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This year, CEGA was recognized by the American Economic Association (AEA) for our efforts to promote diversity and inclusion in the field of economics and within our center. In this post, Maya Ranganath, Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, reflects on CEGA's inclusion strategy, pointing to unequal power dynamics in global development research and discussing how CEGA ensures that our work — externally and internally — is consistently aligned with our core values.CEGA Fellows, from left to right: Jaah Mkupete, Fola Aina, Hellen Namawejje, Caroline Sitienei Koech, Arnold Musungu, Ojiri Enahoro Innocent, and Muthoni Ng'ang'a, alongside Maya Ranganath at PacDev 2024 | Credit: CEGAAt CEGA, we regularly reflect on what it means to produce evidence for decision-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) from our position at an elite academic institution in the United States. In recent years, we have increasingly focused on how scientific narratives are "owned" by privileged groups and have updated our diversity, equity, inclusion, and justice (DEIJ) strategy to address this dynamic. While inclusion has always been core to CEGA, we have consistently updated our strategies to match evolutions in the development research ecosystem.CEGA's theory of change centers our DEIJ goals: our third pillar is to "make the evidence ecosystem more inclusive." We pursue three interlocking objectives in support of this:To center the voices of underrepresented groups — including researchers, decision-makers, and study participants in LMICs — in social science research and policy debates.To ensure that rigorous evidence exists to help decision-makers in LMICs address injustices in society.To create a diverse and welcoming community at CEGA, respect and reflect the communities in which we live and work, and encourage the broader evidence-informed policy ecosystem to seek the same.We pursue these objectives by investing in LMIC scholars and institutions, supporting inclusive and equitable research, promoting ethics in research, diversifying our networks and team, and creating an environment where our staff and researchers feel a sense of belonging. Below we highlight some of the most important aspects of our DEIJ strategy.Investing in LMIC Scholars and InstitutionsSince 2008, CEGA's Global Networks initiative has bolstered the leadership of scholars from Africa, South Asia, and other low-income regions by equipping them with the tools, skills, networks, and funding they need to thrive. We organize short-course workshops, host semester-long fellowships, and provide extensive follow-on support. To date, CEGA has hosted 85 scholars at UC Berkeley, Northwestern University, and virtually. The fellowships provide the opportunity to audit relevant courses, present work in seminars, apply to competitive funding calls, receive mentorship, and network with faculty members and students. These scholars have received nearly $2 million in grant funding to promote their independent research activities and mainstream of development research globally. Program alumni started the Network of Impact Evaluation Researchers in Africa (NIERA) in 2018, an independent organization of former fellows that works to advance decision-focused evaluations in sub-Saharan Africa.Importantly, the capacity-strengthening support we provide to LMIC scholars is designed to meet the demand for training and mentorship in the short- and medium-term. Longer term, we are eager to support the transfer of ownership of these types of programs to LMIC institutions, to leverage their growing capacity and resources to train and mentor the next generation of African scholars.As a learning organization, CEGA is committed to pursuing open inquiry and debate about the barriers to — and opportunities for — inclusion across the evidence-informed policy ecosystem. Through our Collaboration for Inclusive Development Research (CIDR), we are working with NIERA to develop an evidence-based theory of change for inclusion that delineates which stakeholders are best placed to add value at various stages of the research-to-policy pipeline.Supporting Inclusive and Equitable ResearchMany research approaches in development economics reinforce Western notions of "epistemic superiority" over indigenous ways of knowing. CEGA has long encouraged an inclusive approach and a plurality of methods and disciplines that, together, make our research more accessible and more relevant to a broader range of stakeholders. While we continue to prioritize the use of impact evaluations where feasible and appropriate, we also support studies that leverage quasi-experimental methods, qualitative methods, data science, and mixed-methods approaches.As a re-granting institution, we recognize our power to fund research equitably and inclusively and support research that challenges unequal power structures. Our research granting policy formalizes how and when research teams should consider DEIJ criteria when awarding new grants. Typically, when evaluating research proposals, we include criteria that assess the diversity of the research team and of the larger portfolio. We have also developed a "co-authorship statement" with our grant awards outlining how researchers should be credited for their contributions, encouraging greater equity within research teams.CEGA prioritizes research activities that address persistent inequities and injustices in society. This means moving beyond sub-group analysis and conducting research with transformational potential for traditionally disadvantaged groups. For example, CEGA recently established a "Gender & Agency" theme to support gender transformative research aimed at dismantling harmful power structures and promoting gender equity. Additionally, our domestic-facing portfolio, the Opportunity Lab, hosts an initiative on "Racial Equity in the Labor Market," which examines the role of state and federal wage and employment policy in reducing racial disparities and promoting greater equity of economic opportunity in the United States.CEGA's Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences (BITSS) works to democratize the way social science is produced, scrutinized, and shared by realigning incentives for knowledge generation and use. For example, the BITSS catalyst program invests in scholars from LMICs to encourage transparent and reproducible research. Tools and standards that foster open access to data, code, and published research make it easier for LMIC researchers to access and advance new research. Additionally, the Social Science Prediction Platform (SSPP) provides a tool for sourcing input from community members, amplifying local knowledge, and helping to inform better research.Diversifying our Network and TeamCEGA continues to pursue a more diverse staff and network of affiliates. We have audited and refined our hiring processes, writing more inclusive job descriptions, disseminating them to diverse institutions, and developing a more equitable interview process. While the work of diversifying our organization will never be "finished," our efforts have yielded some progress: currently, 27% of our staff come from underrepresented backgrounds (as defined by UC Berkeley), up from 9% only three years ago. To track our progress, we conduct annual demographic surveys with staff, measure staff perceptions of the Center's equity and inclusivity, and enable anonymous feedback mechanisms. Meanwhile, we recently revamped our compensation framework to ensure that staff of different backgrounds are compensated equitably and transparently. We also audited and adapted our affiliate nomination process to ensure it is equitable and conducive to a diverse network. Importantly, we maintain a variety of staff forums to discuss our positionality in development research and reflect on current events in our communities.CEGA's DEIJ work is managed by a dedicated working group that I lead as the Associate Director of Global Networks and Inclusion, and guided by an internal DEIJ strategy and set of key performance indicators. We are energized by the AEA's recognition of our efforts over the years, while acknowledging that we have a long way to go to achieve our DEIJ goals. In this spirit, we welcome your comments and feedback on our approach. We further commit to sharing our learnings, including our challenges and failures, openly and transparently. Please stay tuned for more updates on DEIJ in the near future.CEGA's Award-Winning Approach to Promoting Diversity and Inclusion was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

The Pentagon's plan for floating piers and a causeway to surge humanitarian aid into Gaza is drawing fire from military experts for its lack of detail, potential danger to U.S. troops, and risk of mission creep. Bottom line, it's a bit of a head-scratcher."Biden is committing the United States military to conducting a highly complex, very expensive, low-production operation to bring food into the strip — when Biden could massively increase the amount of food into the strip with far less effort or expense: demand that Israel merely open the damn gates and roll the hundreds of trucks awaiting entry right now. Today," exclaimed (Ret.) Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, senior fellow at Defense Priorities, in an exchange with RS."This is an absurd idea, on so many levels," Davis added.The Pentagon said Tuesday that five Army cargo and support ships have left their base at Fort Eustis, Virginia, to assist the building of "roll on-roll off pier capability" just off the Gaza shore in order to begin a mission of injecting "two million meals a day" into the starving strip. The efforts, as announced Friday, will take an estimated 60 days.These massive ships will be able to carry the enormous amount of materials and personnel needed to construct what the Pentagon says will be a floating pier to which aid loaded at Cyprus will be taken. That aid, according to Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder, will then be moved by Navy logistic support vessels to a floating causeway — about 1,800 feet long with two lanes and anchored to the beach of Gaza — that will also be constructed by the U.S. military as part of the mission.Questions remain how the aid will get to the beach (the Pentagon insists it won't be via U.S. military) and to actual Gazans, given the intense Israeli security there, and ongoing shelling, bombings, and other combat activity inside the strip. As to the delivery and security questions, Ryder said in his Friday briefing that "we're continuing to plan and coordinate with partners in the region."Much of the criticism about this plan points out that there there has been plenty of aid waiting at the borders already, but Israeli inspections and the lack of security — including incidents where Israel has been accused of attacking aid workers and Palestinians forming up for aid — has prevented critical deliveries.According to reports Friday a new inspection process will supposedly take place in Cyprus, the starting point of a new maritime corridor just established by the U.S., United Arab Emirates, and European countries. This may have all been Bibi Netanyahu's idea (reportedly, based on a single source), but there has been no official confirmation from Israel that it has agreed to allow aid into Gaza from the beach. Furthermore, this U.S. effort is expected to involve "more than 1,000 U.S. forces" — quite a fungible number — between the Army and Navy. Michael DiMino, a former career CIA military analyst and counterterrorism officer who is now a program manager at Defense Priorities, notes that Ryder did not have much to say Friday when asked about the potential vulnerability of troops, and how much role they might play in staging aid operations."It is a non-trivial concern that troops may come under attack," by militants, particularly Hamas, DiMino said. "That is shocking to me that there is no real explanation about what the contingency plans are. How are we going to respond if our troops or government personnel come under attack?"The hackles were raised when Ryder was asked two key questions in the DoD briefing room. One, if the U.S. has received assurances from Israel that it will not fire on Palestinians seeking to retrieve the aid, and the second, whether there is concern that U.S. troops could be fired upon by Hamas.On the first, Ryder said, "look our focus is on delivering the aid, I'm not going to speak for the Israelis." On the second, he said, "that's certainly a risk, again if Hamas truly does care about the Palestinian people then one would hope that this international mission would be able to happen unhindered." DiMino says his "Spidey senses are tingling," as there is "no such thing as zero risk." "I think the biggest potential problem is mission creep," he said, noting we have no guarantee that this won't go from "one pier to two piers, to beach head, to forward operating base — in for a penny, in for a pound."Ultimately, DiMino said, "you'll now have a fixed U.S. presence in the warzone, in what is probably the most unstable place in the world right now."He said the lack of detail from the Pentagon (Ryder said Tuesday that, for operational security reasons, they would not say exactly where the construction would take place) on the size, scope, and manpower, and most importantly, what the beach operation would look like and who would secure deliveries there, is raising serious questions.The Wall Street Journal published an article Sunday that suggested that the administration was in talks with private contractors specializing in humanitarian aid missions in conflict zones. The one named is Fog Bow, which is run almost entirely by former U.S. military and intelligence officers, including Mick Mulroy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East under Trump, U.S. Marine, and 20-year veteran of the CIA. The administration has not yet entered into any formal arrangements, according to the paper.Fog Bow has quite a bit of cross pollination with the Lobo Institute, a consulting firm which also counts former military and intelligence officials, along with diplomats and humanitarian experts, among its expert ranks. The institute says it advises on current wars and "how to end conflicts and prevent their recurrence, and how to help those most affected," but it also provides tactical training "to prepare intelligence and special operations units for both current and future irregular warfare operations."Using private contractors to deliver the aid from causeway to beach and beyond could be a gambit to put a "non-military face" on these military operations, as (Ret.) Col. Doug Macgregor points out to RS, and there are plenty of former Special Operations forces ready to earn a paycheck. It was also suggested in the WSJ article that Fog Bow has already offered to begin delivering aid by sea before the pier is built and to start dredging a corridor on a "private beachfront" to allow barges to land close to shore.The WSJ also confirmed that the Qatari government has already offered $60 million for Fog Bow's efforts. This begs the question of how much this has already been spelled out and greenlighted, in addition to the ultimate cost to U.S. taxpayers. That angle has yet to be revealed, but considering the heavy lift of ships, materiel, fuel and labor, this is going to run into the hundreds of millions, at least, say experts.Lt. Col. Davis said he is incensed with what he said is a needless burden and potential risks. "Instead of using the powerful leverage we have — plane-loads of military kit and ammunition daily to Israel and diplomatic resources at the UN Security Council — Biden is leaving all the tools unused and is instead allowing (Israeli prime minister Benjamin) Netanyahu to fully run the show, and Biden is spending millions of American dollars and diverting U.S. military assets to do what Netanyahu could do for free.""It is shameful at every level," he added. "There's nothing good for the U.S. in this, and it won't even do much to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians."

