and destroys. In chapter II of the same part, looking at the commitments borne by the UN right from its early years in keeping, initially, the interstate and successively also the intrastate peace (of those tormented by reign of violence and terror), we acknowledge the strides gradually taken along the years. These strides has better late than never embraced a multidimensional point in time where civilian protection counts as a primacy. Accordingly, we recognize that the UN military PK is certainly capable of reducing the level of tension in conflicts but we also negated that, by so doing, it is able to guarantee a durable peace not only because of the application of the non-peaceful means which is limited to separating the conflicting parties but also because it lacks the strategic concern of fostering an active citizenship which is a basic ingredient to democratic populace. In Part Two, we have concentrated on the vision and the peculiar picture of the practitioners of the alternative way, particularly; the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) which operates on a benchmark of bottom-up strategic empowerment of local civilian unarmed and nonviolent efforts by international unarmed and nonviolent civilians to protect civilians, prevent, reduce and stop violent conflicts. The first chapter of this second part begins by singling out some of the nuts and bolts (Like: The centrality of sustainability; strategic, local and multilevel capacity and relational empowerment and mediation for peace; conflict transformation as the adequate language; nonviolence and nonpartisanship as a philosophy) that make Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) stands out faithfully to the above stated aspirations. Without giving importance to the chronological specifics and with a particular reference to the assessment of the practicality of the project that, on a later date, would organizationally become the NP, an extensive attention is paid to the vicissitudes that surrounded the founding of this UCP protection agency and especially to the foundations of the formative elements entailed. Chapter II does not only build on the findings and stimuli of Chapter I, it supersedes it and makes real a new and distinct reality. Herein, a unique place is devoted to the formative components reserved to the practitioners as a strategy for guaranteeing the competencies and high professionalism needed for the successful execution of field strategies attached to the NP UCP objectives, principles, key methods and practices. Through the analysis of the UCP Training Course entitled "Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians; A joint UNITAR- Nonviolent Peaceforce online Course" the chapter tries to show how the activities of the organization intrinsically flow from its very being; from elements which define it. And this is illustrated in how the very life of the NP UCP is blended with its formative spirit and content; a sort of transformative training that seeks to promote transformative operational frameworks that applicable to situations and contexts. The third part of the work is an applied one. It is dedicated to our chosen case study, namely, NP's intervention in the longtime violence-stricken Republic of South Sudan; in a country which (Thomas Hobbes would say) has once again reverted to its natural state; a harsh reality of hand to mouth living and a never ending search for sustenance in an ambiance virtually challenging to change. In chapter I, the pragmatic implementation of NP UCP in strengthening the local civilians' capacity, security and sense of safety in situation of violent conflict is marked out. Here, some concrete instances of this intervention are presented to exemplify the claim that a multiple base of actors (UCPs, the inviting civil society and/or local NGOs of an UCP presence and local partners) can sustainably and strategically provide the PoC work that for a long time was and is still largely entrusted to the military. And at the end of the day PK, PM, PB resources are considered to consist in not only financial and material supports, but also, and (in the same way) importantly, the socio-cultural resources of the affected people. And in this way people in conflict settings are seen as resources rather than recipients. Even though we evidently confirmed that the alternative way counts exceptionally big in strategically promoting, developing, and implementing sustainable unarmed civilian PK as a tool for preventing, reducing and stopping violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict, we also acknowledge that it is not without challenges. These are actually what chapter two of the part extensively dwells on. The second chapter is instead dedicated (at length) to looking at the challenges that NP faces not only with regard to its missions lands but also in general. We have gone about this in the form of a comprehensive assessment and in some humble recommendations are advanced. Among these challenges we have particularly paid attention to issues like: The meager UCP funding and the dominant top-down mentality; the violent bully character of some major world power wielders; the need for more practitioners to carry out UCP; the dynamicity and complexity of conflict nature as a challenge; conflict prevention challenges like delays in capturing the signs of time so as to effectively intervene; the presence of spoilers as a challenge; the challenge of effective sustainable credibility. Recommendations proposed include among others: Investing in systematic reflections on the extent of the progress and failures so far registered in efforts to involve the UN, regional bodies and other donor agencies or individuals in the cause of NP (UCP) and reflecting on the philosophy that underpins the reasons why financial assistance to UCP and NP in particular is founded; more emphasis on the already existing engagement with political leaders and other influential people and embarking on popular campaigns to propagate a concretely evidenced knowledge of the feasibility of the alternative way, instituting and investing in "School Project" (dedicated to preferably to high schools) within the NP Advocacy and Outreach office and insisting on the positives of volunteers' contribution; enriching a little more the content of the just elaborated online UCP training course; etc. Hereafter, the general conclusion of our dissertation will be drawn. A profound acknowledgement of the UNPK pivotal role with its actual multidimensional fronts in PK basically intended as PoC specifically in the contemporary intrastate violent conflicts. It is also observed that, thanks to the appropriate blending of local and international capacities giving priority to the former, UCP's strategic approach to PK (which is not limited to the PoCs but is also anchored to preventing, reducing and ending not just those that are already on but also lays for standing up to the future possible ones) could be counted on. Thus far, it is on one hand, admissible that, despite all the challenges that there may be, NP (UCP) mechanisms is already proffering a great deal to this end, and on the other, it is evident that it can and should still do more. The ability of its interventions to stand the test of time and to stand up to the future conflicts (i.e. its sustainability) resides in a time which is not yet at hand and in the continuous involvement and inventiveness of many. As per now, if the Italian proverb "Il buongiorno si vede dal mattino" (Meaning: You can tell how something will go by how it begins) holds, then it is, up till now, realistic to count on NP as one of the most outstanding Bottom-up UCP organizations in the PoC in (selected) contemporary violent conflict situations. All that is needed is the building and the consolidation of international interest and support for UCP that presents the hope and reality of alternatives to over dependence on armed intervention; alternatives that chances the revitalization of local communities and the restoration of the social fabrics and capital of the affected people.
The articles that make up this issue cover a wide range of topics: the ecological impact of some productive practices, the constitution of the subjects of public policies by the policies themselves, the scope and limitations in the effectiveness of social participation according to the issues that motivate it, the levels in which it operates and the political system that frames it; the institutional organization of power and the negotiation and confrontation strategies to which the actors resort in certain contexts and moments.María Emilia Val's text on the process of restructuring Argentina's external debt in 2005 studies the sovereign debt negotiation strategy developed by the government of Néstor Kirchner, with an orientation that would continue until 2015, setting a novel precedent regarding the policy with which the states can promote debt restructuring processes in the current stage of financial globalization. It is particularly appropriate to return to that experience at a time when Argentina has been led to gigantic indebtedness for reckless and misguided government management - judging by the results, which are what counts in terms of political action - generating an economic, financial crisis. and social depth and dimensions unparalleled in the last seventy years. Val's article allows us to appreciate the subtlety of the Argentine strategy that, in a framework of explicit adversity with the creditor bloc, at the same time knew how to take advantage of internal or specific differences between different creditors, and between them and their political guarantors, to optimize the perspectives of success.One of the greatest liabilities of capitalism throughout its history is the environmental one. Two articles analyze two aspects of the issue. Soledad Nión Celio deals with the social construction of risk in the production of soybeans in Uruguay, based on the perception of different actors - an issue that fully touches Argentina. This item is taken as an example of the changes that agricultural production has experienced in recent decades. Martha Jhiannina Cárdenas Ruiz and María dos Dôres Saraiva de Loreto present the results of a qualitative study on informal mining in a region of Peru and its effects on the quality of life of the families involved in the activity.The