Analysis of Evaluation Characteristics of International and Japanese Tourists in Nikko and Hakone
In: Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan, Band 43.3, Heft 0, S. 595-600
ISSN: 2185-0593
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In: Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan, Band 43.3, Heft 0, S. 595-600
ISSN: 2185-0593
In: Studies in educational evaluation, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 69-86
ISSN: 0191-491X
This paper examines the economic effects of employment protection legislation in a sample of developed and developing countries. Implementing a difference-indifferences test lessens the potentially severe endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-country regressions. This test is based on the hypothesis that employment protection regulations are more binding in sectors of activity exposed to higher volatility in demand or supply shocks. The analysis indicates that more stringent legislation slows down job turnover by a significant amount, and that this effect is more pronounced in sectors that are intrinsically more volatile. The paper also finds that employment and value added decline in the most affected sectors, and employment and output effects are driven by a decline in the net entry of firms. In contrast, average employment per plant is not significantly affected.
BASE
In a group of countries like the European Union all countries seek to achieve their national CO2 emissions target by a joint emissions trading scheme covering some part of their economies (trading sector) and by a national emissions tax in the rest of their economies (nontrading sector). Applicable are also emissions taxes overlapping with the trading scheme that can either be freely chosen or are inert. Welfare-maximizing governments determine tax rates and the tradable-permits budget. It is shown that efficiency requires not to levy overlapping emissions taxes and to set the tax rate in the nontrading sector equal to the permit price. In the small-country case emissions control turns out to be efficient if tax rates in the trading sector are flexible. Otherwise it is second-best to violate cost effectiveness and to choose an excessive endowment of tradable permits. If countries are large and optimal tariffs cannot be applied, emissions taxes or subsidies (!) are shown to serve as a perfect surrogate; efficiency cannot be attained unless there is a central authority mandating cost effectiveness and banning overlapping taxes. Fiscal externalities are specified and the countries' welfare in the large and small country case is compared.
BASE
In: NBER Working Paper No. w13194
SSRN
In: Unterricht Arbeit + Technik, Band 9, Heft 36, S. 23-44
ISSN: 1438-8987
In: Environmental politics, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 539-540
ISSN: 0964-4016
In: The Creation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, S. 69-82
In: Private Military and Security Companies, S. 377-393
In: Archiv des Völkerrechts, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 53
ISSN: 1868-7121
In: The RUSI journal: independent thinking on defence and security, Band 152, Heft 1, S. 61-67
ISSN: 0307-1847
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 563
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Horizons stratégiques: revue trimestrielle du Centre d'Analyse Stratégique, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 100-115
ISSN: 1760-8023
In: Marine policy, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 220-225
ISSN: 0308-597X
In: Explorations in economic history: EEH, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 223-256
ISSN: 0014-4983