Suchergebnisse

Россия — одно из важнейших государств мира, а тем самым русский язык занимает высокое место в списке самых востребованных языков. Цель настоящей дипломной работы — исследовать важность русского языка и русской культуры для стран Европейского союза. Благодаря историческим, географическим и культурным связям, в некоторых странах, особенно в Прибалтике и на Балканах, проживает сравнительно большое число русскоговорящих, а эти страны ориентированы на интеграцию русского языка в своё общество. Более того, по всему Европейскому союзу доступно изучение русского языка и русской культуры. Помимо семейных обстоятельств, главной мотивацией изучения русского языка является бизнес, поскольку растёт спрос на русскоговорящее население — работников в сфере туризма. С другой стороны, русский всё ещё главным образом имеет статус языка национального меньшинства, что ставит его в более низкое положение, чем официальные языки Европейского союза. Таким образом, в большинстве случаев им не пользуются в работе европейских институтов. Однако благодаря стремлению продолжать хорошие дипломатические отношения между Россией и Европейским союзом, а также сильным экономическим и торговым отношениям, мы предполагаем, что русский язык в Европейском союзе ждёт светлое будущее. ; Rusija je jedno od najsnažnijih gospodarstava na svijetu, a samim time već dugi niz godina ruski jezik zauzima visoko mjesto na listi najtraženijih jezika. Svrha ovog diplomskog rada je istražiti važnost ruskog jezika i ruske kulture u zemljama Europske Unije. Zbog povijesnih, geografskih i kulturnih veza u nekim zemljama, posebice na Baltiku i Balkanu, prebiva znatno veći broj ruskih govornika te su te zemlje orijentiranije na integraciju ruskog jezika u svoje društvo. Nadalje, diljem Europske Unije nude se mogućnosti učenja ruskog jezika i upoznavanja ruske kulture. Osim obiteljskih razloga, glavna motivacija učenja ruskog jezika često je upravo ona poslovna, budući da je ruski sve traženiji za potrebe turizma i poslovne suradnje. S druge strane, još uvijek primarno ima status jezika manjine, što ga stavlja u nižu poziciju od službenih jezika Europske Unije te se kao takav u većini slučajeva ne koristi u radu europskih institucija. Ipak, zahvaljujući nastojanjima da se održe dobri diplomatski odnosi između Rusije i Europske Unije, kao i snažnim ekonomskim i trgovinskim odnosima, čini se kako ruski jezik u Europskoj Uniji čeka svjetla budućnost. ; Russia is one of the world's most powerful economies, which has consequently placed Russian at the top of the list of most required languages for a long period of years. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the importance of Russian language and culture for the countries of the European Union. Due to historical, geographical and cultural ties certain countries, especially in the Baltics and the Balkans, have a significantly higher number of Russian speakers, and they are more orientated toward integrating Russian language into their society. Furthermore, possibilities for learning Russian language and culture can be found all over the European Union. The main motivation for learning Russian language, apart from family reasons, is business, given that there is an increased demand for Russian speakers in the tourism sector. On the other hand, Russian is still primarily categorized as a minority language, which places it in a lower position than the official languages of the European Union and thus it is generally not used in the work of european institutions. However, thanks to the efforts to maintain good diplomatic relations between Russia and the European Union, as well as strong economic and trade relations, it seems that a bright future awaits Russian within the European Union.

This study intends to provide a descriptive-analytical inventory of models and policies that Lithuania are using with regard to recruitment, selection and training of statutory officers. For statutory officer ranks, it is compulsory that the applicant have a diploma from a university or a diploma recognized by the Lithuanian state in case they have graduated from a university outside Lithuania. While the idea of university education for statutory officers was first proposed many years ago, there is still no consensus about what officer's professionalism actually means. While the idea of university education for statutory officers is supported by both police and state border guard managers and academics, in principle, the body of knowledge in policing is still being developed. The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Russia is in a war state against Ukraine now. Practically Russia is in a state of war against Europe. It is a very important in aspect of Lithuanian national security. The primary interests of the Republic of Lithuania are: viability of NATO and the EU, security, democracy and welfare of all states of the Euro-Atlantic community. The external risks, dangers and threats which must be given particular attention by the institutions ensuring national security are as follows: economic and energy dependence (energy, transport, finances and crediting); crime and shadow economy, international organized crime and other cross-border crimes – human trafficking, smuggling, illicit trade in drugs, arms, dual-use items, money laundering, illegal immigration, cyber-crime and other criminal acts. The police and state border guard officers must be professional in order to do their tasks professionally. The article strives to disclose the higher statutory officer's education at the Faculty of Public Security Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania. The trends and developments in higher state border guard officer's education in Lithuania have generally confirmed the principal challenges identified in the Bologna Declaration – standardizes and integrates the Lithuanian education in the European Higher Education Area. This paper is part of a larger study into university education for the police and state border guard officer's managers and presents the preliminary findings of the study. ; Šiuo metu Pasaulyje vyksta grėsmingi pokyčiai kuriems būdinga dinamiška nusistovėjusių tarptautinių santykių sistemos transformacija. Rusija yra karinio konflikto su Ukraina iniciatorė bei grasina kitoms Europos valstybėms. Tai labai svarbus aspektas Lietuvos nacionaliniam saugumui. Išoriniams pavojams ir grėsmėms nacionaliniam šalies saugumui turi būti skiriamas ypatingas dėmesys institucijų, užtikrinančių nacionalinį saugumą. Turi būti stiprinama kova su nusikalstamumu (šalies viduje ir tarptautiniu organizuotu lygiu), šešėline ekonomika, kontrabanda, neteisėta prekyba narkotikais, ginklais, pinigų plovimu, nelegalia imigracija, elektroniniais nusikaltimais ir su kitomis nusikalstamomis veikomis. Policijos ir Valstybės sienos apsaugos pareigūnai turi būti profesionalūs, siekdami atlikti pavestas užduotis tinkamai. Tik nuo tinkamai parengto statutinio pareigūno priklauso visos šalies teisėtvarkos politikos sėkmė. Tampa akivaizdu, kad universitetinis išsilavinimas yra statutinio pareigūno privalumas. Tai siejasi su pasikeitusiomis nusikaltimų tendencijomis, jaunesnių ir žiauresnių nusikaltėlių gausėjimu, grupuočių valdomų narkotikų platinimo sudėtingų tinklų atsiradimu, teroristinių išpuolių ir tarptautinio nusikalstamumo bei nusikaltimų, vykdomų panaudojant sudėtines technologijas, išplitimu. Piliečiai iš statutinių institucijų reikalauja daugiau įvairesnių nusikalstamumo prevencijos paslaugų, didesnės atskaitomybės ir efektyvaus darbo. Straipsnyje pagrindžiama nuostata, kad, rengiant šiuolaikinius statutinius pareigūnus, nepakanka vien tik profesinio mokymo, formuojančio specialiuosius įgūdžius, o būtina jiems suteikti galimybę įgyti aukštąjį išsilavinimą. Konstatuotina, kad racionalus profesinių įgūdžių formavimas universitete atsispindės būsimoje statutinių pareigūnų veikloje. Straipsnyje siekiama išryškinti universitetinio lavinimo svarbą rengiant statutinius pareigūnus Mykolo Romerio universiteto Viešojo saugumo fakultete.

This article discusses the Russian theorists' approach to information warfare, its applicability to regain the Soviet Union "lost territories". Reviewed is the juridical background to consolidate the electronic media in the hands of the Russian government. The process of elimination alternative political opinions in Russia is reviewed. Discussed are the thoughts of Russian information warfare theorists about the media used to collect the areas considered as their own. The ways how the media can create the imaginary reality are examined. Russia's state-controlled information space overcomes Russian boundaries and enters the global information space.The information war is not a very new phenomenon. The current military affairs have been led by information war activities. Protests against the former Ukrainian president Viktor Janukovich started in late 2013 and concluded in the open revolt and overthrow of the existing regime. Discontent with such events, Russia brutally intervened in the internal Ukrainian affairs, occupied and annexed the Crimean peninsula, then provoked mutiny in estern Ukrainian regions. The war broke out, and the Russian media have been exploited to legitimize Kremlin's and separatists actions.The purpose of the article is, by using analytical and comparative methods, to scrutinize the information war problematic in Russian's works. Information space exploitation is a crucial Russian politics' part. The consolidated and censored internal Russian media space is designed to consolidate society to support nationalistic and imperialistic Moscow ambitions and to prevent other than Kremlin ideas' circulation. The information war is used to penetrate into the former Soviet Union republics' media space, to form the media agenda, and to shape, now independent from Russia states societies' views. Even more, Russia creates channels for non-Russian speakers to attract them to their side. The Russian media directly or by exploiting close relationships with Moscow business, construct the image of the favourable reality. The complicated social problems have led us to the fact that decision currently is made on the media supplied facts' preferences. The perceptions of ideas is constructed in the information war twilight.The article also draws attention to fact that Lithuania is abjectly prepared to react to the external information war threat from Russia. Russia wisely uses the EU legislation loops into the penetrate to Lithuanian media space and to guarantee the EU law protection and contrary to Russia internally wiped out media field from the non-Kremlin-controlled media. The juridical posed law makes obstacles for foreign capital to invest in the Russian media. And the media which get grants from abroad is claimed to be foreign agents. Lithuania is very concerned about the information war influence on society, but the internal media business practices, the principles of electronic media regulations, and being so late to react do not allow to take effective contra measures. Lithuania has successfully intergraded into political, military, and economic western alliances, but not to the western media space. This fact allows Russia still to fight for Lithuanian hearts and souls. ; Straipsnio objektas – informacinis karas ir Rusijos teoretikų bei norminių dokumentų požiūris į minėtą reiškinį. Straipsnyje aptariamas Rusijos teoretikų požiūris į informacinį karą, šio karo pritaikymas atsikovoti po Sovietų sąjungos žlugimo prarastas teritorijas. Apžvelgiamos Rusijos valdžios rankose esančios elektroninės žiniasklaidos konsolidavimo teisinės prielaidos, alternatyvios politinės nuomonės eliminavimo procesas Rusijoje. Aptariamos Rusijos informacinio karo teoretikų mintys apie medijų naudojimą "susigrąžinant savomis laikomas teritorijas". Nagrinėjama, kaip žiniasklaidos priemonėmis galima sukurti tariamą realybę. Rusijos valdžios kontroliuojama informacinė erdvė peržengia rusų kalbos ribas ir nusitaiko į globalią informacinę erdvę. Apžvelgiama, kaip Rusija, vykdydama informacinio karo veiksmus, pasinaudoja Europos Sąjungos elektroninės žiniasklaidos reguliavimo spragomis.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in 2001 in Shanghai, with PR China, The Russian Federation, The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, The Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan as members, and India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers, is new, but very important security and economic organizational frame in Central and East Asia. During the last six years of its existence the Organization grew stronger, as well as the development of relations among the member states in numerous fields - from border demarcation issues and common border surveillance, common response to traditional and non-traditional security threats, to political cooperation, co-op in culture, education, trade agriculture, transportation, transport infrastructure, investment especially in the field of exploration, exploitation and transit of oil and gas. With the growing influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a successful framework for the confidence building in the region, development of various ways of cooperation, firstly economic and security ones, but on the principles of the equal footing and respect for differences among cultures and models and paths of development of its members, influence and respect for the Organization has been growing in the region and globally. Since the strong presence of the USA and NATO in the region, especially since the invasion of Afghanistan, the role of the SCO has significantly changed and been challenged. So far, it has found the way to respond through deepening its cooperation and building its institutional base. Nonetheless due to the exceptional geopolitical sensitivity of the region, numerous inherited and existing contradictions, the Organization, beyond its huge economic perspective, especially in the fields of energy, traffic infrastructure and trade, has to count on serous limitations and challenges in its future. On the other hand, it has already become security, political and economic factor in the region, counted on by all the other regional and global geopolitical players. ; Šangajska organizacija za saradnju (ŠOS), osnovana 2001. godine u Šangaju čije su članice NR Kina, Rusija, Kazahstan, Kirgistan, Tadžikistan i Uzbekistan, a posmatrači: Iran, Indija, Mongolija i Pakistan, nov je, ali i izuzetno značajan bezbednosno-ekonomski oblik organizovanja u centralnoj i istočnoj Aziji. Tokom šest godina postojanja došlo je do jačanja Organizacije, kao i razvoja odnosa između svih članica u brojnim oblastima - od utvrđivanja međudržavnih razgraničenja i zajedničkog nadgledanja granice zajedničkog odgovora na tradicionalne i netradicionalne bezbednosne pretnje političke saradnje, saradnje u oblasti kulture, obrazovanja, do trgovine poljoprivrede, transporta, transportne infrastrukture, investicija, a naročito u oblasti istraživanja, eksploatacije i prenosa nafte i gasa. S rastom uticaja Šangajske organizacija za saradnju kao uspešnog okvira za izgradnju poverenja u regionu, razvijanje brojnih vidova saradnje, a najpre ekonomske i bezbednosne, na principima ravnopravnosti i uvažavanja različitosti kultura i modela i puteva razvoja članica, rastao je i njen ugled u regionu i globalno. Od snažnog prisustva SAD i NATO u regionu naročito od invazije na Avganistan, uloga ŠOS je doživela značajan preobražaj, ali i jedan od najvećih izazova, na koji je, zasad, našla načina da odgovori kroz produbljivanje saradnje i izgradnju institucionalnog okvira. Ipak, s obzirom na izuzetnu geopolitičku osetljivost regiona, brojne nasleđene i postojeće protivrečnosti, Organizacija, pored izuzetne ekonomske perspektive, naročito u oblasti energenata, saobraćajne infrastrukture i trgovine, u svom budućem razvoju mora da računa i s ozbiljnim ograničenjima i izazovima. S druge strane, ona je već postala bezbednosni, politički i ekonomski faktor u regionu, na koji svaki od prisutnih aktera regionalnih ali i globalnih geopolitičkih dešavanja računa.