Suchergebnisse

The question how voter preferences relate to preferences of representatives under different electoral rules has attracted scholarly attention for some time. Although theoretical work suggests that proportional rule leads to more dispersion of representatives than plurality rule, empirical studies of this nexus have not yet reached a consensus. We argue that this is because they are plagued by serious problems as they rely on measures that differ for both sets of actors. We use behavioral data to estimate ideal points of voters and representatives on a common scale by taking advantage of the high frequency of referendums in Switzerland. We find that members of parliament elected in proportional representation systems are more widely dispersed around the median voter. Probing at what stage this difference in dispersion occurs, we also demonstrate this is the voters' doing, as it only applies to candidates who are elected.

This paper assesses the hypothesis that election quality is worse under plurality voting systems than under proportional representation (PR). We use a two-pronged research design that permits us to harness the advantages of most similar and most different approaches to limit problems of endogeneity that afflict hypothesis testing in comparative politics. We use a subnational database of more than 1,300 accusations of electoral fraud from Costa Rica (1901–1948) that uniquely varies formulae among (provincial) electoral districts. Our statistical models reveal that plurality leads to more ballot rigging than proportional systems. We also demonstrate that plurality voting systems are associated with inferior election quality in the Quality of Elections Database (QED), which covers 170 countries between 1975 and 2004. Our findings suggest that electoral formulae, a basic feature of institutional design, have as much impact as social structure on whether elections are free and fair.

How proportional are the results of electoral systems designed to ensure proportional representation? How large is the deviation from proportionality for relative majority systems? Does a given system favor large, small or medium‐sized parties? Are some parties consistently advantaged? Is the system predictable or erratic? Plotting the percentage of seats–percentage of votes ratio versus percentage of votes for all parties, is found to be a simple and yet powerful graphical method to answer such questions. Application of such "proportionality profiles" to West European multi‐party systems leads to a typology of electoral systems based on their actual effect (rather than their formal procedure or intended effect). District magnitude, the number of rounds, and nationwide adjustment rules are found to be more important than formal seat distribution rules such as d'Hondt or Sainte‐Laguë. Copyright © 1980, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

ABSTRACTThis article conceptualizes the relative absence of youth in legislatures, a feature we perceive as a democratic deficit with detrimental consequences. It introduces a new operationalization: the Youth Representation Index. Rather than calculating youths' representation by the percentage of Members of Parliament 35 or 40 years old and younger or legislatures' median age, we argue that scholars should assess youths' parliamentary presence relative to their proportion of the voting-age population. We contribute by assessing the magnitude of youths' underrepresentation across countries, finding that adults 35 years old and younger are generally underrepresented in legislatures by a factor of three and those 40 years old and younger by a factor of two. We illustrate that youths' presence increases under proportional representation electoral systems and with candidate age requirements set at 18 years. Finally, our results illustrate that countries with a younger population display a stronger discrepancy in youth representation.

AbstractThis study addresses the question of why so many of the world's legislators are lawyers or law graduates. Drawing from previous studies on lawyer-legislators and electoral systems, it develops the argument that 'first-pass-the-post' single-member district electoral systems presume a principal-agent logic of representation and are therefore conducive to political parties selecting representatives with either occupational experience or educational training in the field of law. By contrast, proportional representation (PR) elections presume a microcosm model of representation incentivizing parties to select candidates representing diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds. This conjecture is tested by examining legislator backgrounds in three large parliaments with mixed electoral systems: Germany, Japan, and South Korea. As expected, single-member plurality elections are linked to a greater share of lawyers and law graduates in parliaments compared to those elected via PR even after controlling for several alternative explanations.

