Suchergebnisse

Intro -- CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ANALYSES AND REFORMS -- CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ANALYSES AND REFORMS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 REFORM OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES -- SUMMARY -- THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND POSSIBLE REVISIONS -- The System's Structure -- Possible Revisions -- NEUTRALITY, EFFICIENCY, AND COMPETITIVENESS -- Understanding Capital Export Neutrality, Capital Import Neutrality,and National Neutrality -- Capital Ownership Neutrality -- ASSESSING THE EXISTING TAX SYSTEM -- TERRITORIAL TAXATION: THE DIVIDEND EXEMPTION PROPOSAL -- A RESIDENCE-BASED SYSTEM IN PRACTICE -- PRESIDENT OBAMA'S PROPOSALS TO RESTRICT DEFERRAL AND CROSS-CREDITING -- TAX HAVENS: ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS -- GENERAL REFORMS OF THE CORPORATE TAX AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATMENT -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS -- SUMMARY -- THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM -- REPATRIATED EARNINGS PROVISIONS IN THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT -- IMPACTS OF A REDUCTION IN THE TAX ON REPATRIATED EARNINGS -- Impact on Repatriated Earnings -- Impact on Economic Growth -- Use of Repatriated Earnings and Economic Stimulus -- Exchange Rate Adjustments and Economic Stimulus -- End Notes -- Chapter 3 CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- THE CORPORATE TAX AS A REVENUE SOURCE -- Magnitude and Historical Pattern -- The Role of the Corporate Tax in Backstopping the Individual Tax -- BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES AND REVENUE MAXIMIZING TAX RATE -- Theoretical Issues -- Empirical Analysis -- Brill and Hassett Study -- Clausing Study -- CROSS COUNTRY INVESTMENT ESTIMATES: THE DJANKOV STUDY -- Theoretical Issues -- Empirical Analysis -- DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS -- The Harberger and Randolph Studies

"Geared toward undergraduate and postgraduate students studying international marketing, International Marketing, An SME Perspective blends rigorous theory with practice. The book places emphasis on the impact of technology on the international marketing landscape."--Jacket

Defence date: 15 November 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Árpád Ábrahám, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Andrea Mattozzi, EUI; Professor Alessia Campolmi, University of Verona; Dr. Luca Dedola, European Central Bank ; This thesis sheds light on three questions in international macroeconomics. The first chapter investigates why business cycle correlations are state-dependent and higher in recessions than in expansions. I suggest a mechanism to explain why this is the case. Therefore, I build an international real business cycle model with occasionally binding constraints on capacity utilization which can account for state-dependent cross-country correlations in GDP growth rates. Empirically, I successfully test for the presence of capacity constraints using data from the G7 advanced economies in a Bayesian threshold autoregressive (T-VAR) model. This finding supports capacity constraints as a prominent transmission channel of cross-country GDP asymmetries in recession compared to expansions. The second chapter is joint work with Mathias Hoffmann and Sven Blank of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It analyzes how foreign direct investment (FDI) influences optimal country portfolio diversification. In a DSGE model that features the endogenous choice of firms to become internationally active through either exports or foreign direct investment (FDI), we find that the optimal equity holdings of agents are more biased towards domestic firms than in a model without FDI. The third chapter explores under which circumstances member countries of a monetary union will not find it optimal to bail each other out. To investigate these circumstances, I build a model of cross-country holdings of sovereign debt with the possibility of default, as well as the possibility to negotiate a bailout for a struggling country. I show that if there is a representative household in each individual member country, a bailout solution always exists. In a second version of the model that involves heterogeneity in household wealth within the bailout providing country, the utilitarian government of this country optimally refuses a bailout in some states of the world. ; -- 1 International Co-movements in Recessions -- 2 Foreign Direct Investment and the Equity Home Bias Puzzle -- 3 Sovereign Bailouts: Why defaults are possible in a union after all

Criticizes Carl Schmitt's analysis of liberal universalistic international law. Schmitt's method for contrasting contemporary realities with an idealized "golden age" of international relations is analyzed with attention to his references to Thomas Hobbes & examples of historical distortions. L. Collins Leigh

Im Internationalen Investitionsrecht haben NGOs und sonstige nichtstaatliche Akteure den amicus curiae brief für sich entdeckt, um auf bestimmte Folgewirkungen eines Schiedsspruchs hinzuweisen. Auch die Europäische Kommission tritt in Investitionsverfahren verstärkt als amicus curiae in Erscheinung.Der lateinische Begriff amicus curiae bedeutet übersetzt "Freund des Gerichts". Es handelt sich um ein Rechtsinstitut, das dem angloamerikanischen Prozessrecht entstammt. Es erlaubt verfahrensfremden Dritten, sich mittels eines Schriftsatzes (engl.: "brief") in ein gerichtliches Verfahren einzuschalten und rechtlich Stellung zu nehmen.Das Buch geht auf die historische Entwicklung des amicus briefs ein und analysiert die Rechtsgrundlagen des amicus briefs im Investitionsrecht sowie seine Akzeptanz in der Schiedsgerichtspraxis. Es werden konkrete Vorschläge zur Optimierung der Rechtslage unterbreitet und Handlungsempfehlungen an die Akteure im internationalen Investitionsrecht ausgesprochen

This paper explores the institutional changes of international tax governance in response to growing politicization and contestation of international direct tax issues. I show that politicization – which is a very recent phenomenon in international taxation – results from a governance gap. The traditional setup of international tax cooperation has an unintended consequence in the form of harmful tax competition. In reaction to this problem, civil society groups have begun to question the effectiveness and fairness of the minimal international tax order, lobbying national governments and international organizations for more effective international regulation of tax issues. Thus, in contrast to existing hypotheses, societal politicization does not result from the increasing scope and authority of international institutions, but rather from the lack thereof. However, civil society demands have so far not led to institutional changes in international taxation. Instead, we can only observe indirect and incremental change, which falls short of what would ultimately be needed to address harmful tax competition effectively. ; Dieses Papier untersucht den institutionellen Wandel des internationalen Steuerregimes in Reaktion auf eine zunehmende Politisierung internationaler Steuerangelegenheiten. Gesellschaftliche Politisierung, die im Bereich der internationalen Besteuerung ein sehr junges Phänomen ist, hat ihre Ursache in einer Governancelücke. Das traditionelle institutionelle Arrangement zur Vermeidung von internationaler Doppelbesteuerung hat nicht-intendierte Nebenfolgen in der Form von schädlichem und unfairem Steuerwettbewerb. Als Reaktion auf dieses Problem haben zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure den Mangel an Effektivität und Fairness skandalisiert. Sie versuchen nationale Regierungen und internationale Organisationen zu mehr internationaler Regulierung des Steuerwettbewerbs anzutreiben. Anders als in Teilen der Literatur angenommen wird, ist die gesellschaftliche Politisierung nicht das Resultat eines Zuwachses an politischem Einfluss von nicht ausreichend legitimierten internationalen Institutionen, sondern sie thematisiert im Gegenteil den Mangel an effektiven internationalen Institutionen. Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Forderungen haben bisher nicht zu institutionellen Reformen geführt. Stattdessen lässt sich lediglich indirekter und inkrementeller Wandel beobachten, der nicht ausreichend ist, um das Problem schädlichen Steuerwettbewerbs zu lösen.