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The financial crises across Asia in 199798 ignited fierce debate about domestic economic weaknesses and flaws in the international financial system. Some analysts blamed Asian governments for inadequate prudential supervision, widespread failures of corporate governance and even 'crony capitalism'. Others assailed the inherent instability of global financial markets and what they considered to be hasty and ill-conceived liberalization taken at the behest of Western-dominated international financial institutions. In this volume a distinguished group of political scientists, economists and practitioners examines the political and economic causes and consequences of the crisis. They ask: To what extent were domestic economic factors to blame for the crises? Why were some economies more prone to crisis than others? What are the costs and benefits of international financial liberalization?

Policy change occurs because coalitions of actors are able to take advantage of political conditions to translate their strong beliefs about policy into ideas, which are turned into policy. A coalition's ability to define a problem helps to keep policies in place, but it can also cause coalitions to develop blind spots. For example, policy subsystem actors will often neglect the need for coordination between governmental actors. We examine the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to show how entrenched policy ideas can cause subsystem actors to overlook the need for policy coordination. We first analyze the prevalent idea that policymakers should aim to keep inflation low and stable while employing light touch regulation to financial markets. We then demonstrate how this philosophy led to a lack of coordination between monetary and regulatory policy in the subprime mortgage market. We conclude with thoughts about the need for coordination in future economic policy. Adapted from the source document.

Policy change occurs because coalitions of actors are able to take advantage of political conditions to translate their strong beliefs about policy into ideas, which are turned into policy. A coalition's ability to define a problem helps to keep policies in place, but it can also cause coalitions to develop blind spots. For example, policy subsystem actors will often neglect the need for coordination between governmental actors. We examine the financial crisis of 2007–2009 to show how entrenched policy ideas can cause subsystem actors to overlook the need for policy coordination. We first analyze the prevalent idea that policymakers should aim to keep inflation low and stable while employing light touch regulation to financial markets. We then demonstrate how this philosophy led to a lack of coordination between monetary and regulatory policy in the subprime mortgage market. We conclude with thoughts about the need for coordination in future economic policy.

We analyze contributions of different markets to price discovery on traded inflation expectations and how it changed during the financial crisis. The quicker information is processed on one market and the less one market is disrupted by the financial crisis the more valuable is its information for central banks and market participants. We use a new high frequency data set on inflation-indexed and nominal government bonds as well as inflation swaps to calculate information shares of break-even inflation rates in the euro area and the US. For maturities up to 5 years new information comes from both the swap and the bond markets. For longer maturities the swap market provides less and less information in the euro area. In the US where the market volume of inflation-linked bonds is large the bond market dominates the price discovery process for all maturities. The severe financial crisis that spread out in Autumn 2008 drove a wedge between bond and swap break-even inflation rates in both currencies. Price discovery ceased to take place on the swap market. Disruptions coming from the short-end of the market even separated price formation on both segments for maturities of up to 6 years in the US. Against the backdrop of the most severe financial crisis in decades contributions to price formation concentrated a lot more on the presumably safest financial instrument: government bonds.

A series of crises and traumatic events, such as the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis, seem to have influenced the environment within which modern political leaders act. We explore the scholarly literature on political leadership and crisis since 2008 to evaluate what sorts of questions are being engaged, and identify some new lines of inquiry. We find several scholars are contributing much insight from the perspective of leadership and crisis management. Several analysts are investigating the politics of crisis from a decentralist perspective, focusing on local leadership in response to challenging events. As well, studying how citizens interpret, respond to, or resist leaders' signals is a developing area of inquiry. While our study reveals some debate about the nature of crisis, and whether the context has changed significantly, most of the scholarship reviewed here holds modern politicians face large challenges in exercising leadership within precarious contexts.

