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Maintaining global peace and security remains an essential concern for many actors in the international system. To achieve this goal, both states and international organizations commend that action needs to be taken against perceived threats to national and international security. However, how to respond to these threats continues to divide the world. The declining role of the UN in peace enforcement, emergence of non-state actors, new forms of threats, and increasing unilateral actions by states have raised questions over the legitimacy of who, when, and how these actions can be taken. This article seeks to examine how international actors respond to transnational counterterrorism events. It adopts a comparative case study to discuss how regional and international actors reacted to Saudi Arabia's Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen (2015) and Turkey's Operation Peace Spring in Northern Syria (2019). It draws important similarities in the justification of both countries' actions and the varying responses and attitudes these countries have received for their actions. The study identifies the lack of international consensus on transnational counterterrorism as a catalyst in the crisis being witnessed in crisis resolution. Factors such as timing, universality of the threat, prevailing circumstances, actors involved, and mode of operation shape international response on transnational actions.

Rebels can comply with international law during a conflict by not violating international borders, yet strategic goals may incentivize rebels to violate these borders. When do international borders affect the spatial and temporal distribution of rebel activity in a conflict setting? I theorize rebels have an incentive to refrain from violating borders when doing so will reduce their international legitimacy. When international legitimacy is a less important goal, rebels will be more likely to violate borders. I test this claim in the context of the 1948 War in Mandate Palestine by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in how the 1947 UN partition line was drawn. Using an original dataset on over 1,000 Palestinian villages from British colonial documents and an atlas of aerial photographs of Palestine, I use a geographic regression discontinuity design to see how the UN partition line affected the location and timing of depopulated villages during the war. The results show that villages in areas that the UN assigned to the future Israeli state as part of the 1947 partition plan were more likely to be conquered before Israel received recognition. These findings have important implications for understanding where and when rebels target areas and shed new light on important dynamics of the 1948 War in Palestine.

International criminal justice is at a crossroads: International Criminal Tribunals for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda are closing and the International Criminal Court is developing growing activity. It is therefore crucial to adopt a new perspective in the analysis and understanding of the rationality and impacts of these post-mass crimes mechanisms: this would help clarify and strengthen their foundations and relevance. The purpose of our contribution is to present the analysis of international criminal institutions and justice better understand what kind of answers are given for mass crimes and if they achieve the goals and finalities they pursue, in taking into account the perspective of tried people (acquitted and condemned). More specifically, we analyse the discourses of around 60 individuals (made by semi-directive interviews conducted by the authors) who were tried by the ICTY and ICTR in order to approach experience and reception of international criminal law. This article is divided in two chapters. Before presenting the results of our research, we propose to develop a theoretical approach that would justify the recourse to "penal experience" of people prosecuted in order to analyse the rationality, functioning and impacts of international criminal justice. Our reasoning, based on conceptual landmarks drawn from the social sciences, allows us also to support a specific approach to the legal process as phenomenon. It is therefore not only addressed to sociologists, social psychologists or criminologists, but also to lawyers, who are, considering the foundations of their field, probably the most resistant to our approach. The article expounds first the necessity to establish a Respondents' approach. Secondly, we propose a presentation and analysis of discourses of tried people. It gives different results: firstly, the criminal process is poorly conceived, more so than the pronounced sentence. Moreover, the attributed responsibilities are rejected as a matter of principle, with a particular dismissal of forms that are specific to international criminal law i.e. command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise. These two results explain why international justice is viewed as unfair, politicised and as an outgroup justice. We analyse these findings against the backdrop of the current scholarly debates and developments concerning the forms of responsibility ascribed for international crimes, as well criminology research on biases in self-perceptions of responsibility. Secondly, discourses of tried people highlight domination and scapegoating rhetoric. Fourthly, we analyse specifically the experience of acquitted people. Indeed, acquittal is an unthought in international criminal law and the discourse of our participants confirms this assessment. So, these empirical results challenge the purposes pursued by international criminal law.

International criminal justice is at a crossroads: International Criminal Tribunals for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda are closing and the International Criminal Court is developing growing activity. It is therefore crucial to adopt a new perspective in the analysis and understanding of the rationality and impacts of these post-mass crimes mechanisms: this would help clarify and strengthen their foundations and relevance. The purpose of our contribution is to present the analysis of international criminal institutions and justice better understand what kind of answers are given for mass crimes and if they achieve the goals and finalities they pursue, in taking into account the perspective of tried people (acquitted and condemned). More specifically, we analyse the discourses of around 60 individuals (made by semi-directive interviews conducted by the authors) who were tried by the ICTY and ICTR in order to approach experience and reception of international criminal law. This article is divided in two chapters. Before presenting the results of our research, we propose to develop a theoretical approach that would justify the recourse to "penal experience" of people prosecuted in order to analyse the rationality, functioning and impacts of international criminal justice. Our reasoning, based on conceptual landmarks drawn from the social sciences, allows us also to support a specific approach to the legal process as phenomenon. It is therefore not only addressed to sociologists, social psychologists or criminologists, but also to lawyers, who are, considering the foundations of their field, probably the most resistant to our approach. The article expounds first the necessity to establish a Respondents' approach. Secondly, we propose a presentation and analysis of discourses of tried people. It gives different results: firstly, the criminal process is poorly conceived, more so than the pronounced sentence. Moreover, the attributed responsibilities are rejected as a matter of principle, with a particular dismissal of forms that are specific to international criminal law i.e. command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise. These two results explain why international justice is viewed as unfair, politicised and as an outgroup justice. We analyse these findings against the backdrop of the current scholarly debates and developments concerning the forms of responsibility ascribed for international crimes, as well criminology research on biases in self-perceptions of responsibility. Secondly, discourses of tried people highlight domination and scapegoating rhetoric. Fourthly, we analyse specifically the experience of acquitted people. Indeed, acquittal is an unthought in international criminal law and the discourse of our participants confirms this assessment. So, these empirical results challenge the purposes pursued by international criminal law.