AbstractTwo new studies challenge the prevailing consensus that proportional representation (PR) systems produce greater ideological congruence between governments and their citizens than majoritarian ones. This has led to what has become known as the 'ideological congruence controversy'. G. Bingham Powell claims to resolve this controversy in favour of PR systems. Specifically, he argues that the results from the two new studies are based on an anomalous decade and that PR systems generally do produce greater government congruence. In addition, he also asserts that PR systems exhibit less variability in government congruence. In this article, the empirical evidence for these two claims is re‐evaluated using exactly the same data as employed by Powell. The analysis indicates that although PR systems produce better and more consistent representation in the legislature, they do not hold an advantage when it comes to representation at the governmental level.

"Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with
proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision.
Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses
on voters' attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of
polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a
realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly
accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political
sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a
small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus,
the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading." (author's abstract)

AbstractExisting studies on legal approaches to ethnic minority representation often highlight different systems' strengths and weaknesses. While this scholarship provides important insights into the growing body of literature on minority representation, the topic remains largely under-theorized. Because systems of ethnic minority representation clarify the organizations and philosophies of diverse states, more theoretical analyses can enrich the descriptive literature. Building on the existing scholarship, this article assesses Romania's particular version of proportional representation regarding designated national minorities. It applies two theoretical models: (1) institutional activism and (2) ethnic intermediation. The former clarifies the establishment of Romania's post-communist constitutional provisions regarding minority organizations, and the latter explains how small yet influential minority populations make claims to and reallocate resources from the Romanian state. Through a unique, understudied case study – the Armenian community of Romania – this article attempts to broaden ethnic minority representation scholarship by refining the theoretical frameworks of institutional activism and ethnic intermediation.

There is little serious debate over the desirability of an active civil society in South Africa's new democracy. (...) As occurs in many democratic governments, however, the area least open to public input is foreign policy. Yet as foreign policy issues increasingly impinge on the lives of South Africans, (...) so the level of interest in foreign policy issues is likely to increase within South African civil society. (...) While the content of South African public opinion is not the focus of this briefing, the important role of public opinion in a democracy is good reason to examine the dynamics of policymaking in South Africa in 2002, and their implications for civil society participation in matters of foreign policy. This briefing attempts to offer some observations and analysis that might contribute to the discourse. (SAJIA/DÜI)

If representational democracy is to progress, the House of Commons must make significant & immediate reforms, as it sits unchanged amid constitutional & technological revolutions. Suggested here are ways of modernizing Parliament, including sacrificing the costumes & customs denoting tradition in favor of the form of a modern & democratic government; operation within reasonable hours; near year-round sessions, with only statutory breaks; abandoning figurehead leadership in order to emphasis people as citizens, rather than subjects; giving proportional representation; & perhaps providing new buildings at a more accessible location. A proper process of pre-legislative scrutiny, the timetabling of all legislation; & information upon demand from the executive branch is needed for efficient operation. Technological reforms could modernize voting, make information instantly available to both citizens & lawmakers, & increase communication between the MP & his constituency. In light of devolution & the widening role of the European Union, failure to institute change will leave Parliament as an insignificant backwater. L. A. Hoffman

This article investigates the effects of Serbian semi-presidentialism and the proportional representation electoral system on democratic performances. Both electoral and political systems provide incentives for power-sharing mechanisms and the pluralistic character of the party system. However, in situations when one party becomes much stronger and predominant, there is a growing probability for the presidentialization of politics and excessive centralization of power that might lead to competitive authoritarianism. I am analysing three such cases from different periods – Milošević regime (1990–2000), the first transitional decade (2000–2012) and the return of the old regime (2012–2020) in order to identify causes of democratic crises that are embedded in institutional design.

Three devolved bodies in the UK (the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the London Assembly) use Multi Member Proportional Representation electoral systems. These bodies have two groups of representatives, regional and constituency, elected through different methods. Using a survey of members of the public who contacted their representative, constituency representatives are shown to have a higher response rate across all three bodies, and this effect is isolatable from the role of being a government party. In Scotland, this effect is demonstrable when comparing the behaviour of the same people holding different roles, suggesting that individuals adapt their behaviour to the expectations of the role.

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.