Suchergebnisse

Each year the Commission on Prosecution Coordination reports to the Office of State Budget its annual accountability report that includes the mission, objectives, and performance measures.

Contracting out raises important issues of accountability, as recognised by the inquiry being conducted by the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee. The claim made by the Industry Commission that contracting out does not reduce government accountability for public services is mistaken. Contracting out involves a trade-off of political accountability for efficiency. Contracting out inevitably involves some reduction in accountability through the removal of direct departmental and ministerial control over the day-to-day actions of contractors and their staff. Indeed, the removal of such control is essential to the rationale for contracting out because the main increases in efficiency come from the greater freedom allowed to contracting providers. Accountability is also likely to be reduced through the reduced availability of citizen redress under such instruments as the Ombudsman and FOI. At the same time, accountability may on occasion be increased through improved departmental and ministerial control following from greater clarification of objectives and specification of standards. Providers may also become more responsive to public needs through the forces of market competition. Potential losses (and gains) in accountability need to be balanced against potential efficiency gains in each case.

Multi-Service Accountability Agreements (MSAAs) have been put in place to hold Community Sector Service (CSS) agencies to account for services receiving public funding in Ontario. The MSAA seeks to support financial and performance accountability, requiring CSS agencies to report on their performance quarterly. The MSAA is an expenditure policy tool that has undergone several iterations, each informed by negotiations between the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC), the province's regional authorities—known as Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs)—and organizations/associations representing CSS agency interests. This approach to accountability is consistent with a broader focus on the government role as 'steering' service delivery rather than 'rowing.' The MSAA offers a standardized, politically acceptable approach to accountability. However, the MSAA relies heavily on performance indicators that may not adequately reflect quality care. The MSAA exemplifies the tension between the need for strong standardized accountability requirements for publicly-funded health service providers and the need for services that meet the needs of their communities. Les ententes de responsabilisation en matière de services multi-sectoriels (ERS-M) ont été mis en place pour que les centres d'accès aux soins communautaires (CASC) recevant des financements publics en Ontario puissent rendre des comptes. Les ERS-M visent à obtenir des redditions de compte financiers mais aussi à responsabiliser les centres sur leur rendement en leur demandant des rapports trimestriels sur leur rendement. L'ERS-M est un instrument de politique budgétaire élaboré par itérations successives, reposant sur des négotiations entre le Ministère de la Santé et des Soins de Longue Durée de l'Ontario, les autorités régionales de la province—connues sous le nom de Réseau Locaux d'Intégration des Services de Santé (RLISS)—et les organisations ou associations représentant les intérêts des CASC. Cette façon d'appréhender la responsabilisation s'inscrit dans un plan d'ensemble visant à concentrer le rôle du gouvernement sur le « pilotage » des services plutôt que sur la « manoeuvre » de leur production. L'ERS-M propose une méthode de responsabilisation normalisée et acceptable politiquement. Cependant, l'ERS-M fait un usage intensif d'indicateurs qui peuvent ne pas refléter correctement la qualité des soins. L'ERS-M est une bonne illustration de la tension existant entre le besoin d'imposer des standards stricts de responsabilité pour les fournisseurs de services financés sur fonds publics et l'adéquation de ces services aux besoins locaux.

The scope & meaning of "accountability" have been extended well beyond its core sense of being called to account for one's actions. It has been applied to internal aspects of official behavior, to institutions that control official behavior, to means of making officials responsive to public wishes, & to democratic dialogue between citizens. In each case, the extension is readily intelligible because it is into an area of activity closely relevant to the practice of core accountability. However, in each case the extension of meaning may be challenged as weakening the importance of external scrutiny. 43 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article develops a conceptual framework for studying democratic accountability in decentralised governance, and discusses critical issues about democratic accountability from a citizen's perspective. First, the concept is discussed and adapted to make it useful for studying democratic accountability in different governance structures. Second, the article scrutinises conditions for democratic accountability in decentralised governance based on three models. Third, democratic accountability is discussed with reference to a case study of public reviewers operating in four municipalities in Sweden. The study indicates that municipal auditors and the local media have the greatest impact on municipal policy. On the whole, auditors improve local governments' internal control and systems for steering and monitoring municipal policy, whereas the media sometimes alter the policy agenda without changing the policy. Auditors maintain and support an elitist democratic orientation of democratic accountability, and the media maintain this democratic orientation and in addition promote democratic dialogue. Viewed from a citizen's perspective, the traditional accountability system does not work satisfactorily. State inspectors and municipal auditors – two important public reviewers in the current system – could improve their work to make it more useful to citizens' democratic control. Another way discussed to develop democratic accountability is to promote participatory policy and concrete means of accountability (e.g. on‐site visits, conducted tours and different forms of democratic dialogue). The formal way to improve democratic accountability implies more transparency, monitoring and control, which may also lead to distrust and scapegoat thinking (i.e. a surveillance society), whereas concrete modes of accountability, more associated with participatory and deliberative democracy, imply mutual responsibility and trust building. Strengthening participatory policy, active citizens, collective responsibility and democratic dialogue could be an alternative to the emerging audit society.

Discusses implementation theory. Basic to implementation is accountability, which restricts the amount of trust that gives autonomy to those responsible for the implementation of policies. The conceptualisation of implementation as a combination of accountability and trust points in a new direction for the analysis of policy cycles. (Abstract amended)

Article interviews former US Deputy Secretary of Defense and new President of the World Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, about world poverty, particularly in Africa. Reasons for the extensive poverty and possible solutions for it are discussed.

Accountability in the context of constitutional and administrative law is a complex concept. This book examines the legal framework of public institutions in light of contemporary accountability debates, the role of human rights in public accountability, accountability in regulation, and the operation of accountability in multi-layered government.

Each year the Education Oversight Committee produces an annual accountability report for the South Carolina General Assembly and the governor. This report presents an executive summary, major achievements of the past year, key strategic challenges, and budget expenditures, and The report uses the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria (The Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence) elements for the structure of evaluation.