Since 2014, many scholars have drawn renewed attention to the subject concerning unilateral coercive measures adopted by States. Due to the annexation of Crimea and to the conflict broke out in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has been accused of committing serious breaches of international law. As a response to them, several States, such as the United States, Japan, Australia and the members of the European Union, have adopted so called economic sanctions against Russia, in particular, against Russian officials and enterprises. International practice, far from being limited just to this case, shows how the adoption of economic restrictive measures as a reaction to serious breaches of international law has turned to be a relevant phenomenon in recent years. The object of the present analysis is part of one of the most controversial field in international law: reaction of States against violation of international law and enforcement of international rules. Notably, the international Community is made up of sovereign, equal and independent States and, as a consequence, coercive measures may be implemented only through self-help measures. Such a decentralized reaction system need to be framed in a judicial architecture which seems necessary in order to avoid the primacy of power-based, instead of law-based, relations. Moreover, the complexity of the present subject has increased due to the emergence of the erga omnes obligations which are meant to protect fundamental values and basic principles of the international Community. All States have to comply with this kind of rules, thus entailing an overcoming in the classical bilateral structure of international relations. As a consequence, new questions have been raised by scholars concerning the possibility for States, not directly affected by the wrongful act, of reacting against violations of erga omnes obligations through the adoption of countermeasures. Violations of erga omnes obligations are deeply linked to the most serious breaches of international law which represent a threat to international peace and security and thus to the stability of international relations. This is the reason why it is possible to affirm that the central point this work aims at assessing concerns conditions of States' reaction "between words and war". In particular, the present research will be focused on the lawfulness of countermeasures adopted by States not directly affected by the wrongful act in case of violations of erga omnes obligations. Indeed, the solution proposed by the Draft Articles on State Responsibility for internationally wrongful act, adopted in 2001, is deemed to be a compromise not setting out any clear regime. In view of the above, the first part of the work will be focused on the analysis of preliminary concepts considered as fundamental for a comprehensive understanding of the matter, and on the theoretical debate developed by scholars. The second part will be devoted to the exhaustive study of international practice and opinio of States in order to assess the emergence of a new international rule allowing the adoption of countermeasures by all States to enforce erga omnes obligations. The third part will deal with the analysis of possible legal basis other than countermeasures which could justify unilateral coercive measures. The fourth and final part of the work will eventually discuss about the limits of countermeasures, steering the attention at proportionality and protection of economic, social and cultural human rights.
Após o falido levantamento militar de Benjamín Menéndez em setembro de 1951, o presidente Juan D. Perón decretou o estado de guerra interno, o qual não era uma figura legal prevista na Constituição reformada dois anos atrás. Sua sanção, vigente até a queda do governo em 1955, foi justificada pelo oficialismo perante a intentona de desestabilização por parte da oposição. Porém, para os antiperonistas, esta figura densificou as crescentes restrições governamentais dos anos prévios e consagrou a consolidação de um regime alheio ao estado de direito. Este trabalho analisa como os partidos opositores ao governo peronista interpretaram a aplicação do estado de guerra e de que forma a rejeição inscreveu-se em um beligerante clima político que prevaleceu durante a segunda presidência de Perón. A principal hipótese sugere que a sanção desta figura por parte do Poder Executivo foi determinante para a construção de um discurso antiperonista que deu conta de uma ruptura definitiva da ordem democrática, a qual aprofundou a tendência dos grupos opositores pelas opções extra institucionais para enfrentar o governo. ; Tras el fallido levantamiento militar de Benjamín Menéndez en septiembre de 1951, el presidente Juan D. Perón decretó el estado de guerra interno, que no era una figura legal prevista en la Constitución reformada dos años atrás. Su sanción, vigente hasta la caída del gobierno en 1955, fue justificada por el oficialismo frente a los intentos de desestabilización por parte de la oposición. Sin embargo, para el campo antiperonista, que venía experimentando un proceso de radicalización política, esta figura condensó las crecientes restricciones gubernamentales de los años previos y consagró la consolidación de un régimen ajeno al estado de derecho.Este trabajo analiza cómo los partidos opositores al gobierno peronista interpretaron la aplicación del estado de guerra y de qué forma su rechazo se inscribió en el beligerante clima político que predominó durante la segunda presidencia de Perón. La principal hipótesis sugiere que la sanción de esta figura por parte del Poder Ejecutivo fue determinante para la construcción de un discurso antiperonista que daba cuenta de una ruptura definitiva del orden democrático, lo cual profundizó la inclinación de los grupos opositores por las opciones extrainstitucionales para enfrentar al gobierno. ; After the failed military coup led by Benjamín Menéndez in September 1951, Perón sanctioned the state of internal war, which was not a legal figure included in the Constitution reformed two years ago. This law, in force until the fall of the government in 1955, was justified by the ruling party against the destabilization attempts made by the opposition parties. However, for the anti-Peronist camp, which had been experiencing a process of political radicalization, this figure summarized the growing governmental restrictions of the previous years and consolidated the breakdown of the rule of law.This paper analyzes how the opposition parties to the Peronist government understood the state of war and how their rejection was inscribed in the belligerent political climate that prevailed during the second presidency of Perón. The main hypothesis suggests that the sanction of this law by the Executive Power was decisive for the construction of an anti-Peronist discourse that declared the definitive rupture of democracy. This deepened the preference of opposition groups for extra-institutional strategies to confront the government.
Bu çalışmada, anayasacılık düşüncesinin gelişimi, özelde de politik anayasacılık anlayışının mahiyetinin 1961 Anayasası üzerinden değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Anayasacılık akımı doğal hukuk, toplum sözleşmesi ve kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesi çerçevesinde geliştirilmiştir. Anayasacılık temelde siyasal iktidarın keyfi yönetimine karşı temel hak ve özgürlüklerin garanti altına alınmasıyla birlikte bu iktidarın denge-fren mekanizmasıyla kontrol altında tutulmasını amaçlamaktadır. Politik anayasacılık, anayasanın toplumla olan bağlarına dikkat çeker. Anayasanın asıl sahibini kurucu iktidar olarak görmez; toplum iradesinin bizzat sahibi olan halkı esas alır. Politik anayasacılık anlayışı, özünde politik bir metin olan anayasaların, siyasal iktidar ile toplum arasında imzalanan bir sözleşme niteliğinde olması gerektiğini ve bu durumun da anayasaların sosyo-politik meşruiyetini arttırıcı bir unsur olduğuna vurgu yapmaktadır. 1961 Anayasası yapım sürecinde uygulanan "kurucu meclis" sistemi anayasanın toplum sözleşmesi niteliğinde oluşu açısından önemli olmakla birlikte, meclisin oluşumu ve halkı temsil niteliğinin eksikliği yönünden demokratik bir şekilde gerçekleşmemiştir. 1961 Anayasası, çoğulcu demokratik düzeni gerçekleştirebilmek için bir dizi hüküm kabul etmiştir. Bunlardan belki de en önemlisi Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin kuruluşudur. Anayasanın üstünlüğü ilkesi teorik düzeyde ifade edilmekle yetinilmemiş, kanunların anayasaya uygunluğunun yargısal denetimi yoluyla gerçek güvence ve müeyyidesi sağlanmıştır. Çift meclis sistemi ile parlâmentonun çoğunluk gücüne dayanarak keyfi uygulamaları engellenmek istenmiştir. Hak ve özgürlükler alanında ise sistemli ve ayrıntılı düzenlemeler yoluna gidilmiştir. Ancak bütün bu düzenlemelerin yanında özellikle 1971 ve 1973 yıllarında yapılan değişiklikler ile askerî otoritenin sivil otorite karşısında ayrıcalıklar elde edeceği düzenlemeler getirilmiştir. ; In this study, it is aimed to evaluate the development of constitutional thought, in particular the nature of political constitutionalism through the 1961 Constitution. Constitutionalism has been developed within the framework of natural law, social contract and the principle of separation of powers. Constitutionalism mainly aims to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms against the arbitrary administration of political power and to keep this power under control by the checkbalance mechanism. Political constitutionalism draws attention to the bonds of constitution with society. It does not consider the real owner of the Constitution as constitutive power; it considers the people who are the owners of the will of society. The concept of political constitutionalism emphasizes that constitutions, essentially political texts, must have the characteristics of a contract signed between political power and society, which in turn increases the socio-political legitimacy of constitutions. Although it is important in terms of being a constitution of society, the "constituent assembly" system applied in the 1961 Constitution was not democratic in terms of the constitution of the assembly and the lack of representation of the people. The 1961 Constitution adopted a number of provisions to achieve a pluralistic democratic regime. Perhaps the most important of these is the establishment of the Constitutional Court. The principle of the supremacy of the Constitution was not satisfied by being expressed at the theoretical level, but by the judicial review of the conformity of the laws to the constitution, real assurance and sanctions were provided. With the dual-parliamentary system, it is desired to prevent arbitrary applications based on the majority power of parliament. As to the field of rights and freedoms, systematic and detailed regulations have been made. However, amendments made in 1971 and 1973, along with all of these regulations, introduced regulations for the military authority to obtain privileges in the face of civilian authority.
There is an extensive research that explores the reproduction of transnational communities and relations, with a particular focus on locality, identity and culture. However, the existing literature on transnational migration is largely based on the case studies of immigrant communities living in the United States and Western Europe, while not much has been said about the transnational practices of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia, even though Russia is the world's third largest recipient of labour migrants (after the US and Germany), and Central Asian republics rank among the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. Given the socio-political and cultural differences between Western and post-Soviet societies, it is rather naive to assume that the theoretical perspectives and insights from Western context may be applicable in the illiberal political contexts such as Russia where labour migrants can hardly engage in collective action or transnational activism.A case in point is Uzbek labour migrants in Russia. Unlike Western countries (e.g. US, UK, Germany) where migrants have/had possibilities for establishing relatively functional transnational and diasporic communities, there is little in the way of 'Uzbek community' established in Russia and it is a form of temporary migration where young Uzbeks (mainly men) go to Russia for a few years and return more or less permanently to Uzbekistan after being deported, getting entry ban or due to loss or unavailability of jobs. Although Uzbek labour migrants can hardly be called 'transmigrants', in this paper I argue that rapid improvements in technologies of communication (e.g. smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to stay in touch with their origin societies as well as to create some form of permanent, telephone-based 'Uzbek mahalla' (community) in Moscow, which usually gathers around migrants that hail from the same mahalla or village in Uzbekistan. In other words, Uzbek migrants' transnational place-making practices take place via smartphones and social media. The existence of such telephone/internet-based transnational environment helps migrants cope with the challenges of 'musofirchilik' (being alien) and avoid or manoeuvre around structural constraints such as complicated residence registration and work permit rules, social exclusion, racism and the lack of social security. These specifics of the Russian migration regime have implications for transnational migration literature both theoretically and empirically as well as provide nuanced insights on the impact of migration on everyday life and social change in Central Asia.These processes will be investigated with reference to ethnographic study of the everyday life and experiences of Uzbek migrants who work in construction sector in Moscow and their family members and community who stay behind in Shabboda mahalla in rural Fergana, Uzbekistan. By ethnographically attending to the experiences of Uzbek migrants and their left-behind communities, I will try to demonstrate the everydayness of material, emotional, social, and symbolic networks and exchanges that connect Shabboda mahalla (neighborhood community) to Moscow. More specifically, I will show how the bonds of 'mahalladoshlik' (shared mahalla origin) and mahalla-level social relations (e.g. hashar (reciprocity), trust, obligation, age hierarchies, gossips and social sanctions) are reproduced and maintained across distance, through smartphones and social media, and have identifiable impact on the outcomes of many practices that Uzbek migrants (and other actors) engage with in Moscow. This paper is based on ethnographic material gathered between January 2014 and May 2017 in Moscow, Russia and Fergana, Uzbekistan. (for a total thirteen months).
Настоящая статья посвящена анализу основных принципов формирования, развития и деятельности института Защитника народа в Республике Перу. Это государство Латинской Америки развивалось по демократическому пути только в течение последних 65 лет. За этот период было принято тринадцать различных конституций, но лишь последняя Конституция 1993 г. провозгласила действительно демократические принципы жизни перуанского государства. В этой конституции закреплён большой объём личных, социально-экономических и политических прав и свобод граждан. Одной из гарантий осуществления указанных прав и свобод на практике является учреждение института омбудсмена, в перуанском законодательстве именуемого «Защитником народа» (Defensor del pueblo). Данному институту посвящена глава 11 Конституции, а также Органический закон о ведомстве защитника народа №26520 от 4 августа 1995 г. В статье на основе перуанского органического законодательства анализируется роль и значение института Защитника народа в Республике Перу. Описан порядок формирования этого института, процедура избрания защитника народа, назначение двух его заместителей. Показан общий объём полномочий Защитника народа, порядок его взаимоотношений с другими государственными органами, в том числе и с Национальным конгрессом. Отдельное внимание уделяется процедуре рассмотрения жалоб граждан Ведомством защиты народа. Ежегодно Защитник народа представляет депутатам конгресса доклад о своей деятельности за истекший год, публикуемый в официальном издании «Эль Перуано», в котором даётся отчёт о количестве и типе полученных жалоб, результатах расследований, а также о принятых мерах и санкциях. ; The presented article is devoted to the analysis of the basic principles of development, formation and activity of the institute of rhe Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Peru. This Latin American state only 65 years ago took the democratic pass. Thirteen various constitutions were accepted in the meantime, and only the last constitution of 1993 could proclaim really democtratic principles of a state regime. The constitution recognizes a wide range of personal, socio-economic and political rights and freedoms of individuals. One of the guarantees of their implementation in practice is establishment of the institute of the Commissioner for Human Rights (in the Peruvian legislation referred to "The defender of the people" [Defensor del pueblo (spanish)], which is regulated by chapter 11 of the Political Constitution of 1993, and also by the Organic Act on the Human Rights Protection Agency № 26520 of August 4, 1995. The represented article analyzes the role and the significance of the institute of Human Rights Commissioner in the Republic of Peru on the basis of Peruvian organic legislation. The research paper investigates the procedure for forming this institution, demonstrates the process of electing the Commissioner for Human Rights as well as the appointment of his two deputies. Particular emphasis is laid upon the scope of the Ombudsman's responsibility and his cooperation with other state authorities in the Republic of Peru, including National Congress, along with the value of annual and emergency reports of Human Rights Commissioner to the State's legislative Authority. Special attention is paid to the procedure of consideration of citizen' complaints by the Human Rights Protection Agency. Annually the Commissioner for Human Rights submits the report on activities over the expired year to the Members of Congress, published in the official publication "El Peruano", which contains the report on the number and type of the received complaints, the results of the investigations as well as taken measures and sanctions.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
On Jan. 20, 2024, Iran's Revolutionary Guards successfully launched a three-stage rocket that put the Sorayya satellite into orbit, at an unprecedented 460 miles above the Earth's surface. It is alleged that Iran's space program is a cover for testing a nuclear weapons delivery system. What is a scientific victory for Iran could also be a strategic projection of the Islamic Republic's geo-spatial power. While this space launch was planned days in advance, it occurred on the same day that Israeli forces allegedly killed five Revolutionary Guards of the expeditionary Quds Force in Damascus, followed by an Iraqi militia affiliated with Iran firing ballistic missiles at a base housing American forces in Iraq. Just five days earlier, Iran launched salvos of ballistic missiles towards Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan against alleged terrorist bases.The recent satellite launch into space is connected to these political tensions on the ground. It sent a message to the U.S. and Israel that, despite sanctions or the assassination of its scientists, Iran can still develop the technology to fire a long-distance missile, whether into space or over a continent. If the sanctions and assassinations were meant to curtail such activities, Iran demonstrated they are not working.This points to an unexamined aspect of the conflict in the Middle East since Oct. 7, 2023: Outer space has become a conflict zone. When Iraqi Shi'a militias or Yemeni Houthis launch a drone or ballistic missile, these weapons either enter space or depend on satellites.What the latest Iranian launch has also demonstrated is that the conflicts of Earth — the current fighting in the Middle East in this case — have been projected into space, reminiscent of a trend that began with the Cold War superpowers.Militarizing spaceA ballistic missile burns up the fuel that propels it into the atmosphere until it enters space. Once the fuel is consumed, the missile's trajectory cannot be altered, following a path determined by gravity pulling it back toward the Earth's surface — and its eventual target. The German V-2 was the first ballistic missile. Fired on September 8, 1944, it was the first human-made object hurtled into space. As they invaded Germany, both the U.S. and Soviets sought out the German rocket scientists to develop their respective missile/space programs. The V-2's technology allowed the U.S. and Soviets to send satellites into space, even allowing astronauts to reach the moon itself.In October 1957, the Soviets launched the first satellite, Sputnik, into space, where it orbited the earth and delivered a prestigious victory for communism during the Cold War. According to historian Douglas Brinkley, "For a world locked in a Cold War rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets, space quickly became the new arena of battle." Space launchers and launches were a means of refining military technology discreetly, in the name of space exploration, while simultaneously broadcasting these advances to adversaries and allies. From an American national security perspective, if the USSR could launch a satellite into space, it could do the same with a nuclear warhead, putting American territory in danger. Furthermore, a missile/ rocket might carry a physical payload, such as a satellite or a warhead, but it also carries a political message intended to communicate to adversaries short of violence. That dynamic is what made the Cold War cold.The same threat perceptions explain why the U.S. feared Iran's satellite program well before the regional war escalated last October, pitting American forces against the Islamic Republic's allies in Yemen and Iraq.The American and Soviet space programs were also about prestige, and the most recent launch has been a matter of national prestige for Iran in the aftermath of the deadly terrorist blasts that occurred in the nation on Jan. 3.Middle East geopolitics and astropoliticsAs for the Middle East, historically, outer space was an area used to penetrate the region. During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR deployed spy satellites above the Middle East, and later satellites were essential for the global positioning system (GPS) to guide American cruise missiles and drones used against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, and then against al-Qaida after 2001.In the 21st century, the Global South entered the space arena, led by China, India, and Iran. Space soon emerged as an arena for competition among Middle Eastern states. Among the Persian Gulf regimes, Qatar achieved asymmetric power in the 1990s against Saudi Arabia by broadcasting Al Jazeera to its much larger neighbor, as well as the entire region, via a news channel that depends on satellite technology. The United Arab Emirates is currently bolstering its credentials as a regional Sparta by embarking on a mission to Mars.Israel, however, had a monopoly on space technology and putting its own satellites into space. Iran's current space program serves as a means to challenge a regional rival as well as a superpower — the U.S. At the same time, Iran's allies in the "Axis of Resistance" have militarized space. Iran gave Houthis drone technology that can fly long distances to strike Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Houthi drone attacks are guided by satellite technology, as a drone flying at such a long range depends on a satellite data link for information to be sent back to the pilot in Yemen. As for Houthi drones, they are GPS-guided to their target before crashing into it to wreak havoc and damage. The Houthis have no known communications satellites and rely on commercially available satellite space. These attacks demonstrate a sophisticated level of coordination among the Houthis, who use 3D printing to build the drones and the components based on Iranian designs, while imagery analysts, uplink engineers, mechanics, and pilot crews work in unison to support the attacks. By 2022, Houthi strikes were one of the factors that pushed Saudi Arabia and the UAE to extricate themselves from the Yemen conflict, which also gave an advantage to Iran, the Gulf countries' regional adversary. The Houthis mastered both drone technology and ballistic missiles. The Soviets transformed the German V-2 into the Scud, the most widely proliferated ballistic missile in the Arab world. The Houthis inherited Scuds from the former government after the Arab Spring. In 2017, they fired them towards Saudi Arabia. In 2023, the Houthis launched both drones and ballistic missiles towards Israel's southern port of Eilat, in solidarity with Hamas. In 2017, the Houthis attacked King Salman air base in Saudi Arabia and as well as Riyadh with the Burkan 2-H, a ballistic Scud-type missile inherited from the old Yemeni arsenal, and engineered with a range of more than 500 miles to hit the Saudi capital. Unlike the Burkan, the missiles that were launched towards Eilat were most likely based on the Iranian Ghadr (or Qadr) a close relative of the North Korean Nodong, basically a larger missile based on the original Soviet Scud missile, with more than double the range at 1,200 miles. These Houthi ballistic missiles reached outer space, where Israel's Arrow defense system intercepted them in the stratosphere, marking the first instance of space combat in history.The Islamic Republic's most recent space launch has sent a message to Israel that Iran is catching up. The message to the U.S. is that Iran is in a stronger position after Trump's 2017 unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Afterwards, Iran had the excuse to advance its centrifuge nuclear technology, its nuclear stockpile, and now advance its space program.Meanwhile, the message to the Iranian people is that, while its economy is under sanctions and they endure terrorist attacks, at least they can take national pride in reaching space.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Every year, the State Department issues its new "Country Reports on Terrorism," and each year, the rationale for Cuba's listing among the state sponsors of international terrorism gets thinner. The 2022 report, issued just last month, justifies the inclusion of the other countries on the list — North Korea, Iran, and Syria — by citing specific acts of state terrorism or ongoing support for terrorist groups. The report on Cuba, however, is simply an historical account of how Cuba ended up on the list in the first place rather than a rationale for keeping it there.In 1982, President Ronald Reagan designated Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism for supporting revolutionary movements in Central America. In 2015, President Obama determined, based on an intelligence review, that Cuba was not a state sponsor of terrorism and took it off the list. In January 2021, just days before leaving office, President Trump put Cuba back on the terrorism list in a transparent political pay-off to conservative Cuban American supporters in south Florida, and a last-ditch attempt to complicate Joe Biden's stated intention to resume normalizing relations with Havana. Trump's rationale was that Cuba, which had been hosting peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN guerrilla movement, refused to extradite the ELN negotiators to Colombia's new conservative government after it broke off the talks — despite the fact that Colombia had previously signed a protocol specifying that if talks collapsed, the ELN negotiators would be guaranteed safe passage back to Colombia. Norway, co-guarantor of the talks along with Cuba, sided with Havana. (Norway was not designated a state sponsor of terrorism.)Even that thin rationale disappeared when Gustavo Petro was elected president of Colombia in 2022, restarted the peace talks, and demanded that Washington remove Cuba from the terrorism list, calling its inclusion "an injustice."Not until its final sentence does the 2022 Terrorism Report offer any rationale for Cuba remaining on the list: "Cuba also continues to harbor several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades."Cuba has, in fact, given political asylum to a handful of U.S. political exiles accused or convicted of politically motivated acts of violence in the 1970s. The United States, of course, has given political asylum to many more Cubans who engaged in politically-motivated violent attacks in Cuba — some of them trained by the CIA as soldiers in its secret war against Cuba in the 1960s. But does harboring U.S. fugitives qualify as sponsoring international terrorism? Although the fugitives have been in Cuba since the 1970s, they were not cited as a rationale for Cuba's designation as a state sponsor until 1988, by which time, the annual reports admitted, there was no longer any evidence of Cuba supporting any foreign revolutionary groups. The law requiring the annual State Department terrorism report defines international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." That does not fit the U.S. fugitives, whose violent acts were committed in the United States before they sought asylum in Cuba. Some of their actions might qualify as domestic terrorism, but not international terrorism. Nor does giving alleged terrorists political asylum constitute providing them with a terrorist sanctuary, which the law defines as territory from which terrorists are allowed "to carry out terrorist activities… or as a transit point." None of the U.S. fugitives have planned or plotted terrorist attacks against the United States since arriving in Cuba half a century ago. In 2015, when President Obama took Cuba off the list, Secretary of State John Kerry implicitly acknowledged that the U.S. fugitives were not a valid reason to keep Cuba on the list.In short, there is no longer any legitimate rationale whatsoever for Cuba being designated a state sponsor of terrorism. Cuba stays on the list because the Biden administration does not have the political courage to remove it — even though Cuba and the United States have a Memorandum of Agreement and active dialogue on counter-terrorism cooperation! Various U.S. officials have offered different stories about whether the Biden administration is reviewing Cuba's designation. Shortly after Biden's inauguration, then-White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said it was under review, along with the rest of Trump's Cuba policies. More recently, in March 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken was browbeaten by Rep. Maria Salazar (R-Fla.) into declaring it was not being reviewed. A number of Democratic members of Congress who have been pushing the administration to take Cuba off the list were given the impression by Biden officials that the policy was being reviewed — until Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric Jacobstein told them last week that it was not. They were livid, according to a report in The Intercept.Treating Cuba's listing like a political poker chip has real costs, not only to Cuba but to the United States as well. Most obviously, it delegitimizes the list itself, reducing it to little more than an arbitrary political cudgel. Cuba's designation has alienated important U.S. allies in Latin America and Europe. For Latin Americans, it is a symbol of Washington's broader policy of regime change, a policy universally opposed in the region. Colombia has taken the lead in organizing Latin American governments to pressure the Biden administration to take Cuba off the list. When Secretary Blinken visited President Petro in Bogotá in October 2022, Petro made a point of publicly calling for Cuba to be removed from the list. Blinken replied, "We have clear laws, clear criteria, clear requirements, and we will continue as necessary to revisit those to see if Cuba continues to merit that designation." But since the administration refuses to actually "revisit" Cuba's designation, the clear laws, criteria, and requirements never come into play. Most Europeans are able to visit the United States without seeking a visa under the ESTA (Electronic System for Travel Authorization) visa waiver program — unless they have recently traveled to a country on the state sponsors of terrorism list. The impact of this sanction on European travel to Cuba has been significant. The number of visitors from the major European countries (Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany) remains significantly depressed from pre-COVID levels while the number from Canada, which is not part of the ESTA program, has returned to pre-pandemic levels. European governments regard this restriction on their citizens as utterly unjustified and their representatives in Havana are as vocal as the Latin American diplomats in complaining about it to U.S. officials. But thus far, to no avail.As campaign 2024 kicks off, the chances that the Biden administration will admit the obvious and take Cuba off the terrorism list appear increasingly remote. There have been 16 U.S. presidential elections since Fidel Castro rode into Havana in 1959, and only once has the incumbent U.S. president relaxed sanctions during an election year — Obama in 2016 as part of his normalization policy. No president running for re-election has ever relaxed sanctions during a campaign.Cuba is living through its worst economic crisis since the 1990s, unable to access the international financial system because of the terrorism designation. But apparently, Cubans will be condemned to suffer for at least another year, branded with the Scarlett Letter T for terrorist, while the Dimmesdales of Biden's campaign try to curry favor with Cuban Americans in south Florida who are not going to vote for him anyway.
En Colombia, con el propósito de generar escenarios de transparencia en el ejercicio contractual, y sobro todo en lo que tiene que ver con la selección del ejecutor, se estableció la ley 80 de 1993, donde el Régimen de Contratación Estatal se configuró como un instrumento que garantiza que dicho ejercicio se realice dentro de los principios establecidos en la Constitución Política en el artículo 209, dentro de los que se identifican igualdad, moralidad imparcialidad, eficacia, economía, claridad, publicidad y responsabilidad. Asimismo, con la expedición de la ley 1150 de 2007, se buscó incorporar elementos que garanticen la transparencia y la eficiencia en la contratación pública, afirmando que la modalidad directa de contratación supone la configuración de escenarios de corrupción en la celebración de contratos con recursos públicos y por lo tanto direcciona el ejercicio contractual a procesos de contratación competitivos y oficiales, a partir de modalidades de selección que se ajustan a las necesidades de las entidades que se quieren cumplir con la celebración de los contratos. Por otra parte, con la ley 1474 de 2011, se incorporaron mecanismos de sanción de tipo administrativo, disciplinario, penal y fiscal, que permiten de forma regulada la lucha contra la corrupción. El Decreto 1510 de 2013, estandarizó los procesos, procedimientos, necesidades y precios para todas las entidades que con conforman el Estado, en aras de combatir del flagelo de la corrupción. La Constitución Política de Colombia, garantizando el interés público o social, determinó que los monopolios sólo se pueden configurar para atender dicho interés, por esto en su artículo 336 estableció que los monopolios sólo podrían establecerse como arbitrios rentísticos y es allí donde 100 consideró que los juegos de suerte y azar, son por si mismos un monopolio rentístico, en donde los ingresos generados se destinan para el financiamiento del sector salud en el país. ; In Colombia, with the purpose of generating scenarios of transparency in the contractual exercise, and especially in what has to do with the selection of the executor, Law 80 of 1993 was established, where the State Contracting Regime was configured as an instrument that guarantees that said exercise is carried out within the principles established in the Political Constitution in article 209, within which are identified equality, morality, impartiality, efficiency, economy, clarity, publicity and responsibility. Also, with the issuance of Law 1150 of 2007, it was sought to incorporate elements that guarantee transparency and efficiency in public procurement, stating that the direct modality of hiring involves the configuration of corruption scenarios in the conclusion of contracts with public resources and therefore directs the contractual exercise to competitive and official contracting processes, based on selection modalities that are adjusted to the needs of the entities that wish to comply with the execution of the contracts. On the other hand, with Law 1474 of 2011, sanction mechanisms of administrative, disciplinary, criminal and fiscal type were incorporated, which allow the fight against corruption to be regulated. Decree 1510 of 2013, standardized the processes, procedures, needs and prices for all entities that make up the State, in order to combat the scourge of corruption. The Political Constitution of Colombia, guaranteeing the public or social interest, determined that monopolies can only be set up to meet this interest, for this reason in its article 336 established that monopolies could only be established as rentistic arbitraries and it is there where 100 considered that games of luck and chance, are by themselves a rent-seeking monopoly, where the income generated is used to finance the health sector in the country.
The article provides a social and philosophical analysis of the new generation of warfare. In the unipolar world dominated by the USA, the threat of economic, 'elite', networked, informational and cybernetic wars has dramatically increased, thus exacerbating the situation already destabilized by the nuclear threat. These new types of warfare are characterized by a greater role of non-combat factors aimed at the destruction of social and economic foundations of a state, its place in the international system, its cultural and moral values, social order and political regime, all made possible by new types of weapon and new styles of warfare. Russia is now facing the threat of war in both its old and new formats.Under globalization, economic warfare have become mainstream. Leading powers in the global system strive to achieve their goals by exerting economic pressure on other states – e.g., by introducing economic sanctions. Contemporary 'elite' wars make wide use of cutting-edge discoveries in applied psychology, which help model the political personae of global leaders, their strengths and weaknesses and predict their reactions and decisions. Another threat for Russia lies in networked warfare of military origin. Without resorting to real weaponry, perpetrators of such war can achieve a real military victory, i.e. take control over a territory.Information wars are a new type of struggle between states. They include a series of actions aimed at undermining the information security of an enemy state. Information war can damage the enemy's infrastructure (communication and telecommunication lines, radio and electronic devices) and/or the morale of the political elites and populations, the public opinion and the mechanism of decision making. Another subtype of information war in the sphere of technology is to achieve informational superiority by simultaneously attacking the enemy's informational systems and protecting those on your side. Virtual space and cyberworld have also become a battleground for conflicts of these new types. ; В статье дан социально-философский анализ войн нового поколения. Показано, что в условиях однополярного мира и доминирования США на мировой арене наряду с опасностью ядерной войны резко возросла угроза войн нового поколения: экономических, «элитных»; сетецентричных, информационных, кибервойн. Речь идет о повышении роли невоенных факторов, направленных на разрушение социальных и экономических основ другого государства, его окружения, культурных и духовных ценностей, общественного уклада и политического режима с помощью новых средств борьбы и видов оружия. Подчеркивается, что ныне Россия столкнулась с очень серьезным вызовом — угрозой войны и в прежних, и в новых форматах.В условиях глобализации широкое распространение получили экономические войны. Ведущие страны стремятся к достижению своих целей на мировой арене воздействием на политику других государств экономическими методами, например введением экономических санкций. В современных «элитных» войнах широко используются новейшие достижения прикладной психологии, которые позволяют точно реконструировать личности лидеров, выявлять их сильные и слабые стороны, а также прогнозировать их возможные действия. Не меньшую угрозу для России в настоящее время представляет вид сетевых войн, имеющих военное происхождение. Их особенностью является то, что в них невоенными средствами достигается реальная военная победа, осуществляется захват территорий и устанавливается контроль над ними.Информационная война представляет собой одну из новых форм борьбы между государствами, а также систему мер, осуществляемую одним государством с целью подрыва информационной безопасности. Если главными объектами воздействия и защиты при информационно-технической борьбе являются информационно-технические системы (системы связи, телекоммуникационные системы, радиоэлектронные средства), то при информационно-психологической борьбе — психика политической элиты и населения противостоящих сторон, системы формирования общественного сознания, мнения, выработки и принятия решений. Особый вид информационно-технической войны представляет собой систему мер, направленных на достижение информационного превосходства путем воздействия на информацию и информационные системы противника при одновременной защите собственной информации и своих информационных систем. Виртуальное пространство, киберпространство стало еще одним пространством, в котором проходят конфликты.