Favors that one country gives to another imply leverage that the former can exert on the latter. Withholding, or even threatening to withhold, such largesse, focuses minds within the recipient country's government and can influence its policies.The favors that the United States has given to Israel have been enormous, as reflected in $318 billion, adjusted for inflation, in foreign aid through 2022 — far more than the United States has given to any other country since World War II. Thus, the leverage the United States has available to use on Israel is large. But it has used almost none of it.Even when Israeli policies fly in the face of U.S. preferences, the result is nothing more than a verbal slap on the wrist. Examples include the countless times that construction of more Israeli settlements in occupied territory are followed by timid official U.S. statements but no action — such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying last month that he was "disappointed" by Israel's latest announcement of new settlement construction in the West Bank.When the subject of employing the leverage is raised, voices in response usually say something similar to what retired general David Petraeus said recently, which was that the United States is "committed" to Israeli security, that we tend to "overestimate the leverage," and that Israel is currently in a "life and death situation."In fact, the days of Israel being a beleaguered, vulnerable state surrounded by strong, hostile neighbors are long gone. Israel has the most potent military in the Middle East — even just at the conventional level, let alone when considering nuclear weapons. Israel's military offsets any numerical inferiority in raw numbers of troops with advanced technology that far surpasses what any other state in the region enjoys. Despite frequently heard rhetoric that attributes to some regime or group a supposed dedication to "destroying" Israel, no enemy of Israel has anything close to the capability of doing so.One might argue that this secure Israeli position is thanks in part to all that U.S. assistance, and thus is a reason to continue the aid. But Israel is a wealthy country. It is in the richest 20 percent or even 10 percent of nations in the world, depending on how one measures GDP per capita. Israel can pay by itself for that potent military. The voluminous U.S. aid is a subsidy by American taxpayers to Israeli taxpayers.Therefore, reduction or termination of the aid would not endanger Israeli security, no matter how much the United States considers itself committed to that security. Israel would spend what it must to meet its own conception of security. But interruption of the voluminous no-strings-attached American subsidy would certainly get the attention of Israeli politicians and thus can have considerable influence on Israeli policy.In many respects, spending on, and use of, the Israel Defense Forces does not enhance Israeli security and may even detract from it. In recent years, the IDF has been largely occupied with keeping down a subjugated and thus discontented Palestinian population in the occupied territories and protecting Israeli settlements there. This is not a matter of securing Israel but instead of incurring the costs of choosing to cling to conquered territory and sustaining an illegal occupation.The full range of costs of this use of the IDF was underscored by the lethal Hamas attack on southern Israel last October. One reason Hamas was able to perpetrate its atrocity so easily was that Israel had moved forces from the area in question to the West Bank.Today, any munitions that the United States provides to Israel or finances are most likely to be used in further devastation of the Gaza Strip. That raises important issues, in addition to questions of leverage and influence, about possible U.S. complicity in war crimes. But for present purposes, one point to note is that because the Israeli assault has gone far beyond what can be construed as defense, any U.S. curtailment of the means for continuing the assault would be reducing devastation in Gaza, not Israeli security.In fact, continuation of the assault, and any logistical or financial facilitation of the assault, is likely to decrease rather than increase the future security of Israelis. The suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza is breeding an entire angry generation that will be determined to strike back against Israel, including with terrorist violence. As journalist Peter Beinart observes, even if Israel could achieve the probably unachievable objective of "destroying Hamas," we should expect that "Palestinians will create another organization based on trying to fight back, indeed using violence, given the extreme unimaginable violence that Palestinians have now suffered."Another relevant point about the current carnage in Gaza is that the U.S. has leverage that can curb the worst aspects of Israeli policies not only by influencing Israeli policymakers but also by directly inhibiting the execution of those policies. Although Israel will eventually make or obtain elsewhere the munitions it wants to use, at least in the short run the fewer bombs the U.S. provides that can flatten civilian neighborhoods, the fewer neighborhoods are likely to be flattened.U.S. largesse toward Israel and the leverage that goes along with it extend far beyond military aid. The diplomatic cover that the United States has routinely provided Israel, shielding it from consequences of Israel's own actions, are unquestionably of high importance to Israeli policymakers. Of the 89 vetoes the United States has cast in the history of the United Nations Security Council, more than half have been on resolutions criticizing Israel, mostly for its occupation of Palestinian territory and treatment of the Palestinians. The Biden administration has continued this pattern, vetoing multiple resolutions calling for a cease-fire in Gaza.Even just abstentions on such resolutions would jolt Israeli decisionmakers into having to think more seriously about changing their most damaging policies. Votes in favor would have even more of an effect, underscoring for Israel that it could no longer count on its superpower patron standing in the way of worldwide outrage over Israeli actions.The Biden administration could take other non-military measures to exercise its considerable political and diplomatic leverage with Israel. It could reverse some of the all-in-with-Israel actions of the Trump administration, such as by re-establishing the consulate in East Jerusalem that had served as a principal channel of communications with the Palestinians. It could even join the 139 nations that have formally recognized the State of Palestine.None of these diplomatic measures would jeopardize in the slightest the security of Israel or any U.S. commitment to that security. Nor would they entail international political or diplomatic costs to the United States. To the contrary, they would improve the U.S. global standing by making the United States less of an outlier from an international consensus.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu projects, at least as much as other Israeli leaders, the image of someone determined to go his own way regardless of what the United States wants or says. But that self-assurance is based on the now decades-old pattern of the United States not using its leverage with Israel. "I know what America is," Netanyahu once said. "America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. They won't get in the way."If America were to stop being moved so easily and started getting in the way of objectionable Israeli conduct, Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders would change their tune.The default U.S. policy toward Israel through multiple administrations has been to lavish unqualified support and hope that the United States can gain some influence through the very closeness of the relationship. The Biden administration has continued this approach with its influence-through-hugging notion. Clearly, the approach has not worked. It is past time to exercise the leverage the United States has had all along.

China and the United States, like sports captains picking sides, have been engaged in a considered effort to enlist partners. In the recruitment rush, the Biden administration has given short shrift to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its much vaunted balancing, or "centrality" in the Asia Pacific. Washington, like Beijing, has favored certain ASEAN members over others, frustrated no doubt by the group's lack of cohesion and effectiveness. But in the new multipolar world, these hinge countries and their groupings can be as important as power poles. There has been a lot of coalition building lately. In August, the BRICS bloc — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — invited six new members to join at the start of 2024. In March, Iran and Saudi Arabia reestablished ties after years of antagonism in a deal brokered by Beijing. In July, China signed an accord on law enforcement and security with the Solomon Islands and announced a strategic partnership with Georgia. This month, China upgraded its relationship with American bugaboo Venezuela to an "all-weather" partnership.The U.S. has been similarly busy — perhaps more so to make up for Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridge-building over the past decade. In August, President Joe Biden and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts launched a trilateral grouping at Camp David. The U.S. and the Philippines in February revived an agreement giving increased American access to Filipino military facilities. In May, the U.S. and Papua New Guinea concluded a defense pact. At the G20 summit in New Delhi this month, the leaders of the U.S., the European Union, India, Saudi Arabia and other countries committed to developing an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor for cooperation on clean energy, power grids and telecommunications. After the G20, Biden traveled to Hanoi where the U.S. and Vietnam announced that they were elevating relations to a "comprehensive strategic partnership," deepening cooperation in cloud computing, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — all areas of contention between Washington and Beijing. In a 2021 lecture, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan described how the administration was assembling a "latticework of alliances and partnerships globally." This was "not just about refurbishing the old bilateral alliances," he explained, "but modernizing those elements of the latticework and adding new components." Sullivan cited as examples the upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.), to leader level and the creation of AUKUS, the partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra and collaborate on advanced technologies.Both Washington and Beijing say they are not forcing countries to pick sides, though the impression that they do just that is unavoidable. Beijing has applied economic pressure on states for actions that it perceives to hew too closely to American positions — Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan have had to deal with such coercion. In network building, the U.S. has offered more carrots than sticks, particularly when it comes to courting pivotal states that Washington deems to have distinct geostrategic importance and — more to the point — the capacity to contribute to countering or containing China. In the Indo-Pacific, India, the Philippines and Vietnam have been the chief recipients of American courtship. But what about ASEAN? Washington insists that it values ASEAN centrality, but the proof of its perspective is in its actions. Biden skipped ASEAN's annual leaders' jamboree with dialogue partners, leaving it to his vice president to go to Jakarta, but squeezed in a visit to Hanoi just days later. The president's participation in the G20 was a not-to-be-missed opportunity to butter up Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who only in June had been feted at the White House. India is the most-prized pivot country in the Indo-Pacific (that status so obvious in the term). Under Modi, it sees itself as a power pole in its own right. New Delhi has proven its multi-alignment credentials, with its participation in the Quad, the BRICS and the China/Russia-conceived Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and its refusal to turn against traditional ally Moscow since the Ukraine war broke out. Biden is oiling the Indian hinge so it swings more Washington's way — and may be succeeding, given India's border clashes with China and its participation in joint military activities in the Pacific, Quad initiatives and Biden's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).ASEAN should be as critical a hinge player if not to win over, at least to keep "central" as the region's balancer — a crucial section of the lattice that would act as a security blanket for peace and stability. Some member states, worried that the China-U.S. rivalry undermines their agency, have warned the two great powers against forcing them to choose sides. ASEAN has not bought into the American Indo-Pacific construct, merely articulating an "outlook" on the concept. Southeast Asian nations will profit more not by putting on any one team's jersey, but instead playing the field as something of a referee or honest broker in good stead with both sides, however heated the competition.U.S. administrations have never taken the centrality of ASEAN seriously, largely because member states themselves have failed to show what it means to be the region's ballast. It is a systemic problem — ASEAN is no EU in either form or practice. Even though it has launched an "economic community" and has sought to address thorny problems, such as Myanmar and the South China Sea, as a group, it remains a politically divided, economically diverse collection of states, with a reputation for glacial progress and ineffectiveness. It was born this way, though it was successful in its founding mission to be a bulwark against communism's spread.But ASEAN has strengths beyond being the world's fifth largest economy. Its convening power is unmatched, reaching across economic and strategic spheres. Its ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus are as evolved and inclusive a strategic framework for the region as is possible. ASEAN-led platforms offer a neutral space for the great powers to interact on a wide range of issues. By lavishing attention on certain ASEAN members — the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore (host of a U.S. military facility) — Washington is mimicking the Chinese divide-and-conquer approach (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are reckoned to be on Team Beijing). But even small gaps weaken a lattice. The ASEAN way may be slow and plodding — negotiations with Beijing on a code of conduct in the South China Sea have dragged on for years — but this tortoise cannot be written off.In a speech on September 13 outlining "the power and purpose of American diplomacy," U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tellingly never mentioned ASEAN. Yet, the Biden administration may be smartening up. Seven of the ASEAN 10 are part of the IPEF, the American answer to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), from which the U.S. withdrew, and the ASEAN-China concocted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade accord. And guess who's coming to the White House for a bilateral with Biden in November? Indonesian President Joko Widodo, the very leader whom Biden "snubbed" in favor of one night in Vietnam. With its sizable population, strategic geographical position, participation in China's BRI, a maritime dispute of its own with Beijing, a growing strategic relationship with Washington, and a critical presidential election next year, Indonesia is the key hinge power in Southeast Asia. Like India, it has proven its agency and pragmatism, particularly in vital areas such as data security standards and infrastructure development. Giving Jakarta more attention would bolster ASEAN's position in the American Indo-Pacific latticework, especially with Laos, a country that tilts towards Beijing and is taking over from Indonesia as ASEAN chair next year.

