Suchergebnisse

Part I. Past imperfect: prehistory and history -- When did it all begin? -- Why people fought in the evolutionary state of nature -- The clash of the state-leviathans -- Part II. Flaws and miconceptions in disciplinary grand theories -- Anthropology: why people fought (if they did) -- The causes of war (or their absence) in international relations theory -- Part III. The modernization peace -- Has war been declining - and why? -- Challenges to the modernization peace: past and future -- Conclusion: the logic of war and peace

Los pasados presentes -- ¿Otras violencias, otras epistemologías? -- El discurso transicional como lugar -- Estéticas y políticas -- Las circulaciones del porvenir

El gobierno de la paz y los enemigos agazapados (1982-1986) -- La "Iniciativa para la Paz" : el punto de partida (1986-1990) -- Bienvenidos al futuro (1990-1994) -- El salto a Maguncia (1994-1998) -- El mandato por la paz (1998-2002) -- La hora dela seguridad democrática (2002-2010) -- La puerta del diálogo no está cerrada con llave (2010-2016)

Scattered over the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea lie the remnants of failed peace proposals, international summits, secret negotiations, UN resolutions, and state-building efforts. The conventional story is that these well-meaning attempts at peacemaking were repeatedly, perhaps terminally, thwarted by violence. Through a rich interweaving of reportage, historical narrative, and powerful analysis, Nathan Thrall presents a startling counter-history. He shows that force has impelled each side to make its largest concessions, from Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution to Israeli territorial withdrawals. This simple fact has been neglected by the world powers, which have expended countless resources on initiatives meant to diminish friction between the parties. By quashing any hint of confrontation and providing bounteous economic and military assistance, the United States and Europe have merely entrenched the conflict by lessening the incentives to end it. Thrall's important book upends the beliefs steering these failed policies, revealing how the aversion of pain, not the promise of peace, has driven compromise for Israelis and Palestinians alike.