text of Jimena Pesquero Bordón focuses on the role of the vice government in the politics of three Patagonian provinces in recent years. The work opens the way for the study of an issue that until now had been ignored by the "subnational" political analysis. The author emphasizes the strategic relevance that the figure of the Vice Governor usually plays in certain institutional situations and the counterpoint of political games that develop within the respective provinces around the Governor / Vice Governor relationship and the gravitation of that relationship in provincial policy and in its articulation with the federal political system. For its part, Catalina Luz Bressán's article is part of the contemporary theoretical reflection on the relationship between the scale of citizen participation and democracy. Criticisms of the effective modalities in which "transitions to democracy" developed in several countries of our region, in particular what these criticisms posed as a growing distance between formal political systems and the demands of broad sectors of citizenship, led to exalt the virtues of the local, the direct, possibly the immediate, to the detriment of representative democracy practices oriented in the best case towards issues and with approaches alien to the specific problems of citizens and to an effectively democratic participation, generating a vision of the local as an idealized area of participation and deepening of democracy. On the contrary, the author argues that democratic participation is not condemned to the limits of the small scale; maintains that democracy is strengthened the greater the scale of participation as it allows to achieve a citizen involvement of better quality and politicity. "Who nominates dominates" says the old apothegm; naming means identifying and also calling, questioning someone or something, constituting it as a subject or object. The state names through its policies and the tools it uses to achieve its objectives. María Florencia Marcos' article inquires about the production of rural development subjects based on the analysis of the Social Agricultural Program (PSA), a state policy that was developed in Argentina between 1993 and 2013.onstitutes the subject; more often the name, the word, does not change, but the identity mutation occurs as a result of substantive policies, particularly those aimed at empowering its recipients. This is the case of Conectar Igualdad, to which Victoria Matozo's article is dedicated. Conectar Igualdad was one of the best known and possibly successful programs designed and promoted by the government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, later dismantled and concluded by the Cambiemos Alliance government. It was also a program surrounded by some controversies, referring to the role of ANSES in its implementation and financing, and how to classify the program within the rigidities of academic classifications: social policy? Educational policy? Technological democratization? - not to mention the deployment of denigrative adjectives and social prejudices that were directed against the program and its beneficiaries. Victoria Matozo's article gets into the discussion from a rights perspective, debating with some social questions, popularized by the media, about the recipients of the program and its scope in relation to the objectives of this policy. The massive student mobilizations that took place in Chile in the 1990s and in recent years highlighted, in the field of public education, the limitations of a firmly structured representative democratic system and the inevitability of the formulation of participation claims and greater democratization far beyond the local level. Braulio Carimán Linares focuses them using theoretical methodological approaches developed in the study of social movements and the analysis of public policies. The article also shows the challenges that student demands posed to successive Democratic Concertación government and the different responses with which they tried to agree with organizations, against the background of a power structure that, in the economic-financial field, maintained continuities with which he had supported the military regime that was installed in 1973. ; Los artículos que integran este número cubren un amplio arco de temas: el impacto ecológico de algunas prácticas productivas, la constitución de los sujetos de las políticas públicas por las propias políticas, los alcances y limitaciones en la eficacia de la participación social de acuerdo a los asuntos que la motivan, los niveles en los que se desenvuelve y el sistema político que la enmarca; la organización institucional del poder y las estrategias de negociación y confrontación a las que recurren los actores en determinados contextos y momentos. El texto de María Emilia Val sobre el proceso de reestructuración de la deuda externa argentina en 2005 estudia la estrategia de negociación de deuda soberana desarrollada por el gobierno de Néstor Kirchner, con una orientación que se continuaría hasta 2015 sentando un precedente novedoso respecto a la política con la que los estados pueden impulsar procesos de reestructuración de deuda en el actual estadio de la globalización financiera. Resulta particularmente oportuno regresar a esa experiencia en momentos en que Argentina ha sido conducida a un endeudamiento gigantesco por una gestión gubernamental imprudente y desacertada -a juzgar por los resultados, que son lo que cuenta en materia de acción política- generando una crisis económica, financiera y social de profundidad y dimensiones sin paralelo en los últimos setenta años. El artículo de Val permite apreciar la sutileza de la estrategia argentina que, en un marco de explícita adversariedad con el bloque acreedor, supo al mismo tiempo aprovechar diferencias internas o puntuales entre distintos acreedores, y entre estos y sus garantes políticos, para optimizar las perspectivas de éxito. Uno de los mayores pasivos del capitalismo a lo largo de su historia es el ambiental. Dos artículos analizan sendos aspectos de la cuestión. Soledad Nión Celio trata la construcción social del riesgo en la producción de soja en el Uruguay a partir de la percepción de diferentes actores -un asunto que toca de lleno a Argentina-. Este rubro es tomado como un ejemplo de los cambios que la producción agrícola ha experimentado en las últimas décadas. Martha Jhiannina Cárdenas Ruiz y María dos Dôres Saraiva de Loreto presentan los resultados de un estudio cualitativo sobre la minería informal en una región de Perú y sus efectos en la calidad de vida de las familias involucradas en la actividad. El texto de Jimena Pesquero Bordón enfoca el papel de la vicegobernatura en la política de tres provincias patagónicas en años recientes. El trabajo abre el camino para el estudio de un tema que hasta ahora había sido soslayado por el análisis político "subnacional". La autora destaca la relevancia estratégica que la figura del Vicegobernador suele desempeñar en determinadas coyunturas institucionales y el contrapunto de juegos políticos que se desenvuelven dentro de las respectivas provincias en torno a la relación Gobernador/Vicegobernador y a la gravitación de esa relación en la política provincial y en su articulación con el sistema político federal. Por su parte el artículo de Catalina Luz Bressán se inscribe en la reflexión teórica contemporánea sobre la relación entre escala de la participación ciudadana y democracia. Las críticas a las modalidades efectivas en que se desenvolvieron las "transiciones a la democracia" en varios países de nuestra región, en particular lo que esas críticas plantearon como un creciente distanciamiento entre los sistemas políticos formales y las demandas de sectores amplios de la ciudadanía, llevó a exaltar las virtudes de lo local, lo directo, eventualmente lo inmediato, en detrimento de las prácticas de la democracia representativa orientadas en el mejor caso hacia temas y con enfoques ajenos a las problemáticas concretas de los ciudadanos y a una participación efectivamente democrática, generando una visión de lo local como ámbito idealizado de participación y profundización de la democracia. Al contrario, la autora argumenta que la participación democrática no está condenada a los límites de la pequeña escala; sostiene que la democracia se fortalece cuanta mayor es la escala de participación en cuanto permite alcanzar un involucramiento ciudadano de mejor calidad y politicidad. "Quien nomina domina" reza el viejo apotegma; nombrar significa identificar y también llamar, interpelar a alguien o algo, constituirlo como sujeto u objeto. El estado nombra a través de sus políticas y de las herramientas de que se vale para alcanzar sus objeticos. El artículo de María Florencia Marcos indaga acerca de la producción de sujetos de desarrollo rural a partir del análisis del Programa Social Agropecuario (PSA), política estatal que se desarrolló en Argentina entre el 1993 y el 2013. El análisis del PSA explicita el modo en que el nombre constituye al sujeto; más a menudo el nombre, la palabra, no cambia, pero la mutación identitaria ocurre por efecto de políticas sustantivas, particularmente aquellas encaminadas al empoderamiento de sus destinatarios. Es el caso de Conectar Igualdad, a la que se dedica el artículo de Victoria Matozo. Conectar Igualdad fue uno de los programas más conocidos y posiblemente exitosos diseñados e impulsados por el gobierno de la presidenta Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, posteriormente desmantelado y concluido por el gobierno de la Alianza Cambiemos. Fue también un programa rodeado de algunas polémicas, referidas al papel de la ANSES en su implementación y financiamiento, y a cómo encasillar al programa dentro de las rigideces de las clasificaciones académicas: ¿política social? ¿política educativa? ¿democratización tecnológica? -para no mencionar el despliegue de adjetivaciones denigratorias y prejuicios sociales que se dirigieron contra el programa y sus beneficiarios-. El artículo de Victoria Matozo se mete en la discusión desde la perspectiva de derechos debatiendo con algunos cuestionamientos sociales, popularizados mediáticamente, sobre los destinatarios del programa y su alcance con relación a los objetivos de esta política. Las masivas movilizaciones estudiantiles que tuvieron lugar en Chile en la década de 1990 y en años recientes pusieron de relieve, en el terreno de la educación pública, las limitaciones de un sistema democrático representativo firmemente estructurado y la inevitabilidad de la formulación de reclamos de participación y mayor democratización mucho más allá del nivel local. Braulio Carimán Linares las enfoca recurriendo a abordajes teórico metodológicos desarrollados en el estudio de los movimientos sociales y el análisis de políticas públicas. El artículo permite ver asimismo los desafíos que las demandas estudiantiles plantearon a sucesivos gobierno de la Concertación Democrática y las diferentes respuestas con que estos intentaron acordar con las organizaciones, con el trasfondo de una estructura de poder que, en el terreno económico-financiero, mantenía continuidades con la que había servido de sustento al régimen militar que se instaló en 1973.
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As the race to net zero needs to accelerate in the upcoming years, climate policies are increasingly affecting citizens and companies, intensifying the urgency of a just transition. Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a role in raising awareness and keeping the attention high on climate issues, while pushing for national decarbonisation strategies. Moreover, CSOs can promote multilevel dialogue among different stakeholders and contribute to overcoming the growing polarisation on climate policies. Dialogue is crucial between CSOs as well, especially to promote cooperation between unions and environmental groups that can help build a fair transition. CSOs may also act as impartial advisors to both institutional and private sector stakeholders, offering a data-driven point of view on a range of environmental issues. Therefore, promoting the dialogue and exchange of best practices between German and Italian CSOs may contribute to enacting a just and inclusive transition in both countries.CSOs as promoters of multi-stakeholder dialogue CSOs in both countries have been at the forefront of climate debate over the years and have demonstrated their potential to foster dialogue among diverse stakeholders, pushing for more ambitious targets from which private and institutional actors might shy away. This can be done both at the national and European levels, with CSOs having recently been involved in climate discussions trough public consultation to design the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) in the framework of European energy governance. They are also crucial in the implementation of the transition at the local level as they are often in direct contact with local communities; therefore, they represent the ideal player to design context-specific solutions and to promote them in multi-stakeholder dialogues, while at the same time channelling public concerns for environmental and social impacts. This is well exemplified by the case of Civitavecchia coal plant phase-out in Italy. The plant, initially destined for conversion to gas, was ultimately decommissioned to be replaced by offshore wind farms, largely due to dialogue between local CSOs, such as WWF Italy and Legambiente, also involving trade unions, local authorities and energy companies.[1] This kind of CSO-initiated dialogue has been key to address social aspects of the transition in Germany as well, for example trough the Sector Dialogue on Automotive Industry.[2] This aims to integrate social sustainability criteria into the automotive sector by bringing together representatives of the civil society, such as Germanwatch and Transparency International Deutschland, along with institutional actors and private companies. However, the potential for CSOs to stimulate cooperation in Germany and Italy is not without challenges. Growing polarisation around climate policies, fears over the costs of the transition and the slow pace of structural reforms may be difficult to overcome.Dealing with growing polarisation Climate policies have become a divisive issue in Italy and Germany, and the subsequent political polarisation creates challenges for social dialogue.[3] The Scholz coalition government, comprised of the Greens, Liberals, and Social Democrats, has been tested on its climate approach due to internal disagreements among the three parties. Moreover, the energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine has created an opening for the opposition party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has capitalised on public discontent by promising to slow down the transition.[4] Similarly, in Italy, climate issues have become highly polarised. Even if the right-wing narrative has increasingly acknowledged the necessity of the transition, situations of conflict arise when the debate focuses on the best strategies to cope with this process.[5] As climate discourse becomes more polarised, CSOs find it more difficult to foster multi-stakeholder dialogue. This is especially testing for the Italian civil society, which has traditionally been scarcely engaged by political institutions and the private sector, leaving CSOs excluded from climate governance and unable to raise issues in debates on the social dimension of the transition.[6] In principle, CSOs may contribute to reducing polarisation by providing citizens with evidence-based information and promoting public participation in climate discussions. Many CSOs specialise in specific issue areas, such as air pollution, renewables or green mobility, developing expertise and data-driven information that could be used to facilitate informed discussions. However, even when their dissemination efforts are grounded in empirical research, their findings may still be challenged as part of a one-sided narrative. Furthermore, CSOs may encourage a more diverse public participation in climate discussions. Indeed, polarisation on the matter is often linked to factors like age, education, household income and political affiliation.[7] CSOs may offer spaces where people from diverse social backgrounds can engage with the issue directly, fostering a constructive dialogue.Ensuring a just transition Decarbonisation carries risks of significant social inequalities if not managed orderly. Both Italy and Germany are exposed to job losses, diminished industrial competitiveness and decreased energy security. Italy has a historically fragile job market, marked by high unemployment, which makes it even more difficult to integrate "climate losers" into the transition. Similarly, the decarbonisation of German industries, such as the chemicals and steel sectors, may create significant pressure on existing jobs.[8] Against this backdrop, there is a need for coordination between environmental groups and trade unions to implement decarbonisation strategies that also consider workers' needs, particularly in carbon-intensive sectors. One way to achieve this is by supporting the creation of just transition dialogues, bringing together governments, employers and unions to plan more comprehensive social safety nets for those segments of the population penalised by the transition. However, this model presents challenges in both Germany and Italy. Both countries have traditionally strong and heterogeneous unions. For example, only one member of the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB), the United Services Trade Union, is part of the German Climate Alliance, the main German civil society forum for promoting climate objectives. By contrast, unions representing workers in carbon-intensive industries, like the Industrial Mining, Chemistry and Energy Union (IG BCE), have been largely outspoken against German environmental groups pushing for the phase-out of coal and nuclear. On the contrary, the Construction, Agriculture and Environment Workers Union (IG BAU) has pushed for more ambitious climate policies than those proposed by the government, stating that industrial growth and climate policy can be complementary and promote opportunities for development.[9] In Italy, the dialogue between unions and environmental groups has been equally challenging, but recent attempts to cooperate have emerged in the Climate-Work Alliance (Alleanza Clima Lavoro), a platform to promote dialogue between environmental groups and unions, composed among others of FIOM-CGIL, FILT-CGIL, FLAI-CGIL, Kyoto Club, Legambiente, WWF Italia and Greenpeace.[10]Institutional advocacy and participation in climate governance In both Italy and Germany, CSOs' advocacy is not always effective in addressing policy gaps and promoting structural reforms. In Italy, CSOs' efforts to have a larger role in climate governance are challenged by a centralised approach to energy and infrastructural planning which makes it more difficult for civil society organisations to bring their voices to institutional stakeholders.[11] In Germany, due to its federal system, regional (Länders') governments are sometimes more receptive to the social consequences of the transition for their own constituencies. However, this does not necessarily translate to tangible benefits because compensating companies and workers affected by the transition requires financial means that are not always available at the regional level. CSOs effectiveness for legislative change is also highly volatile. Traditionally, they can mobilise public support for climate reforms when specific events or crises capture public attention. In these cases, momentum can be channelled into pressuring governments to enact more ambitious climate targets. For example, in Germany, a coalition of 40 environmental and development organisations significantly influenced the country's climate ambitions through a comprehensive action plan, the German Civil Society Climate Protection Plan 2050, by capitalising on the public attention to climate issues generated by the Paris Agreement.[12] Italy has not witnessed a similar joint effort; Legambiente, for example, launched its own proposals before the 2022 elections, but the lack of a broad coalition behind it and the absence of external events arousing public interest for climate action, minimised the document's influence on the public debate.