Last month, CEGA held its ninth annual Measuring Development (MeasureDev) conference on "Mitigating the Risks and Impacts of Climate Change," in partnership with the World Bank's Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) Department, Data Analytics and Tools Unit (DECAT), and the University of Chicago's Development Innovation Lab (DIL). Speakers showcased innovative approaches for measuring and tracking climate-related risk, developing effective responses, and evaluating outcomes in data-sparse environments. Sean Luna McAdams, CEGA's Data Science for Development Program Manager, shares key insights from the event here.Climate change is disrupting weather patterns around the world. Look no further than the unhealthy levels of smoke in the Northeast's skies last week. The impacts on human activity require urgent investments in mitigation and resilience for those most vulnerable. Last month, CEGA, DIL, and the World Bank brought together some of the most innovative social and natural scientists working on this existential challenge to share how they are pushing the frontiers of data collection, for example by using remote sensing technologies, engaging in participatory data collection, and effectively (and meaningfully) integrating different data streams.University of Chicago's Rachel Glennester emphasized the importance of measurement to help diagnose, mitigate, and adapt to climate change, particularly to incentivize green investments in LMICs. Credit: World Bank.A Call for Better Measurement"Mitigation is one of the true global public goods," noted the University of Chicago's Rachel Glennester in her keynote address. Indeed, the efforts by one country or group of countries to reduce carbon emissions will have benefits that are felt worldwide. Recognizing that low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) — who have historically contributed little to climate change — nevertheless face growing opportunities to mitigate emissions for the whole planet, Rachel suggested high-income countries could fund highly costeffective mitigation efforts in LMICs. These payments should not be considered aid as they benefit the world and offset high income countries' damage to the atmosphere. To do this effectively we need scalable approaches to measuring emissions, among many other critical indicators.Cost-Effective Measurement with Remote SensingMany speakers addressed the challenge of cost-effective measurement through the use of remote sensing. CEGA Affiliate Tamma Carleton highlighted the promise of satellite imagery and machine learning (SIML) to improve climate management. Her own work on MOSAIKS demonstrates the potential for these data and predictive models to increase the spatial coverage and resolution of survey and administrative georeferenced data, while lowering barriers to access for decision-makers in low-resource settings. Similarly, Dieter Wang showcased how higher resolution and frequency satellite imagery alongside cloud-penetrating sensors can improve estimates of how well conservation policies in the Brazilian Amazon are preventing deforestation. Better measurement in this case makes it possible to reward governments through bonds whose rates are tied to mitigation performance. Kangogo Sogomo discussed a novel approach that leverages satellite imagery to predict maize yields at a finer scale with less computational resources.Since 2010, new satellites have come online that increase both sensor resolution and cloud-free revisit rate. These advances provide researchers with more granular and frequent imagery data to incorporate into their analyses. Credit: Burke et al, Science 2021.Of course, remote sensing is not just limited to satellites and can inform adaptation and resilience alongside mitigation. Samuel Seo, for example, compared measurement strategies for methane emissions from a large, unmanaged landfill in Dakar, Senegal by collecting data using human enumerators, drones, and satellites. Across the board, these measurements suggest that current approaches used by the IPCC underestimate total emissions from these sites by more than half. Bridget Hoffman instead used low-cost air pollution sensors along bus routes and within buses in Dakar to understand the effects of an infrastructure project on air quality. Drones, stationary sensors, and other instruments can all provide rich data at scale to improve the evaluation and monitoring of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies.The Role of Participatory Data CollectionResearchers and climate practitioners not only think creatively about the sensors they use to collect data, they also innovate data collection and its infrastructure to make it more participatory. Kangogo Sogomo noted increasing mobile phone use and internet penetration across the global South suggesting, "climate action is urgent… there is still an opportunity for having participatory methods [for data collection]." Tom Bewick, for example, has trained indigenous communities in Africa and Latin America how to collect georeferenced data on planted trees to improve the monitoring of their growth and local collective governance. Similarly, Kenneth Mubea, who works to conserve mangrove forests, discussed how his research assembled teams of students to work with local communities to collect georeferenced data. Participatory approaches can extend to model validation, as with the case of Alejandra Mortarini. She worked with organizations that have long-standing relationships with communities living in informal settlements in Honduras to help validate the outputs of the predictive model and calibrate it to improve its performance. By incorporating local actors into data collection efforts, we can increase its frequency, provide greater access, and contribute to a local culture of evidence-use.New Approaches to Data IntegrationA third strategy to make data collection cheaper and more effective relies on exploiting efficiencies generated by integrating different data streams. The World Bank's Stéphane Hallegatte stressed the opportunity of integrating different data sources in his remarks."We have all this fantastic progress in measurement with remote sensing and big data, we have these household surveys that are playing an absolutely critical role to measure what we are doing and to prioritize," said Hallegatte. "One of the big challenges is to make them completely interlinked and to flow smoothly from the spatial to household surveys, and have household surveys that can be more flexible when there is a shock that can use data coming from satellites to maybe focus and do dedicated surveys in places that have been affected by a shock."In particular, Hallegatte stressed that traditional measures of vulnerability may lead us to miss some individuals who may be critically underprepared to face the "long tails" of climate shocks. Adaptive research designs can help us understand which interventions work best in particular contexts and communities, improving our understanding of how climate systems affect those who are socioeconomically and environmentally most vulnerable and how we may build resilience together.Hallegatte stressed how different metrics of climate vulnerability can lead policy makers to prioritize different areas. Here we see how four different risk indicators — annual asset risk, annual consumption poverty increase, socioeconomic resilience, and annual well-being risk — map onto the Philippines. Source: Hallegatte 2023.Paola Agostini, Mohammed Basheer, and Erwin Knippenberg simulated physical and social systems in their research designs. These simulations enabled each of them to estimate new quantities of interest, like the decision-space of negotiations for potential dam designs in the Nile River Basin, the cost-per-benefit of different land restoration interventions in Tajikistan, or the percentage of the population at risk of falling into poverty due to weather shocks in Afghanistan. Ben Brunckhorst showed how the incorporation of weather predictions unlocks the possibility of anticipatory cash transfers with demonstrable effects on household resilience to flooding in Bangladesh.Through better measurement we can improve our collective efforts to meet the challenge of climate change. As Hallegatte reminded us in his keynote remarks, how we construct these measures of impact fundamentally affects what regions, communities, and interventions we prioritize. A critical part of this effort will be to leverage measurement strategies highlighted during MeasureDev 2023 to channel resources to the places and communities where interventions to mitigate and adapt to climate change will have the greatest impact. In so doing, measurement can contribute to a more equitable future by incentivizing green investments in LMICs.How does Measurement Contribute to a Habitable Planet for All? was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Eye health and vision have widespread and profound implications for many aspects of life, health, sustainable development, and the economy. Yet nowadays, many people, families, and populations continue to suffer the consequences of poor access to high-quality, affordable eye care, leading to vision impairment and blindness. In 2020, an estimated 596 million people had distance vision impairment worldwide, of whom 43 million were blind. Another 510 million people had uncorrected near vision impairment, simply because of not having reading spectacles. A large proportion of those affected (90%), live in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, encouragingly, more than 90% of people with vision impairment have a preventable or treatable cause with existing highly cost-effective interventions. Eye conditions affect all stages of life, with young children and older people being particularly affected. Crucially, women, rural populations, and ethnic minority groups are more likely to have vision impairment, and this pervasive inequality needs to be addressed. By 2050, population ageing, growth, and urbanisation might lead to an estimated 895 million people with distance vision impairment, of whom 61 million will be blind. Action to prioritise eye health is needed now. This Commission defines eye health as maximised vision, ocular health, and functional ability, thereby contributing to overall health and wellbeing, social inclusion, and quality of life. Eye health is essential to achieve many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Poor eye health and impaired vision have a negative effect on quality of life and restrict equitable access to and achievement in education and the workplace. Vision loss has substantial financial implications for affected individuals, families, and communities. Although high-quality data for global economic estimates are scarce, particularly for LMICs, conservative assessments based on the latest prevalence figures for 2020 suggest that annual global productivity loss from vision impairment is approximately US$410·7 billion purchasing power parity. Vision impairment reduces mobility, affects mental wellbeing, exacerbates risk of dementia, increases likelihood of falls and road traffic crashes, increases the need for social care, and ultimately leads to higher mortality rates. By contrast, vision facilitates many daily life activities, enables better educational outcomes, and increases work productivity, reducing inequality. An increasing amount of evidence shows the potential for vision to advance the SDGs, by contributing towards poverty reduction, zero hunger, good health and wellbeing, quality education, gender equality, and decent work. Eye health is a global public priority, transforming lives in both poor and wealthy communities. Therefore, eye health needs to be reframed as a development as well as a health issue and given greater prominence within the global development and health agendas. Vision loss has many causes that require promotional, preventive, treatment, and rehabilitative interventions. Cataract, uncorrected refractive error, glaucoma, age-related macular degeneration, and diabetic retinopathy are responsible for most global vision impairment. Research has identified treatments to reduce or eliminate blindness from all these conditions; the priority is to deliver treatments where they are most needed. Proven eye care interventions, such as cataract surgery and spectacle provision, are among the most cost-effective in all of health care. Greater financial investment is needed so that millions of people living with unnecessary vision impairment and blindness can benefit from these interventions. Lessons from the past three decades give hope that this challenge can be met. Between 1990 and 2020, the age-standardised global prevalence of blindness fell by 28·5%. Since the 1990s, prevalence of major infectious causes of blindness—onchocerciasis and trachoma—have declined substantially. Hope remains that by 2030, the transmission of onchocerciasis will be interrupted, and trachoma will be eliminated as a public health problem in every country worldwide. However, the ageing population has led to a higher crude prevalence of age-related causes of blindness, and thus an increased total number of people with blindness in some regions. Despite this progress, business as usual will not keep pace with the demographic trends of an ageing global population or address the inequities that persist in each country. New threats to eye health are emerging, including the worldwide increase in diabetic retinopathy, high myopia, retinopathy of prematurity, and chronic eye diseases of ageing such as glaucoma and age-related macular degeneration. With the projected increase in such conditions and their associated vision loss over the coming decades, urgent action is needed to develop innovative treatments and deliver services at a greater scale than previously achieved. Good eye health at the community and national level has been marginalised as a luxury available to only wealthy or urban areas. Eye health needs to be urgently brought into the mainstream of national health and development policy, planning, financing, and action. The challenge is to develop and deliver comprehensive eye health services (promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation) that address the full range of eye conditions within the context of universal health coverage. Accessing services should not bring the risk of falling into poverty and services should be of high quality, as envisaged by the WHO framework for health-care quality: effective, safe, people-centred, timely, equitable, integrated, and efficient. To this framework we add the need for services to be environmentally sustainable. Universal health coverage is not universal without eye care. Multiple obstacles need to be overcome to achieve universal coverage for eye health. Important issues include complex barriers to availability and access to quality services, cost, major shortages and maldistribution of well-trained personnel, and lack of suitable, well maintained equipment and consumables. These issues are particularly widespread in LMICs, but also occur in underserved communities in high-income countries. Strong partnerships need to be formed with natural allies working in areas affected by eye health, such as non-communicable diseases, neglected tropical diseases, healthy ageing, children's services, education, disability, and rehabilitation. The eye health sector has traditionally focused on treatment and rehabilitation, and underused health promotion and prevention strategies to lessen the impact of eye disease and reduce inequality. Solving these problems will depend on solutions established from high quality evidence that can guide more effective implementation at scale. Evidence-based approaches will need to address existing deficiencies in the supply and demand. Strategic investments in discovery research, harnessing new findings from diverse fields, and implementation research to guide effective scale up are needed globally. Encouragingly, developments in telemedicine, mobile health, artificial intelligence, and distance learning could potentially enable eye care professionals to deliver higher quality care that is more plentiful, equitable, and cost-effective. This Commission did a Grand Challenges in Global Eye Health prioritisation exercise to highlight key areas for concerted research and action. This exercise has identified a broad set of challenges spanning the fields of epidemiology, health systems, diagnostics, therapeutics, and implementation. The most compelling of these issues, picked from among 3400 suggestions proposed by 336 people from 118 countries, can help to frame the future research agenda for global eye health. In this Commission, we harness lessons learned from over two decades, present the growing evidence for the life-transforming impact of eye care, and provide a thorough understanding of rapid developments in the field. This report was created through a broad consultation involving experts within and outside the eye care sector to help inform governments and other stakeholders about the path forward for eye health beyond 2020, to further the SDGs (including universal health coverage), and work towards a world without avoidable vision loss. The next few years are a crucial time for the global eye health community and its partners in health care, government, and other sectors to consider the successes and challenges encountered in the past two decades, and at the same time to chart a way forward for the upcoming decades. Moving forward requires building on the strong foundation laid by WHO and partners in VISION 2020 with renewed impetus to ultimately deliver high quality universal eye health care for all.