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in 2001 in Shanghai, with PR China, The Russian Federation, The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, The Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan as members, and India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers, is new, but very important security and economic organizational frame in Central and East Asia. During the last six years of its' existence the Organization grew stronger, as well as development of relations among the member states in numerous fields - from border demarcation issues and common border surveillance, common respond to traditional and non-traditional security threats, to political cooperation, co-op in culture, education, trade agriculture, transportation, transport infrastructure, investment, especially in the field of exploration, exploitation and transit of oil and gas. With the growing influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as successful framework for the confidence building in the region, development of various ways of cooperation, firstly economic and security ones, but on the principles of the equal footing and respect for differences among cultures and models and paths of development of its' members, influence and respect for the Organization has been growing in the region and globally. Since the strong presence of the USA and NATO in the region, especially since the invasion of Afghanistan, the role of the SCO has significantly changed, and been challenged. So far, it has found the way to respond through deepening its' cooperation and building its' institutional base. Nonetheless, because of the exceptional geopolitical sensitivity of the region, numerous inherited and existing contradictions, the Organization, beyond its huge economic perspective, especially in the fields of energy, traffic infrastructure and trade, has to count on serous limitations and challenges in its' future. On the other hand, it has already become security, political and economic factor in the region, counted on by all the other regional and global geopolitical players. ; Šangajska organizacija za saradnju (ŠOS), osnovana 2001. godine u Šangaju čije su članice NR Kina, Rusija, Kazahstan, Kirgistan, Tadžikistan, i Uzbekistan, a posmatrači: Iran, Indija, Mongolija i Pakistan, nov je, ali i izuzetno značajan bezbednosno-ekonomski oblik organizovanja u Centralnoj i istočnoj Aziji. Tokom šest godina postojanja došlo je do jačanja Organizacije, kao i razvoja odnosa između svih članica u brojnim oblastima - od utvrđivanja međudržavnih razgraničenja i zajedničkog nadgledanja granice zajedničkog odgovora na tradicionalne i netradicionalne bezbednosne pretnje političke saradnje, saradnje u oblasti kulture, obrazovanja, do trgovine poljoprivrede, transporta, transportne infrastrukture, investicija, a naročito u oblasti istraživanja, eksploatacije i prenosa nafte i gasa. Sa rastom uticaja Šangajske organizacija za saradnju kao uspešnog okvira za izgradnju poverenja u regionu, razvijanje brojnih vidova saradnje, a najpre ekonomske i bezbednosne, na principima ravnopravnosti i uvažavanja različitosti kultura i modela i puteva razvoja članica rastao je i njen ugled u regionu i globalno. Od snažnog prisustva SAD i NATO u regionu, naročito od invazije na Avganistan, uloga ŠOS je doživela značajan preobražaj, ali i jedan od najvećih izazova, na koji je, za sada našla načina da odgovori kroz produbljivanje saradnje i izgradnju institucionalnog okvira. Ipak, s obzirom na izuzetnu geopolitičku osetljivost regiona, brojne nasleđene i postojeće protivrečnosti, Organizacija, pored izuzetne ekonomske perspektive, naročito u oblasti energenata, saobraćajne infrastrukture i trgovine, u svom budućem razvoju mora da računa i sa ozbiljnim ograničenjima i izazovima. Sa druge strane, ona je već postala bezbednosni, politički i ekonomski faktor u regionu, na koji svaki od prisutnih aktera regionalnih, ali i globalnih geopolitičkih dešavanja računa.

The main transformation courses in Serbia and its capital have been portrayed covering the period of the 19th century's last three decades, i.e. the aftermath of the partial national liberation from the centuries lasting Turkish occupation. Political and economic changes in the princedom and later the kingdom of Serbia prompted the capital's swift transformation and the construction of numerous edifices, especially those accommodating government or public institutions. The construction of the Royal Theatre several Ministries, schools, hotels and other public edifices brought to the capital the new building spirit clearly influenced by the European historic style architecture. Through a chronological overview of the major stateowned and public edifices construction and their architectural form analyses, some key characteristics of this period's architecture in Serbia have been elucidated, with reference to some authors` importance and their relationship with the European building art. The emphasis is put on the reflection of certain phases, which the architectural form had undergone at the end of the 19th century. The changes became manifest through the permanent enrichment of the architectural expression and the construction advancement, thereby achieving the European centers standing. The creation of closer links with the adjacent neighborhoods, namely Zemun and Pancevo and subsequently with the broader European surroundings, particularly Budapest and Vienna, where most of the authors came from, introduced the European academic architecture spirit into Serbian architecture. However, in the first period, analysed in part one of this study, by the end of the 60s and during the 70s of the 19th century, because of adverse political and economic times, only a fairly small number of public edifices were built. Distinguished are the Theatre at the Stambol Gate, the new hotel at the Serbian Crown, and the hotel Russia, in whose formal expression the transitional phase characteristics might be discerned. Under the influence of the academic neo-renaissance, this period's essential trait was the interweaving of the new formal elements with the motifs of the previous romantic epoch. ; U radu su prikazani osnovni tokovi preobražaja Srbije i njene prestonice u poslednje tri decenije 19. veka, nakon ostvarivanja delimičnog nacionalnog oslobođenja posle viševekovne turske vlasti. Političke i ekonomske promene u Kneževini, kasnije Kraljevini, Srbiji uticale su na ubrzani urbani preobražaj prestonice i izgradnju velikog broja novih građevina, posebno za smeštaj državnih i društvenih ustanova. Izgradnja Pozorišta, Kraljevog dvora, brojnih ministarstava, škola, hotela i drugih javnih zdanja donela je u srpsku prestonicu novi duh graditeljstva, koji je bio pod neposrednim uticajem evropske arhitekture istorijskih stilova. Kroz hronološki prikaz izgradnje najznačajnijih državnih i društvenih građevina i analizu njihovog arhitektonskog oblikovanja, u radu se izlažu osnovne karakteristike srpske arhitekture posmatranog perioda, značaj pojedinih autora i njihov odnos prema tadašnjem evropskom graditeljstvu. Težnja je bila da se jasnije sagledaju određene faze kroz koje je prošlo arhitektonsko oblikovanje krajem 19. veka. Promene su se manifestovale kroz stalno obogaćivanje arhitektonskog izraza i unapređenje izvođenja, što je rezultiralo dostizanjem nivoa razvijenih evropskih centara. Uspostavljanje neposrednijih veza sa najbližim susedstvom, Zemunom i Pančevom, a zatim i širim evropskim okruženjem, posebno Peštom i Bečom, odakle su dolazili autori ovih zdanja, unosi u srpsku arhitekturu duh evropske akademske arhitekture. Međutim, u prvom periodu, koji se analizira u prvom delu rada, krajem šezdesetih i tokom sedamdesetih godina 19. veka, zbog loših političkih i ekonomskih prilika, izgrađen je mali broj javnih zdanja. Izdvajaju se Pozorište na Stambol kapiji, novi hotel Kod srpske krune i hotel Rusija, u čijem oblikovanju uočavamo karakteristike prelaznog perioda, kod koga se prožimaju novi oblikovni elementi pod uticajem akademske neorenesansne arhitekture s motivima karakterističnim za prethodnu, romantičarsku, epohu.

Rad analizira prilike u Persiji tokom vladavine poslednjih vladara iz dinastije Safavida. Slabljenje Persije nastojala je da iskoristi Rusija i osvoji delove Kaspijskog regiona, a iste namere imalo je i Osmansko carstvo. Istraživanje je zasnovano na neobjavljenim britanskim izvorima, odnosno službenim izveštajima ambasadora Velike Britanije u Istanbulu Abrahama Stanjana. Ova arhivska građa vlasništvo je Nacionalnog arhiva u Londonu (The National Archives, London)i nalazi se u seriji State Papers, fondu 97 (Turkey), fascikli n°24. Uz to, izveštaji doprinose sveobuhvatnijem sagledavanju pitanja koja se odnose na trgovinsku razmenu Velike Britanije sa tim delom sveta. Osim diplomatskih arhivskih dokumenata, u istraživanju je kao izvor korišćena i ondašnja štampa (The Monthly Mercury), kao i rezultati savremene istoriografije, prvenstveno britanske i ruske. ; The crisis which at the beginning of the 18th century caught Persia strengthened the aspirations of its neighbors, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, in regard to certain parts of its territory. The ascent of Persia in the era of Safavid contributed to the production of raw silk, which made it a major exporter of raw and processed silks of the finest quality. This was the main reason why some European countries (England, France and the Netherlands) established permanent diplomatic and trade relations with Persia. With several decades of delay, a new competitor appeared in that field, Russia, which in the middle of the 17th century was seriously interested in joining this trade, but by its own model. The British East India Company, which opened the factories in the most important centers of silk production, established by the benefits it gained a certain degree of monopoly on its exports directly from the territory of Persia. Although in certain periods the Porte was leading a protectionist policy to ban the export of Persian Silk through its territories, it did not succeed in it precisely because of the demand of the European market for the merchandise. Silk and raw yarn exported from Persia to the Ottoman Empire became the object of the trade of European Levant companies (English, French, and Dutch). The interests which the European trading companies placed in the course of events in the Ottoman Empire and in Persia took on the mark of serious diplomatic activities, which used various means to achieve political pressure. The initial phase of the disintegration of the Safavid state found its place in British diplomatic sources. The significance of these archival sources can be seen in the fact that they offer a different point of view it shows the realities in Persia in the period from 1721 to 1723, while presenting plenty of new data. The British diplomatic mission in the Ottoman Empire, led by Ambassador Abraham Stanyan, had a series of justifications to monitor developments in the Caspian and Caucasus regions, fearing that they would influence the fall of the British exchange with those areas. Due to the ambitions of Russia to divert to its territory parts of the trade route where the exchange of silk took place, the Levant Company would have become the most damaged side, which additionally influenced Stanyan to engage in the defense of British trade interests. Diplomacy, as a rule, played a role in normalizing relations in Persia, but its mechanisms of pressure, which it employed, proved insufficiently strong to prevent the Russian army from attacking Dagestan and Georgia, as well as the breakthrough of the Ottoman army in Persia. Attempting to neutralize the actions of French Ambassador Marquise de Bonacca, Stanyan sought to closely moni­tor developments in Persia and respond in a timely manner. In doing so, he was aided by the privileged position in the diplomatic corps in Istanbul, which British diplomats gained in successful mediation during the negotiations in Sremski Karlovci in 1699 and Požarevac in 1718, which was contrary to the principles of Russian diplomacy, which did not trust the Great Britain and its representatives in the Ottoman state and Persia.