The most renowned substantive criminal law decision of the October 2002 Term, Lawrence v. Texas, will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law debates over the proper scope of the penal sanction. For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The court's ruling is the coup de grace to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations. As a matter of federal due process, courts reviewing penal legislation must now deploy some other principle to distinguish between permissible and impermissible majoritarian moral opprobrium. What that other principle will consist of is not clear. Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Lawrence offers a dizzying array of possibilities – a rhetorical smorgasbord of legal authority. Justice Kennedy's pastiche is, at a legal theoretical level, incoherent and under normal circumstances – in many other cases – would be internally contradictory. The theoretical incoherence and rhetorical overkill of Justice Kennedy's opinion lends credence to Justice Antonin Scalia's incendiary dissent in Lawrence, specifically to the idea that the majority's holding is no technical knock-out victory for liberal legalism, but rather a politically or culturally partisan decision. What is missing from Justice Scalia's dissent, though, are the important nuances and subtleties that shape the contemporary sex wars, that make them so fascinating and so unpredictable, and that both resignify and ambiguate the purported gay victory in Lawrence. This Foreword probes the fragmentation of sexual projects in the West and its implications for the sex wars and the penal law. It is intended as a guide or manual for the interpretation of the result in Lawrence and future sex battles. Part I focuses on the fracturing of sexual projects and demonstrates that it is, today, far too simplistic – in fact profoundly counterproductive – to describe the culture wars as a two-party conflict or to talk about a "homosexual agenda." In the Lawrence litigation, this point was brought home in the surprising coalition opposing the Texas statute. The question this raises is: what kinds of fissures split the gay community? What would it sound like to argue from a gay-friendly perspective against the ruling in Lawrence? Part II explores this question and develops, through a pastiche of radical statements, a politics that embraces the marginal, even criminal desire to transgress for the sake of transgression, that thrives on rebellion against hegemonic legal regimes. With this in place, Part III reconstructs Scalia's radical dissent and sharpens it to produce a keener interpretive framework to understand the result in Lawrence and future sex wars. Scalia is right that there is a culture war and that the courts are inextricably involved in those wars. He is also right that the court is shaped by the legal profession and that their decisions are largely shaped by the law profession culture. This culture and the legal academy that reproduces it are by and large more tolerant of homosexuality than many other sectors of society. The decision in Lawrence is the product of this law profession culture, and, at least on the surface, is gay-friendly – it favors the interests of liberal pro-gay-rights advocates. But it does not necessarily promote the interests of all gay-friendly. It is here that the Foreword probes the Lawrence decision – dark side and all.
Introduction: The Trade Environment Nexus:- Proposition 1: Protection of the environment has become exceedingly important, and promises to be more important for the benefit of future generations. Protecting the environment involves [both national environmental regulation and] rules of international cooperation, sanction, or both, so that some government actions to enhance environmental protection will not be undermined by the actions of other governments. Sometimes such rules involve trade-restricting measures. Proposition 2: Trade liberalisation is important for enhancing world economic welfare and for providing a greater opportunity for billions of individuals to lead satisfying lives. Measures that restrict trade will often decrease the achievement of this goal. The above propositions reflect one of the major tensions that governments and international society face today in promoting sustainable development. The principle of sustainable development, a main organisational concept in international environmental law ('IEL'), seeks to integrate environmental and socio-economic considerations through the development of human systems capable of meeting the basic needs of all individuals, both now and in the future, whilst respecting ecological integrity. Three main arguments support positive synergies between free trade and environmental protection. First, liberalised trade encourages nations to specialise in the production of goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage. This can lead to more efficient use of natural resources. Second, exposure to international competition forces companies to innovate and anticipate demand, which may further improve efficiency. Finally, a correlation has been found between economic growth, generated by freer trade, and citizen demand for environmental protection. There are also three main ways in which free trade can harm the environment. First, tensions between free trade and environmental protection occur when environmental externalities are not taken into account. In such situations, free trade can exacerbate already environmentally harmful resource allocation, because it magnifies economic activity. Second, free trade may lead to a 'race to the bottom' or 'regulatory chill' on environmental protection, as countries compete to attract investment. This claim is contested and empirical evidence equivocal: while some countries have reduced, or not strengthened, their environmental regulations to increase competitiveness, there is also evidence that freer trade, through increasing economic interdependency, has enhanced environmental protection in other countries. The final area of concern, which is the focus of this paper, is the treatment of environmental interests within the international trade regime's dispute settlement system. In part due to its high public profile, dispute settlement has become the arena in which conflicts between trade and environmental protection are being fought out. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the environment-related jurisprudence of the panels/AB, in light of the PP and CP. This will allow an assessment of whether the panels/AB are integrating environmental considerations into WTO dispute settlement to the extent necessary to balance the goals of the propositions outlined initially. Section Two examines why the panels/AB should take principles of IEL into account in trade-related dispute settlement and provides a brief discussion of the PP and CP. Section Three analyses the jurisprudence of the panels/AB under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ('SPS') in light of the PP. Section Four considers the recent AB and panel interpretation of GATT Article XX in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle) in light of the CP. Section Five concludes the evaluation of the panels/AB's integration of the PP and CP into the trade regime.
Introduction: The Trade Environment Nexus:- Proposition 1: Protection of the environment has become exceedingly important, and promises to be more important for the benefit of future generations. Protecting the environment involves [both national environmental regulation and] rules of international cooperation, sanction, or both, so that some government actions to enhance environmental protection will not be undermined by the actions of other governments. Sometimes such rules involve trade-restricting measures. Proposition 2: Trade liberalisation is important for enhancing world economic welfare and for providing a greater opportunity for billions of individuals to lead satisfying lives. Measures that restrict trade will often decrease the achievement of this goal. The above propositions reflect one of the major tensions that governments and international society face today in promoting sustainable development. The principle of sustainable development, a main organisational concept in international environmental law ('IEL'), seeks to integrate environmental and socio-economic considerations through the development of human systems capable of meeting the basic needs of all individuals, both now and in the future, whilst respecting ecological integrity. Three main arguments support positive synergies between free trade and environmental protection. First, liberalised trade encourages nations to specialise in the production of goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage. This can lead to more efficient use of natural resources. Second, exposure to international competition forces companies to innovate and anticipate demand, which may further improve efficiency. Finally, a correlation has been found between economic growth, generated by freer trade, and citizen demand for environmental protection. There are also three main ways in which free trade can harm the environment. First, tensions between free trade and environmental protection occur when environmental externalities are not taken into account. In such situations, free trade can exacerbate already environmentally harmful resource allocation, because it magnifies economic activity. Second, free trade may lead to a 'race to the bottom' or 'regulatory chill' on environmental protection, as countries compete to attract investment. This claim is contested and empirical evidence equivocal: while some countries have reduced, or not strengthened, their environmental regulations to increase competitiveness, there is also evidence that freer trade, through increasing economic interdependency, has enhanced environmental protection in other countries. The final area of concern, which is the focus of this paper, is the treatment of environmental interests within the international trade regime's dispute settlement system. In part due to its high public profile, dispute settlement has become the arena in which conflicts between trade and environmental protection are being fought out. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the environment-related jurisprudence of the panels/AB, in light of the PP and CP. This will allow an assessment of whether the panels/AB are integrating environmental considerations into WTO dispute settlement to the extent necessary to balance the goals of the propositions outlined initially. Section Two examines why the panels/AB should take principles of IEL into account in trade-related dispute settlement and provides a brief discussion of the PP and CP. Section Three analyses the jurisprudence of the panels/AB under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ('SPS') in light of the PP. Section Four considers the recent AB and panel interpretation of GATT Article XX in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle) in light of the CP. Section Five concludes the evaluation of the panels/AB's integration of the PP and CP into the trade regime.