Der große Artenreichtum der mitteleuropäischen Kulturlandschaften ist zu weiten Teilen unmittelbar von bestimmten extensiven Formen der Landbewirtschaftung abhängig. Vielfältige, artenreiche Biozönosen waren und sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil landwirtschaftlicher Nutzflächen. Sie haben sich seit dem Neolithikum im Wechselspiel mit den landwirtschaftlichen Wirtschaftsweisen kontinuierlich weiterentwickelt. Erst als synthetische Pflanzenschutzmittel, Mineraldünger und leistungsstarke Landmaschinen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts weite Verbreitung erfuhren, setzte ein bis dato beispielloser, stetiger und schneller Rückgang der Artenvielfalt von Äckern, Wiesen und Weiden ein. Trotz politischer Absichtserklärungen den raschen Artenschwund zu stoppen, hat sich der Druck auf die verbleibenden Populationen auch in den letzten Jahren weiter erhöht. Der Klimawandel und der Wunsch die Abhängigkeit von endlichen fossilen Energieträgern zu reduzieren, haben dazu geführt, dass die Nachfrage nach Ackerland zum Anbau von Energiepflanzen, bedingt durch einschlägige Subventionen, stark gestiegen ist. Nur wenige wissenschaftliche Publikationen haben sich bisher mit den Folgen der schnellen Ausweitung des Energiepflanzenanbaus Ackerflora beschäftigt. Diese Dissertation soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke durch Untersuchungen der Habitatbedingungen (Bewirtschaftungsmethoden, Lichtklima im Bestand, Bodenchemie) und der Phytodiversität in verschiedenen Energiepflanzenbeständen (Silomais zur Biogaserzeugung, Winterraps zur Biodieselherstellung, Kurzumtriebsplantagen (KUP) aus Pappeln oder Weiden zur Hackschnitzelverbrennung) zu schließen. Die Energiepflanzenbestände wurden zudem mit konventionellem Wintergetreide zur Nahrungs- und Futtermittelproduktion (Winterweizen und -gerste) und mit extensiven Weizenbeständen aus Agrarumweltmaßnahmen (AUM) verglichen. Die Untersuchungsergebnisse weisen eindeutig darauf hin, dass die eigentlichen Ursachen des starken Phytodiversitätsverlustes auf Äckern weiter reichen und grundlegender sind als der Anbau von Energiepflanzen. Es wurde gezeigt, dass die Phytozönosen im Inneren von Bioenergiemais- und Rapsäckern sowie auch in Wintergetreidebeständen extrem verarmt sind (im Mittel 3–6 Arten 100 m 2). Die durchschnittliche Stickstoffdüngung (195 kg N ha-1 a-1) und der Herbizidbehandlungsindex (HI = 1.8) waren sowohl in Mais- als auch in Winterweizenbeständen ähnlich hoch. Eine Bedrohung für die Pflanzenartenvielfalt durch übermäßige Phosphatdüngung (im Mittel 96 kg P2O5 ha-1 a-1) wurde jedoch vor allem beim Maisanbau festgestellt. Zudem war die Beschattung in Maisbeständen erhöht (11 % PAR Transmissivität im Vergleich zu 19 % in Wintergetreide), was mit einem Rückgang der mittleren Artenzahlen am Feldrand einherging (11 Arten 100 m-2 im Mais, 15 Arten 100 m-2 in Wintergetreide). Die Pflanzengesellschaften konventioneller Äcker wurden regionsübergreifend von nur 5–10 häufigen Problemunkrautarten dominiert. Maisbestände wiesen als Sommerkulturen eine von Winterkulturen leicht abweichende Artenzusammensetzung auf. Eine ausgeglichene Mischung von konventionellem Mais, Winterraps und Wintergetreide in der Agrarlandschaft bietet mehr Arten einen geeigneten Lebensraum als jede dieser Kulturen für sich genommen. Insgesamt waren die Habitatbedingungen auf den im Rahmen von AUM extensiv bewirtschafteten Äckern jedoch wesentlich heterogener und boten einer weitaus größeren Zahl von Pflanzenarten (darunter auch seltene und bedrohte Taxa) geeignete Lebensbedingungen. Im Mittel wurden 21 Arten 100 m-2 im Inneren und 33 Arten am Feldrand gezählt. Auch die Regressionsmodelle weisen darauf hin, dass moderate Beschränkungen der Herbizidbehandlungsintensität oder der Düngung, die sich im Rahmen der zur Zeit üblichen konventionellen Bewirtschaftungspraktiken bewegen, kaum dazu beitragen den Rückgang der Ackerflora zu stoppen. Neue, an die jeweiligen regionalen Gegebenheiten angepasste Konzepte und extensive Ackerhabitate sind hierzu unerlässlich. Die Vegetationsaufnahmen zeigen zudem, dass die Phytodiversität von KUP mit dem Alter der Plantagen stark zurückgeht. Junge KUP, ohne Düngung und mit nur geringem Herbizideinsatz, wiesen eine mit frühen Sukzessionsstadien von Ackerbrachen vergleichbare Artenzusammensetzung auf. Im Gegensatz hierzu wurden die 5–8 jährigen, dichtgepflanzten Plantagen von wenigen stickstoffliebenden Habitatgeneralisten dominiert. Obwohl sie seit mehreren Jahren weder gedüngt noch mit Herbiziden behandelt wurden, waren diese Bestände zudem dunkler (1–4 % PAR Transmissivität) und nur wenig artenreicher (8–19 Arten 75 m-2) als einjährige Energiepflanzenkulturen. Die Pflanzung von 5–20 m breiten Energieholzstreifen zur Zerteilung großer Schläge in strukturarmen, landwirtschaftlichen Intensivregionen kann jedoch aus naturschutzfachlicher Sicht empfohlen werden, insbesondere wenn Maßnahmen nur Erhöhung der Habitatvielfalt in den Plantagen ergriffen werden. Um die grundlegenden Ursachen des Pflanzenartenschwundes in Agrarlandschaften zu beheben, erscheint es jedoch darüber hinaus dringend notwendig, ein langfristig angelegtes Netzwerk extensiver Feldflorareservate zu begründen, um dauerhaft überlebensfähige Ackerwildkrautpopulationen zu erhalten und eine Ausbreitung dieser Arten in die weitere Agrarlandschaft in Zukunft wieder zu ermöglichen. Um politische Entscheidungsfindungen zu unterstützen, erscheint es notwendig im Rahmen von zukünftigen Forschungsprojekten den Blickwinkel vom Feld auf die Landschaftsebene zu erweitern und verbleibende offene Fragen über die Wirkungen der Ackerflora auf andere taxonomischen Gruppen zu klären. ; The rich biodiversity of the Central European farmland is to a large extent directly dependent on human management decisions. Diverse and dynamic biocoenoses have developed in mutual interactions with farming practices, and have been an integral part of agricultural land ever since the Neolithic. In the middle of the 20th century, when synthetic biocides, mineral fertilisers and more powerful machinery became widely available, an unprecedented, steady and rapid erosion of farmland biodiversity commenced. Despite political declarations of intentions to slow biodiversity loss, pressure on farmland biodiversity has been further increasing in recent years. In the face of climate change and to reduce the dependency on limited fossil fuels, the subsidy-driven bioenergy boom is increasing the demand for arable land to cultivate the required feedstocks. Only few scientific publications have yet addressed the consequences of the rapid expansion of energy cropping on farmland plant diversity. This thesis aimed to contribute to filling this gap, by recording the habitat conditions (field management, light regime, soil chemical properties) and the plant diversity in different energy cropping systems (maize for anaerobic digestion, oilseed rape for biodiesel and poplar/willow short rotation coppices (SRC) for wood chip combustion). Subsequently, the energy cropping systems were compared to conventionally managed food/fodder crops (winter-sown wheat and barley) and to winter cereal fields managed extensively according to an agri-environmental scheme (AES). The results show clearly that the underlying root causes of the strong decline in arable plant diversity extent far beyond energy cropping. We found the arable plant assemblages in the field interior to be extremely impoverished in energy maize and oilseed rape fields as well as in conventionally managed winter-sown wheat or barley (on average 3–6 species 100 m-²). The mean nitrogen fertilisation rate (195 kg N ha-1 yr-1) and herbicide use intensity (HI = 1.8) were shown to be similarly high for maize and winter wheat. Excessive phosphorus fertilisation (on average 96 kg P2O5 ha-1 yr-1) was, however, discerned as a threat to plant diversity which mainly applies to maize production. Maize was also found to be more shading (11% PAR transmissivity vs. 19% in winter cereals) and consequently less species rich at the field margins than winter cereals (11 and 15 species 100 m-2 respectively). Across study regions, the arable plant communities of conventionally managed fields were typically dominated by the same set of only 5–10 common weedy species. We found (summer-sown) maize stands to offer habitats to a slightly different set of arable plant species than fields cultivated with winter-sown crops. A balanced mixture of maize, oilseed rape and winter cereals at the landscape scale consequently offers habitats to a wider range of arable plant species than any of these crops alone. Habitat conditions on extensively managed fields cultivated according to an AES were, however, found to be much more heterogeneous and suitable for a far greater range of species, including rare and threatened taxa (on average 21 species in the interior and 33 species 100 m-2 at the field margins). Our models also demonstrate that moderate reductions in herbicide use intensity or fertilisation while staying within the range of currently practiced conventional farming techniques can hardly be expected to reliably halt the decline in arable plant diversity. Novel, regionally adapted approaches and extensively managed arable habitats are urgently needed. The plant diversity of SRC was found to decline strongly with plantation age. Young, low-input SRCs showed a community composition similar to early successional fallow land. Contrarily, 5–8 year old densely planted SRCs were found to be dominated by a set of few generalist, nitrophilous species. They were more shading (1–4% PAR transmissivity) and only slightly more species rich (8–19 species 75 m-2) than annual energy crops, despite not being fertilised or treated with herbicides for several years. The planting of 5–20 m wide SRC strips dividing larger fields with annual crops, can nevertheless be recommended in structurally impoverished, intensively managed agricultural landscapes, particularly if measures to increase the variability of habitat conditions in the coppices are applied. To address the root causes of plant diversity loss on farmland it seems, however, additionally paramount to create a permanent network of extensively managed field sanctuaries to maintain viable source populations which can potentially disperse to the wider agricultural landscapes in the future. To effectively inform policy makers, future research on energy cropping and farmland plant diversity should broaden the focus from the field to the landscape scale and address remaining open questions with regard to the interactions of arable plant diversity with other taxonomic groups.

У представленій статті автором аналізуються наукові дослідження, присвячені темі міського управління українських земель у складі Російської імперії кінця ХІХ –початку ХХІ ст. Ідеї та практика місцевого самоврядування мають давні традиції від вічових зборів Київської Русі, запровадження магдебурзького права, інститутів козацької демократії, функціонування міських дум, губернських і земських установ, сільських сходів під час перебування України у складі Російської імперії, сільських, містечкових, волосних органів, повітових і губернських комісарів, дум за часів УНР та в сучасних умовах.Автор особливо звертає увагу на те, що ще українська історіографія першої половини ХІХ ст., продовжуючи державницькі традиції гетьманської доби, шукає синтези у формі загальних праць з історії України, а зокрема місцевого самоуправління. Праці Д.Бантиш-Каменського дають системний огляд історії України від давніших часів до кінця ХVIII ст., докладніше спиняючись на козацькому самоуправлінні. Але водночас українська історіографія в добу романтизму ставить в центр уваги народ, його життя і рухи. Романтичне захоплення народністю згодом переростає у співчуття до соціальної та економічної недолі народних мас, головно — селянства. Досліджуючи спочатку народ як об'єкт історії, українська історіографія згодом ставить його на чолі українського історичного процесу. При певних відмінах, в різні часи й у різних дослідників, народницький напрям характеризує всю українську історіографію середини і другої половини ХIХ ст., а відгуки його мають вплив ще в перших десятиліттях ХХ ст. Народницький напрям найяскравіше виявився в працях М.Максимовича, П.Куліша, О.Лазаревського та ін., які присвятили головним чином свої праці вислідам історії козаччини та його управлінню. У статті проаналізовано погляди революційних народників, які схилялися на принцип верховенства волі народу, що був основою всіх рівнів влади. У програмних принципах народоправління акцентувалось на демократичних традиціях сільської громади. Висуваючи загальнодемократичні гасла про права нації на суверенний розвиток, вони мали на увазі не федерацію рівноправних народів, а федерацію громад, об'єднаних в області й підпорядкованих на місцях обласному управлінню, а в центрі—союзному урядові. Але народники не дали відповіді на поставлені життям питання, практичних рекомендацій з розв'язання національних проблем.Центральна Рада виявляла свою прихильність до інституту місцевого самоврядування. Разом з тим чи не в усіх її документах фактично йдеться про підпорядкування органів місцевого самоврядування центральному урядові.Певну чіткість і перспективи місцевого самоврядування в Українській Народній Республіці вносить Конституція 1918 р. Систему місцевого самоврядування мали становити землі, волості й громади, а їх відносини з державою передбачались у такому вигляді: «Не порушуючи єдиної своєї власті, УНР надає землям, волостям і громадам права широкого самоврядування, додержуючи принципу децентралізації». Та в умовах громадянської війни ці наміри не реалізувались. ; У представленій статті автором аналізуються наукові дослідження, присвячені темі міського управління українських земель у складі Російської імперії кінця ХІХ –початку ХХІ ст. Ідеї та практика місцевого самоврядування мають давні традиції від вічових зборів Київської Русі, запровадження магдебурзького права, інститутів козацької демократії, функціонування міських дум, губернських і земських установ, сільських сходів під час перебування України у складі Російської імперії, сільських, містечкових, волосних органів, повітових і губернських комісарів, дум за часів УНР та в сучасних умовах.Автор особливо звертає увагу на те, що ще українська історіографія першої половини ХІХ ст., продовжуючи державницькі традиції гетьманської доби, шукає синтези у формі загальних праць з історії України, а зокрема місцевого самоуправління. Праці Д.Бантиш-Каменського дають системний огляд історії України від давніших часів до кінця ХVIII ст., докладніше спиняючись на козацькому самоуправлінні. Але водночас українська історіографія в добу романтизму ставить в центр уваги народ, його життя і рухи. Романтичне захоплення народністю згодом переростає у співчуття до соціальної та економічної недолі народних мас, головно — селянства. Досліджуючи спочатку народ як об'єкт історії, українська історіографія згодом ставить його на чолі українського історичного процесу. При певних відмінах, в різні часи й у різних дослідників, народницький напрям характеризує всю українську історіографію середини і другої половини ХIХ ст., а відгуки його мають вплив ще в перших десятиліттях ХХ ст. Народницький напрям найяскравіше виявився в працях М.Максимовича, П.Куліша, О.Лазаревського та ін., які присвятили головним чином свої праці вислідам історії козаччини та його управлінню. У статті проаналізовано погляди революційних народників, які схилялися на принцип верховенства волі народу, що був основою всіх рівнів влади. У програмних принципах народоправління акцентувалось на демократичних традиціях сільської громади. Висуваючи загальнодемократичні гасла про права нації на суверенний розвиток, вони мали на увазі не федерацію рівноправних народів, а федерацію громад, об'єднаних в області й підпорядкованих на місцях обласному управлінню, а в центрі—союзному урядові. Але народники не дали відповіді на поставлені життям питання, практичних рекомендацій з розв'язання національних проблем.Центральна Рада виявляла свою прихильність до інституту місцевого самоврядування. Разом з тим чи не в усіх її документах фактично йдеться про підпорядкування органів місцевого самоврядування центральному урядові.Певну чіткість і перспективи місцевого самоврядування в Українській Народній Республіці вносить Конституція 1918 р. Систему місцевого самоврядування мали становити землі, волості й громади, а їх відносини з державою передбачались у такому вигляді: «Не порушуючи єдиної своєї власті, УНР надає землям, волостям і громадам права широкого самоврядування, додержуючи принципу децентралізації». Та в умовах громадянської війни ці наміри не реалізувались. ; The paper analyzes the scientific research on the topic of urban governance of the Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire in late ХІХ – early ХХ1 centuries. Ideas and practice of local government have had a long tradition since veche meetings of Kiev Rus, the introduction of Magdeburg rights, institutions of Cossack's democracy, the functioning of urban doom, provincial and district institutions, the rural meetings while Ukraine was a part of the Russian Empire, rural, burghs, township authorities, county and provincial commissioners, dooms in timesof UPR as well as in modern terms.In particular the author emphasizes that Ukrainian historiography of the first half of the nineteenth century, while studying state features of the Hetman period, is looking for syntheses in the form of general researches on the history of Ukraine, and espesially local government. D.Bantysh-Kamensky's scientific papers give a systematic overview of the history of Ukraine from earlier times to the end of the eighteenth century, paying more attention to the Cossack self-government. At the same time Ukrainian historiography puts into focus the people's life and motion in the age of Romanticism. Romantic fascination ethnic group then develops into compassion for the social and economic distress of the masses, mainly - the peasantry. Exploring the ukrainians as the subject of history, Ukrainian historiography puts it at the head of Ukrainian historical process. In certain cases, at different times and in different researchers populist trend characterizes all Ukrainian historiography of the middle and second half of the nineteenth century, and reviews its influence even in the first decades of the twentieth century. Populist trend is the most clearly evident in the researches of M.Maksymovych, P. Kulish, O.Lazarevsky and others who have dedicated their works mainly to the results of Cossack's history and its management.The paper examines the views of revolutionary populists, who bowed to the rule of the will of the people, which was the basis for all levels of government. In the program principles of public government emphasized the democratic traditions of rural communities. Advancing the general democratic slogans of the sovereign right of nations to develop, they were not referring to a federation of equal nations, but a federation of communities united in regions and subordinated to the local regional management, and in the center-the central government. But populists did not give answers to life's questions, practical recommendations concerning national problems.Central Council demonstrated its commitment to the institution of local government. However, not all of the documents announced the subordination of local governments to the central government.The Constitution of 1918 brings some clarity and perspectives of local government in the Ukrainian People's Republic. The system of local government had to include the lands, provinces and communities, and their relationship with the state anticipated in the form: «Without prejudice to its single power, UPR provides land, townships and communities with the right of wide government, keeping to the principle of decentralization.» And in the civil war, those intentions were realized.