This book takes a multi-disciplinary approach to the great financial crisis of 2007-09. It combines the disciplines of economics, finance, sociology and politics to analyse the causes, consequences and challenges of the crisis. The authors propose that the causes of the crisis should be understood at three inter-related levels - the level of theory and ideology; the level of financial industry practices and malpractices; and finally the level of structural imbalances in the international economy. Above all, the book is historical and holistic in perspective. This book is an excellent read for the critical layman interested in understanding the causes that underlie the global financial crisis. The authors combine the inquisitive and critical mind of a scholar and the lucid writing style of a journalist. The book provides a perspective on the crisis that is both practical and down to earth and at the same time, rigorous and holistic. Khor Hoe Ee, Chief Economist, Abu Dhabi Council for Economic Development, and former Assistant Managing Director, Economics, Monetary Authority of Singapore The authors trace the rise of finance and its domination over the real economy, the consequences of financial innovation and deregulation for systemic fragility, and the failure of conventional economic and financial theory to analyse and anticipate the consequent dangers. Their main original contribution is to relate these Western market developments to recent trends in the East Asian region and to call for appropriate systemic reforms, not only to avoid similar future crises, but also to address other underlying development and analytical problems.K.S. Jomo, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United NationsIn linking wealth and income distribution to financial instability, this book makes an important point that is often missed in the debate on the crisis. Central Banks have become strongly opposed to the idea of accommodating wage demands with the help of monetary easing, but they have been increasingly tolerant, or even supportive, of debt-financed consumption and asset inflation. Indeed, by serving to concentrate wealth further in the hands of a small rentier class, while protecting that class from the risks of debt defaults, they are only adding to systemic pressures that give rise to serious financial crises. Yilmaz Akyuz, Special Economic Advisor, South Centre, and former Chief Economist at United Nations Con ...

No one can deny the outstanding success of the East Asian economies in the last two decades of rapid economic growth backed by surging capital inflows. Key questions posed by the current crisis are: what went wrong, and why? how to fix it? and, how to prevent a recurrence? To answer them, the article begins with a brief overview of recent developments in the miracle economies of East Asia, focusing mainly on Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. We focus too on some of the shadows that came to darken the glittering success story—on declining competitiveness and growing financial vulnerability; and on regulatory failures in banking. Then we take a leaf from Charles Kindleberger's book (1996) on Panics, Manias and Crashes and discuss—with historical precedents—various types of financial crisis: speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates, asset bubbles, stock market crashes and bank runs. Based on the distinction between illiquidity, due to a shortage of cash, and insolvency arising from a failure of economic prospects, we go on to outline three main views of the current crisis.First that it was simply due to reversal of capital flows, to a failure of collective action on the part of creditors which could and should have been solved by supplying extra liquidity—or by forcing creditors to roll over their loans. Second the view that the miracle had grown into a bubble that had finally had to burst: so the problem was essentially one of insolvency. Finally the view that we prefer, that the panic was not wholly groundless (and rescue efforts were bound to be difficult) mainly because weak regulation combined with implicit deposit guarantees had left local bankers free to gamble with the money that global capital markets had poured into their parlours. Panic set in when foreign depositors realised that there were not enough dollar reserves left for the guarantee to be credible. This account (championed most notably by Paul Krugman of MIT) involves both illiquidity and insolvency and helps to explain why the IMF was unwilling simply to throw money at the problem.Why did the crisis spread like wildfire around the region? Was it because a bank run due to shaky fundamentals in one country was imitated elsewhere, as investors joined the herd heading for the exit? This and other accounts of contagion are discussed before turning to ideas for crisis prevention and management, and a brief account of future prospects for the region. The article concludes by outlining immediate steps to resolve the current financial crisis and by proposing international monetary reforms to prevent a recurrence.

