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This paper advances a model of multilateral trade negotiations to analyze the effects of the most‐favored‐nation clause (MFN) on international trade agreements. Negotiations are modeled in a three player, non‐cooperative, dynamic bargaining framework that admits the possibility of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. The central result is that bargaining in the presence of MFN results in Pareto efficient, mutually advantageous, multilateral trade agreements. The free‐rider problem commonly attributed to the presence of MFN does not arise, and, under a condition of symmetry, each country receives equal gains (or reciprocity) from the agreement. In the absence of MFN, many of these properties may not hold. Examples are given in which at most two of the three countries benefit from agreement. These results suggest that many of the criticisms levied against the MFN clause are misplaced; moreover, attempts to replace unconditional MFN with conditional MFN may sacrifice many of the long‐held values of the GATT.

In a recent article published in this journal Steven Sheffrin presented the results of two tests on the so called "Rational Partisan Theory". Sheffrin concluded that the evidence provides "little support for a strict interpretation of the theory". This note argues that, although interesting in itself, the tests performed by Sheffrin are not particularly informative about the empirical relevance of the Rational Partisan Theory. Also, this note reconciles Sheffrin's results on OECD economies with the literature, which, in general, has found rather supportive evidence for the Rational Partisan Theory.

Bezug auf Argentinien, Brasilien, Mexiko und Venezuela

The economic approach to understanding human behavior has encountered serious difficulties when attempting to explain the private provision of public goods, such as voting and charitable contributions to large organizations. To gain insights into these important issues, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach. The individual is modeled formally in terms of dual egoistic/altruistic utilities, and the recursive relation between altruism and the existence and production of social capital is developed. The model is analyzed as a non‐cooperative game between the egoistic and altruistic selves. The socialized rational actor that results from the combination of social capital, dual utilities, and non‐cooperative behavior resolves a number of public goods paradoxes. Comparative statics and the dynamics of social capital formation are explored.

This paper studies an election game between two politicians, in which each provides income transfers to special‐interest groups in return for political contributions. It is shown that a move to a more inefficient form of transfers may lower the total excess burden created by these transfers, because the politicians are induced to reduce their provision of transfers. For the case in which the income transfers are indirectly provided as trade protection to import‐competing industries, a switch from production subsidies to tariffs as the form of protection reduces the equilibrium level of excess burden and makes both politicians better off.

In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.