International relations are developed among states by using various methods and under different conditions. State leaders, governing techniques, cultural and historical background define relations among neighbouring countries and on global scale. In order to better understand how countries create their relations and why they choose different cooperation types, it could be analysed through examples of specific states. This master thesis is designed to discuss German foreign policy during the tenure of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Germany is chosen as the main research country since its considered as the leader in the region. Two types of cooperation – bilateral and strategic – are analysed. France and Russia are chosen as bilateral partners, while strategic agreements are reviewed between Germany, China and Brazil. These cases have been chosen based on their leading positions in Europe, Asia and Latin America. This paper aims to reveal how Germany is developing its bilateral relations and what importance it attaches to strategic partners. Also, what type of cooperation for Germany is more politically and economically beneficial. The most important documents for the study are partnership agreements, which lay down the areas of cooperation. Media outlets show real results of cooperation. Attention is drawn to expert opinion on possible future tendencies in German foreign policy. Object of the research – the comparison of German bilateral cooperation and strategic partnerships during the tenure of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Research aim – to determine which type of cooperation – bilateral relations or strategic partnership – is more beneficial for Germany. While analyzing theoretical assumptions, analysis of scientific literature is performed. Legal document analysis is carried out in order to identify areas of cooperation set out in bilateral and strategic partnership documents. Discourse analysis identifies how political dialogue between the parties is carried out, as well as how the strategic partnership agreements are implemented in real political life. After comparing the development of political dialogue and economic cooperation, it has been noted that greater differences from the German side are perceived towards each country than based on the type of partnership. Political dialogue is most actively developed with bilateral partner France. There is consensus on most of the issues at both EU level and during the leaders' meetings. Economic cooperation is most beneficial in China's case. China remains the main importing country and the third export country for Germany. ; Tarptautiniai santykiai tarp šalių vystomi įvairiais metodais ir įvairiomis sąlygomis. Valstybių vadovai, valdymo būdas, kultūrinis ir istorinis palikimas lemia ryšius tiek su kaimyninėmis šalimis, tiek globaliu mastu. Norint geriau suprasti, kaip šalys kuria tarpvalstybinius santykius, kodėl pasirenka vienus ar kitus bendradarbiavimo būdus, galima tirti per konkrečių šalių pavyzdžius. Šis baigiamasis magistro darbas skirtas aptarti Vokietijos užsienio politikos kryptis kanclerės Angelos Merkel vadovavimo laikotarpiu. Kaip pagrindinė tyrimo šalis pasirinkta Vokietija, pripažįstama Europos regiono lydere. Tyrimui pasirinkti du bendradarbiavimo tipai – dvišalis ir strateginis. Kaip dvišalės partnerės nagrinėjamos Prancūzija ir Rusija, o strateginės sutartys apžvelgiamos tarp Vokietijos, Kinijos ir Brazilijos. Šie atvejai pasirinkti dėl šių šalių lyderiaujančių pozicijų Europoje, Azijoje ir Lotynų Amerikoje. Darbe siekiama atskleisti, kaip Vokietija vysto dvišalius santykius ir kokia reikšmė skiriama strateginiams partneriams. Taip pat kuris bendradarbiavimo tipas Vokietijai yra naudingesnis politiškai ir ekonomiškai. Tyrimui svarbiausi partnerysčių sutarčių dokumentai, kuriuose atsiskleidžia numatytos bendradarbiavimo sritys. Taip pat žiniasklaidos priemonės, kuriose matomi realūs bendradarbiavimo rezultatai. Atkreipiamas dėmesys į ekspertų nuomonę apie galimas Vokietijos užsienio politikos ateities tendencijas. Tyrimo objektas – Vokietijos dvišalių ir strateginių partnerysčių palyginimas kanclerės Angelos Merkel vadovavimo laikotarpiu. Tyrimo tikslas – įvertinti, kuris bendradarbiavimo tipas – dvišaliai santykiai ar strateginė partnerystė – yra naudingesnis Vokietijai. Darbe, analizuojant teorines prielaidas, atliekama mokslinės literatūros analizė. Dokumentų ir teisės aktų analizė atliekama siekiant nustatyti dvišalių santykių ir strateginių partnerysčių dokumentuose išdėstytas bendradarbiavimo sritis. Diskurso analizė leidžia identifikuoti, kaip vykdomas politinis dialogas tarp šalių, taip pat, kaip strateginės partnerystės sutartys įgyvendinamos realiame politiniame gyvenime. Lyginant vystomą politinį dialogą ir ekonominį bendradarbiavimą pastebėta, kad didesni skirtumai iš Vokietijos pusės jaučiami kiekvienos šalies atžvilgiu atskirai, o ne dėl partnerystės tipo. Politiniai santykiai aktyviausiai palaikomi su dvišale partnere Prancūzija. Tiek Europos Sąjungos mastu, tiek lyderių susitikimų metu reiškiamas sutarimas dauguma klausimų. Ekonominis bendradarbiavimas naudingiausias Kinijos atveju. Kinija išlieka pagrindine importo šalimi ir trečia eksporto šalimi Vokietijai. ; Politikos mokslų ir diplomatijos fakultetas ; Politologijos katedra

In this article, the author observes and discusses the effects of Russian history on Russian music in the second half of the XXth century. Forming part of author's long-range persistent polemics against Russian exceptionalism and against the kind of romantic overvaluation of art, the article expresses sharp and provocative views of the main stylistic tendencies in Soviet and Russian music during and after the epoch of the Cold War, as well as after the Second Russian Revolution in 1991. Special attention is paid to the activity and works of the most prominent Russian composers of their time Andrey Volkonsky, Edison Denisov, Nikolai Keretnikov, Arvo Pärt, Elena Frisova, Sofia Gubaidulina and Alfred Schnittke. ; Naslov članka je, svakako, vagnerijanska (ili ničeanska) šala. Autor međutim, ne samo da ne veruje u muziku kao proročanstvo, već se, naprotiv u skorije vreme upravo posvetio borbi protiv romantičarskog precenjivanja umetnosti. O tome svedoči i njegova knjiga Muzički definisati Rusiju (Defining Russia Musically, Princeton University Press, 1997) u kojoj je između ostalog, neprekidno vodio polemiku sa ruskom "izuzetnošću". Neposredni podsticaj za oštro kritikovanje stereotipa u mišljenju i pisanju o muzici (posebno ruskoj), Taraskin nalazi u tekstu "Paradoks ruske neslobode" ("The Paradox of Russian Non-Liberty", The Musical Quarterly, 1992) Aleksandra Ivaškina, koji je poput mnogih najistaknutijih postsovjetskih muzičara nakon 1992. godine napustio Rusiju. Upozoravajući na anahronost i štetnost stereotipnih predstava o Rusiji, Orijentu i Zapadu, Taraskin ističe da svakom pokušaju muzičkog definisanja Rusije nužno prethodi definisanje klase autentičnih Rusa. Osim toga što se takvim pogledima vrši nasilje nad muzikom u njima su, što je svakako mnogo gore, sadržane i klice rasizma. "Je li tako teško", pita se Taraskin, "posmatrati muzički stil kao način ponašanja diskutovati o njemu i procenjivati ga u sprezi sa drugim formama muzičkog ponašanja kao što su izvođenje i recepcija, a ne tražiti u njemu takozvanu emanaciju suštine?" Prateći, potom, razvojne tokove sovjetske i ruske muzike u drugoj polovini XX veka, autor posebno pažljivo registruje momente prodora i usvajanja zapadnoevropske avangarde i identifikuje političke i ideološke aspekte recepcije novih strujanja kako u Rusiji, tako i na Zapadu. Tako su na primer, u decenijama Hladnog rata, serijalne kompozicije Andreja Volkonskog (Plač Šasi), Edisona Denisova (Sunce Inka) i Alfreda Šnitkea (Pianissimo za orkestar) bile na obe strane pozdravljane kao muzički vesnici disidenstva. No, apstraktni i akademski serijalni model nije dugo zadržao prestiž u Sovjetskom savezu, čak ni među disidentima koji su početkom 60-tih muzičku scenu shvatali kao poprište političke bitke, a ni kasnije kada je izgubio primat čak i na Zapadu. Promene zvaničnog sovjetskog kursa jasno uočljive tokom sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina, donele su, na primer, afirmaciju Nikolaju Karetnjikovu i Arvu Pertu. Prvi od njih, vođen nepogrešivim instinktom za uspeh, komponuje crkvenu muziku u modernističkom stilu, dok Pert, prethodno odbacivši "hladnoratovski" (to jest dvanaestotonski) prtljag, svoj arhaizam usmerava ka vitalnijem savremenom diskursu. Priključivši se redovima New Agea, Pert postaje najpopularniji postsovjetski autor u svetu. Sredinom 80-tih godina, kompozicije predstavnika tada mlade generacije sovjetskih autora bile su alarmantno slične; uzorno uglačana i nezaustavljiva u pokretu sličnom baroknoj motoričnosti, ova dela povezivala je i pripadnost takozvanom novom folklornom talasu. Identifikujući u ovim tendencijama jasne simptome neo-nacionalizma, Taraskin ističe da je početkom 90-tih ipak bio svedok i početka jednog drugačije usmerenog toka ruske muzike, oličenog u delima Elene Firsove i Sofije Gubajduline. Izrasla na podlozi poznih kvarteta Šostakoviča i novijih radova Galine Ustvolske, muzika dveju autorki govori o njihovom naporu da izbegnu varljivu raspričanost neposredne muzičke prošlosti. Na drugačiji način reagovao je Aleksandar Knaifl, koji se proslavio po efektu kombinovanja hermetičnog, stidljivog, takoreći mucajućeg kompozitorskog govora i dilatiranog muzičkog vremena (njegov kvartet Agnus Dei traje puna dva i po sata!). Kada je, pak, o Šnitkeu reč, Taraskin smatra da nema smisla Šnitkeovoj "polistilističnosti", to jest njegovom stilskom eklekticizmu dodeljivati pomodnu etiketu "postmoderne". "To je jednostavno post-izam (post-ism), post-svegizam (post-everythingism), podsećanje na zastrašujući svet Dostojevskog u kome nema Boga, u kome je sve moguće i gde više ništa nije bitno." Iako je nakon Druge revolucije 1991. godine u Rusiji nastupila duboka promena koja je obećavala duh oslobađanja, u muzici počinje da deluje program nihilizma, prepoznatljiv po nostalgiji za "lošim starim vremenima". Komentarišući Ivaškinove reči da je "Rusija postala nova država, ali da u njoj, uprkos slobodi, nešto nedostaje", Taraskin veruje da to što mnogim nostalgičnim Rusima nedostaje jesu heroizam, tragičnost, pa i sama tiranija koja provocira otpor. Osuđujući Ivaškinove poglede kao puko "romantičarenje" izraslo na podlozi ideje da umetnost ne može cvetati u demokratiji i istovremeno, deleći uverenje po kome je "umetnost samo jedan luksuz u životu a osnovni su poštenje, razum i pravda" (Stendal), kao i ono po kome "muzika ostavlja najdublji pečat na ljude koji nisu u stanju ili nemaju pravo da raspravljaju" (Niče), Taraskin zaključuje da bi u svetu, pod određenim uslovima, jednog dana možda i moglo biti moguće imati i veliku umetnost, ali takođe i - poštenje, razum i pravdu.

Since the beginning of the 20th century un­til now, there have been several key issues to indicate why the restitution from Russia to Lithuania of the Vilnius Museum of Antiqui­ties (1855–1865) collections that were removed by Tsarist Russian authorities to the Moscow Rumyantsev museum in 1868, and perhaps also in 1914, with other valuable collections of the Vilnius Museum under the Vilnius Public Li­brary (1867–1915), is irrecoverable, except for a small amount (286) of their total.The positions regarding the restitution of Lithuanian cultural property, including that of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, from Rus­sia is not always active enough and properly justified. Lithuania has no precise registers of the values removed from the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities to the Rumyantsev museum and other museums of Russia.The data in the information published by Russians about the amount of the values re­moved from the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities are understated.Lithuania, referring to the Peace Treaty with Russia (1920), conducted negotiations for the recovery of the Lithuanian cultural property re­moved to Russia. The expert negotiator Paulius Galaunė made significant additions to the Vilnius museum collection inventory which was published in the Antiquities Department of the Rumyant­sev Museum inventory catalog in 1906.The four, so far unpublished, registers of the values removed from the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities in 1868, sent to the Rumyantsev museum by Pompey Batiushkov, Curator of the Vilnius Educational District reveal the scale of the removal – more than 10 000 items.In the beginning of the third decade of the 20th century, negotiations between Lithuania and Russia on the return of values of the Vil­nius Museum of Antiquities failed because of the unsuccessful Polish claim to receive them and of the desire of Russians to strengthen the global importance of the Rumyantsev museum by adding values from the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities.In 1928, Poland received from the St. Pe­tersburg Hermitage one item from the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities – a marble sculptural composition depicting Jadwiga with Jagiello – which after three years was transferred from Warsaw to the Polish Friends of Science Society in Vilnius (1907–1939). The Society declared that they were successors of the traditions of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities and the Temporary Archaeology Commission, although the remains of the Vilnius Museum of Antiqui­ties collections were inherited by the Museum of Archaeology (1921–1939) at Stefan Batory University, but not by the Society.In Soviet times, the historical continuity of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections inheritance became the main pretext for its re­turn to Vilnius. In 1956, 1966 and 1968, 285 items were returned from Russia to the History and Ethnography Museum of the LSSR Acad­emy of Science (1952–1963) and the Museum of History-Ethnography of the LSSR (1963–1990). These museums were proclaimed the successors of the Vilnius Museum of Antiqui­ ties. An important predestination of the return was the social-ideological cohesion of Soviet Lithuania and the USSR, heritage funds, as well as professional efforts of the scientist and mu­seum curator Adolfas Tautavičius.After 1990, Lithuania and Russia, like a number of other countries of the world, have ac­cepted international agreements and guidelines recommended by the ICOM (International Council of Museums) Code of Professional Eth­ics which states the belonging of the collections to the locations where they were formed. How­ever, overdue of the rest of Vilnius Museum of Antiquities collections for Lithuania warns that there must be legal intergovernmental agree­ments between Russia and Lithuania on the return of cultural property to Lithuania. There is a lack of an appropriate juridical position. The agreement between Russia and the Repub­lic of Lithuania (29 07 1991) does not specify the return of cultural property from Russia to Lithuania. The mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Culture (06 07 2009) just appealed to the discovery of the cultural property illegally exported to the territory of another state.According to the Lithuanian government decrees, programs, heritage laws, resolutions that refer to the issues of return of the cultural property to Lithuania, concrete recoveries from Russia have yet not been achieved.The National Museum of Lithuania is in­terested to recover the collections of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities from the Russian Fed­eration. The Museum, which keeps about 1000 items from those collections, is the successor of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities. These items are only the remains of the collection of the Vilnius Museum of Antiquities, which were left in Vilnius by the Tsarist Russian authorities, and include also 285 items returned from Soviet Russia. ; Lietuvos kultūros tyrimų institutasSaltoniškių g. 58, LT-08105 Vilnius, LietuvaVilniaus universiteto Bibliotekininkystės irinformacijos mokslų institutasUniversiteto g. 3, LT-01513 Vilnius, LietuvaEl. paštas: nastazija.kersyte@kf.vu.ltStraipsnyje analizuojamos apie 10 000 vertybių,1855–1865 m. buvusių Vilniaus senienų muziejuje ir 1868 m. (tikėtina, ir 1914 m.) carinės Rusijos išvežtų į Rumiancevo muziejų Maskvoje. Tiriant ir vertinant šių vertybių atgavimo pastangas nuo XX a. pradžios iki šių dienų, aptariamos aplinkybės ir pateikiami argumentai, kodėl iš tų vertybių šiandien Lietuvoje yra tik 286. Iš jų 1956, 1966, 1968 metais Lietuvai grąžinta 285 vertybės ir 1928 m. Lenkijai – viena. Šioji 1931 m. sugrąžinta į Vilnių. Straipsnyje keliamos šios pagrindinės problemos: nepakankamas teisinis Lietuvos kultūros turtų restitucijos iš Rusijos pagrindimas, blogai organizuotos Lietuvos derybos su Rusija dėl kultūros vertybių susigrąžinimo, Rusijos nenoras šias vertybes atiduoti.

V dizertaciji sem poskušal raziskati, kako oskrba z energijo v vsaki od štirih svetovnih velesil (EU, ZDA, Ruski federaciji, Ljudski republiki Kitajski) vpliva na njihovo zunanjo energetsko politiko, kateri od treh elementov energetske politike (konkurenčnost, varnost oskrbe, trajnostnost) odraža zunanjo energetsko politiko teh držav in kako lahko različne regionalne iniciative iyhajajoče iz zunanje energetske politike teh držav pojasnjujemo s teorijo neofunkcionalizma. Prvo poglavje želi predstaviti neofunkcionistično teorijo kot teorijo regionalne integracije. Najprej analizira poskus Jeana Monneta za spodbujanje evropske integracije, ki so jo po drugi svetovni vojni ilustrirale Evropske skupnosti: Evropska gospodarska skupnost, Euratom in Evropska skupnost za jeklo in premog. Neofunkcionalizem je teorija, ki razlaga proces integracije na regionalni ravni glede na naraščajoče vzajemne gospodarske odnose med državami. Analizira sposobnost regionalnih organizacij za reševanje sporov in oblikovanje mednarodnih pravnih režimov, znotraj katerih lahko nadnacionalna tržna pravila nadomestijo nacionalne regulatorne režime. Integracijo pojasnjuje tudi s specializacijo elit in s pozitivnim učinkom prelitja (spill over effect), ki se kaže v nujnosti sodelovanja med sektorji, povezanimi s tistim sektorjem, v katerem se je regionalno sodelovanje prvič začelo. Drugo poglavje na kratko predstavlja 130 let zgodovine regulacije za zaščito konkurence na energetskih trgih, približno 80 let izzivov glede varnosti oskrbe in prestopa te teme v politiko ter približno 70 let stremljenja k trajnostnosti v sodobni energetski politiki. Tretje poglavje predstavlja strukturo oskrbe z energijo v vsaki od analiziranih svetovnih velesil. Očitno je, da so energetski trgi (nafta, plin, elektrika) v ZDA in EU zelo konkurenčni in učinkoviti. Velesili si prizadevata za trajnostnost in nenehno zmanjšujeta izpuste škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn, v prometu ter pri drugih dejavnostih. Medtem, ko je EU močno odvisna od uvoza (leta 2017 je uvozila več kot 55% vseh virov energije), so se ZDA v zadnjih 15 letih iz največjega uvoznika energetskih virov na svetu razvile v neto izvoznico in leta 2018 dosegle energetsko samozadostnost. Ruski indeks neto uvoza energije znaša -84%. Po podatkih iz leta 2014 je država ena največjih neto izvoznikov nafte (približno 10% svetovne proizvodnje) in plina (blizu 20% svetovne proizvodnje). Leta 2018 je bila izvožena količina energije skoraj enaka tisti, ki jo je država v tem letu porabila. Kljub energetskemu izobilju, ima Rusija močno regulirane in neučinkovite trge s plinom, nafto in električno energijo. Med štirimi analiziranimi velesilami daleč najmanj učinkovito izrablja svoje energetske vire. Monopol državnega podjetja Gazprom postaja vedno bolj vprašljiv zaradi vse manjših koristi, ki jih tako stanje prinaša Rusiji. Posledično naraščajo pritiski na Moskvo za reformo energetskega (zlasti plinskega) sektorja. Do zdaj je ruska vlada bolj ali manj odklanjala strukturne reforme in se poskušala prilagajati novim okoliščinam s prerazporejanjem obstoječih dohodkov. Kitajska počasi liberalizira svoj trg s plinom. Reforma, ki je v devetdesetih pritegnila v proizvodnjo električne energije nove, zasebne vlagatelje, je bila vmes že odpravljena, zasebni vlagatelji pa izrinjeni. Plin, premog, nafto ter proizvodnjo električne energije v glavnem nadzirajo državna podjetja, ki praviloma ne dopuščajo konkurence. Kitajska je leta 2017 porabila 22% vseh svetovnih virov energije in je bila tako daleč največji porabnik energije na vsem svetu. Kitajska izkoplje in sežge približno polovico svetovnega premoga in je tako močno netrajnostno usmerjena. Količina izpustov škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn ostaja visoka in stabilna, emisije CO2 pa se nenehno povečujejo. Se pa Kitajska v zadnjih letih veliko bolj osredotoča na storitveno ekonomijo in proizvodnjo elektrike iz obnovljivih virov. Kitajski indeks neto uvoza energije je 15%, kar kaže na zmerno odvisnost od uvoza. Četrto poglavje je namenjeno analizi zunanje energetske politike EU v globalnem kontekstu zapletenih energetskih odnosov. Energetika je že zelo dolgo politično občutljiv sektor in je kot tak tesno povezan z državno suverenostjo in nacionalnimi interesi. Posledično so se bruseljska prizadevanja za oblikovanje skupne zunanje energetske politike, ob delitvi pristojnosti z državami članicami in ob upoštevanju skrbno pripravljenega kompromisa iz člena 194 Pogodbe o delovanju EU, izkazala za zelo zahteven in težko dosegljiv cilj. Dejstvo, da je Evropska unija močno odvisna od tujih dobaviteljev energije (med katerimi ima Rusija s svojo vizijo političnim ciljem podrejene energetske politike najpomembnejšo vlogo), dodatno omejuje težnje EU po uvedbi univerzalnih tržnih pravil v energetskem sektorju. Pri promociji tržnih pravil kot osnovi energetske politike je EU vseeno uspelo doseči nekaj napredka, zlasti z ustanovitvijo Evropskega gospodarskega prostora in Energetske skupnosti. V zadnjih letih, ki jih zaznamujeta zmanjšan pomen multilateralizma in povečan pomen bilateralnih odnosov, je EU začela oblikovati svojo lastno zunanjo energetsko politiko (po moji oceni od 2015 dalje) in takoj, tako kot druge velesile, v svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko vnesla elemente dominantnosti. Neofunkcionalistična teorija, ki evropsko integracijo razlaga z učinkom prelitja, se je izkazala za uporabno tudi pri razlagi procesov oblikovanja zunanje energetske politike EU in povečane vloge in avtonomije Evropske komisije v tem procesu. Po teoriji Nye-ja o štirih stopnjah pri oblikovanju regionalne integracije EU trenutno prehaja iz tretje stopnje (redukcija alternativ) v četrto (eksternalizacija). Peto poglavje skuša pokazati kako je ameriška energetska politika skozi zgodovino doživela več sprememb. ZDA so si v začetku dvajsetega stoletja, tako kot mnogo let od krize v Sueškem prekopu sredi 70-ih let 20.stoletja, prizadevale za konkurenco, ki naj bi omogočila ustrezen dostop do virov energije s ciljem, da bi ohranile sprotno zadovoljevanje svojih energetskih potreb. Od sredine osemdesetih let je postala ameriška energetska politika bolj večstranska, z vedno večjo skrbjo glede okoljskih vprašanj, vendar sta varnost oskrbe in konkurenčnosti še vedno na prvem mestu. Medtem, ko je ameriško energetsko politiko v dvajsetem stoletju vodil strah pred pomanjkanjem energije, je tako imenovana nekonvencionalna revolucija pri pridobivanju plina in nafte iz škrilavcev v drugem desetletju enaindvajsetega stoletja spremenila odnos Washingtona do zunanje energetske politike in močno vplivala na mednarodne trge nafte in plina. Obdobje nenehno rastoče skrbi glede pridobivanja energetskih virov je tako nadomestila doba energetske obilnosti. V dobi energetske obilnosti v ZDA si je Trumpova administracija zastavila cilj, da ZDA postanejo energetsko dominantne. Zaradi tega je Trumpova administracija začela podpirati politične posege v kreacijo cen na naftnem trgu in odmik od multilateralizma, ki je poprej omogočal globalno konkurenco. Kljub temu, da so ZDA dosegle status največje svetovne proizvajalke nafte in plina, se zdi, da Washington še vedno ne odstopa od ciljev, ki jih tradicionalno zasleduje s svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko: zagotavljanje zalog na svetovnih naftnih trgih in zmanjševanje motenj pri dobavi ; spodbujanje zaveznikov, da diverzificirajo lastne energetske vire, kjer je bila Evropa v glavnem v središču prizadevanj ZDA ; in s svojo močjo kaznovati države izvoznice plina in nafte ter jim ukazati, naj spremenijo politike, z uporabo možnosti uvedbe sankcij. Uvajanje sankcij ima vse pomembnejšo vlogo v ameriški zunanji politiki, saj je vedno bolj vprašljivo, kdaj, in če sploh, uporabiti vojaško silo za politične cilje. Nova doba obilja energije ZDA omogoča, da k uvedbi sankcij pritegnejo tudi druge države ter jih tako skupaj lažje uvedejo koordinirajo. Po drugi strani pa je zelo verjetno, da bi odločitev ZDA, da izkoristijo svoj položaj energetskega dobavitelja in začnejo izvoz energije uporabljati v politične namene, lahko delovala proti njihovim lastnim interesom in zmožnosti doseganja njihovih zunanjepolitičnih ciljev. ZDA nikoli niso sodelovale v nobeni gospodarski organizaciji, ki bi omogočala prenos suverenosti glede energetske politike v roke neke nadnacionalne strukture in neofunkcionalizem v njihovi zunanji energetski politiki nima nobenega odmeva. Šesto poglavje, ki je posvečeno Rusiji, raziskuje, kako njena bogata baza energetskih virov zagotavlja davčno osnovo za državno porabo, devizne prihodke in vzvod (zlasti v primeru dobave plina) v mednarodnih odnosih. Zahvaljujoč visokim cenam nafte iz obdobja pred pandemijo COVID-19 je Rusiji uspelo obnoviti gospodarstvo in povečati svojo geopolitično trdnost. Zaradi izjemne odvisnosti od energetskih prihodkov za ruski državni proračun je neugodna kombinacija nizkih cen nafte in finančnih sankcij ZDA in EU skupaj z naraščajočo konkurenco v proizvodnji nafte in plina povzročila postopno zmanjševanje ruskega vpliva v mednarodni politiki. Rusija nima veliko možnosti, da bi v bližnji prihodnosti postala pomemben igralec na