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This e-book examines the phenomenon of immigration and the legal responses to it by European Union states. The reasons for, and the specific process of, conferral of protection on immigrants raise questions which have been the subject of lengthy analysis and debate. Divided into two parts, this ebook first analyses the protection given to aliens in Germany, France and Spain, and goes on to evaluate these findings by deconstructing the process of conferral of protection

In modern times the idea of the objectivity of law has been undermined by skepticism about legal institutions, disbelief in ideals of unbiased evaluation, and a conviction that language is indeterminate. Greenawalt here considers the validity of such skepticism, examining such questions as: whether the law as it exists provides determinate answers to legal problems; whether the law should treat people in an "objective way," according to abstract rules, general categories, and external consequences; and how far the law is anchored in something external to itself, such as social morality, political justice, or economic efficiency. In the process he illuminates the development of jurisprudence in the English-speaking world over the last fifty years, assessing the contributions of many important movements. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1226/thumbnail.jpg

AbstractThis article focuses on the trends of law journals published by law schools in India. The article comprises a short overview of the free access to law movement around the world, and it is an attempt to showcase the growing open access to law movement in India. The article visualizes results of the responses received over the publications of legal scholarship in journals by 23 Indian law schools. The article appends recommendations for greater visibility of AW journals published by law schools in India.

This paper provides a commentary on the evolution and position of petty offence law in the Polish legal system. For the sake of order, it should be noted that the nature of petty offences is ambiguous and not one-dimensional. Their status and role depend on the assumptions of the legislator, who may emphasise their various aspects. A petty offence may be an element of criminal law in the broad sense, as a "small crime" or an administrative tort. More-over, the development of Polish petty offence law and the arguments supporting the choice of specific legal solutions are presented. The probable future of Polish petty offence law was also indicated, aiming at the conclusion that the most serious petty offences would become crimes, and the rest would become administrative torts.

The substance of Dugard's International Law: A South African Perspective has undergone major changes to take account of new developments both on the international legal scene and in South Africa. The fifth edition presents a South African perspective of international law. The basic principles of international law are described and examined with reference to the principal sources of international law. This examination, however, takes place within the context of South African law. South African state practice, judicial decisions and legislation on international law receive equal treatment with international law as it is practised and taught abroad.

AbstractAlthough Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness (Hobbes does not name the vice corresponding to mercy, this is my attempt to provide one.), cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness (I take this to be the vice corresponding to equity). The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, (Hobbes does not give, and I do not know what would count as, the virtue corresponding to his account of cruelty), civility, humility, (Hobbes uses this as one of the names for the virtue corresponding to the vice of arrogance, but I am using it as the opposite of pride.), modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. (See H, XIII, 9) The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." (C, II, 1; see also L, XIV, 3) But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" (L, XV, 34; see also C, III, 32) is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." (C, III, 31; see also L, XV, 40) Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues.