Suchergebnisse

International audience ; The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastricht Treaty and the Status Quo — reveals that the amended Maastricht Treaty, despite the fact that it was the Condorcet winner and won the 1993 referendum, may not have been preferred by a majority but was probably the most preferred alternative only for a minority of the electorate.

In France, the referendums held on September 20, 1992 on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and on May 29, 2005 on the EU Constitution, were two fundamental moments in the history of Europe's process of integration. These two referendums shed a clear light on the tensions and divisions within the French Socialist Party (PS), which had begun to show cracks in the early Eighties when the Mauroy government adopted policies designed to ensure that France would remain in the European Monetary System (EMS), thus accepting the constraints of participating in the process of European integration. The divisions reemerged in February 1984 at the time of the European Parliament's vote on the Spinelli Project, French socialists opting for abstention. When President Mitterrand announced a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the Socialist Party's Bordeaux Congress of July 1992 plumped for "Yes". Jean-Pierre Chevènement, however, came in on the "No" side, founding the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) presided by Max Gallo. The MDC was still a faction of the PS, from which it separated in April 1993 to become an autonomous political party in December of the same year. Then there was the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. The Socialist Party had polled its members, a majority of whom were in favour of ratification. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a number of prominent party figures announced their opposition during the national referendum campaign, including Laurent Fabius, Marc Dolez, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Henri Emmanuelli. For his part, Chevènement was also against ratifying the EU Constitution. En France, les référendums sur la ratification du Traité de Maastricht et du Traité constitutionnel, qui se sont respectivement déroulés le 20 septembre 1992 et le 29 mai 2005, furent des événements décisifs pour l'histoire de la construction européenne et de division pour la sphère socialiste française, mettant en évidence les fractures au sein du Parti socialiste (PS) sur la nature du processus d'intégration européenne, sur le plan économique, social et institutionnel. Ces divisions étaient en partie déjà apparues en mars 1983, sur la politique économique adoptée par le gouvernement Mauroy pour garantir la permanence de la France dans le Système monétaire européen. Les socialistes français se divisèrent, en outre, sur le Projet Spinelli, en optant pour l'abstention à l'occasion du vote au Parlement européen en février 1984. En 1992, après le choix de François Mitterrand d'organiser un référendum sur la ratification du Traité de Maastricht, et après les résultats du Congrès de Bordeaux, où le PS se prononça en faveur du « oui » au référendum, Jean-Pierre Chevènement quitta la Direction du parti pour s'engager dans la campagne en faveur du « non » et fonder le Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), avec Max Gallo à la présidence. Le MDC constituait encore une composante du PS, dont il se sépara en avril 1993 pour se transformer en un parti en décembre de la même année. Puis, il y eut le référendum sur le Traité constitutionnel européen. Le PS organisa, entre ses membres, le 1er décembre 2004, un référendum sur le Traité qui vit prévaloir le « oui » à la ratification, mais des dirigeants socialistes importants, comme Laurent Fabius, Marc Dolez, Jean-Luc Mélenchon et Henri Emmanuelli, soutinrent le « non », pendant la campagne pour le référendum national. En dehors du PS, Chevènement fit – lui aussi - campagne en faveur du « non ».

The safeguarding of human rights remains highly problematic, despite the proliferation of human rights instruments and the many actions taken by a variety of actors, such as governmental and non-governmental organisations, (individual) states and the international community over the past decades. Human rights violations do still occur on a large scale and injustice remains rampant. Central to this problem appears to be that social, economic, cultural and political structures in societies provide denialist defence mechanisms. Such deeply embedded denialism causes and/or facilitates human rights violations, because the true nature of the problems involved remains fully or partly unacknowledged and as a result appropriate action remains absent. In order to safeguard the effectuation of human rights it is thus pertinent to acknowledge and address this problem of denialism and develop strategies to move beyond it. To address the above-mentioned problem, an international conference was organised on the theme of Denialism and Human Rights by the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights in 2015, which brought together scholars, practitioners and students from various disciplines and fields to unearth and address denialism in the context of their own particular area of research. The present volume contains a unique collection of papers that were presented during the conference. The content of the papers ranges from more general reflections on the theme of denialism and human rights to more specific areas of research that are relevant in terms of denialism such as genocide, children's rights, the role of (inter)national organisations, penology, and social, economic and cultural rights

Il saggio discute le osservazioni presentate sulla stessa rivista dal prof. Paolo Savona in merito a un mio saggio dedicato al Trattao di Maastricht e all'Unione monetaria europea apparso sul libro Andreotti e l'Europa curato da F. Lefebvre D'Ovidio e da Luca Micheletta. ; The chapter describes – based on Giulio Andreotti's personal papers – the decision by the Italian government of the day, taken in the course of the extraordinary council of 27-28 October 1990 in Rome during the semester under the Italian presidency, to agree to the adoption of a single currency. Actually, however, the documents do not directly reflect Andreotti's thoughts on the issue. The interpretative scope of the chapter is accordingly limited: the idea was to show how the Italian government conducted the negotiations within the European institutions in the preparation of the Maastricht treaty and its ratification, not to consider the effects of EMU on the Italian economy, nor to express my personal opinion concerning the decision.