azijskih trgih. Tako se je država usmerila k širitvi in osvežitvi svojih energetskih vezi z Evropo. Kljub temu pa Moskva vzporedno s tem spodbuja svoj konkurenčni integracijski projekt Evroazijske ekonomske unije (EAEU), katerega namen je povsem nasproten cilju evropskih integracijskih projektov, po katerih se vsaj formalno zgleduje. S tem projektom želi Rusija, med drugim, v energetskem sektorju zaščiti svoj prevladujoči položaj v postsovjetskem prostoru. Kljub formalni podobnosti EAEU z EU tam ni mogoče pričakovati učinkov prelitja na nadnacionalni ravni v skladu s teorijo neofunkcionalizma, saj gre za združitev neenakopravnih partnerjev z močnim ruskim vodstvom, ki ne dovoljuje socializacije neke nove, nadnacionalne elite. Sedmo poglavje predstavlja kako je zaradi hitro rastočega gospodarstva in povečanega povpraševanja po energiji Kitajska povečevala vpliv na svetovnih energetskih trgih. Na energetsko politiko kitajske vlade je močno vplivalo vse večje povpraševanje po nafti in odvisnost države od uvoza le-te. Naftna in plinska industrija sta zaslužni za zagotavljanje oskrbe, za zadosten proračunski dohodek in tudi za delovna mesta. Kitajska državna podjetja skušajo svoje poslovanje prilagoditi svetovnim praksam, vendar je bil do sedaj njihov manevrski prostor vedno omejen z državnim nadzorom. Pod sedanjim vodstvom kitajska podjetja sodelujejo v mednarodnem prodoru z velikimi, neposrednimi naložbami. Prvi poskus takega prodora je bila iniciativa 16+1 (sedaj 17+1) [e pred sedanjim predsednikom Xi Jinpingom. Njegov prihod na oblast je sprožil še obsežnejšo iniciativo. Prosor v svetovnem merilu je bil pred kratkim zasnovan kot Iniciativa pasu in ceste (Belt and Road Initiative - BRI). Kljub temu, da v BRI sodeluje skoraj 70 držav, pomen iniciative ostaja nejasen. BRI zagotavlja zaščito kitajskih trgovskih poti in oskrbe z energijo ter omogoča državi, da svoje industrijske presežke in gradbene kapacitete učinkovito izvaža po vsem svetu. Z BRI kitajska zunanja politika prek gospodarske diplomacije poskuša povečati svoj vpliv. Ta projekt je treba razumeti kot dolgoročno, globalno iniciativo, ki nima samo gospodarskega cilja. BRI in iniciativa 17+1 sta še dve obliki mednarodnega sodelovanja, ki sta neprimerljivi s postopkom vključevanja v EU in v njiju zaradi dominantnosti Kitajske ni prelitja funkcij na nadnacionalno raven kot ga opisuje neofunkcionalistična teorija. ; In the study, I tried to explore how characteristics of energy supply in each of the four global superpowers (EU, US, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China) influences their foreign energy policy, which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, sustainability) primarily reflects it and how and if different forms of foreign energy policy regional initiatives can be explained with the theory of neofunctionalism. The first chapter aims to present the neofunctionalist theory as a theory of regional integration. It first analyzes Jean Monnet's attempts for European integration, at that time illustrated by the European Communities: European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Steel and Coal Community. Later, it was further developed to be able to explain processes like territorial growth of a regional integrated area and also processes of its shrinking, i.e. Brexit. Neofunctionalism is a theory explaining the process of integration on a regional level with reference to growing reciprocal economic relationships in-between nations. It also analyzes capacity of a regional organization in dispute resolution and creation of international legal regimes, within which the supranational market rules may replace national regulatory regimes. It explains also integration by positive spillover effects as necessities to cooperate in sectors, which are indirectly related to the sector where regional cooperation first started. I briefly present also intergovernmentalism as an alternative theory. The first chapter also briefly presents 130 years of history of regulation to protect competiveness on energy markets, some 80 years of security of supply challenges and their translation into political decisions and some 70 years of history of creation of sustainability in modern energy policy. The second chapter presents the structure of energy supply and the market structure in each of the analyzed global superpowers. It is evident that energy markets (oil, gas, electricity) in the US and the EU are highly competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards sustainability and are constantly decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as well as transport and other energy consuming activities. While the EU is highly import dependent (in 2017 imported more than 55% of all energy sources), the United States in the last 15 years developed from the biggest importer of energy sources globally into a net exporter, reaching energy self-sufficiency in 2018. Russia has a net energy imports index at -84%. It is one of the biggest net exporters of oil (some 10% of global production) and gas (close to 20% of global production), according to data from 2014. In 2018, it exported almost the same amount of energy as was consumed in the country. Despite its energy abundance, Russia has heavily regulated and inefficient gas, oil and electricity markets. Among the four analyzed superpowers, it has far the least energy efficient use of its energy resources. The position of Gazprom, which enjoys a monopoly on pipeline gas exports to Russia's neighbors, has been increasingly challenged. Consequently, pressures on Moscow to reform its energy (particularly gas) sector have been rising. So far, the Russian government has shown reluctance with regard to implementing structural reforms in its energy sector and has rather been trying to adjust, react and adapt to created circumstances. China is slowly liberalizing its gas market. Reform that attracted new private investors into electricity generation in the 1990s has backslid. Gas, coal, electricity generation and oil sectors are primarily controlled by state-owned companies and do not allow much room for competition. China in 2017 consumed 22% of all energy sources globally and was by far the biggest energy consumer worldwide. China extracts and burns around half of all coal being extracted worldwide and is heavily unsustainable. Its harmful emissions from power plants remain high and stable, while CO2 emissions are in constant ascent. However, in recent years, the country has been focusing much more on services-based economy and renewable energy. Additionally, taking into account the combination of effects of factors like structural changes in the economy, growing efficiency within the energy industry and demographic changes, total growth of the energy demand up until the year of 2040 will be comparable to the one that China experienced from 2008 to 2016. Its net energy imports index is 15% and shows moderate dependence on import. The third chapter aims at analyzing the EU's emerging foreign energy policy in a global context of imperfect energy relations. Energy, being an increasingly politicized sector, still remains closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest. Consequently, Brussels's efforts to shape a coherent foreign energy policy, while sharing competences with the Member States and taking into account the carefully drafted compromise of article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, has proved to be increasingly challenging. Moreover, Europe, being highly dependent on foreign energy suppliers (among which Russia, with its contrasting vision of energy policy, plays the most important role) has been further undermining the EU's aspirations of introducing universal, market-based norms in global energy relations. Against this backdrop, the EU managed to make some achievements in its foreign energy policy, particularly, by the means of the European Economic Area and the Energy Community, which was a successful example of what Europe aspired to achieve globally. In recent years marked by the decreased role of multilateralism and the increased role of bilateral relations, also the EU introduced elements of dominance into its foreign energy policy despite opposition to such behavior when performed by other superpowers. The neofunctionalist theory explaining European integration by spillover effect has proven to be usable also in explaining processes of creation of EU foreign energy policy in the years from 2015 on and increased role and autonomy of the European Commission in it. The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that US energy policy has gone through multiple changes throughout history. While in the beginning of the twentieth century, the US pursued competitive access to energy sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand, after the Suez Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the mid-seventies, the US energy policy became centered on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-eighties, it became much more multi-sided, with growing concern about environmental issues, yet without detriment to the importance given to security of supply and competitiveness. While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed Washington's attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted international oil and gas markets. An atmosphere of continuously growing competition for resources has, thus, been replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump's US administration has set the objective of the United States becoming energy dominant, supporting political interventions into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from multilateralism, which enabled global competition. Despite the fact that the US achieved the status of being the biggest producer of oil and gas in the world, Washington does not seem to withdraw the objectives traditionally pursued by its foreign energy policy. Namely, ensuring supplies on the global oil markets and minimizing disruptions ; encouraging allies to diversify their own energy resources, where Europe has usually been the main focus of US efforts ; and using its power to punish countries and to command them to change policies, using the possibility of imposing sanctions on gas and oil exporting nations. With latest Biden's administration US seems to reposition its focus on sustainability and multilateral cooperation again. Despite that sanctions play increasingly important role in US foreign policy, since it is more and more questionable when and if at all to deploy military force. New energy abundant age enables the US to get on board other nations to collectively impose multilateral sanctions easier than in previous times. ON the other side it is very possible that US decision to become energy dominant and start using energy exports for political purposes could work against their interests and ability to achieve their objectives. The US never participated in any economic organization that would tend to transfer sovereignty over energy policy to a supranational structure. The fifth chapter dealing with Russia explores how its vast energy resource base provides the fiscal basis for state spending, foreign exchange earnings, and leverage (especially for gas) in international relations. Thanks to the high oil prices of the pre COVID-19 pandemic decade, Russia managed to recover its economy and increase its geopolitical assertiveness. Nevertheless, due to its extreme dependence on energy revenues, following the unfavorable combination of low oil prices, financial sanctions of the West combined with the rising competition in production resulted in Russia's gradually diminishing economic leverage. Russia, with unlikely prospects to become a prominent player in Asian markets in the foreseeable future, has turned to expanding and refreshing its energy ties with Europe. Yet, in parallel, Moscow has been pushing forward its competing integrationist project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which aims to conflict and overlap with the European integrationist projects, inter alia, in the sector of energy in order to safeguard its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. Despite the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover effect since it is an association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. Country's fast-growing economy and rapid increase in energy demand has lead China to gain more influence in global energy markets. The energy policy of the Chinese government has been strongly influenced by the increasing demand for oil and country's dependence on oil imports. The oil and gas industry has remained a strategic asset for the Chinese government. This industry is responsible for ensuring supplies of oil and gas, for sufficient budget income as well as for employment. With closer integration into global markets, Chinese state-owned companies have been seeking to adapt their operations to global practices, yet, the room for maneuver has always been limited by state control. Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward direct investments. This process was recently soon packed as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fact that nearly 70 countries are participating in the BRI does not improve the perception that its label remains unclear. There is still no exact definition of the qualification of a BRI project Yet, half a decade after the launch of one of the most ambitious geo-economic projects of recent history, some more things became clearer. To name a few, BRI is not only responsible for securing China's trade routes and energy supplies, it is also accountable for the fact, that the country is being able to export worldwide several construction projects due to its industrial overcapacities. The BRI became a major component of China's grandiose foreign policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence in the BRI region and beyond. The past years have proven that the BRI project is to be understood as a long-term, global and not having only an economic goal. Yet, challenges regarding to the future success of the BRI are many and of different nature: technical, political, financial and regulatory, to name a few. Both suspicion and skepticism concerning its real motives and viability remain high, especially among those countries who have been the main designers of today's global financial system and international trade rules. The Belt and Road Initiative is yet another form of international cooperation which is incomparable with the EU integration process and neofunctionalist theory cannot be used for its explanation. The thesis confirmed that characteristics of energy supply in a country are directly and with the same attitude reflected in the foreign energy policy. Foreign energy policy is additionally held up by whichever tool of dominance being available to one of the four studied cases. The thesis also confirmed that Haas' theory of neofunctionalism is still supportive in explanation of regional integration of all initiatives proposed in and by the four global superpowers. EU is creating its own foreign energy policy entering externalization as the last, fourth stage of regional cooperation, according to Nye.

