Over the last decades ethical product attributes have become more and more important in everyday food shopping. Different types of ethical product attributes exist, such as fairly traded, organically produced, environmentally friendly production, and animal friendly production. To date, the main focus in research has been on these ethical product attributes. However, new ethical product components are in need of consideration, like products produced between actors engaged in political conflicts to support their peaceful coexistence. This attribute is called 'conflict resolution'. This thesis is part of the German Research Foundation (Deutsche-Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) founded trilateral project "The Economic Integration of Agriculture in Israel and Palestine". Amongst others, the project analyzes the potential for economic integration of Agricultural Markets in Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest ongoing conflicts in the Middle-East. Due to this conflict, waves of violence and resulting security measures, Israelis and Palestinians are separated from each other. Therefore, this thesis relates the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the ethical product attribute 'conflict resolution' through analyzing consumers' preferences for products produced between Israelis and Palestinians, called 'Peace Products'. The objective of this thesis is to analyze European consumer preferences for jointly produced Israeli-Palestinian Peace Products and to identify factors that influence those preferences. In order to analyze these matters, consumer preferences were studied using choice experiments. Respondents were shown choice cards with three different products for extra virgin olive oil or cherry tomatoes. A no-buy option was included to re-create the situation in a supermarket as closely as possible. Respondents were asked to indicate which of the products they would buy. Each product description was defined as a combination of the attributes: production method (organic/ conventional), four price levels, and origin. The origins were described as Europe (Italy for olive oil, and the Netherlands for cherry tomatoes), Israel, the Palestinian Territories, and Peace Products, (origin of jointly produced in Israel and Palestinian Territories). The Peace Product was introduced to the respondents by the means of the following text: "The examples of food products that you will see below vary in price, production methods and country of origin. A special characteristic is that some of these examples are of so-called Peace Products, which are the result of joint projects that are designed to foster cooperation between farmers from Israel and from the Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian and the Israeli partners in these projects benefit equally from the sales of these Peace Products. The income generated from the sale of these products is used to promote joint Israeli-Palestinian social projects." The choice experiment was part of an online questionnaire; the data were collected by means of an online panel provider in different European countries during different conflict phases in the Middle East in 2012. In addition to the choice experiment questions concerning socio-demographics and attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (anti-Semitism, anti-Arabism, hostility against the Palestinian Territories, anti-Zionism and the Middle East conflict) were included in the questionnaire, to study their influences on Peace Product preferences. Two scientific paper make up the core of this dissertation. The first paper investigates general preferences for different product attributes (organic or conventional production and origin), with a special focus on the ethical product attribute 'conflict resolution'. We use random parameter logit and bootstrap random parameter logit models to estimate willingness to pay in four European countries (Germany, Great Britain, France and Poland). The bootstrap method is used to correct our online sample by generating representative results by gender and age for the surveyed countries. The results of both models are similar, although the bootstrap models generate more significant estimates of socio-demographic effects. Results show that European consumers prefer European products most. However, consumers are willing to pay a significant premium for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Products compared with products only from Israel or the Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, the influences of the socio-demographic variables age, gender, education, and income on Peace Products are investigated, and influences differ by survey country. Generally speaking in our choice experiment young, well-educated males with high incomes display higher willingness to pay for Peace Products, but these results do very across the survey countries. The second paper analyzes the influence of question order (validity) on stated Peace Product preferences in Germany. We manipulate the question context by presenting the anti-Semitic and anti-Arabic attitude questions before or after the actual choice experiment. Additionally, the temporal stability of stated Peace Product preferences is investigated by presenting the same questionnaires, ten months after the first sample was collected, shortly after an Israeli Defense Force operation in the Gaza Strip was under-way as a response to Palestinian Rocket attacks ('Operation Pillar of Cloud'). Data are analyzed by means of an error component logit model. The results show a positive effect on the Peace Product preference if anti-Semitic and anti-Arabic attitudes are surveyed before the choice experiment. A negative effect from the violent dispute is found on stated preferences for products from Israel or the Palestinian Territories if attitudes are surveyed after the choice experiment. Overall preferences for Peace Products are found to be fairly stable over time. In summary, the results presented in this thesis show that respondents in Europe are willing to pay for the ethical product attribute of 'conflict resolution'. The willingness to pay for Peace Products is influenced by socio-demographic variables, and by whether anti-Semitic and anti-Arabic attitudes are surveyed before or after the choice experiment. The results can be used by politicians and marketers to support and implement Peace Product production. Additionally, researchers should be aware about the context effect when implementing stated preference studies.
