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The Israeli military has employed an artificial intelligence-driven "kill list" to select over 30,000 targets in Gaza with minimal human input, fueling civilian casualties in the war-torn strip, according to an explosive new investigation from +972 Magazine.Especially in the early days of the Gaza war, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel ignored the AI's 10% false positive rate and intentionally targeted alleged militants in their homes with unguided "dumb bombs" despite an increased likelihood of civilian harm, according to IDF sources who spoke with +972 Magazine.The investigation sheds light on the myriad ways in which cutting-edge AI tech, combined with lax rules of engagement from IDF commanders on the ground, has fueled staggering rates of civilian harm in Gaza. At least 33,000 Palestinians have died due to Israel's campaign, which followed a Hamas attack that killed 1,200 Israelis last October.The AI targeting software, known as "Lavender," reportedly relies on sprawling surveillance networks and assigns a 1-100 score to every Gazan that estimates the likelihood that they are a Hamas militant. Soldiers then input this information into software known as "Where's Daddy," which uses AI to warn when an alleged militant has returned to their home.Previous reporting from +972 Magazine revealed the existence of a similar AI system for targeting houses used by militants, called "The Gospel." In both cases, the IDF said +972 Magazine exaggerated the role and impact of these high-tech tools."The doomsday scenario of killer algorithms is already unfolding in Gaza," argues Brianna Rosen, a senior fellow at Just Security and the University of Oxford who previously worked at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. RS spoke with Rosen to get her take on the latest revelations about Israel's use of AI in Gaza, how AI is changing war, and what U.S. policymakers should do to regulate military tech. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: What does this new reporting from +972 Magazine tell us about how Israel has used AI in Gaza?Rosen: The first thing that I want to stress is that it's not just +972 Magazine. The IDF itself has actually commented on these systems as well. A lot of people claimed that the report overstates some of the claims about AI systems, but Israel itself has made a number of comments that support some of these facts. The report substantiates a trend that we've seen since December with Israel's use of AI in Gaza, which is that AI is increasing the pace of targeting in war and expanding the scope of war. As the IDF itself has acknowledged, it's using AI to accelerate targeting, and the facts are bearing this out. In the first two months of the conflict, Israel attacked roughly 25,000 targets — more than four times as many as previous wars in Gaza. And they're actioning more targets than they ever have in the past. At the same time that the pace of targeting is accelerating, AI is also expanding the scope of war, or the pool of potential targets that are actioned for elimination. They're targeting more junior operatives than they ever have before. In previous campaigns, Israel would run out of known combatants or legitimate military objectives. But this latest reporting [shows] that's not seemingly a barrier to killing anymore. AI is acting, in Israel's own words, as a force multiplier, meaning that it's removing the resource constraints that in the past would prevent the IDF from identifying enough targets. Now they're able to go after significantly lower targets with tenuous or no connections at all to Hamas even though, normally, they wouldn't pursue those targets because of the minimal impact of their death on military objectives.In short, AI is increasing the tempo of operations and expanding the pool of targets, which makes target verification and other precautionary obligations required under international law much harder to fulfill. All of this increases the risk that civilians will be misidentified and mistakenly targeted, contributing to the enormous civilian harm that we've seen thus far.RS: How does this relate to the idea of having a human "in the loop" for AI-driven decisions?Rosen: This is what is so concerning. The debate on military AI has been for so long focused on the wrong question. It's been focused on banning lethal autonomous weapons systems, or "killer robots," without recognizing that AI has already become a pervasive feature of war. Israel and other states, including the United States, are already integrating AI into military operations. They're saying that they're doing it in a responsible way with humans fully "in the loop." But the fear that I have, and which I think we're seeing play out here in Gaza, is that even with a human fully in the loop, there's significant civilian harm because the human reviews of machine decisions are essentially perfunctory.With this report that was released today, there's a claim that there is human verification of the outputs that the AI systems are generating but that the human verification was done in only 20 seconds, just long enough to see whether the target was male or female before authorizing the bombings. Regardless of whether that particular claim is actually borne out, there have been numerous academic studies about the risk of automation bias with AI, which I think is clearly at play here. Because the machine is so smart and has all of these data streams and intelligence streams being fed into it, there's a risk that humans don't sufficiently question its output. This risk of automation bias means that even if humans are approving the targets, they could be simply rubber stamping the decision to use force rather than thoroughly looking at the data that the machine has produced and going back and vetting the targets very carefully. That's just not being done, and it might not even be possible given the problems with explainability and traceability for humans to really understand how AI systems are generating these outputs. This is one of the questions that I asked, by the way, in my article in Just Security in December. Policymakers and the public need to press Israel on this question: What does the human review process really look like for these operations? Is this just rubber stamping the decision to use force, or is there serious review?RS: In this case, it seems like the impact of AI was amplified by the IDF's use of loose rules of engagement. Can you tell me a little bit more about the relationship between emerging tech and practical policy decisions about how to use it?Rosen: That's the other problem here. First of all, you have the problem of Israel's interpretation of international law, which is, in some ways, much more permissive than how other states interpret basic principles like proportionality. On top of that, there are inevitably going to be errors made with AI systems, which contributes to civilian harm. This latest report claims that the Lavender system, for example, was wrong 10% of the time. That margin of error could, in fact, be much greater depending on how Israel is classifying individuals as Hamas militants. The AI systems are trained on data, and Israel has identified certain characteristics of people who they claim are Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives, and then they feed that data into the machine. But what if the features that they are identifying are overly broad — such as carrying a weapon, being in a WhatsApp group with someone linked to Hamas, or even just moving house a lot, which everyone, of course, is doing now because it's a whole country of refugees. If these characteristics are fed into AI systems to identify militants, then that's a big concern because the system is going to take that data and misidentify civilians a great part of the time.Israel can say that it's following international law and that there's human review of all of these decisions, and all of that can be true. But again, it's Israel's interpretation of international law. And it's how they're defining who counts as the combatant in this war and how that data is fed into the AI systems. All of that compounds in a way that can create really serious harm. I also want to point out that all the well-documented problems with AI in the domestic context — from underlying biases in the algorithms to the problem of hallucination — are certainly going to persist in war, and it's going to be compounded because of the pace of decision making. None of this is going to be reviewed in a very careful way. For example, we know that Israel has a massive surveillance system in the Gaza Strip and that all of this data is being fed into the AI systems to contribute to these targeting outputs. Any underlying biases in those systems will feed into and compound into errors in the final targeting output. If human review is perfunctory, then the result will be significant civilian harm, which is what we have seen.RS: The U.S. is interested in AI for lots of military applications, including automated swarms of lethal drones. What does Israel's experience tell us about how American policymakers should approach this tech?Rosen: It tells us that U.S. policymakers have to be extremely circumspect about the use of AI in both intelligence and military operations. The White House and the Department of Defense and other agencies have put forth a number of statements about responsible AI, particularly in a military context. But these have all been very much at the level of principles. Everything depends on how these broad principles for the responsible use of military AI are operationalized in practice, and, of course, we haven't really had a case yet where we've seen the U.S. in a public way relying on these tools in their conflicts. But that's definitely coming, and the U.S. should use this time now to not only learn all the lessons of what's happening in Gaza, but to be very proactive in operationalizing those broad principles for responsible use of military AI, socializing them among other states, and really leading the world in signing on to these principles for military AI. They have to a certain extent, but the progress has been very, very slow. That's what's desperately needed right now.

In a recent interview with Jordan's government-backed broadcaster, America's top military officer lavished praise on the country's armed forces.


"We have common interests and common values," said Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The Jordanian Armed Forces are very professional. They're very capable. They're well led."


Milley's view represents the most common American line on the Jordanian military, which has long enjoyed a close relationship with the Pentagon. There's just one problem: It's dead wrong, according to Sean Yom, a political science professor at Temple University.


Where Washington sees a small-but-mighty army, Yom sees a "glorified garrison force," as he wrote in a chapter of the recent edited volume, "Security Assistance in the Middle East." The Jordanian military, he writes, is "more accustomed to policing society to maintain authoritarian order at home than undertaking sophisticated operations."


As Yom notes, the regime that the Jordanian military defends has become increasingly autocratic in recent years. King Abdullah recently approved a cybercrime law that would allow the government to jail its citizens for promulgating "fake news" or "undermining national unity" — terms that the law largely leaves undefined. The crackdown on expression comes just three years after the government crushed the country's teachers' union, which had previously acted as a primary vehicle for political opposition in Jordan.


So what does the U.S. have to show for its decades of lavish support for Jordan's military? And what can that tell us about how Washington should approach security aid? RS spoke with Yom to find out. The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.





RS: The conventional story of U.S. security assistance is that, even though some of the countries that we help are authoritarian in nature, our aid tends to lead to greater respect for democracy, and if it doesn't do that, it at least will strengthen partner militaries. But in your chapter, you describe a different story in Jordan. Can you walk me through that a little bit?


