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It is all very well, indeed it is very good, to bear down on the fact that the author of the Constitution was, and still is, "We the People of the United States." But there is more sentiment than explanation in it. We think too much about who is the author of the Constitution. Of course it was not the Convention of 1789, nor the First Congress which wrote the Bill of Rights, nor the Thirty-Ninth which wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. It was We the People, but even when we have recognized this, all we have done is recognize that it is an ambulatory document. We the People did not drop out of the picture in 1789, or in 1791, or in 1868 when We ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. We kept pace with what We had said. But the important question to ask has nothing to do with the author. The important question is, To whom are We speaking? When I turn to the Constitution, I am not really turning to a single document, except typographically. For the Constitution is addressed to a number of persons. In some places, to the Supreme Court itself; for instance, in the Third Article on the judicial power. It is speaking to Congress in the important section eight of the First Article where Congress' legislative powers are set down; and also in section nine, which prohibits Congress to pass bills of attainder, export duties and other things. Throughout the document we find that different parts are addressed to different persons and institutions, and the point I make is that they may interpret the words very differently. Even the same word may mean different things when they are addressed to different people. The person addressed determines the meaning quite as much as the context, since it is he who will first give meaning to the word or phrase on any particular occasion. In the interpretation of the Constitution, this is of paramount importance, because here the courts must pay the person addressed the respect due to an organ of government of equal rank and dignity.

The respect, protection, and fulfillment of the rights of persons with disabilities is an obligation of the state as stipulated in Article 42 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on human rights. Persons with disabilities has been experiencing a lot of discrimination that has not met the right of persons with disabilities. Disability should have the same opportunity in the effort to develop itself. Fulfillment of the rights of persons with disabilities is still considered as a social problem that the new policy with its rights is social security, social assistance, and increase social welfare. Protection and fulfillment of the rights of persons with disabilities can be done by providing and facilitating access to public services. The right to obtain public services should also be reserved for disabled people. The right to obtain public services for disabled people should be seen as a constitutional right. The regulation of public services should provide protection and fulfillment of the constitutional rights of the disabled in obtaining public services. This paper will discuss the law enforcement ideal in strengthening the rights of persons with disabilities as constitutional rights through fair regulation of public services. This paper uses a method normative approach to legislation.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter I: The Principle of Fraternité: From the French Constitutions of the Revolutionary Period to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic -- 1.1: Introduction -- 1.2: Historical excursus on the French Constitutions of the revolutionary period -- 1.3: The French Constitutions of the second post-war period -- 1.4: The debate on the legal nature of the Preamble -- 1.5: Fraternité and constitutional jurisprudence -- 1.6: Concluding considerations -- Chapter II: Rethinking Legality in Contemporary Legal "Space": A "Bridge" between Theory and Practice -- 2.1: Challenges and complexities of today's law: The scope of the research -- 2.2: A key to interpretation and a "privileged" observatory towards a "relational" paradigm from the Italian Constitution -- 2.3: Relationships and genesis of the offense: Criminal law perspectives -- 2.4: Legality as a principle and as a "value": A constitutional reading "beyond" the crisis -- 2.4.1: Principles in criminal law -- 2.4.2: Phenomena of criminality -- 2.4.3: A constitutional perspective -- 2.5: Towards a culture of legality: Needs for safeguards and scope of prevention -- 2.6: Models of responsibility and the "network" of relationships: The emblematic case of economic activities -- 2.7: Towards the "roots" of legality: New pathways and "spaces" of fraternity -- Chapter III: Fraternity and Common Law: Liability for "Failure to Provide Aid" -- 3.1: How does the principle of fraternity fit into Common Law? Solidarity, brotherhood and fraternity in the Anglo-American legal debate -- 3.2: Fraternity and legal duty to provide aid in Common Law -- 3.2.1: "The Neighbour Principle" and the duty to aid in English law -- 3.2.2: The "Good Samaritan Statutes" in the U.S.A.