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This Essay addresses a gap in the federalism literature. Scholars have offered two distinct visions of federal-state relations. The first depicts states as rivals and challengers to the federal government, roles they play by virtue of being autonomous policymakers outside the federal system. A second vision is offered by scholars of cooperative federalism, who argue that in most areas states serve not as autonomous outsiders, but supportive insiders – servants and allies carrying out federal policy. Legal scholarship has not connected these competing visions to consider how the state's status as servant, insider, and ally might enable it to be a sometime dissenter, rival, and challenger. The literature has not developed a vocabulary for describing how states use regulatory power conferred by the government to resist federal policy, let alone a full account of the implications of this practice. It has thus neglected the possibilities associated with what we call "uncooperative federalism." In this Essay, we provide an initial descriptive and normative account of this undertheorized aspect of our federalism. We also explore what a strong commitment to uncooperative federalism would mean for the doctrines on commandeering and preemption, offering some counterintuitive conclusions about the ways in which weakening the protections for state autonomy might push states to engage in stronger forms of dissent.

"Serial no. J-110-38." ; Shipping list no.: 2008-0467-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

It is all very well, indeed it is very good, to bear down on the fact that the author of the Constitution was, and still is, "We the People of the United States." But there is more sentiment than explanation in it. We think too much about who is the author of the Constitution. Of course it was not the Convention of 1789, nor the First Congress which wrote the Bill of Rights, nor the Thirty-Ninth which wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. It was We the People, but even when we have recognized this, all we have done is recognize that it is an ambulatory document. We the People did not drop out of the picture in 1789, or in 1791, or in 1868 when We ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. We kept pace with what We had said. But the important question to ask has nothing to do with the author. The important question is, To whom are We speaking? When I turn to the Constitution, I am not really turning to a single document, except typographically. For the Constitution is addressed to a number of persons. In some places, to the Supreme Court itself; for instance, in the Third Article on the judicial power. It is speaking to Congress in the important section eight of the First Article where Congress' legislative powers are set down; and also in section nine, which prohibits Congress to pass bills of attainder, export duties and other things. Throughout the document we find that different parts are addressed to different persons and institutions, and the point I make is that they may interpret the words very differently. Even the same word may mean different things when they are addressed to different people. The person addressed determines the meaning quite as much as the context, since it is he who will first give meaning to the word or phrase on any particular occasion. In the interpretation of the Constitution, this is of paramount importance, because here the courts must pay the person addressed the respect due to an organ of government of equal rank and dignity.

Se analizan los contenidos de los preámbulos de las Constituciones Políticas de los Estados latinoamericanos, con el de fin de comprenderlos, clasificarlos, exponerlos de manera comparada. Con base en ello, se establece su relación con el actual modelo de Estado de derecho y su papel como insumos ideológicos tanto para la producción de normas jurídicas, como para la respectiva hermenéutica constitucional, específicamente, en los juicios de control o de defensa constitucional. Se describe, además, la evolución de su concepto y significado, sus contenidos, funciones y fines, a partir del examen de las proclamas asumidas como metarrelatos que compendian afirmaciones políticas cohesivas de diferente naturaleza (axiológica, filosófica, mítica, histórica y cultural) y que tienen la pretensión de legitimar un nuevo proyecto de orden sociopolítico o de relegitimar uno existente. Estas son tomadas de los textos de las Cartas Políticas de los Estados latinoamericanos mediante una metodología de análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo. ; The contents of the preambles of the political constitutions of the Latin American States are analyzed, in order to understand them, to classify them, and to expose them in a comparative way. From this, we can establish the relationship between those preambles and the current model of Rule of Law and their role as ideological items for producing both legal norms and the respective constitutional hermeneutics, specifically, in the control trials or constitutional defense. Then we describe this concept's evolution, meaning, contents, functions, and purposes, by examining proclamations assumed as metanarratives that summarize cohesive political affirmations, from different nature (axiological, philosophical, mythical, historical and cultural), and pretend to legitimize a new sociopolitical project or an existing one. Those proclamations are taken from the Political Letters of the Latin American States, through a methodology of quantitative and qualitative analysis.