[13] On another level, European climate governance offers CSOs a way to influence national legislators. Under the regulation on the governance of the Energy Union and climate action, member states are asked to carry out public consultations with citizens, businesses and competent authorities to draft the updated NECPs, the documents outlining how EU countries aim to reach its energy and climate targets for the period 2021-2030. The regulation specifically calls for inputs from civil society to better design transition strategies that address the social dimension. The Climate Action Network and WWF have criticised the Italian and German consultation models as inadequate, blaming both governments for having given too short of a timeframe between public consultations with CSOs and the submitting of the policy documents, which made it impossible to integrate any feedback.[14] However, for the submission of updated draft plans in 2023, Germany reinforced dialogue platforms such as the Climate-Neutral Electricity System Platform and the Alliance for Transformation,[15] which took the form of roundtables on transition issues involving different stakeholders, while Italy launched new public consultations through parliamentary hearings and online questionnaires.[16]Looking ahead As both Italy and Germany try to decarbonise their economies, CSOs will need to cooperate with governments and the private sector to address the social consequences of the transition. The Italian and German civil societies have the potential to foster dialogue among different stakeholders (European, national and local; public, private and individual) and to increase the general level of ambition of climate policies by raising public awareness and promoting engagement. CSOs may act as intermediaries between the public and governments, making them accountable, and contribute to an independent collection of data and monitoring of green pledges. CSOs' action can be especially effective at the local level, where they can promote participatory planning that gives voice to communities and at the same time disseminate information and data about possible consequences of climate change. This communication can help to raise awareness and stimulate new ideas and initiatives to actively impact and promote the social dimension of the transition. To achieve this, CSOs' action at the local level should aim to have long-term horizons, rather than focus on short-term projects or one-off events. However, such engagement efforts are challenged by growing political polarisation and fears over the possible losses brought about by an ill-managed transition. While heterogeneity among CSOs – with trade unions and environmental groups representing often diverging interests – may further complicate cooperation, it may also represent an opportunity for developing solutions for social equity that do not preclude climate ambition. Large coalitions of CSOs may promote the inclusion of workers' rights and social protection mechanisms in just transition policies at the national and European levels, while at the same time advocating for prioritising clean energy and infrastructural projects that provide job opportunities not only for highly skilled workers, but for the labour force at large. CSOs should therefore leverage their advocacy efforts and coordinate at the bilateral and European levels to increase their reach, while at the same time remaining connected to the local level to design context-tailored strategies for the implementation of the transition.Alessio Sangiorgio is Junior Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together civil society representatives from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] Andrea Ballocchi, "Parco eolico offshore: passi avanti per il progetto galleggiante condiviso", in Infobuildenergia, 26 October 2023, https://www.infobuildenergia.it/?p=146289.[2] German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Sector Dialogue Automotive Industry – Guideline for the Core Element: Reporting, November 2023, https://www.bmas.de/EN/Services/Publications/a433e-6-automotive-industry-guideline-reporting.html.[3] Maik Herold et al., "Polarization in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ten European Countries", in MIDEM Studies, No. 2023-1 (April 2023), https://forum-midem.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/TUD_MIDEM_Study_2023-1_Polarization_in_Europe_.pdf.[4] Hans Pfeifer, "Germany's Far-Right AfD Profits from Climate Change Spat", in Deutsche Welle, 6 January 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/a-65797438.[5] Stefano Ghinoi and Bodo Steiner, "The Political Debate on Climate Change in Italy: A Discourse Network Analysis", in Politics and Governance, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2020), p. 215-228, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2577.[6] Maria Kousis, Donatella Della Porta and Manuel Jiménez, "Southern European Environmental Movements in Comparative Perspective", in American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 51, No.11 (2008), p. 1627-1647 DOI 10.1177/0002764208316361.[7] Maik Herold et al., "Polarization in Europe", cit.[8] Cesar Barreto, Robert Grundke and Zeev Krill, "The Cost of Job Loss in Carbon-Intensive Sectors: Evidence from Germany", in OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1774 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1787/6f636d3b-en.[9] Birgit Kraemer, "Germany: Trade Unions' Approach to Climate Change Policies", in Eurofound, 30 January 2018, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/node/19786.[10] Italian Chamber of Deputies Budget Committee, Audizione dell'Alleanza Clima Lavoro, 12 March 2024, https://documenti.camera.it/leg19/documentiAcquisiti/COM05/Audizioni/leg19.com05.Audizioni.Memoria.PUBBLICO.ideGes.32922.12-03-2024-09-22-40.114.pdf.[11] Carlo Frappi and Arturo Varvelli, "Le strategie di politica energetica dell'Italia. Criticità interne e opportunità internazionali", in Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, No. 12 (April 2010), p. 98-114, https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/qri12_0.pdf; Natalia Magnani and Giorgio Osti, "Does Civil Society Matter? Challenges and Strategies of Grassroots Initiatives in Italy's Energy Transition", in Energy Research and Social Science, Vol. 13 (March 2016), p. 148-157, DOI 10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.012.[12] Klima-Allianz Deutschland, Klimaschutzplan 2050 der deutschen Zivilgesellschaft, April 2016, https://www.klima-allianz.de/publikationen/publikation/klimaschutzplan-2050-der-deutschen-zivilgesellschaft.[13] Legambiente, La transizione ecologica che serve all'Italia, September 2022, https://www.legambiente.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Dossier-Legambiente-La-transizione-ecologica-che-serve-allItalia.pdf.[14] Climate Action Network Europe and WWF, Public Participation in National Energy and Climate Plans. Evidence of Weak and Uneven Compliance in Member States, April 2023, https://www.wwf.eu/?10023916.[15] German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, The Climate-Neutral Electricity System Platform – In Dialogue for a New Market Design, May 2024, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Dossier/the-climate-neutral-electricity-system-platform.html; German Federal Government, Focus on Climate-Neutral Economy, Digitalisation and Sustainable Work, 14 June 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/schwerpunkte/klimaschutz/alliance-for-transformation-2052454; and Viel mehr als Mülltrennung und Dosenpfand, 2 February 2024, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/nachhaltigkeitspolitik/allianz-fuer-transformation-2255608.[16] Italian Ministry of the Environment and Energy Security, Quesiti consultazione pubblica 2024 PNIEC, 26 February 2024, https://www.gse.it/PNIEC.
L'hydatidose ou échinococcose cystique est une zoonose majeure et pourtant négligée. Elle est endémique dans plusieurs pays à travers le monde, dont particulièrement le pourtour méditerranéen. Au Maroc, malgré les efforts menés dans le cadre d'un programme national de lutte contre l'hydatidose (PNLH), initié depuis 2007, cette zoonose présente toujours une cause de morbidité importante. Face à cette situation, l'établissement d'une proposition efficace pour améliorer le PNLH est nécessaire. Notre étude part du principe que, pour améliorer le PNLH, il faut d'abord l'analyser et comprendre ses différents enjeux et facettes. Une approche multidisciplinaire a été suivie, basée sur l'estimation des pertes monétaires et non monétaires causées par cette zoonose, ainsi que des analyses participatives de ses parties prenantes, de sa mise en œuvre et des voies de son amélioration. Nous avons pu relever les multiples défis auxquels fait face le PNLH et avons étudié la possibilité d'instaurer une nouvelle stratégie de lutte, basée sur la vaccination des ovins et le traitement des chiens. Théoriquement apte à éliminer cette zoonose au bout de 15 ans, le succès de cette stratégie dépendra en effet de l'aptitude du programme national à la mener et de son acceptabilité auprès de la population directement concernée. Une évaluation précise de la charge de morbidité est essentielle pour la sensibilisation des décideurs, car elle permet de donner la priorité au financement des mesures de lutte en temps opportun. Dans ce but, une première étude a été menée pour estimer les pertes économiques causées par cette zoonose à l'échelle nationale et provinciale en combinant des méthodes financières et non financières. Au niveau de la santé humaine, les pertes d'années de vie corrigées de l'incapacité (DALY), les frais médicaux et les pertes de productivité ont été estimés. Chez l'animal, les pertes liées aux saisies d'organes au niveau des abattoirs et les pertes de production causées par une réduction du lait, de la fertilité, du poids de la carcasse et de la production de laine ont été estimées aussi. L'indicateur zDALY, modifiant l'indicateur DALY pour y intégrer les impacts de santé animale des maladies zoonotiques, a été calculé afin de joindre ces deux composantes. Des simulations de Monte-Carlo ont été utilisées pour calculer les valeurs numériques approchées. Les pertes totales oscillent entre 222 millions USD et 234 millions USD. Les DALYs ont été estimés au niveau national à 0,5 an pour 100 000 habitants et le zDALY à 55 ans pour 100 000 habitants. Selon ces évaluations, les pertes perçues ne représentent que la pointe de l'iceberg, la majeure partie des pertes étant causée par la perte de la productivité humaine chez les cas non diagnostiqués et les pertes de production animale. Cette