Yom: U.S security assistance is typically justified through the doctrine of "building partner capacity." There has been a lot of ink spilled on the importance of modernizing the Jordanian Armed Forces and ensuring that it is a capable, coherent and interoperable armed force that can seamlessly work with the U.S. military or conduct operations on its own in the service of defending Jordan, or bolstering regional stability, for instance, by undertaking counterterrorist operations or contributing to peacekeeping missions.


The problem is that there is very little historical evidence that the Jordanian military is actually a capable fighting force, and I think a few key pieces of evidence underlie this. Number one, Jordan really hasn't fought a major armed conflict in a half century. It's undertaken peacekeeping abroad through the moniker of the UN, and it occasionally conducts one-off missions such as its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria back in 2014. But there is very little evidence on the battlefield that the Jordanian military is what the U.S. would call a capable and competent partner military. The other piece of evidence is that much of Jordan's defense structure has partly been offshored to the United States. The border surveillance system between Jordan and Syria was built by Raytheon Company through U.S. military and economic grants, and much of Jordanian airspace is monitored as closely by the United States as it is by the Jordanians themselves. The significant U.S. military buildup in Jordan is part and parcel of the United States interest in defending the sovereignty of Jordan and ensuring that foreign aggressors — whether they are terrorists or militant organizations or even foreign states — do not penetrate very far into the Hashemite Kingdom.


We don't see a military that is being built to be capable and modernized and independent and combat ready. Instead, the overriding justification — internally at least, seldom mentioned publicly — is that U.S. security assistance in Jordan is designed not to build partner capacity but to ensure political access to the Hashemite monarchy and to lubricate U.S.-Jordanian relations to make sure that this bilateral alliance is smooth and allows both sides to achieve their mutual interests. In Jordan's case, [its interests are] to remain stable, to receive aid and arms from the United States, and to preserve its sovereignty, and in Washington's case, it's to make sure that there is a pro-Western oasis of moderation in the heart of the Near East.


RS: A question that's underlying a bunch of this is whether the monarchy and the system as it exists in Jordan could even continue to exist without American support. To put it bluntly, does U.S. aid underwrite autocracy in Jordan?


Yom: I think it does, but with a few caveats. The first is that, in comparative perspective, Jordan is not unique in being a middle-income country whose autocratic regime needs foreign aid to survive. The other caveat is that I don't necessarily think that U.S. support and aid is the only reason why the current system of government in Jordan is able to endure. It has its own survival mechanisms, whether it is rallying support from certain constituencies in society, such as some tribal communities, or leaning heavily on other partners in the region.


But I will say this: U.S. support may not be the only reason, but it is a major reason why the Hashemite monarchy and its regime has been able to maintain its current political strategy of maintaining power, which is not to democratize or alleviate repression but rather to maintain an authoritarian status quo. And I think U.S. support is also a major reason why the Jordanian leadership has very little incentive to grant meaningful political reforms such as curtailing corruption and granting more democratic freedoms, which clearly a majority of Jordanians desire. And we know this from public surveys. Jordanians are very explicit in what they are unhappy about the current political system, but they also feel that, because the U.S. often refuses to pressure the Jordanian government to grant or concede more of these reforms, they feel that the U.S. is complicit and preserving the authoritarian status quo.


Geopolitically, Jordan plays an important function to U.S. grand strategy as a critical part of its war-making infrastructure in the Middle East, as well as diplomatically a pro-Western oasis or island of stability in the heart of a "shatterbelt" of the Middle East. Because of these factors, Washington has very little problem providing such profuse amounts of military assistance to the Jordanian Armed Forces. Above all else, of course, Jordan abuts Israel. Jordan's role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its primary purpose as a peace partner of Israel validates in the eyes of many American policymakers why they should continue supporting the modernization and the arming of the Jordanian Armed Forces under the guise, of course, of building partner capacity but knowing full well that Jordan is not going to be fighting a war anytime soon.


RS: At some level, you've painted a picture of a big win for U.S. interests here. There's a sense in which America gets a huge plot of land in the middle of a region that it deems vital, and the only downside is that that support doesn't really square with our stated values. But in your article, you had a different conclusion. Can you tell me more about that?


Yom: By helping to maintain [Jordan's] political infrastructure, the United States is complicit in the continued economic and social stagnation of Jordan. For every dinar that the Jordanian leadership spends on security or military items — money that many Jordanians feel it does not have to spend — the less money there is to spend on, say, social programs or economic development.


If you look at the Jordanian economy, it is astounding how much of a crisis that it has fallen into. We're looking at, right now, 22 to 23 percent unemployment overall, which is probably a vast understatement of the real statistic. We're looking at nearly 50 percent youth unemployment. We're looking at poverty, which is between 25 to 30 percent depending upon which estimate we take as reliable. And this is all in a country that also spends approximately a third of each annual budget on military and security spending. So essentially, what you're looking at when you think about the Jordanian economy today is a wartime economy. The Jordanian government positions itself and maintains an army as if it were about to wage a war it doesn't have to wage, and that has a destructive effect on the economy and often justifies draconian security measures to regulate and police society. The United States, I would argue, is complicit in that arrangement.


Washington has had very similar experiences in the past with other countries where regimes have some kind of deep economic or political crisis, and yet they believe that having a well-armed coercive apparatus is going to immunize them from any sort of domestic unrest or popular overthrow. Now, that may be the case in Jordan, because the future is hard to tell. But that certainly wasn't the case in, say, Iran under the Shah. It wasn't the case in South Vietnam. It wasn't the case in some of our Central American client states in the 1970s and the 1980s.


One of the things I wish U.S. policymakers would reconsider is whether or not the current arrangement is fundamentally in the interest of the Jordanian people. If we define stability as a country having not just a legitimate political system, but a sustainable economy and a relatively satisfied population, then Jordan is failing on some of these key fronts.


History shows us that [this] kind of strategy seldom works, and it's one of the dark consequences that I fear the most in Jordan, since obviously instability in Jordan doesn't help anyone. But the current vision of stability that has encaged itself in the minds of American lawmakers is not one that I think is going to be fruitful over the long term.

A joint political project between al-Ghazālī and his Andalusian pupil, Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī concerning the government of Spain can be uncovered from the documentary evidence and some reasoning about the chronology. The idea was apparently to gain a foothold for al-Ghazālī with the Almoravid ruler Yūsuf Ibn Tāshufín. Our conclusions about the existence of a political project are supported by documents which have been available for some time: the fatwā al-Ghazālī wrote in support of Yūsuf, the letter he wrote to Yūsuf praising Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī and the letter he obtained from the caliph, all of which can be compared with al-Turtushī's letter to Yūsuf on the same subjects. The connecting idea is that this is part of a political project which would rely on a power base in the peninsula, most notably the Sufi militants and the previous ruling elite of the Taifa kings (Ibn 'Arabī's father had served Al-Mu'tamid, Prince of Seville). Al-Ghazālī's writings provide an ideological cement for this political alliance in that they praise sufism and criticize taqlīd, which was the standard approach to law used by the jurists who staffed the Almoravid hierachy. Because al-Ghazālī's discourse is far above the intellectual level of the ordinary jurist, either because they provided no immediate profit or because of the practical difficulty for simple people to get books and teachers on these subjects. Hence al-Ghazālī's discourse remains the property of an intellectual elite which is at the same time a social and economic elite, fluent in literary Classical Arabic and distilling the intellectual gains of many generations of educated Andalusians. To confront this group, the Almoravid jurists represented the urban middle class and could arouse the urban mob in their favor. Motivated by fear that the combination of Ibn al-'Arabī and al-Ghazālī could replace him in power, the most prominent among them, Ibn Hamdīn of Cordoba, was able to orchestrate the official burning of Al-Ghazālī's Iḥyā' throughout the realm. Thus we find that the conflict between these two groups was well defined even before Almohad rebellion in North Africa provided the intellectual elite a military champion. The intellectual elite in turn provided the North African Almohads with administrators and an ideology. Al-Ghazālī was identified as an enemy of the Almoravid regime even before Ibn Tūmart, the founder of the Almohad movement, returned from the East to launch his rebellion against the Almoravids from the Atlas mountains. We propose some changes in the previous picture of Al-Ghazālī's whereabouts at different times. Scholars have already accepted a basic modification of the idea that he left Baghdad definitively after he stopped giving his lectures to huge audiences at the Nizāmiyya school because they noticed that Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī says he was tutored by Al-Ghazālī for two years in Baghdad after that period. Now we would like to draw attention to the fact that Ibn Khallikān says that Al-Ghazālī stayed in Alexandria, Egypt waiting for an answer from Yūsuf Ibn Tāshufīn. In the context of a shifting picture of the chronology of Al-Ghazālī's travels, the notion that Ibn Tūmart might have seen the famous scholar seems possible and even probable. ; A través de la documentación conservada y de una reflexión sobre la cronología, es posible descubrir la existencia de un proyecto político de al-Ghazālī y su discípulo andalusí, Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī, con el propósito de ganar para al-Gazālī el favor del príncipe almorávide Yūsuf b. Tāšufīn. Los documentos que prueban la existencia de este proyecto se conocían desde hace algún tiempo: la fatwà que al-Gazālī escribió en apoyo de Yūsuf, la carta que le escribió en alabanza de Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī y la carta que obtuvo del califa, todo lo cual puede compararse con la carta de al-Ṭurṭūšī a Yūsuf sobre los mismos asuntos. La idea que pone todo esto en conexión es que se trataba de un proyecto político con apoyo en la Península, sobre todo de los sufíes y de la elite de los reyes de Taifas (el padre de Ibn 'Arabī había servido a al-Mu'tamid de Sevilla). Los escritos de al-Gazālī suministraron una base ideológica a esta alianza política, puesto que alaban el sufismo y critican el taqlīd, la forma usual de interpretar la ley entre los juristas de la jerarquía almorávide. El discurso de al-Gazālī, muy por encima del nivel intelectual del jurista medio, se aceptó finalmente por la elite de los periodos califal y taifa que tenía interés en las ciencias naturales, la filosofía griega y la lógica. Estos temas eran innacesibles para el jurista medio, bien porque no procuraban un provecho inmediato, bien por la dificultad práctica de encontrar libros y profesores expertos en ellos. Por tanto, fue una elite intelectual (también social y económica) conocedora del árabe clásico y heredera de las adquisiciones intelectuales de muchas generaciones de andalusíes la que se apropió del discurso gazaliano. Frente a ese grupo, los juristas almorávides representaban a las clases medias urbanas y podían movilizar a su favor a las masas urbanas. El más importante de esos juristas, Ibn Ḥamdīn de Córdoba, temeroso de que la combinación de Ibn al-'Arabī y al-Gazālī le expulsara del poder, orquestó la quema oficial del Iḥyā' de al-Gazālī por todo el país. Así es posible observar que el conflicto entre esos dos grupos estaba bien definido incluso antes de que la rebelión almohade en el Norte de África proporcionase a la elite intelectual un adalid militar. A cambio, esa elite suministró a los Almohades una ideología y una clase administrativa. Al-Gazālī fue identificado como un enemigo del régimen almorávide incluso antes de que Ibn Tūmart, el fundador del movimiento almohade, volviese de Oriente para lanzar su rebelión contra los almorávides desde el Atlas.Proponemos algunos cambios en el panorama de las estancias de al-Gazālī en diferentes momentos. Se ha aceptado ya una modificación básica de la idea de que abandonó Bagdad definitivamente tras dejar de dar clases a gran número de personas en la Nizāmīya, al observarse que Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī afirma haber estudiado con él en Bagdad dos años después. Aquí querríamos llamar la atención sobre el hecho de que Ibn Jallikān dice que al-Gazālī estuvo en Alejandría esperando una respuesta de Yusuf b. Tāšufīn. En el contexto de un panorama cambiante de la cronología de los viajes de al-Gazālī, la posibilidad de que Ibn Tūmart estuviera en contacto con él se convierte en una probabilidad.

Otrora la «Suiza de Oriente Próximo», el Líbano se transformó, a partir de 1975 en un paradigma de la violencia política y religiosa sectaria. El país, aparentemente destinado a ser un ejemplo de democracia y convivencia intercomunitaria en la torturada historia de la región, se vio envuelto, durante 15 años, en uno de los conflictos más complejos del Medio Oriente. ¿Cómo se explica el vertiginoso deterioro de la política libanesa a partir de 1975 y la instalación de una hobbesiana guerra de todos contra todos que se prolongó hasta 1990 y cuyas inacabables consecuencias llegan hasta 2005, con el asesinato del primer ministro Rafic Hariri, si no es que terminan manifestándose, todavía, una vez más, en las próximas elecciones parlamentarias del 7 de junio?Para tratar de desenmarañar, aunque sea someramente, lo que está sucediendo actualmente en el Líbano es necesario remontarse a la no tan lejana independencia del país. Bajo el dominio del Imperio Otomano, El Líbano y Siria formaron parte de una sola entidad política y fue la colonización francesa la que separó a aquel de ésta.En 1943, el nuevo país accedió pacíficamente a la independencia transformándose rápidamente en un modelo de sociedad tolerante en la que convivían una poderosa minoría católica –(dividida, por cierto, en diferentes ritos, maronitas, armenios y ortodoxos)- con una mayoría musulmana –(también dividida, a su vez, entre una mayoría chiíta y alauita, y un grupo de obediencia suní). A ello corresponde agregar un pequeño porcentaje de druzos que, aunque linguísticamente árabes, mantienen una identidad religiosa muy peculiar.Poseedor de una clase política sofisticada, el Líbano gozó de un sistema político estable y razonablemente democrático al punto que, hacia los años 70, Beirut era el centro financiero del Medio Oriente en virtud de las garantías que ofrecía, tanto desde el punto de vista político como financiero, a todos los capitales de la región.Es generalmente aceptado que la guerra civil de 1975 estalla como resultado de la presencia en el país de cientos de miles de refugiados palestinos que, erigiéndose en casi el 10% de la población del país, vinieron a romper el frágil equilibrio político, cultural y religioso que había primado hasta su arribo. La explicación es plausible pero la irrupción palestina no hubiese sido tan traumática si hubiese venido a incursionar en un país donde la dominación de las minorías cristianas no hubiese sido tan flagrante y la marginación de algunos grupos musulmanes tan ostensible. Hay entonces también un componente de conflictividad autóctono, estrictamente social, que se hace presente en el conflicto.Siria invade el Líbano en 1976 con la excusa de "proteger a la minoría cristiana" pero es evidente que su intención real era restablecer su presencia política en un territorio que siempre consideró como muy afín, si no es que propio, y, al mismo tiempo, crear cierto equilibrio militar dada la presencia de tropas israelíes en el sur del país. Sin embargo, los acuerdos de Taif del año 1989 acordaron la salida de todas las tropas extranjeras de territorio libanés según un calendario que tardó mucho en cumplirse totalmente, especialmente por parte de Siria.En 1992 irrumpe en la política libanesa, Rafik Hariri. Originariamente desvinculado de las familias políticas tradicionales, Hariri era una suerte de "self made man" que, nacido en una modesta familia sunita de Sidón, logró construir, durante su emigración al Golfo Pérsico, una fortuna estimada en 2.000 millones de dólares. Quizás más decisivo aún: poseía una red de amistades y contactos que tenía como cabezas, por un lado, al Presidente de Francia, Jacques Chirac y, por el otro, a la familia real saudita.El 14 de febrero del 2005 Hariri, entonces Primer Ministro, es asesinado en un atentado realizado con un coche bomba en el que mueren él y 22 personas más. Prestigioso, controvertido, capaz de impactar en el imaginario popular por su origen humilde y sus éxitos financieros y políticos, la muerte de Hariri fue un momento decisivo para la historia del Líbano moderno. En más de un sentido, su ascenso estaba estrechamente vinculado a la esperanza que generó el final de la guerra por lo que su muerte pareció simbolizar que esa esperanza estaba en peligro.Su asesinato puso en marcha un gran movimiento de protesta popular y de reivindicación nacional, bautizado "la revolución del cedro", que obligó a Siria a retirar, en algo más de un mes, sus aproximadamente 15.000 hombres del Líbano. La opinión pública libanesa y mundial culpó a los servicios de inteligencia sirios que, más que seguramente y más allá de declaraciones continúan activos en el país. Pero fue una derrota para Siria y "la revolución del cedro" se encaminó hacia una paulatina pero aún relativa normalización de la vida política del país.Un Tribunal especial para el Líbano (TSL), de carácter internacional, se formó por parte de las Naciones Unidas, como respuesta a la petición de la República Libanesa para investigar, hasta sus últimas consecuencias, el atentado que terminó con la vida del Primer Ministro Hariri. Las investigaciones avanzaron sin mucha celeridad pero, a finales de abril, fueron liberados cuatro generales libaneses -(sospechosos de simpatías pro-sirias)- a petición del Procurador Daniel Dellemare y cabeza operativa del TSL, que fundamentó su petitorio ante la "…ausencia de pruebas suficientes…".Casi simultáneamente, esta experiencia de un Líbano relativamente autónomo de su ambicioso vecino sirio recibió un buen espaldarazo de la nueva administración norteamericana. Joe Biden, el vicepresidente en persona, hizo una visita de siete horas que habia sido precedida, un mes antes, por otra Hillary Clinton: hacia 25 años que personajes del gobierno norteamericano de ese rango no visitaban el país. El mensaje de Biden fue transparente: en esta nueva etapa, los EE.UU. no están dispuestos a manifestar sus simpatías por nadie en las próximas elecciones -(cosa que no era así en el pasado)- pero eso no significa que les sea indiferente quien resulte ganador. Los EE.UU. aprecian la nueva tendencia a la autonomía del Líbano y su ayuda post electoral será proporcional al apego que el ganador demuestre a continuar en esa misma línea.El mensaje de Biden fue claro y prudente a la vez: seguiremos apoyando la soberanía y la independencia del Líbano, pero la calidad de ese apoyo dependerá de quién resulte triunfador. Al mismo tiempo, Biden deja las puertas abiertas porque, para todo observador atento de la realidad del Medio Oriente, queda inmediatamente claro que los EE.UU. también están jugando con Irán y con Siria un partido de "ligas mayores" por lo que no le era posible a Biden comprometer una posición definitiva en un pequeño país cuyo perfil definitivo deberá definirse cuando se arregle -(¡si es que ese día llega alguna vez!)- todo el tablero regional.Era entonces, en una atmósfera relativamente tranquila para los "standards" de la región, que el Líbano se preparaba para las elecciones legislativas del 7 de junio. Pero el sábado pasado, 23 de mayo, el semanario "Der Spiegel", desde Berlín, suelta una "noticia-bomba" que ha puesto en riesgo gran parte de lo avanzado hasta ahora. De acuerdo al reconocido semanario alemán, siguiendo fuentes que la publicación no revela, la liberación de los cuatro generales pro-sirios sospechosos de responsabilidad en la muerte de Rafic Hariri fue el resultado de que el tribunal TSL, presidido por Daniel Bellemare y que sesiona en Holanda en la localidad de Leidschendam, habría llegado a la conclusión que no fueron los sirios los responsables del atentado; el atentado habría sido llevado a cabo por un grupo en el que participó Abd al Maschid Ghamlusch, terrorista miembro de Hezbollah apropiadamente entrenado en Irán. Y las informaciones de las pruebas parecen bastante contundentes.Visto desde América Latina, la primera reacción es: ¿y donde está la diferencia? ¿Quien no sabe que Hezbollah es un grupo terrorista a nivel internacional, que reviste como "partido chiíta" en la política local libanesa y que responde, en proporciones difíciles de determinar, tanto a Damasco como a Teherán? El problema es que para el simple ciudadano libanés -(en especial si es musulmán y chiíta)- la noticia le trastoca todo el escenario electoral: ¿va efectivamente a votar por un partido que pudiese ser el responsable de la muerte de Hariri?El lunes siguiente a la publicación, resultó muy curiosa la reacción de todo el espectro político libanés. Mas allá de que Hezbollah puso el grito en el cielo, casi todos los demás actores de todos los bandos recibieron la noticia con total circunspección sino es que desconfianza; pro-sirios, anti-sirios, druzos, etc. todos callan o bien condenan una publicación que es visualizada como una clara tentativa de boicotear una elecciones que parecían bien encaminadas. La sombra de una nueva guerra civil comenzó a cernirse sobre el Líbano.(Artículo elaborado en base a informaciones de BBC International, L´Orient-Le Jour de Beyruth, BBC Mundo, El País de Madrid y Le Monde)Catedrático de Ciencia PolíticaFacs - ORT- Uruguay

Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) recently sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging him to get tougher on Azerbaijan for its "brazen campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh." This follows an earlier statement from Cardin, shortly after Azerbaijan's September "lightning offensive" against Nagorno-Karabakh, that called for the U.S. to "halt security assistance to Azerbaijan," and increase humanitarian support for the 100,000 ethnic Armenians who fled en masse from Nagorno-Karabakh. As of this writing, neither of those things has occurred and the Biden administration has done little to address Azerbaijan's military aggression. While there are undoubtedly myriad reasons for the U.S. government's lukewarm response, one possible explanation is one of Washington's oldest pastimes: lobbying. For years, the Azerbaijan government has been financing a well connected lobbying and influence operation in the U.S. that has worked diligently to keep U.S. military assistance flowing and to ensure that policymakers turn a blind-eye to the country's consistent human rights violations.As documented in a just released Quincy Institute brief, The Lobbying Battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, the government of Azerbaijan has spent millions of dollars on registered lobbyists and much more on illicit influence operations that have helped foster and maintain support for Baku across Europe and the U.S.The End of Nagorno-Karabakh"The United States will not countenance any action or effort – short-term or long-term – to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh," was an assurance from then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Yuri Kim in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 14.
Just five days later, the U.S. did exactly what Kim said it would not, standing idly by on September 19 as Azerbaijan launched an "anti-terrorist" operation against what remained of Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the ethnic cleansing of over 100,000 of its residents as they fled to the neighboring Republic of Armenia.
The territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh — the mountainous breakaway region internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but self-governed by Armenians — now appears over as the de facto officials announced that all institutions will be dissolved on January 1, 2024. These developments followed what had been a year of Azerbaijani escalation against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper, including an Azerbaijani blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh which lasted almost 10 months and saw the territory's food, medical, and energy supplies all but run out. When Baku launched its military assault, Washington and Brussels were only able to muster strongly worded statements, but no meaningful reaction.The Azerbaijan LobbyDon't count out Azerbaijan's influence operations in Washington for helping to thwart what should have been a stronger response on Capitol Hill and in the White House. The government of Azerbaijan has spent over $7 million on lobbying and public relations firms registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) since 2015, according to OpenSecrets. Chief among the Azerbaijan lobby's hired guns is BGR Government Affairs, one of Washington's top lobbying firms, which is contracted to serve as a liaison for the Azerbaijan Embassy in the U.S.
FARA filings reveal that the firm contacted congressional offices more than 1,000 times on Azerbaijan's behalf in just the first half of 2023, and that their work included efforts "to ensure there were no negative Azerbaijan amendments on the National Defense Authorization Act" and "fair language for Azerbaijan" in the appropriations process. More generally, BGR "educated policymakers in Congress about the important role Azerbaijan plays as a key security partner of the United States."
In 2018, BGR signed an agreement with another lobbying firm — Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell, and Berkowitz — to aid its efforts on behalf of the Azerbaijan Embassy. An analysis of that firm's FARA filings shows that they've been laser focused on the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, which is responsible for, among many other issues, determining how much U.S. military assistance flows to Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Overall, it would seem both firms have been successful at allowing Azerbaijan to dodge criticism and continue to receive millions of dollars in security assistance every year.
Most notably in 2023,the Azerbaijan Embassy hired The Friedlander Group, whose namesake Ezra Friedlander has been a prominent American-Israeli lobbyist for years, rubbing shoulders with a number of top policymakers, including former President Donald Trump. When he was hired by Azerbaijan he immediately put his connections to work, according to his firm's FARA filing, securing meetings with dozens of congressional offices, including even a face-to-face meeting with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.).
This is just the tip of the iceberg for Azerbaijan's influence operations in the U.S. As documented by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), the Azerbaijan government has a history of laundering its influence in Europe and the U.S. The "Azerbaijani Laundromat," as described by the OCCRP, was "a complex money-laundering operation and slush fund that handled $2.9 billion over a two-year period through four shell companies." This 2012-2014 scheme which involved funneling government funds through shell companies, included payments to several pro-Azeri Americans, one of whom later pleaded guilty to concealing the fact that a congressional trip to Azerbaijan he'd helped organize was secretly funded by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR).
Azerbaijan's often illicit influence operations in Europe have dubbed it "caviar diplomacy," given the country's repeated attempts to bribe European officials with all manner of luxury goods, including caviar. At least one investigation resulted in FBI agents raiding the home of the co-chair of the Congressional Azerbaijan Caucus, Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), in January 2022.Armenian Influence in the USArmenians have also sought to influence the U.S. public debate surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. However, this has been done at a significantly smaller scale than their Azerbaijani counterparts, and the main actors of Armenian lobbying efforts in the U.S. have been the estimated one to two million diaspora Armenians in the U.S.In the early 1990s, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. achieved its first major political victory via Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which explicitly prohibited the vast majority of U.S. assistance from the Act to post-Soviet Azerbaijan until Baku "cease[es] all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh." However, in 2002, as the "Global War on Terror" was heating up, Azerbaijan was granted a waiver for Section 907 that has allowed over $160 million of U.S. security assistance to flow to the country ever since. Nevertheless, during the war in 2020, Armenians boycotted lobbying and PR firms working for Azerbaijan and, in 2021, President Joe Biden recognized the systemic mass killings of Armenians during World War I as genocide, a long-standing priority of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. More recently the Senate unanimously passed the "Armenian Protection Act," that would cut off aid to Azerbaijan for at least two years. For Armenians, these developments are viewed as too little too late, however, as Azerbaijan has already achieved what it wanted in Nagorno-Karabakh with little international pushback. This result is likely due in no small part to Azerbaijan's concerted influence operations in the U.S. For years, the lobbyists on Azerbaijan's payroll have worked to keep U.S. military assistance flowing to the country and to tip the scales of U.S. support in their favor. While they may not have "won" this influence battle they have no doubt done enough to keep the U.S. on the sidelines of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Editor's Note: Artin Dersimonian was an intern at the Armenian Embassy in Washington in 2018. The Terjenian-Thomas Assembly Internship Program at the Armenian Assembly — which is mentioned in the QI brief on which this article is based — facilitated Dersimonian's internship with the embassy.