Demokrasinin vazgeçilmez unsuru olan seçimler, seçmenlerin ülkenin yönetilmesinde söz sahibi olmasını istedikleri kişi ya da siyasi partiye yetki vermesi anlamına gelmektedir. Ancak seçmenlerin oy verme davranışını yönlendiren birbirinden farklı nedenler bulunabilmektedir. Sosyo-ekonomik, psikolojik birçok unsurun etkisiyle hareket eden bu seçmenlerin eğilimleri ülkelere, toplumlara hatta aynı bölge ve şehirlere göre farklılık göstermektedir. Türkiye'de seçmen tercihleri ile seçmen tercihlerini etkileyen sosyo-kültürel, ekonomik vb. etkenler hususunda çok sayıda ve geniş kapsamlı birçok araştırma yapılmıştır. Ancak seçmenlerin seçim zamanlarında gerçekleştirilen siyasal seçim kampanyalarında ortaya konulan vaatleri ne kadar dikkate aldığı ya da vaatlerin kaynağı hususunda ne kadar bilgili oldukları hakkında çok fazla bilgi bulunmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'de seçim kampanyalarında kullanılan seçim vaatlerinin seçmenler tarafından hangi siyasi partiye ait olduğunun bilinirliği bir problem olarak ortada durmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı da bu çerçevede Türkiye'de seçim kampanyalarında kullanılan seçim vaatlerinin seçmenler tarafından bilinirliği ve kampanyalarda kullanılan seçim vaatlerinin hangi siyasi partiye ait olduğunun bilinirliğinin tespitini sağlamaktır. ; As an indispensable constituent of democracy, elections can be defined as the authorization of the individuals or political parties that voters favor most to rule the state. Nonetheless it is likely that a wide range of motives direct polling behavior of voters. Driven from a multitude of factors such as socio-economic and psychological the voters, in their polling behavior, may differ with respect to countries, social communities, regions, provinces and expectations. As an outcome of the differentiation of expectations, it became inevitable that parties with different inclinations would introduce polyphony into political life. A good number of comprehensive studies have been conducted on voter preferences in Turkey as well as socio-cultural, economic and similar factors playing role in voter preferences. Nevertheless it has been detected that there are limited number of researches focusing on to what extent voters pay heeds to the promises outspoken during political campaigns or their knowledge on the party origins of such promises. Hence it appears that the awareness of voters regarding the origin of election promises used by each party in Turkey during political campaigns stands as a problem. Within that scope the purpose of current study is to detect whether the promises given during political campaigns in Turkey are paid attention by voters and the level of awareness on the political party origins of these promises. Current research unveiling the general attitudes and inclinations of Konya voters shall meanwhile offer a general evaluation whether voters take declarations of election into consideration and how attentively they follow the party they vote for. Data essential for this research have been collected from a questionnaire which is listed amongst the resources of secondary data. In this questionnaire, there are close-ended questions in addition to Likert scale questions. Field study has been conducted through face-to-face survey method. Field study has covered collectively 1907 subjects from total 22 districts in Konya; 3 central districts and 19 sub districts. Population includes all the voters in Turkey who bear the ability of electing and being elected. After tabulating basic information and inclination of voters in districts, by taking certain criteria into account such as age, profession and income level, the evaluation shall be based on detecting certain issues voters need urgent solutions and also partial analyses shall be aimed to detect how attentively some populations follow campaign promises while voting for their parties and how attentively they analyze declarations of elections. In this questionnaire, aside from questions directed to gather information on the general evaluation of voters, there are some questions as stated below in order to uncover how attentively relevant populations follow campaign promises of the parties. "All living places shall be disabled-friendly", "A high-quality life standard shall be provided to senior citizens", "A new Constitution underscoring personal freedom and judicial independence", "Per capita income shall rise to 25 thousand dollars", "Low-income families shall be granted houses with no advance payments", "Poor newly-wed farmers shall be aided with zerointerest loan", "The dormitories in KYK (Credit and Dormitories Agency) shall reach to 600-thousand capacity", "All citizens shall be covered with health insurance", "Fight against terrorism and state aid for the victims of terrorism", "Personnel cadre ambiguity shall be stopped", "Small size farmers shall receive support", "Chauffeurs shall pay no VAT (Value added tax), SCT(Special consumption tax)", "SMEs shall pay no VAT", "Poor families shall be assisted with Hilalkart", "Wages for the disabled shall be boosted to 450 TL", "Net minimum wage shall be increased to 825 TL", "The aids for the poor shall be increased", "Poor and middle income citizens shall be provided with full mortgage", "Poor Women shall be granted assistance", "Adaptation Law shall pass and better conditions shall be provided to the retired", "University fees shall be nullified", "Istanbul shall be proclaimed as the new prestige finance center". Accordingly the answers of the voter populations to determine the origin -AKP, CHP or MHP- of the most leading promises in declarations of election and fields have been sought. Declaration of election -which is a partnership treaty signed between political parties to be elected and the voters whose polls they need- has been annexed to the relevant questionnaire because of being an issue ignored in our country. In the analysis part of research, a couple of tables that reflect the thoughts of voters regarding the political party origins of the promises that we deem to have been in relation to certain populations are illustrated. Research sampling consists of subjects bearing the ability to elect and be elected selected via simple random sampling method from voters in Konya. The questionnaire which constitutes in the introduction part general questions such as the age, gender, educational background, marital status, profession and monthly income level of participants has been divided into various groups of questions. Thus it has been aimed to detect the issues voters demand urgent solution and also how attentively voters follow election campaigns and whether they are aware of the political party origins of campaign promises. In the end it has been feasible to reach a conclusion regarding the voter population in Konya, political parties that are popular on the basis of districts. Elections are acknowledged as an indication of democratization for countries since it is verified that national will shall eventually rise as the winner from ballot box. However it is indeed hard to detect how many of the voters demonstrate a conscious attitude. Some voters bear an ideological attitude and partisan identity whereas some voters vote for the party whom they believe to be most beneficial for their own sake. The causes that lead a person to different inclinations are not only psychological but can be attributed to a wide range of variables like economic factors, family, educational level, income level, profession, religious tenets (even ethic origins during the latest ages). As regards the outcome with respect to Turkey it seems challenging to arrive at a certain conclusion for the voter population since other than entrenched votes there are also amphibian votes for the parties and no equal stability can be ensured for each party. Therefore it can be argued that the majority of Turkish voters act pragmatically rather than ideologically. In this questionnaire that constitutes the scope of current research data gathered from 22 districts of the sampling city Konya are supportive of this finding. To illustrate, the collected responses manifest that voters select with no awareness of the programs of parties and actually pay no heeds to such issues. Furthermore on the basis of such data it can reasonably be argued that the majority of voters in Konya province unite around the very same parties.

L'étude comparative de la consommation d'énergie en Espagne, au moment présent, montre une très nette décantation pour le pétrôle, au détriment du gaz naturel. Il y a deux causes à cette situation: le faible niveau de consommation des combustibles gazeux par habitant et la préférence pour le gaz butane en bouteille, qui est un derivé du du pétrôle peu employé à l'étranger. L'usage du gaz naturel s'est généralisé en Europe au début des années soixante, en s'appuyant sur l'existance préalable d'un réseau de canalisations fort dense et d'un nombre élevé d'usagers d'autres combustibles gazeux. La grande expansion de la consommation de gaz de houile depuis le milieux du XIX siècle devenait, un siècle plus tard, un élément décisif pour l'adoption rapide du gaz naturel. En Espagne, au contraire, le développement de l'industrie du gaz traditionnelle avait été rachitique et inégal depuis le debut. Il n'y a eu que la Catalogne qui a eu finalement un nombre assez important d'usines à gaz. L'avènement de l'électricité, à la fin du siècle, a coupé l'expansion du gaz alors que seulement 75 villes espagnoles disposaient de ce service. Dans la première moitié du xxème siècle, le réseau de distribution et les niveaux de consommation ont peu varié. C'est un reflêt, en somme, du caractère lent et tardif de l'industrialisation espagnole avant 1960. Lors du tournant économique qui s'est produit après le Plan de Stabilisation, le réseau de distribution du gaz s'est avéré tout à fait insufisant pour faire face à la demande. La décision politique s'est inclinée alors pour la commercialisation massive des gaz liquides provenant du pétrôle (butane et propane) qui n'exigeait d'autre infrastructure que quelques plantes d'embouteillage et un système de distribution par camion. Dans ces circomstances, le gaz naturel, qui à la date s'introduisait dans plusieurs pays européens, a été seulement adopté en Catalogne, où il existait un réseau aproprié et une demande potentielle suffisante. Le bas prix du pétrôle, aux années soixante, n'a pas stimulé l'adaptation des formes de consommation énergétique en Espagne au modèle européen. Par la suite, les hausses du prix du pétrôle, en 1973 et 1979, on eu sur l'Espagne un effet énormement négatif sur la balance des paiements et sur l'ensemble de l'économie; l'Espagne est, en effet, l'un des pays les plus dépendants du pétrôle. On peut dire, en résumé, que le développement tardif et inégal de l'économie espagnole et les carences d'infrastructure qui en ont resulté ont obstaculisé l'adoption de nouvelles techniques dans le secteur énergétique et ont ainsi contribué à aggraver les repercussions sur l'Espagne de la crise économique internationale. ; A comparative study of present energy consumption in Spain demonstrates the predominance of petroleum products over natural gas. The two principal reasons for this situation are: the low per capita consumption of gas based fuels and the preference for bottled butane gas, a petroleum derived product little used elsewhere. The widespread use of natural gas in Europe dates from the early 1960s. Its introduction was favoured by the extensive pipeline network already existing, and the high number of consumers of gas based fuels. The considerable increase in the consumption of bituminous coal gas from the middle of the nineteenth century onward proved to be a decisive catalytic factor in the rapid spread of natural gas one hundred years later. In Spain, on the other hand, the development of the traditional gas industry had been sketchy and uneven right from the outset. It was only in Catalonia that a relatively high number of gas factories were established. The advent of electricity towards the end of the last century paralized the expansion of gas at a time when only 75 Spanish settlements were furnished with piped gas. No improvements were carried out in the first half of this century. Gas consumption and its distribution infrastructure were maintained at relatively low levels. This was in fact a reflexion of the slow and tardy nature of Spanish industrial development prior to 1960. The changed situation after the ccstabilization Plam of 1959 found piped gas in totally unsatisfactory conditions to meet increasing demand. The politicians' answer was the massive commercialization of petroleum-derived liquified gas (butane and propane) for which the infrastructure requirements are limited to a number of bottling plants and a distribution system by lorry. In such circumstances, natural gas, which was at this period being adopted in many European countries, was introduced only in Catalonia, the one region with suficient potential consumption and an adequate distribution network. The low price petroleum in the 1960s did not encourage any possible modificacions in the pattern of Spanish energy consumption to bring it into line with other countries. Hence, when petroleum prices rose spectacularly between 1973 and 1979, Spain was among the countries most dependent upon petroleum, and so suffered immediate effects on the balance of payments and on the Spanish economy since the nineteenth century, and the subsequent deficiencies in infrastructure, have retarded the adoption of new techniques in the energy sector and have contributed, in this way, to increment the negative repercussions of the international crisis in Spain. ; L'estudi comparatiu del consum actual d'energia a Espanya mostra un clar predomini del petroli sobre el gas natural. Dues són les causes d'aquesta situació: un baix consum de combustibles gasosos per habitant i la preferència pel gas butà embotellat, derivat del petroli i poc utilitzat a l'estranger. L'ús del gas natural es generalitzi a Europa a principis de la dècada de 1960. La seva introducció es recolzi en l'existencia prèvia d'una densa xarxa de canalitzacions i d'un elevat nombre de consumidors de combustibles gasosos. La gran expansió del consum de gas d'hulla des de mitjans del segle XIX esdevenia, cent anys després, un element decisiu per a la ràpida adopció del gas natural. A Espanya, en canvi, el desenvolupament de la indústria gasista tradicional fou raquític i desigual des dels primers moments. Només Catalunya arribà a tenir un nombre relativament important de fàbriques de gas. L'arribada de l'electricitat, a finals del segle passat, paralitzà l'expansió gasista en un moment en què només 75 localitats espanyoles comptaven amb servei de gas. La situació no millorà al llarg de la primera meitat del segle actual. El consum de gas, i la seva infraestructura de distribució, es mantingué en uns nivells relatius molt reduïts. Vet aquí, en definitiva, un reflex del caràcter lent i tardà de la industrialització espanyola anterior a 1960. El canvi de situació provocat pel Pla d'Estabilització va trobar el gas canalitzat en molt males condicions per a fer front a l'increment de la demanda. La decisió política s'inclinà per la comercialització massiva dels gasos liquats del petroli (butà i propi), que no exigien més infraestructura que algunes plantes d'envasament i un sistema de distribució per camions. En aquestes circumstàncies, el gas natural, que en aquests mateixos anys s'implantava en molts països europeus, només s'adoptaria a Catalunya, l'única zona amb un consum potencial i una xarxa de distribució suficients. Els anys del petroli barat de la dècada de 1960 no estimularen la possible adaptació del consum energètic espanyol a les pautes internacionals. El fet és que la puja dels preus del petroli de 1973 i 1979 converteix Espanya en un dels països més dependents d'aquesta font energètica, amb efectes immediats en la balança de pagaments i en el conjunt de l'economia espanyola. En definitiva el desenvolupament escàs i desigual de l'economia espanyola des del segle XIX i el corresponent dèficit d'infraestructura han retardat l'acció de noves tècniques en el sector energètic han contribuit, d'aquesta manera, a agreujar a Espanya les repercussions de la crisi econòmica internacional.