El final del siglo XX y los inicios del siglo XXI contemplan la ofensiva final de grandes teorías belicistas y de renovados escenarios de guerra. La nueva globalización se intenta construir sobre criterios de agresión y competencia. Todo está inserto en un juego de exclusiones y de eliminaciones ya sean mercantiles, económicas, culturales, políticas o bélicas. Los derechos pierden terreno ante los criterios. La razón de Estado cede ante la razón Democrática. El criterio de la cantidad se impone ante la calidad.La construcción del Estado Social contempló, desde la década de los cincuenta, una construcción de escenarios jurídicos y populares que garantizaban un máximo de derechos que abrían la vía para generar un modelo social renovado. La energía de la sociedad civil-popular desarrolló en torno a finales de los años sesenta vías y modelos que podían suponer un salto cualitativo. Esta explosión fue también una explosión jurídica. Explosión ius-jurídica que comenzó a producir sofisticados instrumentos jurídico-políticos del que el derecho a la paz o al desarrollo son los mejores ejemplos. Sin embargo también vino la reacción de elites y grupos de presión políticos, económicos y académicos que, desde mediados de los años setenta, jugaron a la contra introduciendo los paradigmas "gobernabilidad" y "seguridad". Sus estrategias generaron una implosión que produjo una disminución brusca del modelo de Estado Constitucional Democrático fundamentalmente hacia dentro del Estado nacional. No obstante no pudieron impedir que la lógica ius-humanista siguiera dando frutos en el ámbito de la construcción jurídica internacional. Sólo ya durante la década de los 90 y principios del siglo XXI las estrategias fatales de la seguridad y la gobernabilidad estarían imponiendo sus criterios de excepcionalidad jurídica y violencia política bajo la inspiración de determinados think-tank internacionales.Ante la anterior ofensiva excepcionalista, la reivindicación y lucha por un derecho colectivo tal como el derecho a la paz es pieza fundamental en la lucha por la reconquista de los espacios de libertad y por el modelo de democracia deliberativa. Derecho a la paz sobre el que trabajar en el ámbito internacional pero también para trasladar a los diferentes marcos jurídicos estatales. En este sentido se hace necesaria la reivindicación de un Derecho Constitucional que regule todas las posibles acciones emprendidas por un Estado en torno a los conflictos: desde la entrada abierta en conflictos bélicos de muy diferente textura hasta el comercio de armamento. Derecho que establezca una serie de controles rigurosos y exhaustivos. Un ius ante bellum, eminentemente constitucional, debe ser un material esencial en la lucha por el derecho a la paz y el control democrático de los instrumentos bélicos y coercitivos en manos de un Estado. Máxime en una época donde se desustancian derechos y elementos fundamentales del Estado Constitucional… ; The end of XX century and the start of XXI one are being witness of the final offensive of great warmonger theories and refurbished battlefield scenarios. Trying to build the new globalisation upon aggression and competition criteria. Everything is inserted into the set of exclusions and eliminations, they could be mercantile, economic, cultural, politic or war ones. Rights are loosing ground in favour of criteria. The reason of State relents in front of Democratic reason. Quantity is imposed to quality.Since the 1950's, the building of a Social State envisaged the construction of juridical and popular scenarios, granting the maximum rights. It opened the way towards a renovated social model. Ending the1960's, the energy emanated of the civil-popular society developed paths and models that could suppose a qualitative leap forward. This explosion was a juridical explosion also. Ius-juridical explosion starts to produce sophisticated juridical-political tools, being the right to peace and the right to development the better examples. However, a reaction followed; it came from politic, economic and academic lobbies alongside with the elites that in the mid-1970's playing against it, introducing the "governability" and "security" paradigms. The implosion, generated by such strategies, brought up an abrupt decline of the "Constitutional Democratic State" model. Mainly inside of the Nation-State. Nevertheless, they cannot avoid the fruits produced by the ius-humanistic logic in the field of a juridical