Suchergebnisse

Resilience has been identified as a protective factor that improves the ability to manage stress, promotes wellbeing and enables individuals to thrive in adverse circumstances. Many social auxiliary workers function independently with sporadic and brief supervision. Considering the stressful work environment that social auxiliary workers must face, it is essential that they be equipped to effectively manage the stressors of social work practice. The study identified how individual, social and environmental factors contribute to the participants' resilience and their ability to thrive in these challenging circumstances. The participants use their interpersonal, intrapersonal and organisational strengths and coping strategies to manage both their positive and challenging work experiences to remain both productive and resilient. Keywords: coping, intrapersonal strengths, interpersonal strengths, organisational strengths, resilience, social auxiliary work, social work

Twenty subjects performed five manual tasks barehanded during exposure to a 60°-F ambient temperature control condition, a 0°-F condition, and three ambient temperature conditions of 20°, 0°, and −20° F, in which auxiliary heat was applied to the hands. The tasks consisted of the Purdue Pegboard assembly, block-stringing, Minnesota Rate of Manipulation placing, knot-tying, and screw-tightening tasks and were performed after exposure durations of 0, 60, 120, and 180 min. Exposure to the 0°-F condition without auxiliary heat resulted in significant performance decrements on all tasks. The application of auxiliary heat to the hands resulted in the avoidance or alleviation of impaired performance during cold exposure depending upon the task, ambient temperature condition, and duration of exposure. The differential effects of auxiliary heat during cold exposure across manual performance tasks were related to the effects of auxiliary heat on hand skin temperature. These effects are discussed in terms of differential hand and finger dexterity, strength, and speed of movement requirements across tasks.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, the infrastructure, competence, and information to be fairly effective monitors, and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. This suggests that interbank discipline affects bank risk taking and merits more consideration than it has received thus far. The rise of interbank discipline has both positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. The bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's creditors, even though it is socially costly. Interbank discipline may thus encourage banks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incentivized to address, and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.

Terrain-scattered interference (TSI), that is, jammer signals reflected on the earth's surface, is a significant problem to military airborne radar. In auxiliary beam TSI suppression, the TSI in the main radar beam is estimated by a single or several auxiliary beams and is subtracted from the main beam channel. The signal to subtract is the auxiliary beam signals fed through an estimate of the 'reflection system', which describes scattering on the surface. The authors first present results on the structure of this TSI suppression, on the estimation of the reflection system and on the quality of the estimate. Then the authors derive theoretical expressions for the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) and the remaining TSI power for a single auxiliary beam. Since the SINR is directly connected to the radar performance, it can be seen what factors affect the performance and how. It was noted that when the estimated reflection system is missing one or more delays of the true system, the TSI filter cannot suppress the TSI signal completely. This phenomenon, which is called 'TSI leakage', has a very large impact on the performance. The SINR cannot be kept constant. Instead, an 'SINR improvement' can be defined.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taking, discouraging banks from taking some types of risk while potentially encouraging the assumption of others. Given its influence, ignoring the phenomenon can lead to inefficiencies and gaps in bank regulation. The rise of interbank discipline has positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. 'The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. he bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's counterparties and other creditors, even though socially costly. Interbank discipline ma thus encourage barks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incented to address and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.