BACKGROUND: Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a leading cause of disability worldwide. AIMS: To examine the: (a) 12-month prevalence of DSM-IV MDD; (b) proportion aware that they have a problem needing treatment and who want care; (c) proportion of the latter receiving treatment; and (d) proportion of such treatment meeting minimal standards. METHOD: Representative community household surveys from 21 countries as part of the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys. RESULTS: Of 51 547 respondents, 4.6% met 12-month criteria for DSM-IV MDD and of these 56.7% reported needing treatment. Among those who recognised their need for treatment, most (71.1%) made at least one visit to a service provider. Among those who received treatment, only 41.0% received treatment that met minimal standards. This resulted in only 16.5% of all individuals with 12-month MDD receiving minimally adequate treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Only a minority of participants with MDD received minimally adequate treatment: 1 in 5 people in high-income and 1 in 27 in low-/lower-middle-income countries. Scaling up care for MDD requires fundamental transformations in community education and outreach, supply of treatment and quality of services. ; The work contained in this paper is carried out in conjunction with the World Health Organization World Mental Health (WMH) Survey Initiative, which is supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; R01 MH070884), the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Pfizer Foundation, the US Public Health Service (R13-MH066849, R01-MH069864, and R01 DA016558), the Fogarty International Center (FIRCA R03-TW006481), the Pan American Health Organization, Eli Lilly and Company, Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Aventis and Bristol-Myers Squibb. We thank the staff of the WMH Data Collection and Data Analysis Coordination Centres for assistance with instrumentation, fieldwork and consultation on data analysis. None of the funders had any role in the design, analysis, interpretation of results or preparation of this paper. A complete list of all within-country and cross-national WMH publications can be found at http://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/wmh/. The Argentina survey – Estudio Argentino de Epidemiología en Salud Mental (EASM) – was supported by a grant from the Argentinian Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud de la Nación). The Bulgarian Epidemiological Study of common mental disorders EPIBUL is supported by the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Public Health Protection. The Chinese World Mental Health Survey Initiative is supported by the Pfizer Foundation. The Colombian National Study of Mental Health (NSMH) is supported by the Ministry of Social Protection. The Mental Health Study Medellín – Colombia was carried out and supported jointly by the Center for Excellence on Research in Mental Health (CES University) and the Secretary of Health of Medellín. The ESEMeD project is funded by the European Commission (Contracts QLG5-1999-01042; SANCO 2004123 and EAHC 20081308), (the Piedmont Region (Italy)), Fondo de Investigación Sanitaria, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain (FIS 00/0028), Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, Spain (SAF 2000-158-CE), Departament de Salut, Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain, Instituto de Salud Carlos III (CIBER CB06/02/0046, RETICS RD06/0011 REM-TAP), and other local agencies and by an unrestricted educational grant from GlaxoSmithKline. Implementation of the Iraq Mental Health Survey (IMHS) and data entry were carried out by the staff of the Iraqi MOH and MOP with direct support from the Iraqi IMHS team with funding from both the Japanese and European Funds through United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF). The Israel National Health Survey is funded by the Ministry of Health with support from the Israel National Institute for Health Policy and Health Services Research and the National Insurance Institute of Israel. The World Mental Health Japan (WMHJ) Survey is supported by the Grant for Research on Psychiatric and Neurological Diseases and Mental Health (H13-SHOGAI-023, H14-TOKUBETSU-026, H16-KOKORO-013) from the Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Lebanese National Mental Health Survey (LEBANON) is supported by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, the WHO (Lebanon), National Institute of Health/Fogarty International Center (R03 TW006481-01), Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Award for Medical Sciences, anonymous private donations to IDRAAC, Lebanon, and unrestricted grants from AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Hikma Pharmaceuticals, Janssen Cilag, Lundbeck, Novartis and Servier. The Mexican National Comorbidity Survey (MNCS) is supported by The National Institute of Psychiatry Ramon de la Fuente (INPRFMDIES 4280) and by the National Council on Science and Technology (CONACyT-G30544-H), with supplemental support from the PanAmerican Health Organization (PAHO). The Psychiatric Enquiry to General Population in Southeast Spain – Murcia (PEGASUS-Murcia) Project has been financed by the Regional Health Authorities of Murcia (Servicio Murciano de Salud and Consejería de Sanidad y Política Social) and Fundación para la Formación e Investigación Sanitarias (FFIS) of Murcia. The Nigerian Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing (NSMHW) is supported by the WHO (Geneva), the WHO (Nigeria), and the Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria. The Peruvian World Mental Health Study was funded by the National Institute of Health of the Ministry of Health of Peru. The Portuguese Mental Health Study was carried out by the Department of Mental Health, Faculty of Medical Sciences, NOVA University of Lisbon, with collaboration of the Portuguese Catholic University, and was funded by Champalimaud Foundation, Gulbenkian Foundation, Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and Ministry of Health. The Romania WMH study projects 'Policies in Mental Health Area' and 'National Study regarding Mental Health and Services Use' were carried out by National School of Public Health & Health Services Management (former National Institute for Research & Development in Health, present National School of Public Health Management & Professional Development, Bucharest), with technical support of Metro Media Transilvania, the National Institute of Statistics – National Centre for Training in Statistics, SC. Cheyenne Services SRL, Statistics Netherlands and were funded by Ministry of Public Health (former Ministry of Health) with supplemental support of Eli Lilly Romania SRL. The São Paulo Megacity Mental Health Survey is supported by the State of São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) Thematic Project Grant03/00204-3. The Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development supports L.A. (CNPq Grant #307623/2013-0). The US National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) is supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; U01-MH60220) with supplemental support from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF; Grant 044708) and the John W. Alden Trust. G.T. is supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South London at King's College London Foundation Trust. G.T. is supported by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) Emerald project. This paper is an output of the PRogramme for Improving Mental health carE (PRIME). The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government's official policies. The research supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South London at King's College London Foundation Trust. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Department of Health via the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Biomedical Research Centre and Dementia Unit awarded to South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust in partnership with King's College London and King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the World Health Organization

Moving back to the land is, from different perspectives, a fascinating topic that has been on stage since the sixties. Since then, new forms of rurality have become an upcoming phenomenon on the media, still today we often hear of unexpected success of rural entrepreneurs who reinvented their life, they represent their triumph as reaction to market failure and city-life depression. From a sociological point of view, it is an exciting counter-cultural subject. How to study neo-rurality nowadays? Speaking in contemporary terms, we can talk about changes in rurality, taking Rural Social Innovation as our approach. As we'll see, social innovation is as appropriate as ambiguous when it comes to the research implementation, lacking in the specificity of the definition. Therefore, I decided to integrate the conceptual framework with two more solid theoretical approaches: social capital and moral market, which may analytically help understand and investigate the topic. From that, a research question rises, followed by an intense fieldwork. Let's go step by step, starting by introducing the study. a) The topic: Neo-rurality In the first chapter I explain the topic. Rurality studies connect different disciplines: sociology (marginality, mobility, market dynamics); geography (distance and periphery); policies and normative discourse (inner areas and rurality). 'Back-to-the-land' generally refers to the adoption of agriculture as a full-time vocation by people who have come from non-agricultural lifestyles or education. Originated in the 1960s, it situates back-to-the-landers as part of broader counterculture practices (Belasco, 2006). The back-to-the-land movement of the 1960s and 70s is often framed in relation to general cultural currents that encouraged "dropping out" of mainstream society in search of alternatives. "Multiplying fivefold between 1965 and 1970" writes Belasco (1989: 76) of communal back-to-the-land projects, "3,500 or so country communes put the counterculture into group practice". During the 1970s, the "protestant neo-ruralism" (neoruralismo protestatario, Merlo, 2006) conceives rural areas as the place where an alternative way of life can be experienced through the creation of an alternative agricultural production process. That approach refuses completely the Green Revolution (GR) paradigm (Shiva, 2016). Later, the development of alternative agricultural production was embedded in the agro-ecological paradigm, then absorbed by the global industrial system through the creation of organic certifications. Such a process of integration has developed a new critical reflection on food production and market relations. Neo-rurality is the frame that collects different approaches which are changing rural areas on different levels. It calls for attention to the relation between environmental issues, rural crisis and territorial issues (Ferraresi, 2013). Neo-rural farmers try a new model that is economically, socially and environmentally sustainable, protects biodiversity and promotes local quality food. In fact, production of quality food is key for the activation of practices and community relationships within the horizon of agro-ecological values. In Italy, pioneers of the alternative movements came from different backgrounds: the radical left, the ecologist movement and the anti-conformist or alternative movements. Also, a pioneering phase was characterized by a multiplicity of regional-level and often unconnected initiatives (Fonte, Cucchi, 2015). Ferraresi (2013) describes 'Neo-rurality' as a new, social and complex economy. Born partly in response to expansion of industrial food and partly due to the survival of some systems that resisted to conversion, we see emerging new or resurgent forms of production, trade and consumption, latterly conceptualised by academics as 'Alternative Agro-Food Networks' (AAFNs) or 'Alternative Food Networks' (AFNs). Movements become key players in the definition of new market places (Friedmann, 2005). Food movements act as an engine of awareness in consumption, and address issues that are core for social and media consensus, for instance health, environment, quality of life (Goodman, 1999), and also social justice and fair trade (Elzen et al., 2010). A second important effect of AAFNs is the empowerment of consumers, a leverage on citizenship action for the transformation of consumption behaviours into political action (Goodman, DuPuis, 2002). Exponents of neo-rural economy, as part of AAFNs, have promoted participation in alternative infrastructures contrasting the conventional market system, developing specific organisational forms, negotiating new forms of collaborative economy (Kostakis, Bauwens, 2014). They thus blur the distinction between public sphere and private sphere (Tormey, 2007). The AAFNs, as shown in the article by Murano and Forno (2017), has three main drivers shaping the form of development of this type of collective action: 1. Greater citizen awareness around economic, social and environmental sustainability issues; 2. The loss of purchasing power within important portions of the middle class, due to the increasing unemployment rates following the recession which started in 2007-2008; 3. General loss of meaning, due to the consumerism and the depletion of social relations, along with the decoupling of GDP growth and happiness (as suggested by the paradox Easterlin, 1974), people's search for a meaning in their life (Castells, Caraça, Cardoso, 2012) which seems to have been lost in a consumer society threatened by an economic, environmental and social crisis (D'Alisa et al., 2015). Tradition of local governance studies focuses on central areas, hi-tech districts, city-regions, overlooking the role of less industrialized areas, that actually represent two thirds of Italy. Northern Italy has been considered as a cluster of industrial development. Given current globalization forces, taking for granted recent government interest in undeveloped areas, inner areas have a stake in getting involved in wider market dynamics and renewed resources. An important contribution to the EU debate on territorial marginalisation has been provided by the Italian government's innovative approach to 'Inner Areas' (DPS, 2014). The government mapped all municipalities and categorized them according to their degree of remoteness from services, consistently with criteria that the debate on Foundational Economy indicates as key factors of spatial (in)justice. The emerging picture offers a polycentric connotation of the Italian territory. The geography of the inner peripheries includes mountain and coastal areas, as well as hilly and lowland areas, but provides no conclusive evidence to establish correlations between morphological conditions and degree of remoteness. The second chapter is dedicated to theoretical approaches: Rural Social Innovation, Social Capital and Sociology of Markets. b) Rural Social Innovation The neo-rurality phenomenon is strictly connected to Rural Social Innovation. Social innovation is a term on everyone's lips, indicating change and development, including social effects. Social Innovation is not specifically mentioned in literature on regional development, but in the more nuanced models we find that most important features are trust among actors, informal ties and untraded interdependencies between actors, which are key factors determining positive differentials in economic performance. Rural Social Innovation is helpfully used in many studies (Bock, 2012). Still, even though it is currently a very relevant phenomenon, Social Innovation itself is a critic concept, it is both one of the most common and ant the most unclear concepts nowadays. Because of its credits to local development, social networks and economic outcomes, I decided to use two more analytical sociological concepts to understand the phenomenon: social capital and sociology of markets. c) Social Capital Individuals generally pursue major life events—marriage, occupational choice—as part of a social network or group. As an exemplum, engaging in the creation of a new firm is generally done in a network of social relationships (Aldrich, 2005; Reynolds, 1991; Thornton, 1999); in that sense entrepreneurship can be considered a social phenomenon, rather than solely one of individual career choice. Social capital is a conscious use of embeddedness, the use of relations and resources for a purpose. According to Coleman (1988), social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure. Coleman refers to the social structure that enables access to resources. Additionally, we can also recall Bourdieu, who sees social capital as the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. And Putnam pointing at three components: moral obligation and norms; social values (trust); and social networks (voluntary association). d) Sociology of Markets The structure of markets can be reduced to its minimal components, that are a buyer and two sellers which compete according to some defined rules (Aspers, 2006b). Relations among actors can be of exchange, as between buyers and sellers, or of competition, as between producers. In the structure of markets, people also mobilize beliefs, ethics, values and views of the common good to talk about the effects of market processes (Boltanski, Thevenot, 2006). As pointed in the recent book published by Granovetter "Society and Economy" (2017:28) The fact that people seek simultaneously economic and non-economic goals is an unprecedented challenge for that economic analysis that focuses only on one of the two horns, as for sociology that focuses only on the other. Current theories of action in social sciences offer little knowledge of how individuals mix these goals. We can therefore recall Zelizer (2007) highlighting that economists and sociologists face a common presumption: the twinned stories of separate spheres and hostile worlds. Separate spheres indicate a distinction between two arenas, one for rational economic activity, a sphere of calculation and efficiency, and one for personal relations, a sphere of sentiment and solidarity. The companion doctrine of hostile worlds affirms that contact between the spheres generates contamination and disorder: economic rationality degrades intimacy, and close relationships obstruct efficiency. Moral economy is based on this attack on the common presumption. According to these considerations on ways that shape relationships and market, the main question that rises is: "Are values and social relationship separate from the market?". e) The Research During my PhD studies I worked on an answer to this question. In the third chapter I present the case of alternative agro-food movements and neo-rurality in urban and inner areas in the region of Campania (southern Italy). The study is based on qualitative research design, composed of fieldwork and interviews, undertaken in Campania during 2014-2016, where inner and central areas are the scenery of innovative development processes, founded on structural and territorial resources, as well as on individual and social capitals. Here I present you with a quote from an Italian journalist, Alessandro Leogrande, recalling the most important anthropologist of southern Italy, Ernesto Demartino: In a complex society, old elements and new elements continue to coexist, traits of modernity and traits of archaisms, pre-Christian segments and post-Christian segments, or entirely de-Christianised ones. It seems to me that the [Italian] South of these years, precisely in the light of a Demartino's analysis, fully returns the overlapping of these various layers. (Leogrande, 2016) I wish you a pleasant journey throughout my pages, at the discovery of neo-rural dynamics in southern Italy, a special place for meeting contradictions, traces of ancient and futuristic art, holy and desacralized behaviours, traditional and innovative practices.