international-building. Only during the1990's and the start of XXI century, the fatal strategies of "security" and "governability" are imposing its criteria of juridical exceptionality and political violence drawing inspiration from certain international think-tanks.Before the mentioned exceptionalist offensive, the struggle and claim for a collective right to peace was a essential piece in the fight for take over the spaces of freedom and for the model of deliberative democracy. The "right to peace" must be worked out by the international community and therefore, to be incorporated in the state legislations. From this point of view, to lay claim to a Constitutional Law that regulates all possible actions that could be carried out by a State related to conflicts (since the open participation in armed conflicts up to armament trade) is very necessary. Such a regulation would be based on rigorous and strict controls. Anius ante bellum, fundamentally constitutional, provides essential stuff to fight for the "right to peace" and democratic control of the security and military powers of a State. Specially at present time, when the fundamental rights and elements of the Constitutional State have been altered, loosing its substance.
In: Revista internacional del trabajo, Band 119, Heft 2, S. 235-276
ISSN: 1564-9148
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The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
In this project, I sought to understand how Palestinian claim-making in the West Bank is possible within the context of continuing Israeli occupation and repression by the Palestinian political leadership. I explored the questions of what channels non-state actors use to advance their claims, what opportunities they have for making these claims, and what challenges they face. This exploration covers the time period from the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s to the so-called Great March of Return in 2018. I demonstrated that Palestinians used different modes and strategies of resistance in the past century, as the area of what today is Israel/Palestine has historically been a target for foreign penetration. Yet, the Oslo agreements between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership have ended Palestinians' decentralized and pluralist social governance, reinforced Israeli rule in the Palestinian territories, promoted continuing dispossession and segregation of Palestinians, and further restricted their rights and their claim-making opportunities until this day. Therefore, today, Palestinian society in the West Bank is characterized by fragmentation, geographical and societal segregation, and double repression by Israeli occupation and Palestinian Authority (PA) policies. What is more, Palestinian claim-making is legally curtailed due to the establishment of different geographical entities in which Palestinians are subjugated to different forms of Israeli rule and regulations. I argue that the concepts of civil society and acts of citizenship, which are often used to describe non-state actors' rights-seeking activities, fall short on understanding and describing Palestinian claim-making in the West Bank comprehensively. By determining their boundaries, the concept of acts of subjecthood evolved as a novel theoretical approach within the research process and as a means of claim-making within repressive contexts where claim makers' rights are curtailed and opportunities for rights-seeking activities are few. Thereby, this study applies a new theoretical framework to the conflict in Israel/Palestine and contributes to a better understanding of rights-seeking activities within the West Bank. Further, I argue that Palestinian acts of subjecthood against hostile Israeli rule in the West Bank are embedded within the comprehensive structure of settler colonialism. As a form of colonialism that aims at replacing an indigenous population, Israeli settler colonialism in the West Bank manifests itself in restrictions of Palestinian movement, settlement constructions, home demolitions, violence, and detentions. By using grounded theory and inductive reasoning as methodological approaches, I was able to make generalizations about the state of Palestinian claim-making. These generalizations are based on the analysis of secondary materials and data collected via face-to-face and video interviews with non-state actors in Israel/Palestine. The conducted research shows that there is not a single