Raširenost vladajućih normi u društvu u kontekstu rata, okupacije, anarhije i preuzimanja vlasti od strane kriminalnih snaga uništava stare, ali postavlja nove norme, koje takođe mogu biti odbačene. Anomija se može opisati kao nukleus društva, kao vrsta "pulsirajuće moralne destrukcije" koju niko ne kontroliše, ali koja paradoksalno proizvodi socijalni red. Anomija se ne rađa iz ništavila, iz praznine; ona je produkt interaktivne dinamike koja nastaje kada se pojedinci udruže, djelujući kao pogonsko gorivo koje potiče pojedince da se sretnu. Émile Durkheim se fokusira na to kako međuljudska interakcija stvara promjene u društvu, pri čemu često pokazuje različite patološke karakteristike koje dovode do frustracije i konflikta. Individualna potraga za sopstvenim oslobađanjem od zajednice dovodi do gubitka osjećaja pripadnosti, a time i otuđenja. Kada se stare društvene mreže pokidaju, postaje nemoguće održati stare norme i vrijednosti. Pojedinac više nije ograničen moralnim načelima i autoritetom. Umjesto toga, može da razvije obrazac po kojem konstantno prevazilazi sve granice jer se kolaps prijašnje socijalne kontrole poklapa sa razvojem sistema koji zahtijeva konstantan porast individualnih potreba. Produkt takve interakcije je stanje društva u kojem postoji nesigurnost po pitanju vrijednosti, ciljeva i normi. Durkheim ovakvo stanje naziva "anomijom". Durkheim analizira devijacije normi (kao i individualni i društveni odgovor/reakciju na devijacije normi, kao što je kazna) kao sastavni dio problema solidarnosti i socijalne kohezije. Moralni red u društvu prema Durkheimu ima fundamentalnu vrijednost zato što su pojedinci integrisani u zajednicu koja ih kontroliše. Durkheim vidi integraciju kao način da se pojedinac veže za zajednicu kroz zajednički stav, solidarnost i rituale. On vidi kontrolu kao silu koja opčinjava i veže pojedinca za norme kroz pravni sistem, zakone i sankcije. Durkheim definiše odstupanje od norme kao čin koji vrijeđa jaku i jasnu kolektivnu svijest. Zbog toga su djela antisocijalna ako krše norme i vrijednosti koje su inače važan segment društvenog jedinstva. Rad obavještajnih i operativnih policijskih i graničnih snaga u oblasti Baltičkog mora (Švedskoj, Finskoj, Estoniji, Litvaniji i Letoniji) karakterističan je po ritualima konstantnog stvaranja normi od samog početka dana: od jutarnje kafe i prve razmjene informacija sa obavještajnom službom do operativnih radnji kao što su nadzor ili kontrola pojedinaca ili automobila. Ove interakcije se odlikuju jakom željom da se očuva postojeći društveni red. Što se tiče prijetnje postojećim normama postoje i normativni rituali. Na primjer, u ovakvim interakcijama, konstruišu se "Rusi koji odbacuju norme", oni nisu fizički prisutni u određenoj situaciji, ali su važni u tim vezama kao neki nevidljivi sveti objekti. Stvaranje kategorije "Rus koji odbacuje norme" u kojoj su Rusija/Rusi iskorišteni za dramatizaciju "drugih" je vidljivo u empirijskom materijalu kada akteri u studiji opisuju (1) Ruse kriminalce, (2) ruske špijune i (3) ruskuvojnu okupaciju. ; Resolution of the prevailing norms in a society in the context of war, occupation, anarchy,and takeover by criminal forces dispels the old norms but also sets new norms, which in turn can bequickly dispelled. Anomie can be understood as the core of society, as a kind of "pulsating moral destructiveness" that no one really can control but that paradoxically produces social order. Anomie does not arise from nothing, from the void; it is the product of the interactive dynamics that arise when individuals come together, acting as a propellant to lead individuals to meet. Émile Durkheim's attention goes to how interpersonal interaction is creating changes in society, often showing thevarious pathological features that can lead to frustration and conflict. The individual's quest toliberate himself from the collective as a result has a rootlessness and isolation. When the old network dissolves, it becomes impossible to maintain the old norms and values. The individual is no longer limited by the rules of morality and authority. Instead, the individual may develop a pattern of constantly exceeding all limits because the collapse of the former social control coincides with the development of the system that requires constant growth of individual needs. The product of such interactions is a state of society where there is uncertainty about the values, goals, and norms. Durkheim refers to this state as "anomie". Durkheim analyzes deviation from the norm (as well as individual and societal response/reaction to the norm deviation, such as punishment) as an integral part of the issue of solidarity and social cohesion. The moral order in a society has a fundamental value according to Durkheim because individuals are both integrated with and controlled by the community. Durkheim saw integration as a way to tie the individual to the community through shared attitude, solidarity, and rituals. He saw control as a compelling force that binds the individual to the norms through the judicial system, laws, and sanctions. Durkheim defines a deviation from the normas an act that offends a strong and definite collective consciousness. Thus, the acts are antisocial inthat they violate norms and values that are important to the social unity. The work of intelligence and operational police and border guards in the Baltic Sea area (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) is characterized by the norm-creating and re-creating rituals from the first moments of theday: from the morning coffee and the first information exchange with an intelligence partner to operational actions in the form of surveillance or control of individuals and/or cars. These interactions are characterized by a strong desire to preserve the prevailing social order. In relation tothe threat to the prevailing norms, there also are normative rituals. For example, in these interactions,"norm-dissolving Russians" are constructed who are not physically present in the situation but whoare important in the relationship as invisible sacred objects. The making of the category "norm-dissolving Russian" in which Russia/Russians are used to dramatize the "other" is made visible in the empirical material when actors in the study describe (1) criminal Russians, (2) Russian espionage, and (3) Russian military invasion. ; II International Scientific Conference. "Social Deviations", Centar modernih znanja, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (20171013-20171014). "Društvo i anomija. Sociološka analiza obavještajnog i operativnog policijskog rada i rada granične službe u oblasti Baltičkog mora" (Society and anomie. Sociological analysis of intelligence and operational police and border guard work in the Baltic Sea area). (Plenary session).