étude a mis en lumière les pertes énormes causées par cette zoonose, sur tout le territoire marocain, indiquant la nécessité d'une amélioration des mesures de prévention et de contrôle. Les résultats de la première étude ont montré la persistance de l'hydatidose/échinococcose au Maroc et la non-atteinte des objectifs du PNHL. Ceci nous a poussé à poser la question des causes de cet échec. Pour répondre à cette question, une deuxième étude sur les enjeux et les obstacles qui ont entravé la réussite du PNHL a été menée. Une approche qualitative a été menée au niveau de cinq régions du Maroc : Rabat-Salé-Kénitra; Béni Mellal-Khénifra; Sous-Masaa; Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra et Guelmim-Oued Noun. Nous avons posé le choix pour cette étude d'ouvrir le cadre d'application au-delà de la seule hydatidose/échinococcose, nommément à la rage et à la tuberculose bovine, afin de mettre en évidence les défis communs que le contrôle de ces zoonoses présente. Des observations participantes et 81 entretiens individuels ont été réalisés avec les vétérinaires, les autorités locales et les abatteurs. Les enregistrements ont fait l'objet d'une transcription intégrale et les narratifs été analysés avec le logiciel R, en utilisant le package RQDA. L'étude a révélé un manque de rigueur professionnelle, un manque de cadre législatif, ainsi qu'un chevauchement de pouvoirs et d'intérêts entre les différentes structures, alors que la stratégie multisectorielle est essentielle dans la lutte contre les zoonoses. Cette analyse a amené à notre troisième étude, qui a analysé les parties prenantes du PNLH pour approfondir notre compréhension des relations de chaque acteur avec le programme. La troisième étude vise donc à analyser les acteurs du PNLH pour identifier des pistes de son amélioration et de proposer des voies plus adaptées. Des parties prenantes ont été identifiées, et au total, 163 entretiens semi-structurés ont été menés dans les mêmes régions que la deuxième étude, ainsi qu'un atelier interministériel à Rabat. Les catégories classiques d'analyse des parties prenantes, c'est-à-dire l'implication, l'intérêt, l'importance, l'influence, la priorité et le pouvoir, ont été semi-quantifiées. Un cadre analytique a été proposé combinant ces catégories pour évaluer les acteurs par trois attributs: l'appropriation des mesures, l'agence politique et l'agence sociotechnique. L'étude a mis en évidence une organisation déficiente de la diversité des acteurs impliqués, se traduisant dans une déficience dans les trois attributs mobilisés. Cette étude a proposé une approche analytique et informative, particulièrement utile pour une orientation de la lutte contre les zoonoses dans laquelle la coordination multisectorielle est capitale. Dans la recherche de nouvelles stratégies de lutte contre l'hydatidose/échinococcose, des essais de vaccination des ovins (le vaccin EG95) associés au traitement anthelminthique des chiens ont été menés dans le Moyen Atlas, la région du pays ayant la prévalence la plus élevée. Cette étude présente l'analyse de la faisabilité et de l'acceptabilité sociale de cette stratégie, dont le but est de tracer une approche pour l'élaboration d'un guide pour mener une telle intervention dans l'avenir. Onze groupes de discussion et seize entretiens individuels approfondis ont été menés avec les éleveurs, les femmes, les autorités locales, les médecins et vétérinaires privés, ainsi que les fonctionnaires des structures responsables de la mise en œuvre potentielle du PNLH en parallèle avec les essais du vaccin. Les enregistrements ont été transcrits et analysés avec le logiciel R, en utilisant le progiciel RQDA. Cette étude a mis en évidence différentes réserves émises par les acteurs sur la faisabilité de la stratégie. L'étude a permis de collecter les propositions des participants pour une meilleure mise en place de cette nouvelle stratégie. Ces réserves et propositions devront impérativement être prises en compte pour l'élaboration d'un plan renouvelé. En conclusion, l'étude a mis en évidence l'impact de l'hydatidose/échinococcose dans tout le territoire marocain, qui cause des pertes qui arrivent à 0.07% du PIB du Maroc. Ainsi, l'approche qualitative nous a permis d'abord de comprendre le fonctionnement du PNLH sur le terrain, et de proposer un schéma d'instauration d'une nouvelle stratégie de lutte, que théoriquement, pourra contrôler cette zoonose au bout de 15 ans. ; Cystic echinococcosis (CE) is a major zoonosis, however, it is neglected. It is endemic in several countries around the world, particularly around the Mediterranean. In Morocco, despite the efforts carried out within the framework of a national hydatidosis control program (NHCP), initiated in 2007, this zoonosis still presents a major cause of morbidity. Faced with this situation, the establishment of an effective proposal to improve the NHCP is necessary. Our study is based on the principle that, in order to improve the NHCP, we must first analyze and understand its different issues and facets. A multidisciplinary approach was followed, based on the estimation of monetary and non-monetary losses caused by this zoonosis, as well as participatory analyzes of its stakeholders, its implementation and ways of improving it. We were able to raise the multiple challenges facing the NHCP and studied the possibility of establishing a new control strategy, based on the vaccination of sheep and the treatment of dogs. Theoretically capable of eliminating this zoonosis in 15 years, the success of this strategy will indeed depend on the ability of the national program to carry it out and on its acceptability among the population directly concerned. Accurate assessment of the burden disease is essential for sensitizing decision-makers, as it helps prioritize funding for timely control measures. In this objective, a first study was carried out to estimate the economic losses caused by this zoonosis at the national and provincial level by combining financial and non-financial methods. In terms of human health, loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALY), medical costs and productivity losses were estimated. For animals, organ seizure losses at slaughterhouses and production losses caused by reducing milk, fertility, carcass weight and wool production were also estimated. The zDALY indicator, modifying the DALY indicator to include the animal health impacts of zoonotic diseases, was calculated to combine these two components. Monte-Carlo simulations were used to calculate the approximate numerical values. Total losses range from USD 222 million to USD 234 million. DALYs were estimated nationally at 0.5 years per 100,000 person and zDALY at 55 years per 100,000 person. According to these assessments, perceived losses are only the tip of the iceberg, with most of the losses being caused by loss of human productivity in undiagnosed cases and losses in animal production. This study highlighted the enormous losses caused by this zoonosis, throughout Morocco, indicating the need for improved prevention and control measures. The results of the first study showed the persistence of CE in Morocco and the failure that meet NHCP objectives. This prompted us to ask the question of the causes of this failure. To answer this question, a second study on the issues and obstacles that hindered the success of the NHCP was conducted. A qualitative approach was carried out in five regions of Morocco: Rabat-Salé-Kénitra; Béni Mellal-Khénifra; Sous-Masaa; Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra and Guelmim-Oued Noun. We made the choice for this study to open the framework for application beyond hydatidosis alone, namely rabies and bovine tuberculosis, in order to highlight the common challenges that the control of these zoonoses presents. Participatory observations and 81 individual interviews were conducted with veterinarians, local authorities and slaughterers. The recordings were fully transcribed and the narratives analyzed with R software, using the RQDA package. The study revealed a lack of professional rigor, a lack of legislative framework, as well as an overlap of powers and interests between the different structures, while the multisectoral strategy is essential in the fight against zoonoses. This analysis led to our third study, which analyzed NHCP stakeholders to deepen our understanding of each stakeholder relationship with the program. The third study, therefore aims to analyze the actors of the NHCP in order to identify avenues for improvement and to propose more suitable ways. Stakeholders were identified, and a total of 163 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the same regions as the second study, as well as an inter-ministerial workshop in Rabat. The classic categories of stakeholder analysis, i.e. involvement, interest, importance, influence, priority and power, have been semi-quantified. An analytical framework was proposed combining these categories to evaluate the actors by three attributes: the appropriation of the measures, the political agency and the socio-technical agency. The study highlighted a deficient organization of the diversity of the actors involved, resulting in a deficiency in the three attributes mobilized. This study proposed an analytical and informative approach, particularly useful for an orientation of the fight against zoonoses in which multisectoral coordination is essential. In the search for new CE control strategies, sheep vaccination trials (EG95 vaccine) associated with anthelmintic treatment of dogs were carried out in the Middle Atlas, the region of the country with the highest prevalence. This study presents the analysis of the feasibility and social acceptability of this strategy, the aim of which is to outline an approach for the development of a guide for carrying out such an intervention in the future. Eleven focus groups and sixteen in-depth individual interviews were conducted with breeders, women, local authorities, private doctors and veterinarians, as well as officials from the structures responsible for the potential implementation of the NHCP in parallel with the trials of the vaccine. Recordings were transcribed and analyzed with R software, using RQDA software package. This study highlighted various reservations expressed by the players on the feasibility of the strategy. The study made it possible to collect participants' proposals for a better implementation of this new strategy. These reservations and proposals must imperatively be taken into account for the development of a renewed plan. In conclusion, the study highlighted the impact of CE throughout the Moroccan territory, which causes losses reaching 0.07% of Morocco's GDP. Thus, the qualitative approach allowed us first to understand the functioning of the NHCP in the field, and to propose a scheme for the establishment of a new control strategy, which theoretically, could control this zoonosis in 15 years.