Jointly published by three international organizations with mandates relating to occupational health and ionizing radiation - the ILO, IAEA and WHO - the publication will be useful for national authorities, trade unions, employers and other parties with an interest in ensuring an equitable approach to workers' compensation

Since the ratification of TRIPs Agreement in 1994, Intellectual Property (IP) has been the fastest growing field of law in Indonesia and the Government has launched a substantial reform in this area. This reform has tried to bring Indonesian IP Laws to meet International standard in all subjects of protection including agricultural innovation of new plant varieties. To complete this reform, the Government enacted Plant Varieties Protection Act (PVP Act) in 2000. The main substance of the PVP Act has borrowed mainly to International Convention on Plant Varieties (1991 UPOV), although there is no international law obligation for Indonesia to fully comliance with 1991 UPOV, except under Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). In fact, Indonesia has not been member to and does not ratify the 1991 UPOV yet. Firstly, this paper examines the historical background of the international intellectual property rights on agriculture, particularly 1991 UPOV and the significance for Indonesia to provide such protection under its national law. Secondly, it compares the 1978 UPOV and 1991 UPOV, and its substantial provisions particularly in the context of breeder's rights and farmer's rights. Thirdly, this paper also examines whether the adoption of such Convention into Indonesian PVP Act does easily match with Indonesian stage of agricultural research and development as well as the nature of traditional agricultural system in this country. Lastly, it also explores the substantiak provisions of the Act, particularly in the context of farmer's rights and the protection of local varieties. Apart from that, it further examines whether the PVP Act is adequate to protect prevailing tradional agricultural system of knowledge in Indonesia.

Proceedings of the ECIR Workshop on "Cyber International Relations: Emergent Realities of Conflict and Cooperation," October 13–14, 2010, MIT, Cambridge, MA. ; An event of the MIT-Harvard multidisciplinary Minerva Project on "Explorations in Cyber International Relations" (ECIR), this conference seeks to adjust traditional views to the cyber realities of the 21st century. Of the many questions shaping world politics today, few are as daunting as Who Controls Cyberspace? Clear as it might appear, this question is deceptively simple, even elusive. It obscures other hidden or implicit aspects, namely, who can control cyberspace, who will control, and who should control cyberspace. However framed, the issue of control is closely tied to matters of scale and scope as well as authority and legitimacy – and most certainly intent and capacity. Our vision is to create new understandings of these realities that help: Highlight alternative perspectives and policies as well as institutional requirements; Clarify threats and opportunities in cyberspace for national security, welfare, and influence; Provide analytical tools for understanding and managing transformation and change; and Attract and educate a new generation of researchers, scholars, and analysts. We hope to develop an integrated approach to international relations and help frame cyber theory and practice for the 21st century. Most important of all, we seek to provide foundations for an integrated view of international relations. ; This material is based upon work supported by the Office of Naval Research under Grant No. N00014-09-1-0597. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research.

This paper argues that international relations in Africa have changed especially in content since the abatement of the Cold War. These changes have been accelerated by the pressures unleashed by the international environment, including the reality of Africa's marginalisation and the forces of globalisation. These, along with domestic factors, including debt, internal conflicts, the impact of the ubiquitous structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), HIV/AIDS and human insecurity in general have combined to underscore foreign aid and economic assistance as key driving forces of the continent's foreign policies and diplomacy towards the North. Yet, the new thrust of foreign policies, informed by the need for foreign aid, has not occurred without a price. Among other things it has elevated technocrats in central or reserve banks and finance ministries to positions of prominence vis-à-vis officials from foreign ministries and in the process introduced extra- African actors into the foreign policy making process of the continent. This in turn has undermined Africa's increasingly tenuous economic sovereignty. But above all, it has led to the strengthening of ties with the North and international creditors in particular at the cost of intra-African relations. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) recently inaugurated, promise to open a new chapter in Africa's international relations. It is argued, however, that against a background of a confluence of factors, these new continental projects will make only a minimal impact in terms of mitigating the consequences of the aid-driven foreign policies and thus altering the donor-oriented postures of African states.