Predmet analize u tekstu je bila sigurnost snabdevanja Poljske gasom. Analiza se temelji na tri glavna aspekta: (1) domaći potencijal konvencionalnih resursa gasa, (2) domaći potencijali nekonvencionalnih resursa gasa (gas iz škriljaca i tight gas), (3) potencijal razvoja domaće gasne infrastrukture, uzimajući u obzir značaj LNG terminala u Svinoujšću. Analiza je obuhvatila sadašnje stanje, kao i proces promena, uzimajući u obzir predikciju sigurnosti snabdevanja Poljske gasom u 2022. g. Pretpostavka kvalitativne predikcije je da će do tog vremena doći do kvalitativne promene sigurnosti snabdevanja gasom u Poljskoj, što se može nazvati "novom perspektivom sigurnosti snabdevanja Poljske gasom". To stanje će se temeljiti na većem nivou stabilosti isporuke gasa zahvaljujući diversifikaciji tehničkih mogućnosti uvoza te sirovine. U cilju izvršenja detaljnije podele navedenog problema, u radu su postavljena dva pitanja, koja se mogu povezati sa sledećim zaključcima: (1) U kolikoj će meri potencijali domaćih resursa gasa i razvoja domaće gasne infrastrukture uticati na energetsku bezbednost Poljske? Treba obratiti pažnju da nedostatak sigurnih i proverenih podataka o nekonvencionalnim resursima gasa dovodi do poteškoća kod predikcije kratko i dugoročne sigurnosti snabdevanja Poljske gasom. Ipak se može teoretski pretpostaviti da industrijski resursi gasa iz škriljaca mogu iznositi najmanje 50 mld m3 i isto toliko tight gasa. Takva pretpostavka znači da čak i u vezi sa teoretskom predikcijom za resurse gasa, može se pretpostaviti da je potencijal ekspolatacije na nivou 3 Mtoe godišnje za svaki od dva resursa nekonvencionalnih ležišta. Potencijalno moglo bi se pretpostaviti da domaća eksploatacija konvencionalnog i nekonvencionalnog gasa mogla bi postići nivo 9-10 mld m3, što bi znatno smanjilo koeficijent uvozne gasne zavisnosti Poljske. Ipak kod te predikcije moguć raspon merne nesigurnosti je veliki. Čak i ako pretpostavimo takvu varijantu, istražni proces i proces vađenja i investicija u oblasti te sirovine moraju da budu dinamičniji. U periodu od narednih nekoliko godina ta varijanta je – kako se čini - malo realna, na što mogu uticati "ekomomski" i "organizacijski" faktori. U tom zadnjem slučaju na prvom planu je neefikasna politika države, što dokazuju izveštaji Republičke komore za kontrolu u slučajevima kontrole koncesijskog procesa za gas iz škriljaca i kontrole investicionog procesa LNG terminala. Čini se da je neophodno traženje strateškog partnera, koji bi bio zainteresovan za tehnologiju frakturiranja i proces vađenja nekonvencionalnog gasa u Poljskoj. U vezi sa činjenicom da su se zapadne firme povukle iz Poljske, treba razmišljati o razvoju saradnje sa privrednim subjektima iz Kine. Kad je u pitanju prenosna infrastruktura za gas, Poljska je napravila najveći napredak, što može da bude rezultat ulaganja, između ostalog - finansijske podrške od Evropske unije, ali i dobrog upravljanja operatorom prenosnih sistema, tj. GAZ-SYSTEM-om. U vezi sa predmetnom predikcijom za drugu deceniju 21. veka, vredi obratiti pažnju na rast tehničkog potencijala infrastrukture prenosa gasa. "Istočni pravac" u okviru strukture tehničkih uvoznih mogućnosti će imati udeo od samo 27%. To znači da Gasprom neće imati superiornu poziciju u vezi sa budućim tehničkim potencijalom uvoza gasa u Poljsku. Već sada više cene za gas koji se iz Rusije uvozi u Poljsku nisu ekonomski opravdane, a još više neće biti opravdane u budućnosti. Ako se cene budu održavale, to će biti vezano uz "politički faktor". U vezi sa razvojom infrastrukture treba takođe spomenuti smanjivanje opasnosti po sigurnost snabdevanja Poljske gasom u slučaju potencijalne primene "gasne ucene" od strane Rusije. Ipak ta pretpostavka neće biti od značaja, ako dođe do radikalizacije konflikta Evropska unija-Rusija, jer i dalje znatni deo gasa koji se uzvozi u Evropsku uniju je iz "istočnog pravca". Ne uzimajući u obzir pesimistički scenario može se reći da će se 2022. g. raditi o "novoj perspektivi sigurnosti snabdevanja gasom" u Poljskoj, što će biti podržano razvojom ciljeva Energetske unije izeđu zemalja-članica Evropske unije. (2) U kolikoj će meri funkcionisanje LNG Terminala u Svinoujšću uticati na državnu i regionalnu sigurnost snabdevanja gasom? Otvaranjem LNG terminala u Svinoujšću faktički se uvodi diversifikacija isporuka gasa. On je i garant sigurnosti isporuka sirovine u vezi sa eventualnim gasnim konfliktima na istočnoj granici Poljske. Njegov značaj bi mogao još više porasti u vezi sa potencijalnim redefinisanjem energetske politike zemlje, naročito u slučaju prihvatanja gasno-ugljenog scenarija uz stalni razvoj obnovljivih izvora energije. Ipak takvo rešenje bi zahtevalo opoziv odredaba i odustajanje od prioriteta koji su sadržani u planskom dokumentu, tj. Energetska politika Poljske do 2050.g. i izazvalo bi potrebu za znatnim ulaganjima u celi gasni sektor u Poljskoj. Kad je u pitanju regionalna skala, bitna bi bila tesna sinergija poljskog gasovoda sa projektom Koridora Sever-Jug), čija bi infrastruktura povezivala Baltičko more sa Mediteranskim morem. Razvoj i pojačanje gasne infrastrukture u pojasu Srednje Evrope pružao bi pristup gasu iz raznih delova sveta, naročito preko razvoja LNG terminala na području zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. Ipak na značaj poljskog gasovoda treba se osvrnuti kroz prizmu drugih gasnih projekata, koji bi smanjivali njegovu ekonomičnost, barem kroz prizmu investicija u Nord Stream II ili South Stream. Veliki značaj za Poljsku će imati realizacija izgradnje gasovoda Nord Stream II, jer će se u Evropskoj uniji pojaviti znatne količine gasa, koji je verovatno jeftiniji od onog koji se uvozi pomoću brodova za prevoz gasa. Ovo bi bio i primer instrumentalnog tretiranja "energetske solidarnosti" od strane Nemačke. U tekstu nije izvršenja analiza svih faktora, koji bi mogli uticati na sigurnost snabdevanja Poljske gasom. U daljoj perspektivi vredi proširiti istraživanja na aspekte energetske bezbednosti kao što su npr. ekološki i ekonomski aspekt. Oni bi sigurno bili vrlo bitni kod vađenja nekonvencionalnog gasa. Imale bi realni uticaj na realizaciju gasnih projekata. Osim aspekta infrastrukture na promene tržišta gasa u Poljskoj će uticati procesi liberalizacije i novi instrumenti za promet gasom. ; The subject matter analysed in the text is gas security, viewed as an element of Poland's energy security, which has been broken down as a description of the three-fold potential: (1) gas resources in Poland in general, (2) unconventional gas resources in Poland, (3) a development of the domestic gas infrastructure. The issue of the gas infrastructure has been extended with a short case study as exemplified by the Świnoujście LNG terminal. With a view to elaborating the research issue addressed in the text, the following questions have been posed: (1) To what extent will the potential of gas resources and of the development of the domestic gas infrastructure affect Poland's energy security?, (2) To what extent will the operation of the Świnoujście LNG terminal affect the domestic and regional gas security? ; Predmet analize rada je sigurnost snabdevanja gasom kao sastojni elemenat energetske bezbednosti Poljske. Analiza se temelji na karakteristici tri potencijala: (1) resursa zemnog gasa u Poljskoj uopšte, (2) nekonvencionalnih resursa gasa u Poljskoj, (3) razvoja domaće gasne infrastrukture. Problematika gasne infrastrukture je proširena na kratka studija slučaja na primeru LNG terminala u Svinoujšću. U cilju izvršenja podele istraživačkog problema na manje delove postavljena su sledeća istraživačka pitanja: (1) U kolikoj će meri potencijal domaćih resursa gasa i razvoja domaće gasne infrastrukture uticati na energetsku bezbednost Poljske?, (2) U kolikoj će meri funkcionisanje LNG Terminala u Svinoujšću uticati na državnu i regionalnu sigurnost snabdevanja gasom?

The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper. ; Straipsnyje lyginamas nacionalinių pinigų įvedimas ir stabilizacija Pirmojoje ir Antrojoje Lietuvos Respublikose (LR I ir LR II). Šie diachroniniai palyginimai papildomi sinchroniniais – LR I lyginama su Estija, Latvija ir Lenkija, o LR II – su Estija ir Latvija, gretimomis šalimis, kurios vienu metu sprendė nacionalinės valstybės kūrimo ir makroekonominės stabilizacijos problemas. Ir vienoje, ir kitoje epochoje LR paskutinė įsivedė nacionalinius pinigus, nors tarpukariu tik Latvija aplenkė Lietuvą tuos pinigus galutinai stabilizuodama. Palyginimų tikslas yra išaiškinti LR vėlavimo priežastis ir jo padarinius. Pirmiausia išryškinami LR I ir LR II ekonominės situacijos pirmaisiais nepriklausomybės metais panašumai ir skirtumai. Išryškinant panašumus, parodoma, kad sovietinio komandinio-administracinio ūkio prototipas buvo Pirmojo pasaulinio karo laikų kaizerinės Vokietijos karinė administracinė ekonomika, kurios poligonu tapo Oberosto kraštas (apėmęs ir šiuolaikinės Lietuvos teritoriją), kur administracinė ūkinės veiklos kontrolė įgijo griežčiausias formas. Grįžimą prie kapitalistinės laisvosios rinkos ekonomikos ir makroekonominės pusiausvyros atkūrimą ankstyvuoju tarpukariu sukomplikavo nepaprastosios išlaidos nepriklausomybės karams, dar tik besikuriančioms nacionalinėms valstybėms neturint administracinių gebėjimų surinkti tradicinio tipo mokesčius. Visos Lietuvos kaimynės nepriklausomybės karus finansavo infliaciniu mokesčiu, pačioje nepriklausomybės pradžioje įsivedusios nacionalinius pinigus ir iki 2/3 visų valstybės pajamų gaudamos iš senjoražo. Vos ne tarp visų nepriklausomybės karus moderniaisiais laikais kariavusių šalių LR I unikali savo monetarine "neoliberalia iki neoliberalizmo" finansų politika, išsivertusi be senjoražo pajamų, padovanotų Vokietijai, su kuria Lietuva iki pat 1922 m. išlaikė pinigų sąjungą. Nepriklausomybės atkūrimo laikais delsimą nutraukti pinigų sąjungą su buvusiu imperiniu siuzerenu (Rusija) lėmė Gedimino Vagnoriaus vyriausybės pasirinkimas ir po tarptautinio LR II nepriklausomybės pripažinimo 1991 m. rudenį tęsti pirmoje tų metų pusėje pasiteisinusias infliacijos lenktynes, kuriose išlošdavo sparčiausiai atlyginimus ir kainas keliančios rublio zonos narės. Taigi dėl taupios LR I finansų politikos ankstyvojo tarpukario Lietuva kentėjo tik dėl importuojamos iš Vokietijos infliacijos, atsikovojusi nepriklausomybę ir toliau išlaidavusi Lietuva infliaciją iš Rusijos ir importavo, ir eksportavo. 1992 m. rudenį talonui tapus vienintele teisėta mokėjimo priemone, LR II vyriausybė dar aštuonis mėnesius savo išlaidoms dengti naudojo infliacinį mokestį, vykdydama moraliai nepateisinamą taikos sąlygomis finansų politiką, kuri dėl masinės privatizacijos vykdymo artimomis hiperinfliacijai sąlygomis turėjo pragaištingų ilgalaikių padarinių Lietuvos ekonominei raidai – nulėmė jos didėjantį atsilikimą nuo Estijos. O tarpukario nepriklausomybės pradžios LR I vyriausybės padarė strateginę klaidą, atsisakydamos infliacinio mokesčio nepaprastosioms nepriklausomybės karo išlaidoms finansuoti. Jis mažiau gyventojų turinčioms ir ne mažiau už Lietuvą nuo Pirmojo pasaulinio karo veiksmų nukentėjusioms Estijai ir Latvijai davė išteklių mobilizuoti apie 70 000 vyrų kariuomenes. Vykdydama neadekvačią karo sąlygoms taupią ir atsakingą finansų politiką, valstietiškai šykšti Lietuva 1920 m. rudenį turėjo tik apie 30 000 vyrų kariuomenę, kuri buvo per maža ir silpna apginti Vilnių nuo vienos dvarponiškai išlaidžios Lenkijos (kuri kaip ir kitos Lietuvos kaimynės savo 1918–1920 m. karus finansavo iš infliacinio mokesčio pajamų) tariamai sukilusios divizijos.