This Article argues that the U.S. and EC views of the national security interests exceptions reflect competing conceptions of the WTO legal order. Under the first, the WTO is viewed as merely an agreement between states governing a limited issue area, the disciplining of protectionist policies, under which other issue areas are reserved to sovereign state decisionmaking or, alternatively, whatever other international institutions states have separately granted competence for management of the issue. Under this view, the United States might well argue that its Helms-Burton sanctions are outside the jurisdiction of the WTO and instead within the jurisdiction of the United Nations (and, particularly, the Security Council). This Article suggests yet a third mode of interpreting the essential security interests exception that mediates between the two competing conceptions. Drawing on choice of law principles, it argues that the WTO legal order should look to the practices of the United Nations to ascertain the circumstances under which a state could legitimately invoke the essential security interests exception-in particular, to whether the Security Council has ever found a similar situation to warrant international enforcement action. Before articulating this view and applying it to the U.S.-EC dispute, Part II of this Article discusses the alternative conceptions of the WTO that underlie the competing U.S. and EC legal positions. It does so by explicating the debate between Judith Hippler Bello and John Jackson concerning the WTO remedial system, in which Bello suggests a bargain theory of the new WTO as a contract between sovereigns and Jackson argues from the premises of a public law, perhaps even quasi-constitutional, conception. Part H further explores the presuppositions inherent in Jackson's analysis of the administrative law concept of deference as a possible tool for describing the relationship between WTO dispute settlement and national adjudication of antidumping claims. Part III then employs these competing perspectives to develop arguments for and against self-judging interpretations of the WTO national security exceptions and shows how each approach fails to resolve adequately the tension between the supranationalizing effect of WTO law and the enduring importance of national sovereignty. Part IV considers the relationship between the WTO legal order and other structures of governance in the international legal order that are implicated by the two conceptions. It does so by reexamining the question of whether and how, in light of the establishment of an "Organization" for the management of world trade, WTO law can function as a special legal regime, separate from the general principles and rules of international law or the influence of other international institutions. Finally, Part V advances a choice of law approach for interpreting the essential security interests exception that addresses the weaknesses of the bargain and constitutional conceptions. It then applies the choice of law approach to the Helms-Burton dispute. The Article concludes that, although the choice of law approach would not necessarily resolve particularly hard cases, such as that between the United States and European Union over Cuba, it would provide an objective basis for addressing disputes of this kind. It would also encourage principled decisionmaking within each institution, thus benefiting the broader community by publicizing the relationship between issue areas and the tradeoffs and bargaining that occur at the supranational level, furthering the rational allocation of decisionmaking competence and buttressing the legitimacy of the structure of international institutions as a whole.
Tämä tutkimus käsittelee suojeluvastuun periaatetta, jota analysoidaan erityisesti Etelä-Sudanin konfliktin kontekstissa. YK:ssa ja YK:n turvallisuusneuvostossa kehitetty suojeluvastuu on poliittinen käsite, jolla on oikeudellisia seuraamuksia. Suojeluvastuussa on kyse ihmisoikeuksien toteutumisesta, joita tarkastellaan neljää vakavaa ihmisoikeusrikkomusta vasten: kansanmurha, sotarikokset, rikokset ihmisyyttä vastaan sekä etniset puhdistukset. Nämä rikkomukset on edelleen määritelty Kansainvälisen rikostuomioistuimen Rooman perussäännössä. YK:n keskeisiä tavoitteita on normatiivisen kehityksen edistäminen sekä kansainvälisen rauhan ja turvallisuuden ylläpitäminen sen peruskirjan mukaisesti. Suojeluvastuun periaate hyväksyttiin YK:n yleiskokouksen huippukokouksessa vuonna 2005. Tämä oli merkittävä poliittinen, moraalinen ja eettinen kannanotto suhteessa kaikkein vakavimpiin ihmisoikeusrikkomuksiin. YK:n pääsihteeri laati vuonna 2009 kolmen pilarin strategian suojeluvastuun toteuttamiseksi. Ensimmäinen pilari viittaa valtioiden vastuuseen suojella väestöään; toinen pilari puolestaan viittaa kansainvälisen yhteisön vastuuseen auttaa valtioita tässä tehtävässä ja kolmas pilari viittaa edelleen kansainvälisen yhteisön vastuuseen toimia oikea-aikaisesti ja päättäväisesti kyetäkseen suojelemaan väestöä mainituilta rikkomuksilta mikäli valtio itse ei ole siihen kykenevä. Nämä kolme pilaria käsitetään tässä tutkimuksessa suojeluvastuun diskursiivisiksi käytännöiksi. YK ei ole kuitenkaan kyennyt suojelemaan siviiliväestöä aseellisissa konflikteissa erityisen tehokkaasti, vaikka suojeluvastuun käytäntöjen kautta siihen olisi mahdollisuus. Tätä ristiriitaa tarkastellaan tutkimuksessa Etelä-Sudanin konfliktin kautta. Sen lisäksi, että huomio kiinnittyy usein epäonnistumisiin suojeluvastuun periaatteen mukaisessa toiminnassa, tulisi YK:n ja turvallisuusneuvoston toimintaa tarkastella tässä yhteydessä myös niiden luoman normatiivisen muutoksen ja kehityksen kautta. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään kuinka YK:n ja turvallisuusneuvoston diskursiiviset ja sosiaaliset käytännöt mahdollistavat suojeluvastuun ja kuinka nämä käytännöt muuttavat tai ylläpitävät kansainvälisen yhteisön primääri-instituutioita kuten ihmisoikeuksia, suvereniteettia ja suurvaltainstituutioita ja tätä kautta mahdollistavat kansainvälisen yhteisön muutosta. Ihmisoikeudet, suvereniteetti ja suurvaltainstituutio ymmärretään myös suojeluvastuun perusperiaatteiksi. Tutkimuskysymyksen ensimmäinen osa käsittelee YK:n ja turvallisuusneuvoston roolia kaikkein vakavimpien ihmisoikeusrikkomusten ehkäisemisessä ja niihin vastaamisessa. Toinen osa liittyy YK:n ja turvallisuusneuvoston sekä Kansainvälisen rikostuomioistuimen kaltaisten sekundääri-instituutioiden rooliin kansainvälisten suhteiden englantilaisen koulukunnan instituutioiden muutosta koskevassa teoreettisessa keskustelussa. Tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan että suojeluvastuun mahdollistamisella YK ja turvallisuusneuvosto myötävaikuttavat tavoitteidensa mukaisesti kansainväliseen rauhaan ja turvallisuuteen. Tutkimuksen teoreettinen viitekehys rakentuu kansainvälisten suhteiden englantilaisen koulukunnan ja instituutioiden muutosta käsittelevän teoretisoinnin sekä konstruktivismin ja eettisten näkökohtien tarkastelun varaan. Eettiset näkökohdat huomioidaan erityisesti englantilaiseen koulukuntaan liitettyjen käsitteiden pluralismi ja solidarismi kautta. Tutkimuksen menetelmälliset suuntaviivat muodostuvat tavoista tarkastella turvallisuusneuvoston käytäntöjä suojeluvastuuta rakentavina käytäntöinä osana suojeluvastuun muodostamaa normatiivista viitekehystä. Lisäksi analyysissä hyödynnetään eettisen päättelyn kriteereitä, koska suojeluvastuukäytäntöjen tulisi olla eettisesti päteviä. Tutkimuksen primääriaineisto ajalta 2011–2015 muodostuu YK:n, turvallisuusneuvoston, yleiskokouksen, Ihmisoikeusneuvoston, Afrikan Unionin sekä YK:n rauhanturvaoperaation UNMISSin Etelä-Sudania koskevista päätöslauselmista, keskusteluista, dokumenteista, raporteista