In the sprawling megalopolis of Metro Manila, the failure or inability of centralized public and privatized water service utilities to connect outlying and poor communities within their service areas led to the emergence of community-owned water providers run by cooperatives and neighborhood associations, often led and initiated by women. Born out of necessity and daily struggles to provide water for their households, communities organize themselves as water service cooperatives or associative water systems that assume the traditional role of the state as duty-bearers in ensuring universal access and human rights to water. Employing long-term ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation, key informant interviews and literature review, this paper critically examines urban poor communities' experimentations of water service provisioning whereby women have taken on the cudgels to effectively deliver water to their own people and in the process, practice self-governance and autonomy. Using neo-institutionalist (Ostrom and Cox, 2010) and critical socio-institutionalist frameworks (Cleaver, 2002), we critically interrogate the praxes of women-led associative water systems, a model whereby water consumers both control and own the service in their capacity as consumers, using the cases of Bagong Silang and Recomville Two water service cooperatives located in Caloocan City. By illustrating on-the-ground experiences, we stress the crucial role that waterless citizens and communities play in bridging the gap in the country's water service provision, thereby expanding the private/public dichotomies that often dominate water governance debates. Through these case studies, we argue that associative water systems were borne out of collective desire to have safe, clean, and affordable water to flow to waterless communities. As Metro Manila remains under a privatized water set up, these community-owned initiatives are legitimate expressions of social transformation. We problematize how these women-led associative water systems progress in the face of neoliberal governance marked by hegemonic power of private and public actors. We also investigate how democracy is exercised —or not— within these systems as well as surface the various contestations they face. This paper therefore scrutinizes the principles and pitfalls of, the ups and downs and lessons learnt from associative water systems in providing piped connections to waterless communities. Our aim is to shed light on the reconstruction of public services anchored on collective action. We find that the political possibility for collective self-organization and bottom-up social governance are facilitated or constrained by a combination of political, socioeconomic factors such as access to technical inputs and financing, social acceptability and legitimacy of the cooperative, sustained social organizing, and understanding of micro-politics and power in the community. Afterall, community-led initiatives operate in a highly contentious local politics marked by clientelism and heterogeneity. We posit that the successes of associative water systems lie on their ability to practice democracy, transparency, and accountability as well as mobilize social capital, trust, and cooperation. However, the experiences of urban poor communities in Caloocan City reveal a more complicated picture in which water service cooperatives are plagued by multiple governance issues, internal corruption, power struggles, and affordability issues. The process of building cooperatives is tension-laden, revealing the challenges of creating the commons through sociopolitical and institutional arrangements on the ground. The paper further reveals how state and market institutions successfully managed to define the terms of engagement with the urban poor communities that constrain the latter's capability to expand water service in their areas, on one hand. On the other, private and public actors have distanced themselves from the people and obscured their objectives and economic interests from the communities they are supposed to serve. This generated a situation where dissatisfaction and capitalistic exploitation are directed toward cooperatives, instead, further redefining social relations within communities (Cheng, 2014; Chng, 2008). The paper is organized into six sections. The first parts provide a short introduction of the topic as well as a brief overview of the history and socio-political underpinnings of Metro Manila's water privatization and neoliberal undercurrents that gave way to the rise of associative water systems. The second section outlines methodological considerations that detail our general approach in gathering empirical material. The third part offers a conceptual and literature review of associative water systems in theory and practice, outlining the positive and promising principles as well as the pitfalls of the model as commons or bottom-up social governance. Examples from Bolivia and the Philippines are mentioned that offered inspiration for urban poor communities in Caloocan City to embark on their own cooperative-building and water service provisioning. The fourth part narrates the dynamics, history, and experiences of Bagong Silang and Recomville Two water service cooperatives, underlining the similarities in the contexts where they operate as well as the various tensions and challenges they faced in the process of creating cooperatives and delivering quality and safe water to the urban poor households. We pay special attention to the role of women as leaders and changemakers amid a generally masculinized culture. The part played by two NGOs as wayfinders and supporters that accompanied the cooperatives accentuate the importance of having allies and partners in the process. We also detail how the uneven and inequitable relationship between Maynilad and the cooperatives produced a culture of payment for water which partially contributed to strained social relationships in the community. This culture restructured the roles and responsibilities among community, state, and market actors. The fifth part sketches the lessons learnt from these experiences, underlining the communities' struggle for self-governance and autonomy to remake public services through collective action and participation in water service provision and stressing the crucial role that women played in the process. This section also identifies three challenges around issues of non-participation, power, and outcomes/impacts, underscoring the dangers of fetishizing communities (Cleaver, 2002) as homogenous, idealized forms or sources of social innovation. Divided along the lines of gender and class, women empowerment facilitated by the cooperative through trainings and skills enhancement did not sit well with some men in the communities. Further, the capacity to pay for water of the urban poor that is greatly tied to precarity of work and informality affects the operations and management of the system. We conclude by reiterating the pivotal role played by communities in enabling water to flow to their homes. But associative water systems are far from perfect. As on-going works-in-progress, the urban poor's desired water services can only be discovered and constructed through daily —democratic— political struggles, collective action, and contestations. The praxes of associative water systems accentuate what Dahl and Soss (2012, as mentioned in McDonald, 2016) argue that "democratic conceptions of the common good will always be partial and provisional, never universal or static" (p. 4). ; En la megalópolis en expansión de Metro Manila, el fracaso o la incapacidad de los servicios públicos centralizados y privatizados de los servicios de agua para conectar a las comunidades pobres y periféricas dentro de sus áreas de servicio llevó al surgimiento de proveedores de agua de propiedad comunitaria administrados por cooperativas y asociaciones de vecinos, lo que entendemos como sistemas de agua asociados, que a menudo son dirigidos e iniciados por mujeres. A través de un trabajo de campo etnográfico, la observación participante, entrevistas con sujetos clave y mediante una revisión de la literatura, nuestro artículo investiga críticamente las prácticas de los sistemas de agua asociativos dirigidos por mujeres, anclados en la acción colectiva, entendidos como alternativa a las fallas del estado y del mercado. Utilizando marcos neoinstitucionalistas y socioinstitucionalistas críticos, enfocamos nuestro trabajo en dos comunidades sin agua ubicadas en la ciudad de Caloocan y subrayamos sus luchas diarias por el autogobierno y el compromiso crítico con los límites de la publicidad. Encontramos que la posibilidad política de autoorganización colectiva y de gobernanza social bottom-up, se ve facilitada o restringida por una combinación de factores políticos y socioeconómicos, tales como: el acceso a insumos técnicos y financiación, aceptación y legitimidad social de la cooperativa, sostenibilidad en el tiempo, así como la confrontación de micropolíticas y relaciones de poder dentro de la comunidad. Las iniciativas lideradas por la comunidad operan en una política local altamente polémica marcada por el clientelismo, la heterogeneidad, así como por las dinámicas de clase y género. El documento también demuestra el papel fundamental de las mujeres —a menudo desatendidas tanto en la vida como en la política de la comunidad—, como vanguardistas en la realización del derecho humano al agua de las comunidades. Las cooperativas entendidas como vehículos de empoderamiento para las mujeres ayudaron a la promoción de su movilidad social y de su reconocimiento como miembros importantes, reconstruyeron sus identidades y relaciones tanto dentro de la comunidad, como de la familia, a través de expresiones diferenciadas de agencia humana y acción colectiva. Por último, los casos estudiados, ofrecen lecciones y desafíos importantes sobre la (re)creación de servicios públicos, implorando a los profesionales, los responsables políticos y los activistas que analicen los beneficios y los límites de tales formas en el contexto de la gobernabilidad neoliberal y las desigualdades continuas.
