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While research on the influence of divided government upon legislative outputs is available, relatively little identifies the effects of divided government on legislative control of bureaucratic discretion. Some suggest that inter‐branch conflict between the President and Congress leads legislators to seek to retain legislative control over the bureaucracy. As a result, periods of divided government increase statutory control and reduce agency autonomy. Close examination of statutes creating each federal agency between 1946 and 1997 reveal that divided government increases specificity of statutory control. In addition, the particular type of divided government involving split partisan control between the chambers of Congress fosters greater specific statutory control when new government agencies are created.

"Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs." ; At head of title: 95th Congress, 2d session. Committee print. ; Bibliography: p. 169-175. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Legal restrictions on executive branch agency use of funds for public relations activities and propaganda can be found in statutory law, appropriations law, and federal regulations. Nevertheless, executive agencies frequently expend public funds to promote aggressively the agendas of presidents. The legal restraints against propaganda have proven ineffective for three reasons: first, agencies do not track spending on public relations activities, which makes congressional oversight difficult; second, the line between appropriate public relations activities and propaganda is blurry; and, third, enforcement of the laws against propaganda runs headlong into the separation of powers.

This study uses Anthony Downs's well-known typology of bureaucratic roles (climbers, conservers, advocates, zealots, and statesmen) as a theoretical template to examine the roles of political appointees and career executives serving in Washington, D.C. during the Reagan administration. Officials were asked to rank various personal goals in a 1987 survey. Political appointees were more likely to endorse climber (career advancement) and zealot (policy promotion) goals. Career executives were more likely to endorse advocate (support for the organization) responses. Notably, both political and career officials ranked zealot and statesman goals highly, suggesting that each group gains significant psychic income from supporting policies they believe in and from serving their country. Furthermore, each group was relatively unlikely to endorse conserver options, suggesting that those who reach the highest rungs of the civil service, whether political or career, are not motivated by job security or a limited workload.

The Art of Policymaking: Tools, Techniques and Processes in the Modern Executive Branch, Second Edition is a practical introduction to the specific tools, techniques, and processes used to create policy in the executive branch of the U.S. government. George E. Shambaugh, IV and Paul Weinstein, Jr. explain how government officials develop policy, manage the policymaking process, and communicate those policies to stakeholders and the public at large. The authors draw on both their academic and government experience to provide real-world advice on writing policy decision memos, preparing polling questions, and navigating the clearance process. An abundance of case studies show how actual policies are developed and how and why policies and processes differ across administrations. Finally, practice scenarios allow students to apply the tools and techniques they have learned by working through both domestic and foreign policy situations.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Info -- Contents -- Chapter 1 Becoming President -- Chapter 2 Government Branches -- Chapter 3 Bills -- Chapter 4 Chief Executive -- Chapter 5 Foreign Policy -- Chapter 6 Commander In Chief -- Glossary -- Learn More About Government -- Index/Photo Acknowledgments -- Back Cover

In his April 15, 2011, signing statement President Barack Obama implied that, as president, he may suspend laws, or portions of laws, and that he is not controlled by statutory language that interferes with his ability to receive advice from White House aides or other executive branch officials. This article analyzes the claim that presidents have the prerogative to wall themselves and their aides off from statutory direction and controls, and concludes that there is no constitutional or legal basis for such an understanding of the executive power.