Suchergebnisse

THROUGH THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY (WHA), COUNTRIES HAVE SIGNED ONTO GLOBAL NUTRITION TARGETS, AND AS CHAPTER 2 SHOWS, ONE WAY to track countries' progress is to apply these global targets to the national level. Yet targets that countries set for themselves are likely to be more effective tools for promoting accountability. By definition, these self-generated targets have greater government buy-in and ownership than those set from outside the country. And these targets are most useful for accountability when they are SMART (that is, specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound). ; PR ; IFPRI1; CRP4; B Promoting healthy food systems ; A4NH; PHND ; CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)

"For the past decade, international donors have made efforts to reform the security sector in Guinea-Bissau - yet success has been elusive. Why have international reform concepts largely failed? By exploring reform attempts in the police sector, the author investigates the causes which led up to this situation. He identifies a number of problems concerning among others the communication or the course of action between the International Community and Bissau-Guinean institutions and gives advice on how to improve the solutions to security sector related issues." (author's abstract)

This article provides an overview of some common challenges and opportunities related to cultural adaptation of behavioral interventions. Cultural adaptation is presented as a necessary action to ponder when considering the adoption of an evidence-based intervention with ethnic and other minority groups. It proposes a roadmap to choose existing interventions and a specific approach to evaluate prevention and treatment interventions for cultural relevancy. An approach to conducting cultural adaptations is proposed, followed by an outline of a cultural adaptation protocol. A case study is presented, and lessons learned are shared as well as recommendations for culturally grounded social work practice.

As with any institutional feature, the size of the Supreme Court should be informed by a definition of functional goals. This article describes how the current size of the Supreme Court is largely untethered from any such definition, and it begins the process of understanding how size and Court performance might interact. To do so, it identifies a list of institutional goals for the Supreme Court and explores how changing the size of the Court promotes or obstructs the attainment of those goals. Given that the Court's institutional goals are numerous and occasionally in tension, there is no definitive answer to the question of how large the Court should be. Instead, the optimal size of the Court depends on how one views the relative importance of each institutional goal and how those goals should be balanced. Unfortunately, the current size of the Supreme Court is not attributable to a careful balancing of these institutional goals, but instead is due to political efforts to secure power on the Court. Consequently, a reconsideration of the Court's size in light of institutional considerations is long overdue.