To cope with the economic uncertainties of the changes, transformations, and transitions affecting current European and world agriculture, many farmers are rethinking the purposes of their business and are looking to diversify their activities. Taking advantage of certain assets related to their operation and of opportunities for tourism development in the region (such as availability of buildings, subsidies related to ecology and environment images), some of them have chosen agritourism, a tourist activity proposed by the farmer on his/her farm. The literature includes many studies on this topic, but there is no consensus on terminology, definitions, and concepts: they vary from one author to another and evolve over time. Having distinguished different agritourist typologies in which accommodation is a basic element, we have personally chosen to study agritourism defined as "all tourist and leisure activities and services present in a working farm". Wallonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, our geographical research areas, are neighbouring entities, with similar agriculture, and their tourist markets offer some similarities. Included in rural tourism, agritourism is nevertheless marginal compared to the overall tourist product offered. Some successes might suggest that agritourism could be the panacea against the crisis in agriculture. But is this always the case? Agritourism should be defined, localized, and differentiated. Working on these two periurban entities of Western Europe which are not yet discussed in the literature, we wanted to understand and to identify agritourist dynamics. We wanted to understand the geographic relationship between agritourism, periurban countryside, local resources, and agricultural and tourist specializations. We wanted to understand the logic of the emergence of tourism on a farm and the links between tourist and agricultural functions in a specific spatial context. Finally, we wanted to understand the integration of the motivations of different types of tourists and their reasons for visiting particular regional and local contexts. To do this, we analyse both the location and the agritourist geographical position in relation to the different markets. To meet the objectives, we conducted a comparative heuristic analysis of agritourism in both territories. We interviewed key organisational representatives (31 persons), we made field observations, documents comparisons. We conducted interviews with various Walloon and Luxembourg farmers (34 life histories) affording different agritourist practices that we synthesized by circumstantial geographical sketches. We conducted surveys with potential tourists (1148surveys) in seven Walloon and Luxembourg tourist spots. These steps and the statistical and cartographic processing based on the results allowed us to build a heuristic geographical model of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourism. The experiences of farmers interviewed allowed us to understand the position of the agritourist system in its spatial context. Each of them develops opportunities and experience threats (economic, social, from heritage) in connection with the launch of the project, a true survival kit in some cases. It appears that agritourism is not always a panacea for farmers. On the farm, the tourist function comes after the agricultural one and is based on the latter, but the agricultural function also benefits from the tourist function because both activities are related. The emergence of tourism is an autonomous decision of the farmers who can be influenced by other actors, including authorities, but also by other factors such as the existence of a local demand or the regional real estate pressure. There is no particular profile of tourists visiting agritourism, but some features, including those of family, are more favourable to the experience of this type of tourism. Definitions and representations as well as the reasons and expectations differ depending on the characteristics of the interviewed tourists: urban or rural origin, level of experience. Three agritourist profiles were also highlighted: those seeking accommodation in a rural environment, those who think about accommodation linked to gastronomy, those who prefer accommodation that would be a comfortable basis from which to tour in a tourist area. The comparison between the experiences of farmers and the expectations of tourists shows that there is a risk of developing different organizational temporalities in the farm "open" to tourists as well as of favouring unbalanced images of agritourism, which could lead to a vision and a promotion of agriculture which does not correspond to its regional reality. By combining the different results and by linking the typology of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourist products, the types of rural areas and the geographical components, it appears that agritourism should not only be analysed according to the environmental dimensions, but that the analysis must also take into account other factors such as accessibility, local communities, hospitality, rural development policies, the real estate market, the agricultural orientation of farm operations, as well as the degree of complementarity with tourist spots. We have demonstrated that agritourism, combining agriculture with tourism, is not developing, either everywhere, or in the same manner, and differs between different types of periurban countryside, depending on local resources. Moreover, agritourism is not always a solution for all countrysides, nor always a path for each farmer, nor always a perfect tourist destination for all tourists. However, even if strict regionalization of agritourism does not seem possible when we consider all the factors involved in the different regions, trends may emerge depending on agritourist types. There is thus a link between agritourism type and countryside type, which the heuristic model we propose should allow to improve in order to increase the convergence between the expectations of the different stakeholders. ; Pour faire face aux incertitudes économiques auxquelles les mutations, transformations et transitions actuelles confrontent les agricultures européennes et mondiales, nombre d'agriculteurs repensent les finalités de leur métier et cherchent à diversifier leurs activités. Profitant des atouts liés à leur exploitation et des opportunités de développements touristiques régionaux (tels que disponibilité de bâtiments, subsides, images liées à l'écologie et à l'environnement), certains d'entre eux se sont orientés vers l'agritourisme, cette activité de tourisme proposée par l'agriculteur dans son exploitation agricole. La littérature abonde d'études relatives à ce phénomène, mais il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la terminologie, aux définitions et aux concepts y afférant : ceux-ci varient d'un auteur à l'autre et évoluent avec le temps. Après en avoir dégagé différentes typologies de l'agritourisme, où l'hébergement est à considérer comme un produit de base, nous avons choisi d'étudier un agritourisme défini comme « l'ensemble des activités et services de tourisme et de loisirs présents dans une exploitation agricole en activité ». La Wallonie et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, cadre géographique de la recherche, sont des entités contiguës, proches par leur agriculture, dont les marchés touristiques offrent certaines similitudes. Inclus dans le tourisme de terroir, l'agritourisme y est pourtant marginal par rapport à l'offre touristique globale. Toutefois, quelques réussites donnent à penser que l'agritourisme pourrait être une panacée pour cette agriculture en crise. Mais est-ce le cas partout ? L'agritourisme demande à être défini, localisé, différencié. En travaillant sur ces deux entités périurbaines d'Europe occidentale non encore analysées dans la littérature, nous voulions comprendre et faire émerger des dynamiques agritouristiques. Nous voulions comprendre la relation géographique entre agritourismes, campagnes périurbaines, ressources locales et spécialisations agricoles et touristiques. Nous voulions comprendre les logiques d'émergence du tourisme au sein d'une exploitation agricole et les liens entre les fonctions touristiques et agricoles dans un contexte spatial particulier. Enfin, nous voulions comprendre l'intégration des raisons et motivations des touristes par rapport aux contextes régional et local. Pour ce faire, il s'agissait d'analyser à la fois la localisation et la position géographique de l'agritourisme par rapport aux différents marchés. Afin de pouvoir répondre aux objectifs, nous avons procédé à une analyse heuristique comparative de l'agritourisme au sein des deux territoires cités. Nous avons interviewé des témoins privilégiés (31 personnes), nous avons fait des observations de terrain, des comparaisons documentaires . Nous avons effectué des interviews auprès de différents agriculteurs wallons et luxembourgeois (34 récits de vie) proposant différentes pratiques agritouristiques que nous avons synthétisées sous forme de schémas circonstanciels géographiques. Nous avons réalisé des enquêtes auprès de touristes potentiels (1148 enquêtes) dans sept lieux touristiques wallons et luxembourgeois. Ces étapes et les traitements statistiques et cartographiques effectués sur les résultats nous ont permis de construire un modèle heuristique géographique de l'agritourisme wallon et luxembourgeois. Les expériences des tenanciers interrogés nous ont permis de renforcer le positionnement de l'agritourisme dans son contexte spatial. Chacun d'eux développe des circonstances positives et négatives (patrimoniales, économiques et sociales) en rapport avec le lancement de son projet, véritable kit de survie dans certains cas. Il en ressort que l'agritourisme n'est pas toujours une panacée pour les agriculteurs. Au sein de l'exploitation, la fonction touristique arrive après la fonction agricole et repose sur cette dernière, mais la fonction agricole bénéficie aussi