During the broad preparatory process for the Johannesburg World Summit there was hope that Johannesburg would become the starting point for establishing a more effective "international environmental governance". However, there is still controversial debate on how to achieve the aim of better governance. As the idea of establishing a Global Environment Organisation (GEO) with which the existing UNEP could merge can, at best be realised in the long run, UNEP should continue to play its leading role in the field of international environmental action. However, it will undoubtedly be unable to do so unless its internal structure and financial base are considerably strengthened. It was certainly a serious handicap that, until recently, the UNEP Governing Council has hampered effective ministerial participation and continuity in governance. Now it is supposed to share its governance role with the newly established Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF), functioning as an additional UNEP policy organ that is expected to provide broad overarching policy advice. The GMEF is determined to meet annually at ministerial level. But there is still controversial debate on the question whether the GMEF, as opposed to the Governing Council, is to be organised as a body with universal membership. In the author's view, UNEP should continue to function as a non-plenary organ with clear-cut decision-making powers. It should meet at the ministerial level. Considering its broad range of tasks, it should function on a permanent basis in the future. And, finally, it should be assisted by a high-level intergovernmental body for providing broad overarching environmental policy advice; the GMEF might function as such a body. Both UNEP and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) must foster environmental protection and development as a uniform endeavour which urgently requires integrated solutions. This can be done by effecting a pragmatic division of work at functional and operational levels. In addition, three other strategies of strengthening international environmental governance should be pursued: First, the various international environmental treaty-making and treatyimplementation processes should be better harmonised or, at least, co-ordinated; in this context, UNEP is called upon to continue and intensify its efforts to enhance the synergies and linkages between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with comparable areas of focus, by prompting the respective MEA secretariats to enter into appropriate co-ordination arrangements and giving them full logistic support in this respect. Second, as many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have considerable knowledge and expertise in environmental and developmental matters, States should consider intensifying the partnership with them. States should, however, be empowered to make a selective choice among the mass of NGOs operating at international level. They should accept as partners only those NGOs which meet certain qualitative requirements. Third, as local governments are key components of national sustainable development strategies if such plans are to succeed, the existing local Agenda 21 processes should be expanded and intensified. In particular, supporting the direct engagement of local and sub-national institutions from around the world in international activities and partnerships is an important component of good international environmental governance

During the broad preparatory process for the Johannesburg World Summit there was hope that Johannesburg would become the starting point for establishing a more effective "international environmental governance". However, there is still controversial debate on how to achieve the aim of better governance. As the idea of establishing a Global Environment Organisation (GEO) with which the existing UNEP could merge can, at best be realised in the long run, UNEP should continue to play its leading role in the field of international environmental action. However, it will undoubtedly be unable to do so unless its internal structure and financial base are considerably strengthened. It was certainly a serious handicap that, until recently, the UNEP Governing Council has hampered effective ministerial participation and continuity in governance. Now it is supposed to share its governance role with the newly established Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GMEF), functioning as an additional UNEP policy organ that is expected to provide broad overarching policy advice. The GMEF is determined to meet annually at ministerial level. But there is still controversial debate on the question whether the GMEF, as opposed to the Governing Council, is to be organised as a body with universal membership. In the author's view, UNEP should continue to function as a non-plenary organ with clear-cut decision-making powers. It should meet at the ministerial level. Considering its broad range of tasks, it should function on a permanent basis in the future. And, finally, it should be assisted by a high-level intergovernmental body for providing broad overarching environmental policy advice; the GMEF might function as such a body. Both UNEP and the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) must foster environmental protection and development as a uniform endeavour which urgently requires integrated solutions. This can be done by effecting a pragmatic division of work at functional and operational levels. In addition, three other strategies of strengthening international environmental governance should be pursued: First, the various international environmental treaty-making and treaty-implementation processes should be better harmonised or, at least, co-ordinated; in this context, UNEP is called upon to continue and intensify its efforts to enhance the synergies and linkages between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with comparable areas of focus, by prompting the respective MEA secretariats to enter into appropriate co-ordination arrangements and giving them full logistic support in this respect. Second, as many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have considerable knowledge and expertise in environmental and developmental matters, States should consider intensifying the partnership with them. States should, however, be empowered to make a selective choice among the mass of NGOs operating at international level. They should accept as partners only those NGOs which meet certain qualitative requirements. Third, as local governments are key components of national sustainable development strategies if such plans are to succeed, the existing local Agenda 21 processes should be expanded and intensified. In particular, supporting the direct engagement of local and sub-national institutions from around the world in international activities and partnerships is an important component of good international environmental governance.

This study directly evaluates the visibility and the impact of Romanian academic psychology on the international scene using bibliometric indicators from the PsychoINFO, the MEDLINE, and the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI). It is also intended to use this evaluation of its international impact as an indirect estimate of the quality of Romanian academic psychology and to allow a consideration of future possible directions in its development. Such information would be useful for Romanian psychology programs in making future developmental policy and would further also be informative for our international colleagues in choosing Romanian partners for various projects and for the international institutions for a better allocation of the international psychological resources. The preliminary conclusion is that although Romanian psychology is visible—an important point, considering the obstacles during the communist period—its products (i.e., publications) are still less competitive and play a minor role in international psychology. A supplementary analysis identifies the major players in Romanian academic psychology and in clinical psychology.