In response to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis many schemes were initiated to reform the international financial architecture. The proposed reforms had two wide-ranging objectives: (i) to prevent currency and banking crises and better manage them when they occur; and (ii) to support adequate provision of net private and public flows to developing countries, particularly low-income ones. Unfortunately the progress has been uneven, asymmetric, and patchy. This is largely because the structural problems related to the supply side of capital flows have not been addressed, particularly the unipolar character of the global financial system. As a result, many East Asian economies face many of the same conditions that prevailed immediately prior to the crisis: huge capital inflows heavily tilted toward hot money, rapid appreciation of currencies in real terms, surging stock prices, and little policy space to implement countercyclical measures in the event of a crisis. The difference is that many countries have accumulated a large amount of foreign exchange reserves but at the expense of domestic investment and economic growth. In order to resolve the problems that are posed by volatile capital flows it is important to accelerate East Asian cooperation and integration, particularly with regard to the objective of using regional savings for regional infrastructure projects. Political rapprochement between China and Japan is a necessary condition both to move regional cooperation and integration forward and to overhaul the unipolar global financial system.

This paper develops a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework that accommodates a banking sector and money. The model is used to shed light on the period of the recent period of financial crisis. It differs from other applications in the use of indirect inference to estimate and test the fitted model. We find that the main shocks that hit China in the crisis were international and that domestic banking shocks were unimportant. Officially mandated bank lending and government spending were used to supplement monetary policy to aggressively offset shocks to demand. An analysis of the frequency of crises shows that crises occur on average about every half-century, with about a third accompanied by financial crises. We find that monetary policy can be used more vigorously to stabilise the economy, making direct banking controls and fiscal activism unnecessary.

As we write, the world is still in the grips of a financial crisis. Germany was one of the first countries to bail out a bank in July 2007. Then, in September 2007, the United Kingdom (UK) witnessed a run on a building society, Northern Rock, and the subsequent widespread nationalization of its banking sector. In the United States, the crisis led to a number of collapses among financial institutions, most famously Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and the bail out of the insurance group, AIG, all in 2008.

Extraordinary amounts of public funds and/or assistance were made available to banks since the onset of the 2007–8 financial crises. Governments worldwide have launched a massive bailout package to support banks in distress. Using a probit model, this article investigates the likelihood of bailouts following the financial crisis. Our results lead us to conclude that the governance characteristics of banks, specifically the characteristics of boards, bank risks, as well as bank-level and country-specific banking sector features, explain the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector. In particular, we find that board banking experience, longer directors' tenure, less busy boards, and the existence of a corporate governance committee decrease the likelihood of banks participating in a bailout programme. Inversely, board independence, credit, and liquidity risks increase the probability of banks being bailed out. Furthermore, fewer limitations on banking freedom and greater openness of the banking sector have a harmful impact on the occurrence of bailouts. Our study therefore suggests relevant policy implications, which might help supervisors, regulators, and other public authorities in avoiding costly bailouts.

Project files are comprised of 1 page pdf and presentation recording in mp4 format. ; This project highlights the economic policies adopted by the Venezuelan government during and after the 2008 financial crisis. To gain an understanding of the experience felt in Venezuela, we utilize publications from Venezuela. From newspapers published there to academic reports from an international perspective, our study will illuminate how Venezuelan democracy eroded through the breakdown of institutions following economic collapse. This project's aims are to identify some of the root causes for the Venezuelan economic crisis and the sustained disparity experienced by the Venezuelan people. We are going to show the connection between economic and political issues and their impact on political efficacy in a democracy. Our results show: as Venezuela's economy experienced greater economic strife, the government was able to take more drastic action threatening its democracy. When considering relevant concepts such as globalization, media's influence, and regional issues, it becomes clear that Venezuela's backslide into authoritarianism was inextricably linked to not only the national economy but the global economy's slide into a recession.

In this study we analyze the convergence of GDP per capita from 2000 to2013 (current prices and euro exchange rates) for eight countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) of the European Union (CEE8). Some convergence indicators are also calculated for the CEE8 as a whole. The main purpose of this study is to shed some light on the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on regional convergence in advanced emerging countries, like the CEE8. The main result of random effects panel regressions for unconditional beta-convergence is that significant convergence is found for the whole period from 2000-2013, but not for sub-periods on either end of the sample, except for Hungary and Poland. This means, that convergence in most CEECs is only significant if the GFC is included in the estimation period. The role of capital regions for the convergence process is an item for future research.