Suchergebnisse

We first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using a novel dataset covering 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to government interventions in financial markets. Consistent with a public interest channel, we find post-crisis interventions occur only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous setting -i.e., term limits- muting political accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that may promote (obstruct) private (public) interests.

We first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using a novel dataset covering 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to government interventions in financial markets. Consistent with a public interest channel, we find post-crisis interventions occur only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous setting -i.e., term limits- muting political accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that may promote (obstruct) private (public) interests.

In this paper we investigate the effects of central bank interventions (CBI) in a noise trading model with chartists and fundamentalists. We first estimate a model in which chartists extrapolate past returns and fundamentalists forecast a mean reverting dynamics of the exchange rate towards a fundamental value. Then, we investigate the role of central bank interventions in explaining the switching properties between the two types of agents. We find evidence that in the medium run, interventions increase the proportion of fundamentalists and therefore exert some stabilizing influence on the exchange rate.

This article explains why inflation failed to accelerate in industrial countries after the large exchange rate depreciations of 1992-93. The degree of pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation is assumed to depend on the degree of openness of the country, on unutilized capacity at home and abroad, on the price of oil and on the wage, fiscal and monetary policies followed by the country after devaluation. Inflation equations are then estimated for consumer and wholesale prices using pooled data referring to 80 episodes of devaluations/depreciations for seven industrial countries during the period 1966-93. The tests show that the macroeconomic policy followed by the country significantly influences the degree of pass-through and that the 1992-93 episodes do not constitute a break with respect to previous devaluation episodes when inflation accelerated sharply. (Journal of Common Market Studies / FUB)

This chapter provides a critical overview of the state of the art in the economics literature on structural reforms. It takes stock of theoretical developments, measurement efforts and of the econometric evidence. We start with a simple theoretical framework for the relationship between structural reforms, economic growth and income inequality. We argue that whether structural reforms have a positive or negative impact depends on various factors. The type of reform, timing, sequence and political constraints play crucial roles in determining the effectiveness of reforms on economic growth and income inequality. We conclude by proposing a 7-point agenda for future research.