Catástrofe en Asia China: El fuerte sismo del Domingo pasado, que midió 7,8 grados en la escala de Richter, azotó el sudoeste del país y habría causado cientos de heridos en diferentes ciudades. El sitio más afectado, resultó el condado de Beichuan, donde según reveló la agencia oficial Xinhua se estima que el 80 por ciento de las construcciones se derrumbaron, al mismo tiempo que informó que esa localidad tiene una población de 160.000 personas. Hoy en día las autoridades chinas temen que la cifra de muertos alcance los 20.000. El último balance recoge 14.866 fallecidos.Myanmar: A más de una semana del paso del ciclón tropical "Nargis" por Myanmar, la cifra de fallecidos se situaría en 34.273 y habría 27.836 desaparecidos, aunque la ONU calcula que el número de víctimas mortales se elevará entre los 60.000 y los 100.000 y que los desaparecidos ascienden, en realidad, a unas 200.000 personas. A esta situación se le suman problemas de abastecimiento.Diferentes medios informan al respecto:"MSNBC" informa: "Massive quake kills nearly 10,000 in China.7.9 temblor topples buildings; untold numbers thought to be trapped":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24573168/"Los Angeles Times" informa: "At least 8,500 killed in China earthquake video":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-chinaquake13-2008may13,0,6114570.story"Time" publica: "Toll Mounts in China Earthquake":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1739287,00.html "Le Monde": "Chine : après le séisme meurtrier dans le Sichuan, les secours tentent de s'organiser ":http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2008/05/12/chine-apres-le-seisme-meurtrier-dans-le-sichuan-les-secours-tentent-de-s-organiser_1044028_3216.html#ens_id=1043586"New York Times" publica: "Quake Kills Thousands in Western China":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/world/asia/13china.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin"CNN" informa: "Thousands killed by huge China quake":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/12/china.quake/index.htmlUn terremoto en China dejó 10 mil muertos.El sismo fue de 7,8 grados en la escala de Richter; estiman que se derrumbó el 80 por ciento de los edificios en la provincia de Sicuani, "La Nación" informa:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011813&origen=rss"China Daily" publica: "About 10,000 people dead in killer earthquake":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/13/content_6678227.htm"Time" informa: "Dams Reported Damaged as Soldiers Reach Quake's Center":http://www.time.com/time/worldLas autoridades chinas temen que la cifra de muertos alcance los 20.000, informa "El País" de Madrid:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/autoridades/chinas/temen/cifra/muertos/alcance/20000/elpepuint/20080514elpepuint_8/Tes"CNN" informa: "Girl pulled from quake rubble after 50 hours":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/quake.thursday/index.html"Time" publica: "China Races to Save Quake Victims":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1770925,00.htmlChina busca a miles de víctimas que siguen atrapadas bajo los escombros. El Gobierno ha enviado 50.000 policías y soldados a la zona del terremotohttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/China/busca/miles/victimas/siguen/atrapadas/escombros/elpepuint/20080514elpepiint_6/Tes"China Daily" informa: "National death toll rises to 14,866 two days after quake":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/14/content_6682723.htm"People Daily" publica: "Sichuan quake death toll rises to nearly 10,000":http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6409236.html"CNN" informa: "China's earthquake victims 'eat bitterness'":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/china.vause/index.html"The Economist": "Responding to disaster":http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11359253 Myanmar: "No shelter from the storm", informa "The Economist": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332728"Los Angeles Times" publica: "Myanmar's cyclone victims brace for new storm":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-irrawaddy12-2008may12,0,156545.storyMyanmar persiste en impedir la entrada de ayuda internacional. La Junta Militar fija en 34.000 los fallecidos mientras la ONU eleva la cifra hasta 100.000.- La Cruz Roja alerta de la peligrosidad de nuevas lluvias en la zona, "El País" de Madrid informa: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Myanmar/persiste/impedir/entrada/ayuda/internacional/elpepuint/20080514elpepuint_14/Tes"MSNBC": "Monks back on front line to aid cyclone victims. But they say military is curbing their efforts, even as it fails to deliver aid":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24582349/"New York Times" informa: "Myanmar Votes as Rulers Keep Grip on Aid": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/world/asia/11myanmar.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "La ONU acusa a la Junta Militar birmana de confiscar la ayuda humanitaria":http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/otrasregiones/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4140403.html"CNN" informa: "Relief boat sinks, leaving aid in Myanmar river":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/11/myanmar.aid/index.htmlMyanmar: naufragó un barco de la Cruz Roja. Habría chocado contra un tronco sumergido en las aguas; era el primer envío de ayuda para los sobrevivientes del Nargis:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011613AMERICA LATINA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Los papeles de las FARC acusan a Chávez. El ordenador de Raúl Reyes revela la colaboración del presidente con la guerrilla":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/papeles/FARC/acusan/Chavez/elpepuint/20080510elpepiint_6/Tes"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "Chávez dice que Bush dejará cargo antes que él, pese a supuestos planes de E.U. para derrocarlo":http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/latinoamerica/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4158488.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "E.U. cree en autenticidad de archivos de PC de 'Raúl Reyes' que vinculan a Hugo Chávez con las FARC": http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/euycanada/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4154081.html"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Líder estudiantil venezolano Yon Goicoechea: "Mi lucha no es contra Chávez, es a favor de la democracia"":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/internacional/noticias/3808EB70-8C21-48C3-AE05-9F01BC62C20A.htm?id={3808EB70-8C21-48C3-AE05-9F01BC62C20A"La Nación" informa: "Antes de su gira por América latina, Merkel criticó el populismo y afirmó que frena el desarrollo: La canciller alemana visitará cuatro países de la región, pero no la Argentina":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011478"EL Universal" de México publica: "Dice presidente de la CE que críticas de Chávez a Merkel no ayudan":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/506178.htmlEvo Morales someterá a referéndum su continuidad al frente de Bolivia. Los nueve gobernadores se jugarán también el puesto en la convocatoria, "El País" de Madrid informa: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Evo/Morales/sometera/referendum/continuidad/frente/Bolivia/elpepuint/20080510elpepiint_10/Tes "CNN" publica: "Bolivian president agrees to vote of confidence":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/05/08/bolivia.referendum/index.html"The Economist" informa: "Battle by referendum. A tactical victory for the opposition":http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332954El mandatario brasileño elogió también a Morales y a Lugo. Enérgica defensa de Lula a Chávez. Dijo que "es el mejor presidente que ha tenido Venezuela en los últimos cien años". "La Nación" informa: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011475"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "Grave daño ecológico por erupción del volcán Chaitén en el sur de Chile":http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/latinoamerica/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4158472.html"El Universal" de México informa: "Presionan para evacuar animales de zona cercana a volcán chileno":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/506196.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Gobernadores argentinos abren diálogo con agricultores en medio de la huelga": http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/latinoamerica/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4158573.htmlCortes de tráfico y 'cacerolazos' en apoyo del campo argentino. El sector agropecuario advierte de que la huelga puede extenderse por el país en caso de no obtener una respuesta del Gobierno, "El País" de Madrid publica: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cortes/trafico/cacerolazos/apoyo/campo/argentino/elpepuint/20080512elpepuint_9/Tes"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Crisis política en Argentina: El campo amenaza con extender su paro y gobernadores recibirán a dirigentes ruralistas":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/_portada/noticias/E0D2FC51-C221-419C-92D8-96A811363514.htm?id={E0D2FC51-C221-419C-92D8-96A811363514"Time" publica: "Nicaragua's Great Leap Forward":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1738460,00.html"El Universal" publica: "Cuba descarta el acceso de los particulares a Internet a corto plazo": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/506148.htmlESTADOS UNIDOS/CANADÁ Deferentes medios informan sobre campaña electoral estadounidense:Obama supera a Clinton en número de superdelegados. Varios medios estadounidenses otorgan ventaja al senador por Illinois, que ayer obtuvo el apoyo de su ex rival John Edwards , "El País" de Madrid informa:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/supera/Clinton/numero/superdelegados/elpepuint/20080510elpepuint_4/Tes"The Economist" analiza: "The big remaining question: He is closer to the Democratic nomination. But how will Barack Obama's colour affect his chances in November?":http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332201"New York Times" infroma: "Mississippi Fallout":http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/mississippi-fallout/index.html?hp"CNN" analiza: "Clinton crushes Obama across the board":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/05/13/west.virginia.analysis/index.html"The Economist" publica: "Primary colour":http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332289EE.UU.: al menos 18 muertos tras varios tornados. Golpearon con fuerza en Oklahoma y Missouri; hay cuantiosos daños materiales e interrupción de los servicios; no se precisó el número de heridos, "La Nación" publica:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011606"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Fuertes tornados dejan al menos 22 muertos en el centro y sur de EE.UU.":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/internacional/noticias/6865AB89-CB95-4363-979F-D695E5A52388.htm?id={6865AB89-CB95-4363-979F-D695E5A52388EUROPA Los serbios eligen entre proeuropeos y ultranacionalistas: Tras su victoria en las legislativas el pasado domingo en Serbia, la coalición de fuerzas pro europeas, liderada por el Partido Democrático (DS), del presidente Boris Tadic, emprende ahora el diálogo con fuerzas minoritarias para formar Gobierno. La iniciativa corresponde a los ganadores, partidarios de acabar con el aislamiento serbio y acercar el país a la UE.Diferentes medios informan al respecto: "CNN" publica: "Divided Serbia begins key elections": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/05/11/serbia.election.ap/index.html"New York Times": "Serbia Braces for Electoral Showdown":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/world/europe/13serbia.html?hp"El País" de Madrid informa: "Los partidos serbios buscan alianzas para formar Gobierno":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/partidos/serbios/buscan/alianzas/formar/Gobierno/elpepuint/20080512elpepuint_6/Tes"CNN" publica: "Shock election win sets Serbia on path to EU":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/05/12/serbia.election/index.html"Time" informa: "Serbian Voters Spurn Nationalists":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1739295,00.html"The Economist" publica: "The European Union is doing its utmost to influence Serbia's voters": http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332870"El Mercurio" informa: "Nuevo Premier italiano: Economía y seguridad, los desafíos del cuarto mandato de Silvio Berlusconi": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/_portada/noticias/50C6E7F5-0250-4DB9-81D9-23D31248B00F.htm?id={50C6E7F5-0250-4DB9-81D9-23D31248B00F"La Nación"informa: "Italia buscará la expulsión de la inmigración ilegal. Será considerada un delito penal":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011473"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "El primer ministro italiano Silvio Berlusconi adopta la línea dura contra la inmigración clandestina":http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/europa/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4157840.htmlKey posts unchanged in new Russia government. Putin's reshuffle underscores central importance of gas, oil to economy, "MSNBC" publica:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24577955/ETA quería "una matanza" con una bomba muy potente. Los investigadores atribuyen al 'comando Vizcaya' el atentado en Legutiano, que ha costado la vida a un guardia civil y ha dejado cuatro heridos.- Los terroristas programaron la explosión de más 100 kilos de explosivo con muy poco tiempo para huir, "El País" de Madrid informa:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/ETA/queria/matanza/bomba/potente/elpepuesp/20080514elpepunac_2/Tes"El País" de Madrid publica "El Reino Unido revisa los plazos para abortar":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Reino/Unido/revisa/plazos/abortar/elpepisoc/20080510elpepisoc_5/Tes "El Mercurio" informa: "Premier británico: Popularidad de Gordon Brown cae a niveles récord":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/internacional/noticias/FCB2B2E9-A398-4D68-903B-B86E03AE5982.htm?id={FCB2B2E9-A398-4D68-903B-B86E03AE5982}ASIA – PACÍFICO Y MEDIO ORIENTEHezbolá retira a sus milicias de las calles de Beirut. Los opositores dejan en manos del Ejército las calles de la capital del Líbano, después de que los altos mandos rechazaran las decisiones del Gobierno. "El País" de Madrid informa:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Hezbola/retira/milicias/calles/Beirut/elpepuint/20080510elpepuint_6/TesHezbollah cede el control de Beirut. Lo hizo luego de que el ejército suspendió dos medidas del gobierno en su contra; ayer hubo 14 muertos en el norte del país, "La Nación" publica:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/edicionimpresa/exterior/nota.asp?nota_id=1011552 "El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Aumentan combates entre rebeldes y leales al gobierno en el Líbano": http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/orientemedio/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4158468.html"CNN": "Judge row puts Pakistan coalition in danger":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/11/pakistan.judges.ap/index.html"Atentado en vísperas de elecciones dejó al menos diez muertos en Sri Lanka"http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/otrasregiones/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4154321.html"El Mercurio" de Chile analiza: "A 60 años de la guerra árabe-israelí: Los palestinos necesitan ayudarse a sí mismos para lograr su Estado": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/05/12/internacional/internacional/noticias/C999854B-29DF-4989-BC4C-FF8A87B57BE8.htm?id={C999854B-29DF-4989-BC4C-FF8A87B57BE8 Declaraciones del presidente Iraní respecto al aniversario de independencia israelí: "Mahmud Ahmadinejad dice que Israel "está en vías de desaparición"":http://www.eltiempo.com/internacional/orientemedio/noticias/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR-4151332.htmlBush visita Israel: "Gaza Rocket Rocks Bush's Israel Trip", "Time" informa:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1779536,00.htmlÁFRICAEl líder opositor de Zimbabue acepta la segunda vuelta de las presidenciales. Tsvangirai pide observadores internacionales para que el presidente Robert Mugabe no repita el fraude de la primera ronda.- El Gobierno descarta las condiciones y dice que los comicios se realizarán bajo las leyes vigentes, informa "El País" de Madrid: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/lider/opositor/Zimbabue/acepta/segunda/vuelta/presidenciales/elpepuint/20080510elpepuint_7/Tes "CNN" publica: "Official: Zimbabwe runoff must be delayed":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/11/zimbabwe.runoff.ap/index.html"CNN" informa "U.N. aid worker shot dead in Kenya":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/09/kenya.shooting/index.html"MSNBC" informa: "Sudan closes border with Chad and halts trade. The move comes a day after Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Chad":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24556085/Economist calls on world to aid African farmers, "CNN" informa:http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/05/08/africa.farming.ap/index.html ECONOMIA "The Economist" en su resumen semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11333281&CFID=5407672&CFTOKEN=71878483La mayor aseguradora del mundo entra en 'números rojos'.Los malos resultados de AIG y Citigroup, que ultima una nueva depreciación de activos, ponen de relieve que Wall Street sigue bajo los efectos de la crisis, informa "El País" de Madrid:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/mayor/aseguradora/mundo/entra/numeros/rojos/elpepueco/20080509elpepueco_5/Tes "Time" publica: "Citigroup To Shed Nearly $500B in Assets":http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1738840,00.html?iid=336x280_ad3OTRAS NOTICIAS "The Economist" infroma acerca de la crisis de alimentos: "Taking the strain. The political fallout from the rising cost of food has been manageable—so far":http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332931Fallece rescatadora de 2500 niños judíos en la Shoá (Holocausto), "Irena Sendler, who smuggled children out of Warsaw Ghetto, was 98" "MSNBC" informa:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24574531/"The economist" publica: "Microsoft and Yahoo!, No deal":http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11332396

Inhaltsangabe: Introduction: The master thesis 'Worldwide Development of Nuclear Energy and the Strategic Deployment of German Consultancies on the Arabian Peninsula' is chiefly targeted at German consultancy companies so that they can assess their status of strategic deployment and prioritize their activities to enter a new business sector in a foreign market. This publication could also be of relevance for policy makers, investors, suppliers as well as nuclear energy and governmental agencies to identify their need for external advisers to safely operate a nuclear power program; provides a guideline for how to enter a new market. Hence this thesis should be considered as an aid to identify hurdles and obstacles that have to be foreseen and so overcome. Potential business fields are also noted as well as important factors that have to be considered to minimize the chance of failure in the new market. Nevertheless, this huge market with its continuously changing constraints and conditions could throw up a lot more obstacles than could be covered in this thesis. Also the internal organizations of individual companies may differ from the one described in the thesis. The objective of this master thesis is thus to set out a set of guidelines for possible approaches. The first two chapters present an overview of the current geographical, political, cultural and economic conditions to familiarize the reader with the background information and constraints needed for the subsequent chapters. The third chapter deals more specifically with the energy market on the Arabian Peninsula, particular in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This chapter provides information on types of energy, pending developments, country-specific organizations and institutions, as well as means of financing such huge projects. The fourth chapter is devoted exclusively to nuclear energy, starting with the current status and the motivation of the two countries to launch such a development. This is followed by a description of the legal requirements and other commitments as decreed by the countries' governments. These specific legal conditions do not just apply within the countries concerned, but companies which do business there are likewise obliged to follow these regulations. Challenges for countries are opportunities for consultants, and identification of these represents is the core content of this chapter. The content of the fifth chapter is the preparatory measures that are essential prior to entering a foreign market. A company's vision and mission as well as various analyses are needed to provide a sound basis for taking a decision to proceed. In this context, SWOT analysis is noted as well as an evaluation of M.E. Porter's 'Five Forces' to describe the market and internal organizations. After the preparatory measures, the implementation phase follows. This and its various stages are described in Chapter 6. It is inevitable that, to ensure success, many measures will have to implemented and subsequently adjusted. This starts with deployment and steering of business units and proceeds to overcoming difficulties with external parties. Recruitment on a permanent basis of employees is also a prerequisite for sustained business success, together with a staff feedback, incentive and salary system. Chapter 7 sets out methods for evaluating previous years' activities in the new business. The first couple of years after 'start-up' are over and the situation in which the company is now has to be assessed. It is frequently necessary to undertake organizational upgrades, that could amount to a complete reorganization of the business, aided by change management provisions. The final Chapter 8 summarizes the key information and content, and sets forth the need and reasons for strategic deployment. Changes in the market means that companies will have to re-adjust for economic survival. Because the nuclear program of the United Arab Emirates is more advanced than that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and information is less available in the latter country, the main focus of this thesis is on the UAE. Nevertheless, the KSA is an emerging nuclear market with great ambitious for a nuclear program and so is worthy of mention when discussing constraints and conditions that these countries have in common. Other countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do share an interest in nuclear energy but are not yet at the same stage of development as the UAE and KSA. These serve from time to time to support arguments and figures. A sufficient and reliable energy supply is essential for continuous economic development, contributing also to poverty reduction and health care improvement. If these developments are restricted or lacking, often the result is social conflict that could even lead to civil strife. Examples are rural arid areas in the world where there is no access to potable water. A minor local conflict affects the economic development and population of specific countries and often results in regional instability and interventions from outside. The global energy imbalance has been steadily growing over the past couple of decades. Roughly 1.6 billion people live without electricity, and almost 2.4 billion people rely on traditional biomass to cook their daily meals . Modern fuels are not available or are restricted to the upper social strata. There is an almost equal share of the world's population with no access to potable water, so in the struggle for survival the consequences will be social unrest and riots. In some poor countries of the world, the per capita electricity consumption is as low as 50 kWh per annum, compared to developed countries with 8,600 kWh. Worldwide, the provision of energy is dominated by three major challenges. 1. Energy consumption has tripled in the past half century. If this continues, humankind will consume more energy in the 21st century than in the entire past history. This represents an increase of 53% in global energy consumption by 2030. 2. The main energy resources are now scarce, so to ensure economic development, countries will compete with each other to acquire their own supplies. Each country seeks to protect its existing sources and open up new ones. This will not result in a fair distribution of resources, as poor countries are not able to compete with their developed neighbors and lose out, as has often happened in history. 3. To an increasing extent attention is focusing on environmental impacts. Because of the greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels bring about a rise in global temperatures. The consequences are long-lasting drought, sea level rise, submerging coastal regions and more destructive storms. For these reasons, many governments are reviewing their present energy mixes and are considering alternatives to avert the consequences of energy scarcity, including the renewal of interest in nuclear energy that has been noted in recent decades. Adoption or resumption of nuclear energy is at least one solution for some countries faced with a threat to the security of their energy supplies. Among others, one benefit of nuclear energy is zero emissions of greenhouse gases during their operating phase and the ability of huge plants to provide electricity reliably and on a large scale. Much engineering effort has been devoted to significantly improving nuclear plant safety in recent decades. Furthermore, although they are finite, there are ample reserves of uranium and, unlike petrochemicals, they are not put to any other use apart from as an energy source. Prospecting is under way for new deposits, as currently in Yemen. The cost of electricity generated by nuclear power is now competitive, but a major concern that has still to be resolved is final storage of down burned nuclear fuel rods. An overview of the economics is provided by a cost comparison of the various electricity generation technologies, as shown in Figure 1-1 below. This survey is ongoing in a couple of countries to seek a basis for taking decisions on their energy strategies. The quoted figures are ballpark estimates, with actual values depending very much on local conditions and the current market situation, but they do serve to provide a rough comparison. The outcome of these calculations is that electricity generation from nuclear fuel is, at 91.0 US Dollar/MWh, much more competitive than firing crude oil at 133.4 US Dollar/MWh. However, a major consideration is the distinction that has to be made between supplying base and peak/cycling load. To meet the demand for base-load electricity, large-scale power plants, like nuclear and those fired with coal and crude oil are more favorable. These need an extended start-up period – ranging from a couple of hours to two or three days – before they can feed power into the grid. Smaller scale plant, like diesel-fired simple-cycle gas turbines and solar power plants are able to rapidly ramp their power output up and down to cover daily consumption peaks. For this reason, nuclear power plants almost exclusively operate continuously at or near peak output to supply base load, together with natural gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine plants and coal-fired power plants. Diesel-fired gas turbines and solar power plants find application for peak and cycling duty. The key factors are listed in the following table, with firstly the operating parameters, which are attributes specific to the various power plant technologies that are taken as basic assumptions for the further calculations. The second sub-heading is key financial constraints, which fix the technology that is more economical. These comprise the capital cost for construction and development as well as long-term costs that are highly cyclical and cannot be so readily predicted as the other costs. The third main distinction is the direct electricity generation costs. These are running costs incurred only during power plant operation and are directly related to the rated power output in MWe. This calculation serves as well to identify companies and utility suppliers for nuclear power generation as well as to broaden the mix of energy supply technologies and reduce dependency on specific primary resources.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: List of Figures4 List of Abbreviations6 1.Introduction and Objective8 1.1Objective of this Master Thesis8 1.2Introduction9 2.Geographical, Political, Cultural and Economic Conditions13 2.1Geography and Culture13 2.2Economy and Politics14 2.3Political and Social Stability in the UAE18 2.4Relations between the UAE and Germany18 2.5Relationship between the KSA and Germany19 3.Energy Sectors of the Leading Countries on the Arabian Peninsula20 3.1Electricity Generation and Consumption in KSA and UAE20 3.2Water Production and Consumption in the KSA and UAE24 3.3Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA25 3.4Pending Developments25 3.5Country-specific Organizations and Authorities26 3.6Financing of Power Projects in Arabian Countries27 3.7Summary of Chapter 327 4.Nuclear Energy on the Arabian Peninsula28 4.1Status in the UAE and KSA28 4.2Reasons for Launching a Nuclear Program29 4.3Obligations to Launch a Nuclear Program30 4.4Commitments of the UAE31 4.5Challenges and Potentials of the Nuclear Path33 4.6Global Outlook35 5.Preparations for Market Penetration37 5.1Vision and Mission38 5.2Market Analysis39 5.3Strategic SWOT Analysis41 5.3.1Strengths41 5.3.2Weaknesses45 5.3.3Opportunities46 5.3.4Threats47 5.4Five Elements of Realization Strategy49 5.4.1Arenas (market conditions and valuable segments)49 5.4.2Staging and pacing53 5.4.3Differentiators55 5.4.4Vehicles (course of action)55 5.4.5Economic logic58 5.4.6Summary and checklist of foundation59 6.Execution of the Initial Phase60 6.1Centralization versus Decentralization of Business Units60 6.2Acquisition of New Permanent Employees61 6.2.1Recruitment strategy for employees without experience61 6.2.2Recruitment strategy for experienced employees62 6.2.3Selection of potential candidates63 6.2.4Recruitment process63 6.3Internal Deployment and Organization66 6.3.1Feedback systems66 6.3.2Development of competencies66 6.3.3Incentives and salary systems68 6.3.4Difficulties with external parties69 7.Assessment of Business after 'Start-up Phase'70 7.1Reassessment of Recent Years70 7.2Organizational Improvement Measures72 7.3Change Management and the Reorganization of Business and Markets73 7.3.1Strengthen the position in the existing market74 7.3.2Entering new global markets75 8.Summary76 List of Literature78Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA: Utility companies in the GCC states are under enormous pressure due to the global scarcity of fossil fuels, which are running out much faster than expected, consequently they are boosting also renewable energies. Governmental agencies have been instructed to review energy consumption in the Middle East and are seeking alternatives to meet the rising demand, which is also in line with the global environmental movement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The long shoreline and high insolation throughout the year are optimal for generating wind, water and photovoltaic power. The following illustrate the efforts made by government agencies for the upcoming year: Abu Dhabi's Masdar City is spending US Dollar 2 billion on promoting solar technology. Saudi Arabia is looking to position itself as a centre for solar energy research and so become a net exporter of energy sourced from renewables. Abu Dhabi is to build the world's largest hydrogen power plant at a cost of US Dollar 15 billion. 'Glance over the borders": Jordan is assessing plans for constructing a wind farm while Qatar is considering solar power. 3.4, Pending Developments: Regarding upcoming developments, the two countries, UAE and KSA, have to be considered separately due to the primary resources that are available. Crude oil and natural gas reserves in Saudi Arabia will last decades more than the resources in the UAE. A further reason is that the quality and composition of the mineral resources are much less favorable in the KSA than in the UAE. This means that their firing for power generation is, for economic reasons, the only reasonable option for their exploitation. In the UAE the situation is different, as there the mineral resources are of much higher quality and are too valuable to fire in power plants. The price obtainable on the world petrochemicals market is much higher than the benefit derived from electricity generation. The UAE therefore has a greater incentive to diversify its power generation and to invest in technologies other than fossil fuels much earlier. Based on the financial and economic crisis, the 'Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie' expects a smoother growth of GDP in 2008 and 2009. This means that ongoing projects with a total CAPEX of US Dollar 378 billion will be postponed or abandoned. Despite these figures, the UAE will remain the most important project market for German companies in the Arabian region. Over the near term, between 2009 and 2011, the UAE expects investments of about US Dollar 540 billion. Showing high potential for investments of about US Dollar 24 billion is expansion of water production and power plant capacities. To participate in this development, frequent consultations and top-level meetings are held to strengthen the relationship between German industry and local agencies like DEWA (Dubai Electrical and Water Authority) and ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority). These authorities organize and guide all water and electricity projects, starting with planning and tendering through to commissioning. Over the past four years, energy consumption in the Emirate of Dubai has increased by around 10,000 GWh. As a consequence, the projection for 2010 is for a new electricity generation capacity of 9 GWe provided by power plants. Likewise electricity transmission has potential for growth. DEWA intends to award contracts annually for more than 6,000 km of HVDC (high voltage direct current) transmission lines. DEWA has an estimated annual budget of US Dollar 2 billion.