The defeat of the Confederacy, the prospect of military occupation and Republican state government, and the financial collapse of many plantations and businesses sent a number of white southerners in pursuit of life in a foreign land during the late 1860s. Between 1865 and the early 1870s approximately five thousand white and black southerners trekked to Mexico (28, 37).1 Todd W. Wahlstrom examines this resettlement by studying colonies in the Texas border state of Coahuila. Much of The Southern Exodus to Mexico chronicles the rise and fall of ambitious colonization plans of such ex-Confederates as Matthew Fontaine Maury (scientist and naval officer from Virginia) and former Louisiana governor Henry Watkins Allen (12, 22). Wahlstrom revises earlier histories, engaging Andrew Rolle's The Lost Cause: The Confederate Exodus to Mexico (1965) that describes Confederate flight as "an attempt to snatch some sort of victory out of defeat"2 and as an expression of delusional efforts to preserve Dixie in the Mexican highlands. Wahlstrom seeks to revise Rolle's contention that the southern exodus was a "failure" through revealing "the scope of the vision behind it" (xv). Although Rolle largely ignores the northern Mexican borderlands, Wahlstrom also emphasizes colonization in Coahuila, arguing that border states contributed to a "hemispheric south" where planters and railroad promoters envisioned business and trade networks across the Mexican borderlands and into Latin America during the last third of the nineteenth century (xxvii). Wahlstrom also considers the experiences of African Americans and non-slaveholding whites. Contra Rolle's account, southern emigrants to Mexico did not solely represent a "Lost Cause" flight of renegade whites, but a commercial vanguard. Economic interests yielded unlikely collaborations between Confederate exiles and Mexican liberals who returned to power in 1867 (85). Most of these commercial efforts involved agricultural enterprises, ranging from grand schemes for cotton plantations to the homesteads of black and white yeoman settlers who saw Mexico as an "agricultural paradise just waiting for southern migrants to build up its economy" (23). Mexico might seem an unlikely destination for defeated Confederates, as its government formally abolished caste distinctions and chattel slavery after it gained independence in 1821. Additionally, Mexico had engaged in a war with pro-slavery Anglo settlers in Texas during the 1830s, and was still reeling from the effects of US invasion and occupation from 1846 to 1848. Nevertheless, a unique set of political circumstances made settlement appear promising in the summer of 1865. Under the imperial rule of Maximilian, the republican opposition forces of Benito Juárez were at low ebb, despite growing US pressure for France to decrease its presence in Mexico. Even after Mexico's loss of its northern territory to the US in 1848, vast areas remained beyond government control. Imperial forces, republican resistance, local strongmen, and indigenous peoples all contested Mexico's shifting borderlands.3 Over three centuries after Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca and Estevanico traversed the region, nineteenth-century Coahuila remained a "middle ground" between Apache, Comanche, and Kickapoo Indians, indigenous peoples who migrated into the area to either avoid white settlement or raid white settler outposts. Readers of James Brooks, Pekka Hämäläinen, and Brian DeLay will recognize the "network of violence, theft, and trade" that characterized Coahuila's society during much of the nineteenth century (63–68).4 Wahlstrom does not go as far as these three historians in describing Indian nations as primary powers of this territory, as he finds their sway over Coahuila to be somewhat diminished by the 1860s (64–66). These indigenous groups figure primarily as vexatious raiders in The Southern Exodus to Mexico, not as existential threats to ex-Confederate settlements. Confederate migration to Mexico is one point in a longer arc of Spanish and Mexican efforts to attract settlers to their northern borders in order to control the region. Andrés Reséndez documents the motives that led Mexican officials and, particularly, an ambitious northern Mexican commercial class to attract US settlement and trade during the first half of the nineteenth century.5 Wahlstrom's research makes clear that the US-Mexico War did not diminish economic and settlement patterns. Instead, ex-Confederate migration mapped onto earlier patterns of migration from southern US states to the borderlands of Texas, New Mexico, and the adjacent areas of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Chihuahua. There, white southerners from a slaveholding society found familiar class and labor dynamics. While Mexico was a multiracial nation that espoused the equality of all citizens before the law, it retained sharp divisions between Spanish-descended creoles, mestizos, and indigenous groups. Throughout the nineteenth century, Mexican liberals "argued that white immigration would bring economic advancement," modernization, and a whitening of the Mexican population (21). For their part, many white colonists brought a "racial exclusivity that only included elite Mexicans in the colonization plans." These transplants did not share the goal of transforming their host nation through assimilation or absorption (85). For many African Americans who escaped slavery or the new forms of bondage that emerged after the Civil War, Mexico often represented freedom from racial oppression.6 Sean Kelley, in a study of runaway slaves before the Civil War, vividly describes how Texan African Americans viewed Mexico as the land of liberty.7 While employment by white colonists—often former slave owners—brought an unspecified number of black southerners to Mexico, Wahlstrom argues that their migration "corresponds with other forms of African American agency in the postwar period" (133). However, Wahlstrom also states that black southerners often relocated "under duress" with their former masters (39). In such instances, this agency involved escaping the oversight of former slave owners, as was the case of Thomas C. Hindman, an ex-Confederate general who witnessed the flight of former slave Charlie and the "defection" of other former slaves to Mexico (39). A desire to acquire land and earn economic independence attracted blacks to Coahuila, even though many white colonists envisioned for them only a subservient role on estates that recreated southern plantation life (46, 132, 133). At times, black southerners attempted to form their own colonies. Wahlstrom describes the efforts of William Ellis, whose short-lived 1894 colony in the Laguna area of Durango stands outside the temporal scope of his study but warrants consideration as an emblematic representation of both Mexico's potential and peril to blacks. The settlers experienced "exploitation" as agricultural workers as well as a "swath of yellow fever." Ultimately, when the settlement disbanded, the seventy remaining blacks left the Laguna colony to work in nearby mines. Wahlstrom simply asserts that "seventy of these colonists picked up their hopes and went to the mining town of Mapimí to continue their pursuit of freedom" (46). However, William Beezley's discussion of mining in northern Mexico during this period casts a stark shadow on these optimistic notes; miners endured grueling labor conditions in unlit, poorly ventilated shafts, working with simple hand tools and suffering from exposure to mercury and other toxic compounds.8 Relocation to Mexico offered freedom from Jim Crow; nevertheless, opportunities for economic advancement were often limited for African American emigrants. Wahlstrom's emphasis on leading colonizers such as Matthew Maury, and the political machinations between elite southerners and Mexican officials, obscures insights into the everyday experiences of black and white southern emigrants. While Mexico's leaders found "common ground" with former Confederates in their quest for white immigration, popular Mexican reactions to this influx of American settlers, aside from frequent references to "banditry," do not appear in The Southern Exodus to Mexico (21). An overall impression emerges that white southern colonists created isolated, self-contained enclaves characterized by a southern Protestantism in sharp relief to Mexican Catholicism (143). Wahlstrom's study affords little insight into the competing concerns over religion, language, legal procedure, intermarriage, and schooling that marked the settlement of other Mexican colonies. Aside from passing references to marriages and women and children held as captives, this history centers almost entirely on male settlers. Nancy Brigham, a widowed woman who settled with a group of Texans in the Córdoba colony of central Mexico, is one of the few women mentioned. Wahlstrom ventures that "her involvement reflects the appeal of Mexico as grounds for economic revival, a way to resuscitate her family's future" (24). Nevertheless, beyond ambitions for new farmland and speculative business prospects, Wahlstrom does not investigate how settlers attempted to recreate Dixie on the Mexican borderlands in cultural or spatial terms. Instead, Wahlstrom traces US investment in Mexican railways, contending that economic interests were central to early efforts to link the two nations. He documents the competing efforts of former Union general William S. Rosecrans, who promoted a Mexico Pacific and Rio Bravo Railroad from New Orleans to Mazatlán, and Edward Lee Plumb, who planned to connect Laredo to San Blas on Mexico's Pacific Coast (115–117). As both proposals ultimately failed, Wahlstrom can only make limited claims about the "bilateral benefits of trade and economic development to Mexico and the South" (117). He nonetheless argues that these promoters "helped instill new pathways of prosperity and steer[ed] a course of transnational connections between the United States and Mexico during the second half of the nineteenth century" (127). Such glowing descriptions aside, the efforts of Confederate exiles in Mexico produced few tangible results in railroad and industry in the decade following the Civil War. The final chapter of The Southern Exodus to Mexico makes a more convincing case that southern emigration to Mexico was a harbinger of a "New South" where white leaders embraced industry, finance, and commerce to progressively diversify an agrarian economy, while maintaining a conservative approach to labor and race relations (124–125). At a general level, Mexico's leaders shared these conservative tendencies (21). The transition from imperial rule to liberal governance made economic interests paramount in Mexico's immigration efforts. Several of the Mexican officials who brokered for southern colonists in the 1860s later worked to forge a borderlands economy through the promotion of railroads, mining, and commercial agriculture under Porfirio Díaz. Santiago Vidaurri, a regional strongman and ally of Díaz who exercised political and military dominance over Coahuila, facilitated these emerging trade connections (71–72). Wahlstrom details how this particular migration period anticipates a coming era of US empire-building, where extensive commercial interests, especially in agriculture, created semi-colonial regimes in Mexico and Central America. Importantly, however, Confederate migration does not mark the beginning of US or imperial interest in Mexico. Juan Mora Torres, who also explores the emergence of a transnational economy in northeastern Mexico, dates the foundation of this "hemispheric" economy to the cotton trade that flourished before and during the Civil War.9 The Southern Exodus to Mexico makes a more convincing case that white southerners endeavored to promote cross-border business after the Civil War and that the increased publicity of Mexico's economic potential strengthened the case for foreign investment and more direct transportation linkages (111–112, 127). Ultimately, Wahlstrom provides few examples of lasting economic success or significant social transformations within these attempted southern colonies.