VANDA ARAMAVIČIŪTĖ – Habilitated Doctor of Social Sciences (Education), Professor at the Department of Education, Vilnius University; Research interests: general educology, education and spiritual development of personality, methodology of educational research; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str., LT-O1513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: aramaviciute@gmail.comTATJANA BULAJEVA – Doctor of Social Sciences (Education), Associate Professor at the Department of Education, Vilnius University; Research interests: education policy and management with the current focus on teacher education policy, language education policy; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str., LT-O1513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: ttjnbulajeva@gmail.comDAIVA BUBELIENĖ – Doctor of Social Sciences; Šiauliai University, Faculty of Education, Department of Education Research interests: human resource management, quality of life, social research methodology Address: 25 P. Višinskio Str., Šiauliai, Lithuania; E-mail address: daivabubeliene@gmail.comDAIVA JUOZAPAVIČIENĖ – Psychologist of the Valakupiai Rehabilitation Center Address: 69 Vaidilutės Str., LT-10100 Vilnius; Lithuania; E-mail address: daiva.juozapaviciene@reabilitacija.ltANTANAS KAIRYS – Doctor of Social Sciences (Psychology), Lecturer at the Department of General Psychology, Vilnius University; Research interests: time psychology, career psychology, personality traits; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str.,LT-01513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: antanas.kairys@fsf.vu.ltDAIVA GRAKAUSKAITĖ KARKOCKIE- NĖ – Doctor of Social Science (Psychology); Associate Professor at the Department of Psychology of Didactics, Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences; Research interests: psychology of creativity, gifted children, family psychology. Address: 39-328 Studentų Str., LT-08106 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: daiva.karkockiene@leu.ltMARGARITA KOZHEVNIKOVA – PhD, Senior Researcher at Institute of Teacher and Adult Education, Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg, Russia; Research interests: philosophy of education in the Buddhist tradition; teacher's self-awareness as a philosophical problem; a model of education as bringing to the personal maturity; language of pedagogy; phenomenological aspects of researching the methodology of pedagogic educational research methodology; ethnic and religious problems in education; E-mail address: margaritakozh@ya.ruAUDRONĖ LINIAUSKAITĖ – Doctor of Social Sciences (Psychology), Professor at the Department of Psychology, Klaipėda University; Research interests: psychological time, career psychology, psychological well-being; Address: 5 S. Nėries Str.,LT-92227 Klaipėda, Lithuania; E-mail address: audrone.liniauskaite@gmail.comGEDIMINAS MERKYS – Habilitated Doctor of Social Sciences, Professor, Head of the Social Research Laboratory, Kaunas University of Technology; Research interests: social research methodology (quantitative and qualitative), diagnostics in psychology, management diagnostics, social indicators, sociology of organizations; Address: 20 K. Donelaičio Str., Kaunas, Lithuania;E-mail address: gediminas.merkys@ktu.ltBIRUTĖ POCIŪTĖ – Doctor of Social Sciences (Psychology), Associate Professor at the Department of General Psychology, Vilnius University; Research interests: educational psychology, psychology of career choice, learning; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str.,LT-O1513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: birute.pociute@fsf.vu.ltRASA RUDŽINSKIENĖ – PhD student of Faculty of Education, Šiauliai University; Director of employment agency "Jurgvita"; Research interests: planning of career, professional counselling, coaching; Address: 25 P.Višinskio Str., LT-76351 Šiauliai, Lithuania; E-mail address: karjerosprojektavimas@gmail.comVADIM ROUK – PhD candidate, Tallinn University; Researcher at the Institute of Educational Sciences, Tallinn University;Research interests: curriculum history and theory; curriculum development; political history of Estonia; history of France, Great Britain and South Arfica; holistlic philosophy; Address: Tallinn University, Rüütli 6, 10130, Tallinn, Estonia; E-mail address: vadim.rouk@tlu.eeAUŠRA RUTKIENĖ – PhD, Associate Professor at the Department of Education, Vytautas Magnus University; Research interests: methodology of social research, qanititative research, statistical data analysis, adult learning; Address: 52-301K. Donelaičio Str., LT-44244 Kaunas, Lithuania; E-mail address: a.rutkiene@smf.vdu.ltRŪTA SARGAUTYTĖ – Doctor of Social Sciences (Psychology), Associate Professor at the Department of Clinical and Organizational Psychology; Research interests: vocational rehabilitation, cross-cultural psychology, medical psychology, patient education; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str., LT-O1513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: ruta.sargautyte@fsf.vu.ltEDITA ŠATIENĖ – Directress of the Valakupiai Rehabilitation Center; Address: Vaidilutės Str., 69, LT-10100 Vilnius; Lithuania; E-mail address: edita.satiene@reabilitacija.lt. El. paštas: i.tandzegolskienė@smf.vdu.ltILONA TANDZEGOLSKIENĖ – PhD, Lecturer at the Department of Education, Vytautas Magnus University; Research interests: expression of Students' independent activities, preparation of career specialists, career and labour marker, career in different stages of human development, possibilities for employability, levels in the qualification frameworks, preparation of description of qualifications, objectives of scientific activity; Address: 52-301 K. Donelaičio Str.,LT-44244 Kaunas, Lithuania; E-mail address: i.tandzegolskienė@smf.vdu.ltVILIJA TARGAMADZĖ – Habilitated Doctor of Social Sciences (education), Professor at the Department of Education, Vilnius University; Research interests: social education; education management; problem-based learning; Address: 9/1 Universiteto Str., LT-O1513 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: vilija.targamadze@gmail.comONA TIJŪNELIENĖ – Habilitated Doctor of Social Sciences (education), Professor at the Department of Education, Klaipeda University; Research interests: philosophy of education, methodology of educational research, history of educology; Address: 5 S. Nėries Str., LT-92227 Klaipėda, Lithuania; E-mail address: onatij@one.ltIEVA URBANAVIČIŪTĖ – PhD, Lecturer at the Department of Psychology Didactics, Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences; Research interests: career psychology, work psychology, learning and work motivation; Address: 39 Studentų Str., LT-08106 Vilnius, Lithuania; E-mail address: ieva.urbanaviciute@gmail.com ; VANDA ARAMAVIČIŪTĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologijos) habilituota daktarė, Vilniaus universiteto Edukologijos katedros profesorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: bendroji edukologija, ugdymas ir asmenybės dvasinis brendimas, ugdymo tyrimų metodologija. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius; El. paštas: aramaviciute@gmail.comDAIVA BUBELIENĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologijos) daktarė, Šiaulių universiteto Edukologijos fakulteto Edukologijos katedra. Mokslinių interesų sritys: žmogiškųjų išteklių valdymas, gyvenimo kokybė, socialinių tyrimų metodologija. Adresas:P. Višinskio g. 25, Šiauliai; Tel. 8 41 595 718; El. paštas: daivabubeliene@gmail.comTATJANA BULAJEVA – socialinių mokslų (edukologijos) daktarė, Vilniaus universiteto Edukologijos katedros docentė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: švietimo politika ir vadyba, mokytojų rengimo politika, kalbų mokymo politika. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius; El. paštas: ttjnbulajeva@gmail.comDAIVA JUOZAPAVIČIENĖ – Valakupių reabilitacijos centro vyr. psichologė. Adresas: Vaidilutės g. 69, LT-10100 Vilnius;Tel. (8-5) 247 7545; El. paštas: daiva.juozapaviciene@reabilitacija.ltANTANAS KAIRYS – socialinių mokslų (psichologija) daktaras, Vilniaus universiteto Bendrosios psichologijos katedros lektorius. Mokslinių interesų sritys: laiko psichologija, karjeros psichologija, asmenybės bruožai. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius; El. paštas: antanas.kairys@fsf.vu.ltDAIVA GRAKAUSKAITĖ-KARKOCKIENĖ – socialinių mokslų (psichologijos) daktarė, Lietuvos edukologijos universiteto Psichologijos didaktikos katedros docentė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: kūrybos psichologija, gabių vaikų psichologija, šeimos psichologija. Adresas: Studentų g. 39-328,LT-08106 Vilnius; Tel. 8 683 11803;El. paštas: daiva.karkockiene@leu.ltMARGARITA KOZHEVNIKOVA – dr., Rusijos švietimo akademijos, Mokytojų ir suaugusiųjų švietimo instituto vyriausioji mokslo darbuotoja. Sankt Peterburgas, Rusija. Mokslinių interesų sritys: ugdymo filosofija budizmo tradicijoje, mokytojų savimonė kaip filosofinė problema, asmenybės brandą skatinančio ugdymo modeliai, pedagogikos kalba, edukologinių tyrimų metodologijos fenomenologiniai aspektai, etnines ir religines ugdymo problemos.El. paštas: margaritakozh@ya.ruAUDRONĖ LINIAUSKAITĖ – socialinių mokslų (psichologija) daktarė, Klaipėdos universiteto Psichologijos katedros profesorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: laiko psichologija, karjeros psichologija, psichologinė gerovė. Adresas: S. Nėries g. 5, LT-92227 Klaipėda; El. paštas: audrone.liniauskaite@gmail.comGEDIMINAS MERKYS – socialinių mokslų habilituotas daktaras profesorius, Kauno technologijos universiteto Socialinių tyrimų laboratorijos vedėjas. Mokslinių interesų sritys: socialinių tyrimų metodologija (kiekybinė ir kokybinė), psichologinė diagnostika, vadybos diagnostika, socialiniai indikatoriai, organizacijų sociologija. Adresas: K. Donelaičio g. 20, Kaunas.Tel. 8 37 300 144; El. paštas: gediminas.merkys@ktu.ltBIRUTĖ POCIŪTĖ – socialinių mokslų (psichologijos) daktarė, Vilniaus universiteto Bendrosios psichologijos katedros docentė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: pedagoginė psichologija, karjeros psichologija, mokymasis. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius; El. paštas: birute.pociute@fsf.vu.ltRASA RUDŽINSKIENĖ – Šiaulių universiteto edukologijos doktorantė, Įdarbinimo agentūros "Jurgvita" vadovė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: karjeros projektavimas, profesinis konsultavimas, koučingas. Adresas: P. Višinskio g. 25, LT-76351 Šiauliai.Tel. +370 611 66794; El. paštas: karjerosprojektavimas@gmail.comVADIMAS ROUKAS – Talino universiteto (Estija) doktorantas, Talino universiteto Ugdymo mokslo instituto tyrėjas. Mokslinių interesų sritys: ugdymo turinio istorija ir teorija, ugdymo turinio tobulinimas, Estijos politinė istorija, Prancūzijos, Didžiosios Britanijos ir Pietų Afrikos istorija, holistinė filosofija. Adresas: Rüütli 6, 10130, Tallinn, Estonia. El. paštas: vadim.rouk@tlu.eeAUŠRA RUTKIENĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologija) daktarė, Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto Edukologijos katedros docentė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: socialinių tyrimų metodologija, kiekybiniai tyrimai, statistinė duomenų analizė, suaugusiųjų mokymas. Adresas: K. Donelaičio g. 52-301,LT-44244 Kaunas; El. paštas: a.rutkiene@smf.vdu.ltRŪTA SARGAUTYTĖ – socialinių mokslų (psichologija) daktarė, Vilniaus universiteto Klinikinės ir organizacinės psichologijos katedros docentė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: profesinė reabilitacija, tarpkultūrinė psichologija, medicinos psichologija, pacientų mokymas. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius. Tel. 85 2667605;El. paštas: ruta.sargautyte@fsf.vu.ltEDITA ŠATIENĖ – Valakupių reabilitacijos centro direktorė. Adresas: Vaidilutės g. 69, LT-10100 Vilnius. Tel. (8-5) 247 7544;El. paštas: edita.satiene@reabilitacija.ltILONA TANDZEGOLSKIENĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologija) daktarė, Vytauto Didžiojo universiteto, Edukologijos katedros lektorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: studentų savarankiškos veiklos raiška, karjeros specialistų rengimas, karjera ir darbo rinka, karjera amžiaus tarpsniuose, įsidarbinimo galimybės, kvalifikacijos sąrangos lygmenys, kvalifikacijos aprašo rengimas, mokslinės veiklos uždaviniai. Adresas:K. Donelaičio g. 52-301, LT-44244 Kaunas.El. paštas: i.tandzegolskienė@smf.vdu.ltVILIJA TARGAMADZĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologijos) habilituota daktarė, Vilniaus universiteto Edukologijos katedros profesorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: socialinis ugdymas, švietimo vadyba, probleminis mokymas. Adresas: Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius. Tel. (8 5) 266 76 25;El. paštas: vilija.targamadze@gmail.comONA TIJŪNELIENĖ – socialinių mokslų (edukologijos) habilituota daktarė, Klaipėdos universiteto Edukologijos katedros profesorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: ugdymo filosofija, ugdymo tyrimų metodologija, pedagogikos istorija. Adresas: S. Nėries g. 5, LT-92227 Klaipėda. El. paštas: onatij@one.ltIEVA URBANAVIČIŪTĖ – socialinių mokslų (psichologijos) daktarė, Lietuvos edukologijos universiteto Psichologijos didaktikos katedra lektorė. Mokslinių interesų sritys: karjeros psichologija, darbo psichologija, mokymosi ir darbo motyvacija. Adresas: Studentų g. 39, LT-08106 Vilnius. El. paštas: ieva.urbanaviciute@gmail.com