de la fonction touristique puisque les devenirs des deux activités sont liés. L'émergence de l'activité touristique est une décision autonome de l'exploitant qui peut être influencé par d'autres acteurs, notamment par les autorités publiques mais aussi par d'autres facteurs comme l'existence d'une demande à proximité ou la pression immobilière. Il n'existe pas un profil particulier de touristes fréquentant l'agritourisme, mais certaines caractéristiques, notamment familiales, sont plus favorables à la pratique de ce type de tourisme. Les définitions et représentations ainsi que les raisons et attentes diffèrent selon les caractéristiques des touristes interrogés : origine urbaine ou rurale, degré d'expérience. Trois profils d'agritouristes ont aussi été mis en évidence : ceux qui cherchent un hébergement situé dans un environnement rural, ceux qui pensent à un hébergement lié à la gastronomie, ceux qui privilégient un hébergement qui serait un pied-à-terre confortable pour rayonner dans une région touristique. La comparaison entre les expériences des tenanciers et les attentes des touristes fait apparaître le risque de développer des temporalités organisationnelles en concurrence au sein même de l'exploitation agricole « ouverte » aux touristes ainsi que de favoriser des images déséquilibrées de l'agritourisme, ces dernières pouvant aboutir à une vision et à une promotion de l'agriculture qui ne correspondent pas à sa réalité régionale. En combinant les différents résultats et en reliant la typologie des produits agritouristiques wallons et luxembourgeois, les types de milieux ruraux et les composantes géographiques, il ressort que l'analyse de l'agritourisme ne doit pas seulement tenir compte des aspects environnementaux, mais qu'elle doit aussi tenir compte d'autres facteurs tels l'accessibilité, les communautés locales, l'hospitalité, les politiques de développement rural, le marché immobilier, l'orientation agricole de l'exploitation et le degré de complémentarité avec les lieux touristiques. Nous avons ainsi mis en évidence que l'agritourisme, combinaison de l'agriculture avec le tourisme, ne se développe ni partout, ni de la même manière, quel que soit le type de campagne périurbaine puisqu'il utilise les ressources locales. De plus, il n'est ni toujours une solution pour toutes les campagnes, ni toujours une solution possible pour tous les agriculteurs, ni toujours une destination de tourisme idéale pour tous les touristes. Cependant, même si une régionalisation stricte de l'agritourisme ne semble pas possible quand on considère l'ensemble des facteurs intervenant dans les différentes régions, des tendances peuvent se dégager en fonction de types agritouristiques. Il existe donc un lien entre type d'agritourisme et type de campagne, lien que le modèle heuristique que nous proposons doit permettre de resserrer pour augmenter la convergence entre les attentes des différents acteurs. ; Um sich den wirtschaftlichen Unsicherheiten zu stellen, welche Änderungs, Umwandlungs und Transitionsprozesse in der europäischen und globalen Landwirtschaft mit sich ziehen, überdenken viele Landwirte ihre berufliche Positionierung und versuchen ihre Tätigkeitsfelder zu diversifizieren. Eine Option zur Diversifikation bietet die zusätzliche Nutzung der Ressourcen des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs (Verfügbarkeit von Gebäuden, ökologische Ressourcen und kulturelle Umwelt) für eine touristische Inwertsetzung. Diese von Landwirten angebotene Form des Fremdenverkehrs wird als Agrotourismus bezeichnet. In der Fachliteratur findet sich eine Vielzahl von Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, allerdings werden Terminologien, Definitionen und Konzepten in der Literatur bisher nicht einheitlich verwendet. Die Anwendung von Begrifflichkeiten und Konzepten hat sich zudem im Zeitablauf verändert. Aus diesem Grund wurde für die vorliegende Untersuchung zunächst eine Differenzierung der verschiedenen Typologien von Agrotourismus, in der "Beherbergung" als Basisprodukt betrachtet wird, durchgeführt. Auf Basis der Ergebnisse kann ""Agrotourismus" hier als "die Gesamtheit der dem Tourismus und der Freizeit dienenden Aktivitäten und Dienste, die auf einem Bauernhof in Betrieb zu finden sind" definiert werden. Die Wallonie und das Großherzogtum Luxemburg, die das Untersuchungsgebiet dieser Forschungsarbeit darstellen, sind benachbarte Gebiete mit einer ähnlichen landwirtschaftlichen Struktur und einem vergleichbarem Tourismussektor. Im Vergleich mit dem gesamten Tourismusangebot dieser Regionen ist die Bedeutung des Agrotourismus bisher noch begrenzt gleichwohl ist er ein wichtiger Bestandteil des regionalen Tourismus. In Zukunft könnte der Agrotourismus jedoch eine wichtige Rolle als Mittel zur Überwindung der Krisen in der regionalen Landwirtschaft spielen. Doch, um zu beurteilen, ob dies wirklich überall der Fall ist, muss "Agrotourismus" zunächst genauer charakterisiert, differenziert und lokalisiert betrachtet werden. Durch die Untersuchung der beiden ausgewählten periurbanen Gebiete in Westeuropa, die bisher noch nicht in der Fachliteratur analysiert wurden, soll deshalb die Dynamik des Agrotourismus erfasst und Besonderheiten herausstellt werden. Ziel war es die geographische Beziehung zwischen Agrotourismus, periurbanen Landschaften, lokalen Ressourcen und landwirtschaftlichen und touristischen Spezialisierungen zu verstehen. Dazu wurde zum einen die Struktur des Tourismusaufkommens in landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben sowie das Verhältnis zwischen touristischen und landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten in diesem spezifischen räumlichen Kontext untersucht. Zum anderen wurden auch die Gründe und Motivation der Touristen im regionalen und lokalen Kontext erfasst und die geographische Verteilung und Position des Agrotourismus im Bezug auf die verschiedenen Tourismusmarktsegmente analysiert. Zur konkreten Bearbeitung dieser Fragestellungen wurde eine heuristische Vergleichsanalyse des Agrotourismus in beiden Gebieten durchgeführt. Dazu wurden umfangreiche empirische Erhebungen in Form von Expertengesprächen (31 Personen) und Beobachtungen vor Ort sowie dem Vergleich von Dokumente durchgeführt. Zusätzlich wurden Interviews mit 34 luxemburgischen und wallonischen Landwirten, die verschiedene agrotouristische Praktiken anwenden, geführt. Diese Praktiken wurden mittels umstandsabhängige geographische Schemata zusammengefasst. Zudem wurden Touristen an sieben touristischen Orten der Wallonie und des Großherzogtums von Luxemburg befragt (1148 Befragungen). Diese Schritte und die statistische und kartographische Bearbeitung der Ergebnisse haben uns erlaubt, ein geographisches heuristisches Modell des wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismus zu erstellen. Die Erfahrungen der befragten Betreiber haben uns erlaubt, die Position des Agrotourismus in seinem räumlichen Kontext besser zu verstehen. Jeder der Befragten hat sowohl positive als auch negative Erfahrungen (patrimonial, wirtschaftlich und sozial) seitdem Start seines Projektes gemacht, in einigen Fällen hat sich der Agrartourismus als überlebenswichtig erwiesen. Es zeigt sich aber auch, dass das Agrotourismus nicht immer ein Wundermittel für die Landwirte darstellt Im landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb kommt die touristische Funktion nach der landwirtschaftlichen Funktion und beruht auf ihr. Allerdings profitiert der landwirtschaftliche Bereich von der touristischen Funktion. Die Endscheidung über den Umfang der touristischen Aktivität liegt bei den Landwirten, die jedoch durch andere Akteure, wie Behörden, und weitere Faktoren, wie lokale Nachfrage oder Druck auf dem Immobilienmarkt, beeinflusst werden kann. Die Untersuchung hat gezeigt, dass Touristen, die Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof verbringen, keine klares Profil haben, das aber bestimmte Gruppen wie Familien diese Art von Tourismus bevorzugen. Die Definitionen und Vorstellungen sowie die Gründe und Erwartungen hängen zudem von der Herkunft der befragten Touristen, städtische oder ländliche Herkunft, sowie vom Erfahrungsgrad ab. Zusammenfassend lassen sich drei Profile von Agrotouristen definieren: jene, die eine Unterkunft im ländlichen Raum suchen, jene, die eine Unterkunft mit einem gastronomischen Angebot suchen, und jene, die eine angenehme Bleibe in einer touristischen Gegend suchen. Der Vergleich zwischen den Erfahrungen der Betreiber und den Erwartungen der Touristen zeigt, dass die Schwierigkeiten darin bestehen organisatorische Zeitabläufe innerhalb des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs, zu entwickeln, die beide Bereichen gerecht werden. Zudem besteht die Gefahr, dass verzerrte Bilder von Agrotourismus entstehen, die zu einer Vorstellung und einer Förderung der Landwirtschaft führen können, die nicht der regionalen Wirklichkeit entsprechen. Durch die Kombination der verschiedenen Ergebnisse und durch das Verbinden der Typologie der wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismusprodukte, der ländlichen Gebietstypen und der geographischen Aspekte, geht hervor, dass das Agrotourismus nicht nur anhand von Umweltaspekten analysiert werden darf. Die Analyse muss auch andere Faktoren wie Erreichbarkeit, lokale Gemeinschaften, Gastfreundlichkeit, Entwicklungspolitiken des ländlichen Raumes, Immobilienmärkte, landwirtschaftliche Orientierung des Bauernhofes sowie das Vorhandensein von Sehenswürdigkeiten, berücksichtigen. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Agrotourismus, als Kombination von Landwirtschaft und Tourismus, sich weder überall, noch auf dieselbe Art und Weise selbstständig entwickelt, da es für die Entwicklung lokaler Ressourcen bedarf. Außerdem ist Agrotourismus keine Pauschalösung für alle periurbane Landschaften und nicht alle landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe sind als Reiseziele für alle Touristen geeignet. Dennoch, auch wenn eine strikte Regionalisierung des Agrotourismus nicht möglich scheint, können wenn alle Faktoren gemeinsam betrachtet werden gemeinsame Tendenzen hervorgehoben werden. Es besteht demnach eine Verknüpfung zwischen dem Agrotourismus und seinen Landschaften, diese identifizierten Verknüpfungen können helfen das heuristische Modell, das wir vorschlagen, zu verbessern und die Erwartungen der verschiedenen Akteure zusammenzuführen.