Welche Variablen sollten berücksichtigt werden, um die Wirtschaft der bronzezeitlichen Gesellschaften zu erfassen? Die Mittel der Archäologie erlauben verschiedene Analyseniveaus. Das Gros des Fundmaterials, insbesondere, wenn dieses aus Präventivgrabungen resultiert, dokumentiert die alltäglichen Aktivitäten. Siedlungen, Speicherstrukturen, Abfallgruben. dokumentieren die Grundlagen der Subsistenzwirtschaft. Auf den ersten Blick vollzieht sich die Entwicklung von Ackerbau und Viehzucht nur sehr langsam; den schnellen Veränderungen, die andere technische Systeme wie zum Beispiel die Metallurgie betreffen, ist sie nur wenig ausgesetzt. Umreißt diese scheinbare Starrheit eine neolithische Wirtschaft, deren Strukturen sich mit Neuerungen schwer tun? Die Beobachtungen auf der Ebene einer archäologischen Fundstätte oder kleiner Territorien lassen eine komplexere Situation erkennen. Die landwirtschaftlichen Einrichtungen weisen, je nach Region und Stufe der Bronzezeit, eine recht große Variabilität auf und zeugen von einer Mikroökonomie, deren Infrastrukturen sich den Veränderungen der Größenordnungen bezüglich der Produktivität anpassen zu scheinen. Die landwirtschaftliche Orientierung mancher um Speichergruben oder oberirdische Speicherbauten gruppierter Gehöfte kontrastiert mit vergänglicheren Siedlungsstrukturen, die einer anderen territorialen Bindung entsprechen. Während die Besiedlung und Bodenbewirtschaftung der großen Ebenen und der Plateaus unbeständig ist, bewirken andere Territorien – zum Beispiel die Bergregionen – entgegengesetzte symmetrische Dynamiken. Die Beweidung der Mittelgebirge, zum Beispiel des Pyrenäenmassivs, während der Mittelbronzezeit, steht ganz offensichtlich in Zusammenhang mit spezialisierten Orientierungen der Produktionswirtschaft. Die Veränderungen im Bereich von Ackerbau und Viehzucht begleiten die bedeutenden Veränderungen, die sich in der bronzezeitlichen Gesellschaft vollziehen. Dieser Prozess führt zu Beginn des ersten Jahrtausends unserer Zeitrechnung zur Herausbildung von Territorien, in denen bestimmte Siedlungsformen eine polarisierende Rolle spielen. Durch die wirtschaftlichen Umstände bedingt, geben manche befestigte oder durch ihre geografische Lage natürlich geschützte Siedlungen am Ende der Spätbronzezeit den Ackerbau und die Viehzucht auf; sie zeugen von einer "handwerklichen Kleinproduktion" (Karl Marx). Die in den Abfallgruben dieser Siedlungen nachgewiesenen Reste, die man bei Ackerbau oder Viehzucht betreibenden Gemeinschaften nicht vermutet, zeugen von der Schlüsselposition dieser Siedlungen im Transfer der Rohstoffe und bestimmter handwerklicher Erzeugnisse. Die in den Höhensiedlungen durchgeführten Grabungen zeigen deutlich, dass diese Orte am Übergang von der Bronze- zur Eisenzeit sowohl in sozialer als auch in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht eine bedeutende Rolle spielen. Stellt dieser Prozess deshalb den Höhepunkt eines Mechanismus' dar, der zu Beginn des zweiten Jahrtausends vor unserer Zeit in Gang gekommen war? Die Produktion von Rohstoffen – und insbesondere der Abbau von Metallen, wie Kupfer, Zinn und Blei – erfährt damals auf dem Gebiet des heutigen Frankreich bezüglich der Techniken und der Austauschnetze Veränderungen, die nur erfasst werden können, wenn man eine andere Ebene als die des besagten Gebietes betrachtet. In Südfrankreich entwickelt sich die am Ende des 4. Jahrtausends vor unserer Zeit einsetzende Kupfermetallurgie nach einem multipolaren Modell, welches die Vielfalt der Ressourcen valorisiert, die am Südhang des Zentralmassivs belegt sind. Dieses Produktionsschema, bei dem sich der Absatz auf einen begrenzten Raum beschränkt, ruht während der ganzen Bronzezeit, während die Vorkommen in den Alpen, auf den britischen Inseln und der iberischen Halbinsel intensiv abgebaut werden. Einige regionale Gruppen werden aufhören die Kupferlager auszubeuten, über die sie verfügen, um den Erwerb der Rohstoffe durch Tausch zu privilegieren. Das in Form von Barren, Stangen, Rohlingen (.) transportierte Metall ist Teil einer Warenwirtschaft, die die Unterhaltung von regionalen und überregionalen Handelsnetzen erfordert. Gleichwohl ist der Metallkonsum räumlich und zeitlich nicht gleichmäßig verteilt. So ist er in einigen Kulturräumen, wie zum Beispiel an der Atlantikküste, auffallend hoch. Südfrankreich steht dagegen am Rande dieses Prozesses. In noch höherem Masse werden durch die über eine lange Periode bestehenden Handelsnetze territoriale Organisationen fassbar, die insbesondere an der Verbreitung seltener Waren, so genannter "Prestigegüter" mit hohem technologischem Wert erkennbar sind. Der Vertrieb dieser Waren, die nur von wenigen Individuen der bronzezeitlichen Gesellschaft konsumiert werden, beschreibt eine in die makrohistorischen Netze des Typus économie-monde gehörende Wirtschaft. Durch diese Darstellung zeichnen sich einige bedeutende Tendenzen ab und insbesondere die Frage nach den Zeitlichkeiten: In welchem Rhythmus und zu welchem Zeitpunkt vollzieht sich der Wandel in jeder dieser Sphären, auf die wir hingewiesen haben? Der Handel mit Prestigegütern wird oft angeführt, um den wirtschaftlichen Rhythmus und die Schaffung eines in fortwährender Expansion befindlichen Systems, sowohl in geographischer als auch in quantitativer Hinsicht, zu beschreiben, er wird mehr oder weniger objektiv als ein evolutives Prinzip, Produkt eines Wachstums angesehen. Dieser Argumentation zufolge, ließen sich die Etappen des Wandels von den technologischen Neuerungen und der geschichtlichen Abfolge ihres Auftauchens in benachbarten kulturellen Kulturräumen herleiten. Der Mechanismus des Austauschs und der Verbreitung der Neuerungen sei als deren treibende Kraft anzusehen. Er würde auf Dauer und unvermeidlich zu einer Regulation der Wirtschaft führen, bei der die Politik eine herausragende Rolle spielt. Diesem Modell zufolge, würde dem Beitrag der langwierigen Konstruktion der wirtschaftlichen Struktur sowie den im Bereich der Subsistenzwirtschaft auftretenden Änderungen nur eine Nebenrolle zukommen. Wir können diesem Modell zahlreiche Argumente entgegenhalten und die Zeitlichkeiten umkehren, indem wir annehmen, dass die Änderungen, selbst die unscheinbarsten, die Struktur der Wirtschaft dokumentieren. Die Definition und Quantifizierung von Ackerbau und Viehzucht liefert eine wichtige Dokumentation, die vor allem eine Auf- und Ab-Bewegung mit ihrem vor Augen führt, bei der sich Phasen intensiver Produktion mit solchen der Rezession abwechseln. Die Rohstoffproduktion, insbesondere die der Metalle, spiegelt die unterschiedlichen Ebenen der Konsequenzen wieder, die sie zur Folge hat, je nachdem, ob man Metall produziert oder nicht. Die Betreuung eines – die Pflege sozialer Beziehungen erfordernden – "Marktes" muss als eine freie Entscheidung und nicht als ein deterministischer Zwang angesehen werden. So entstehen Verbindungen zwischen dem Bereich der Subsistenzwirtschaft und dem der Rohstoffwirtschaft. Wenn man diesem Schema folgt, dann können die kulturellen Einheiten als kohärente Räume angesehen werden, innerhalb derer die Waren und die Ideen zirkulieren und so Teil des Tauschgeschäfts sind. Die Grenzen und die Zeitlichkeiten dieser Einheiten lassen die Rhythmen ihres Wandels erkennen, indem sie Krisen, Beschleunigungen beschreiben . Dieses in der Spätbronzezeit klar erkennbare Modell weist der Diffusion der Neuerungen eine zentrale Rolle zu; der Prozess, der sich vollzieht, kann nicht nur dadurch erklärt werden, dass ausschließlich die "Eliten" daran teilhaben. Schließlich stellt sich die Schwierigkeit, diese unterschiedlichen Analyseergebnisse miteinander in Einklang zu bringen, um einen kohärenten Diskurs vorzuschlagen. Wir können einige Hauptideen herausarbeiten: - Die kulturellen Einheiten – Gruppen und technische Komplexe - bilden kohärente, die Organisation der Wirtschaft strukturierende Entitäten; - Der arrhythmische, asynchrone und multipolare Aspekt der treibenden Kräfte des Wandels ist das Ergebnis der Wahrung komplexer auf der Ebene der kulturellen Einheiten ausgeübter Gleichgewichte; - Die Subsistenzwirtschaft beschreibt ein nicht lineares System und zeugt von Zeiten des Wachstums und des wirtschaftlichen Rückgangs. Diese Systeme sind unbeständig und Krisen ausgesetzt, die sich größtenteils durch die Spannungen zwischen den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Strukturen ergeben. ; Which among the many different variables can we interrogate to understand the economy of Bronze Age societies? The tools that archaeology has at its disposal, enables us to reach different levels of analysis. The majority of our documentation, especially when it results from preventive digs, describes the daily activities. Habitats, conservation structures, domestic dumpsters. describe the basis of the subsistence economy. Firstly, agro-pastoral's history stretches over a long period of time, and is only slightly exposed to rapid change, which seems to affect other technical systems, such as metallurgy. Does this apparent opposition to progress depict the outlines of a Neolithic economy of which structures had great difficulty in renewing themselves? The observations conducted on the scale of an archaeological site or enlarged to small territories describe a more complex situation. According to the regions and to the different periods of the Bronze Age, the agricultural structures show a great variability and are witness of a micro-economy of which infra-structures seemingly adapt to the change of scale. The agricultural orientation of certain settlements, formed around buried or aerial storage structures contrasts with more temporary structures, related to a different type of territorial anchorage. Whereas the wide plains and the plateaus know variations in their occupation and in the exploitation of the agricultural fields, other areas, such as mountain ranges, engender opposed symmetric dynamics. The pastoral exploitation in areas of average mountain height, such as the Pyrenean range during the Middle Bronze Age, is obviously related to a specialized economy of production. The complete change affecting the sphere of the agro-pastoral economy was followed by heavy mutations in the Bronze Age society. This process leads, at the dawn of the first millennium B.C., to the elaboration of territories in which certain settlements play a polarizing role. Related to the economic climate of that time, certain fortified or naturally protected sites at the very end of the Bronze Age, lose their traditional agro-pastoral role; they are the witness «to small merchant productions» to quote the terminology of Karl Marx. Occupying a key position in the transfer of raw materials and certain manufactured goods, the dumpsters of these settlements indicate a consumption going far beyond the norm of agricultural and pastoral human units. The excavations carried out on hill-fort type settlements undoubtedly show that these sites play at the same time an essential social and economic role. Does this mean that this process constitutes a peak of a mechanism engaged at the beginning of the second millennium B.C.? The production of raw materials – particularly metallic resources such as copper, tin and lead – undergoes on France's current territory a change in the techniques as well as in the distribution networks which can only be apprehended on a different scale than the one affected by these mutations. In the south of France, the production of the first copper objects which takes place at the very end of the 4th millennium BC develops according to a multipolar model which increases the diversity of the types of resources known on the southern slope of the Massif Central. This system of production, which is in keeping with a model of poor spatial diffusion, is interrupted during the entire Bronze Age whereas the alpine sphere, the British islands, and the Iberian Peninsula will be an area of intensive production. In an indebted position, certain regional groups will cease the exploitation of their copper resources to privilege the acquisition of raw materials through trade. Transported in the shape of ingots, bars or rough outlines, metal partakes of an economy of goods requiring the maintenance of trade networks on a regional and even wider scale. Nevertheless, metal consumption doesn't invest a homogenous aspect in time and space. Thus, certain cultural areas, such as the Atlantic coast, consume openly metallic goods. Southern France on the other hand remains out of these processes. To an even higher degree, the long-term trade networks enable us to access wider territorial organisations, notably revealed by the distribution of rare products, known as « prestige » goods, invested with a strong technological value. The distribution of these goods, only consumed by a handful of people making up the Bronze Age society, depicts an economy inscribed in macro-historical networks, belonging to the "économie-monde" type (F. Braudel). Some important tendencies can be deduced from the above statements; firstly the question of temporality. One wonders what was the rhythm and at which moment these changes took place in the different spheres mentioned? Whereas the economy of prestige goods is frequently put forward to describe the economic pulse and the development of a system constantly expanding geographically and quantitatively. This economy is considered more or less objectively as an evolutionary principle, resulting from economic growth. According to this reasoning, the stages of change follow the technological innovations and also the history of their appearance in contiguous cultural areas. The mechanism of these exchanges and the diffusion of the innovations would therefore constitute the driving force. This would lead with time, ineluctably to the appearance of a regulation of the economy, where the political sphere would play an overwhelming role. According to these models, the part played by the long period of time to the construction of the economical structure as well as the changes intervening in the sphere of the subsistence economy can be considered as indirect factors. Many arguments can oppose this model and reverse the temporalities by considering the changes, even the most discreet, as describing the structure of the economy. The definition and the quantification of the agro-pastoral activities provide an essential documentation which recounts even more an oscillatory movement, demonstrated by the establishment of intensive production structures. The economy linked to the production of raw materials, notably metal, is indicative of the different levels of implication according to a producing or non-producing position. This « market » guardianship, requiring the upkeep of social relations, should be as a choice and not as a determinating constraint. Structuring takes place between the sphere of subsistence and the sphere of the raw material economy. Following this scheme, the cultural entities can be considered as coherent spaces in which goods and ideas circulate (.) attributed to the exchange market. The outlines and the temporalities of these entities give us a glimpse of their rhythms and their modifications, describing crisis and accelerations. Clearly asserted during the end of the Bronze Age, this model confers to the spreading of the innovations a central role; the fact that only the « elite » gain from this is not a sufficient explanation for the process being established. In fine, the main difficulty is to make these different layers coincide in order to propose a consistent discourse. Some strong ideas can be identified: - cultural entities – groups and technical complexes - constitute coherent units which structure the economic organization; - the non rhythmical, non synchronic and multipolar aspect of the dynamics of change results from the maintenance of the complex balances which manifest at the scale of cultural entities; - subsistence economy describes a non-linear system and shows episodes of growth and withdrawal. These systems are fragile and exposed to crisis, which result, for a large part, from the inadequacy between the social and the economic structures