Suchergebnisse

AbstractWhy is it so difficult to qualify the Court of Justice's decisions as 'sources of law?' Does the Court of Justice only 'interpret' law, or does it 'make' it? To what extent should its pronouncements be taken into account by others? This chapter shows how a particular theoretical approach to precedent and judicial lawmaking shapes the answers to the queries mentioned above. It examines a set of interrelated questions concerning precedent and judicial lawmaking by the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation and then applies these findings to the Court of Justice. The questions are: first, in what sense is it said that these courts make law; secondly, who is bound by their pronouncements; and, thirdly, how does this binding force actually work? It is suggested that while the US and French systems have found ways in which to reconcile judicial lawmaking with the basic premises of their constitutional and political systems, especially by allowing other actors to respond to judicial lawmaking (in the particular sense of the word 'lawmaking' used in these two systems), the EU system is still waiting for a satisfactory answer.

Accuracy is an issue that points to the reliability of language used in legal circles. The objective of the present study is to investigate linguistic devices denoting accuracy in Thai legal discourse. Data was gathered from judgments in three Thai courts: the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court. Findings from Thai legal language were also compared to those from three registers: academic, media and political. The results show that Thai legal language employs two major linguistic devices in order to express accuracy: mention of the sources of evidence and legal citations. The use of the two devices is significantly present in legal language when compared with other registers.

Judicial citation of foreign law worries many people, including justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, politicians, and legal academics. The critics in the United States argue that judges "cherry-pick" foreign citations and use them to import foreign norms that do not accord with the Constitution or the will of the American people. This Article argues, based on insights from organizational theory, that the critics overlook another, much greater, concern: the danger does not come from citing or looking at foreign law, but rather, from other types of interaction, such as meetings at judicial organizations, judicial delegations, or judicial conferences. The result of these transnational judicial interactions will be convergence on certain practices of courts, especially in the way courts understand their national roles, the ways they present themselves to their national audiences, and the methods they use to do so. The adoption of these similar practices across national borders is likely to distance the courts from their national audiences and cause courts to lose their national support.

States wishing to extend foster care supports to young adults under the Fostering Connections to Success Act are required to meet all the requirements of Title IV‐E, which include regular reviews that have traditionally been conducted in juvenile courts. For some, this requirement of ongoing judicial involvement is a reason to forgo this significant source of new federal dollars. Others are seeking ways to minimize ongoing court involvement while still complying with federal requirements. This article argues that these views are misguided. Designed properly, juvenile court reviews can play a unique and important role in helping young adults begin to take responsibility for their own futures.