The Gulf – where petrostates and psychodrama hold sway – is a critical field for jockeying in the global shift to multipolarity, and the Ukraine war is recasting what each player wants, and thinks it can get.To wit: The Biden Administration wants to extend the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, so it can point to a key foreign-policy win before next year's presidential election while moving Riyadh back inside the U.S.-Israel tent. Saudi Arabia's Mohammad Bin Salman (Crown Prince MBS) wants instead to distance Riyadh from Washington so he can lead non-aligned talks and take the credit for resolving Ukraine's war with Russia — though, as an aside, he has demanded a nuclear enrichment plant and a fleet of F-35 fighter jets to consider Washington's request in return.Iran, which came in from the cold after the past year's "Women, Life Freedom" protests by signing a China-brokered normalization deal with Saudi Arabia, wants to stymie any Abraham Accords expansion beyond Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates and is working hard on becoming everyone's best friend outside the West — read: Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia.Israel wants to expand the Accords to include Riyadh, seeing it as a rare foreign policy opportunity to both balance Netanyahu's domestic woes triggered by his controversial far-right government and to promote the anti-Iran U.S. alliance in the Gulf.The Gulf's oil and staggering wealth, its divide down the middle between Iran and pro-Western states, and its unwieldy balance of two global energy producers facing each other across the absurdly narrow and strategic Strait of Hormuz all make the region one of the highest-stakes playing fields in the world. And the Ukraine war is shifting the goalposts. The Russians have arrived; China is quietly offering prizes, like nuclear plants, to regional actors; and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are flexing new muscle in the ongoing geo-strategic realignment.Russian Moves Russians are flooding the Gulf. They are buying up everything from lampshades to heavy equipment in Iran's bazaars and avoiding sanctions by shipping them over land and across the Caspian Sea. Saudi Arabia is in talks with Russian weapons manufacturers sanctioned by the U.S. Meanwhile, the hotels in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and down the Omani coast have seen a 200-percent jump in Russian bookings this year (376,000 guests a month in Abu Dhabi alone, triple last year's average) despite the weakening ruble.Both MBS and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE's Emir, have entered the field to negotiate a peace accord between Moscow and Kyiv. MBZ, as he is called, visited Russia in June presenting his mediation skills to President Putin, while MBS hosted a round of peace talks in Jeddah in early August, while voluntarily cutting oil output in July to boost prices, upsetting Washington (yet again) as the move will likely shore up Russian oil revenues.U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's attempt during his trip to Riyadh in July to promote the Abraham Accords and convince MBS not to move the goalposts, as well as to join the sanctions regime against Russia fell well short of success.MBS, touting ties to both Ukraine and Russia, instead drew his own line in the turf, gathering 42 countries to his "peace" summit, including the U.S. and China while excluding Iran and Russia. Western critics dismissed it as a soapbox for MBS to parade his new-found role as peace broker (and Moscow blasted it as pointless). But, with China floating a revised 10-point peace formula at the meeting, it established the kingdom's credentials as an emerging power offering new avenues for global conflict mediation, creating more daylight between Riyadh and Washington.Iran ReconstructedWith a new round of protests to mark the anniversary of the women's demonstrations that began last September, the clerical leadership marks a year of surprising rehabilitation in the Gulf as well as wider afield.Saudi Arabia and Iran have reestablished embassies in their respective capitals, offering a green light to warmer (and more substantive) relationships between Tehran and capitals up and down the Gulf's western littoral. For Riyadh, Tehran's warming relations with Moscow and its military support to Russia's war effort have not posed major hurdles, as its own diplomatic proximity to Russia has grown. Both states recognize that their relations with Moscow are pragmatic, if not entirely problem-free, and, as with much in their own ongoing detente, are more focused at the moment on compartmentalizing points of contention to build, rather than damage, goodwill. Despite their respective reputational black marks for human rights, the two oil heavyweights were just warmly welcomed into the BRICS (along with the UAE). This signals the Global South's growing clout and diversity, as well as a clear willingness to challenge established great power rules, prompting White House National's Security Advisor Jake Sullivan seemingly to dismiss the BRICS after the meeting as geopolitically inconsequential.Israel and the U.S. seeking purchaseAlthough U.S. military engagement and financial commitments remain dominant in the Gulf, Washington is no longer leading the action, and is often caught up short these days by Beijing moving the goal posts behind its back. Following its diplomatic coup with the surprise Iran-Saudi normalization deal, China just last week offered to build a nuclear plant on the Saudi border with Qatar and the UAE without including the same conditions demanded by the U.S. to prevent enrichment and possible nuclear weaponization.This comes hard on the heels of Blinken's trip to Riyadh to promote the Abraham Accords, which he described as the "cornerstone" of the Biden administration's Middle East policy on the basis that "Israel's further integration into the region contributes to a more stable, a more secure and more prosperous region." But with tensions still rising between Netanyahu's far-right government and the Palestinians, Riyadh is unconvinced that a public declaration of amity with Israel is politically wise or would contribute to stability in the Gulf, especially as trade, trust and diplomacy between the two countries have grown steadily without the fanfare of normalization. For MBS, the risks of joining the Accords include not only outraging the kingdom's own population and the wider Muslim community if it is seen as downgrading the Palestinian issue. But it could also stymie progress with Tehran, which would view such a move as Riyadh buckling to U.S. pressure and rejoining the anti-Iran camp. As the kingdom spreads its wings, it is clearly prioritizing Gulf neighborliness and détente over U.S. chumminess.Where Washington has made progress, albeit without Israel's support, is in backroom arrangements with Iran to tone down its nuclear enrichment in exchange for access to $6 billion of its frozen reserves held by South Korea.Under the umbrella of a prisoner swap, which Washington hopes to finalize in two or three weeks, bank transfers have been prepared and Iran has quietly slowed its uranium enrichment to 60 percent and is in the process of diluting its stockpile. It's the first breakthrough on the nuclear front since Donald Trump withdrew from the six-party JCPOA in 2018. And, although it means negotiating with a sworn enemy — and only then through intermediaries, notably Oman and Qatar — it shows that Washington can maneuver adeptly even when the Gulf's goal posts are shifting. What's less clear is whether the U.S. can be as flexible in expanding the Abraham Accords, with both China and Israel nipping at its heels, its hopes for a Libya-Israel rapprochement now dashed, and its erstwhile Team USA — aka the GCC states — heading off in different directions.Though the Ukraine war is playing out in the European arena, its repercussions in the Gulf are striking. It has opened new horizons for Russia and China to engage meaningfully in the region's security and energy, while giving new impetus to the region's mid-level powers to pursue not only their own expanding agendas, but to find common cause in a Gulf-centered community that can sidestep the vicissitudes of Great Power competition.