ja lausunnoista. Analyysin perusteella turvallisuusneuvoston suojeluvastuukäytännöistä, jotka liittyivät valtion rakentumiseen, siviilien suojeluun, pakotteiden asettamiseen ja rauhansopimuksen saavuttamiseen, voidaan päätelminä esittää, että rauhanturvaoperaatio UNMISSin mandaatit muuttuivat Etelä-Sudanin konfliktin muuttuessa ja vastaavasti käytännöt muuttuivat. YK ja turvallisuusneuvosto mahdollistavat suojeluvastuun rakentumisen ja nämä käytännöt ilmentävät sekä pluralistisia että solidaristisia periaatteita. Voidaan esittää, että muutokset käytännöissä olivat merkityksellisiä sekä suojeluvastuun rakentumiselle että kansainvälisen yhteisön primääri-instituutioille. Ihmisoikeudet saattavat olla ensisijaisia suhteessa suvereniteettiin joidenkin käytäntöjen kohdalla ja tämä suurvaltainstituution myötävaikutuksella. Primääri- ja sekundääri-instituutiot ovat konstitutiivisessa suhteessa. Analyysissa havaittiin myös joitakin uusia käytäntöjä. Esimerkiksi UNMISS avasi tukikohtansa pakeneville siviileille, mikä oli eettisesti oikea ratkaisu. Myös uusia ongelmatilanteita syntyi, koska turvallisuusneuvosto ei halunnut toiminnallaan tukea vakavia ihmisoikeusrikkomuksia tehneitä tahoja kuten Etelä-Sudanin hallitusta. Turvallisuusneuvosto ei kyennyt siirtämään Etelä-Sudanin tilannetta Kansainväliselle rikostuomioistuimelle, vaikka tehdyistä rikkomuksista keskusteltiin turvallisuusneuvoston kokouksissa. Suvereniteetti on ensisijainen suhteessa ihmisoikeuksiin, mutta kuitenkin niin että rankaisemattomuuden periaate ei ole enää koskematon. Rauhanturvaoperaatio UNMISSin mandaatit olivat myös varsin laajoja heijastellen Etelä-Sudanin konfliktin moninaisuutta, mutta ilman riittäviä resursseja. Tätä kautta voidaan osaltaan selittää sitä, miksi niin usein ajatellaan YK:n ja turvallisuusneuvoston epäonnistuneen tehtävissään. Yhteenvetona voidaan esittää, että pluralismi ja solidarismi ilmenevät kansainvälisessä yhteisössä samanaikaisesti konstituoiden turvallisuusneuvoston toimintaa ja roolia kansainvälisen yhteisön institutionaalisessa kehityksessä, jatkuvuudessa ja muutoksessa. ; This doctoral dissertation studies the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), especially in the context of the South Sudan conflict. R2P is a political concept, developed at the UN and United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which deals with preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. These are atrocity crimes as defined in the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court (ICC). R2P is about human rights and human rights violations, and although it is a political concept, it has legal consequences. Normative development is one of the UN's main aims. The UN develops norms and standards according to its Charter and to implement its Charter, thus contributing to its fundamental aim of maintaining international peace and security. R2P was accepted at the UN World Summit in 2005, an important event in the international consensus on moral and ethical sentiment on mass atrocities. In 2009, the UN Secretary General developed a three-pillar approach for implementing R2P, in which Pillar I refers to the "protection responsibilities of the State", Pillar II refers to "international assistance and capacitybuilding" and Pillar III to "timely and decisive response of international community". These pillars are discursive practices of R2P. However, the UN and UNSC have not been able to do well in situations of grave human rights violations in armed conflicts, although the international community has a developed system of practices for mass atrocity prevention, namely R2P. How could this paradox be perceived in the South Sudan conflict situation? When discussing the UN and UNSC, it is good to see their long-term developments and achievements instead of only focusing on their failures and catastrophes. My research question regards how UN and UNSC practices, both discursive and social practices, constitute R2P and how they may change or maintain primary institutions – human rights, sovereignty, great power management – of international society and thus affect the nature of international society. The first part of the question refers to the UNSC's role in preventing and responding to mass atrocities, and the second part refers to the role of secondary institutions, the UN, UNSC and ICC, in the English School (ES) theory of international society and institutional change. The question especially concerns how these practices of mass atrocity prevention create and are created by the primary institutions of international society, the mentioned sovereignty, human rights and great power management, which are at the same time basic principles of the R2P. The theoretical framework is constructed with the help of the ES of international relations and constructivist and ethical considerations. Ethical considerations are significant and are discussed in terms of pluralism and solidarism, ES concepts which define different moral frames and possibilities for moral action. The methodological approach proceeds from "deeds to words", meaning how practices construct R2P. It is important to consider UNSC practices for preventing mass atrocities in South Sudan relative to the normative framework R2P has created and thus being able to analyse how the UNSC may change or maintain R2P and whether these practices could be ethically considered as R2P competent. Ethical considerations and reasoning provide criteria for analysing political debates at the UNSC. The primary research material consists of relevant UN, UNSC, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, African Union, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) resolutions, documents, reports, and statements concerning South Sudan during the period of the study 2011- to 2015. Based on the analysis of UNSC practices in South Sudan to prevent and respond to mass atrocities in practices of state-building, protection of civilians, sanctions regime, and peace agreement, it is suggested as a contribution of this study that the mandates of the UNMISS were changing as a response to changes in the South Sudan conflict and respective UNSC practices. All pillars of R2P were used. Thus, the UNSC and the ICC constituted R2P, and as practices, reflected both pluralist and solidarist moral frames. Further, it could be suggested that these changes in practices not only affected R2P, but also had effects on primary institutions of international society, the relation between human rights, sovereignty and great power management. At times, human rights superseded sovereignty, with the help of great power management, thus affecting the nature of international society. There were new practices to protect civilians; the UNMISS opened its base to fleeing civilians, and there were new problems as the UNSC did not want to protect perpetrators (the South Sudan government), and it changed the UNMISS mandate not to do so. These were ethically competent actions. However, the UNSC faced limits, as it could not refer the South Sudan case to the ICC, although mass atrocities were committed in South Sudan by all, and it was discussed openly at the UNSC. Sovereignty superseded human rights, but impunity is no longer intact in international society. The UNMISS mandates were "impossible mandates", and capacities and obligations were not in balance. This in part may explain why and how UN peace operations cannot meet the expectations of international community. To conclude, it is suggested that pluralism and solidarism exist at the same time in international society, thus making the UNSC's working and the role of secondary institutions in institutional continuity and change more understandable.