measure or a standalone condition that hinders Palestinian claim-making, but a complex and comprehensive structure that, on the one hand, shrinks Palestinian living space by occupation and destruction and, on the other hand, diminishes Palestinian civic space by limiting the fundamental rights to organize and build social movements to change the status Palestinians live in. Although the concrete, tangible outcomes of Palestinian acts of subjecthood are marginal, they contribute to strengthening and perpetuating Palestinian's long history of resistance against Israeli oppression. With a lack of adherence to international law, the neglect of UN resolutions by the Israeli government, the continuous defeats of rights organizations in Israeli courts, and the repression of institutions based in the West Bank by PA and occupation policies, Palestinian acts of subjecthood cannot overturn current power structures. Nevertheless, the ongoing persistence of non-state actors claiming rights, as well as the pop-up of new initiatives and youth movements are all essential for strengthening Palestinians' resilience and documenting current injustices. Therefore, they can build the pillars for social change in the future. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation war es zu untersuchen, wie palästinensisches claim-making, also die Artikulation von Forderungen bzw. die Geltendmachung von bestimmten Rechten, vor dem Hintergrund der anhaltenden israelischen Besatzung und Repressalien durch die palästinensische politische Führung im Westjordanland durchgesetzt werden kann. Dabei soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, welche Kanäle nichtstaatliche Akteure nutzen, um ihre Ansprüche geltend zu machen, welche Möglichkeiten sich ihnen dafür bieten und vor welchen Herausforderungen sie stehen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum erstreckt sich dabei vom Osloer Friedensprozess Mitte der 1990er Jahre bis hin zum sogenannten Great March of Return im Jahr 2018. Die im Gebiet des heutigen Israel/Palästina lebenden PalästinenserInnen bedienten sich in Zeiten ausländischer Einflussnahme, z.B. während der britischen Besatzung im vergangenen Jahrhundert, verschiedenster Widerstandsformen und -strategien. Jedoch haben die Osloer Abkommen zwischen der israelischen Regierung und der palästinensischen Führung die dezentrale und partizipative Mobilisierung der palästinensischen Gesellschaft erschwert, die andauernde Enteignung von PalästinenserInnen begünstigt und ihre Rechte bis zum heutigen Tag weiter eingeschränkt. Die heutige palästinensische Gesellschaft im Westjordanland ist daher durch Zersplitterung, geografische und gesellschaftliche Segregation und doppelte Un-terdrückung durch die israelische Besatzung sowie die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde gekennzeichnet. Zudem führt die Etablierung verschiedener geografischer Entitäten, in denen PalästinenserInnen unterschiedlichen Formen israelischer Herrschaft, Regularien und Ein-griffsrechten unterworfen sind, dazu, dass palästinensisches claim-making auch formalrecht-lich eingeschränkt ist. Um die Aktivitäten nichtstaatlicher Akteure in diesem Kontext beschreiben zu können, wer-den häufig das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft oder das der acts of citizenship herangezogen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird jedoch argumentiert, dass diese Konzepte nur bedingt auf den Status Quo im Westjordanland anwendbar sind und palästinensisches claim-making nicht hinreichend verstehen und beschreiben können. Im Laufe des Forschungsprozesses hat sich daher das Konzept der acts of subjecthood als neuer theoretischer Ansatz herausgebildet, der claim-making in repressiven Kontexten beschreibt, in denen nichtstaatliche Akteure nur geringen Handlungsspielraum haben, ihre Forderungen durchsetzen zu können. Durch diese "Theorie-Brille" ermöglicht meine Forschung einen neuartigen Blick auf den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt und trägt auf diese Weise zu einem besseren Verständnis von claim-making-Aktivitäten im Westjordanland bei. Darüber hinaus bettet die vorliegende Ar-beit acts of subjecthood in den größeren Kontext des Siedlungskolonialismus ein. Dieser beschreibt eine Form des Kolonialismus, die darauf abzielt, eine einheimische Bevölkerung durch die der Kolonialmacht zu ersetzen. Im Westjordanland manifestiert sich der israelische Siedlungskolonialismus in der Einschränkung der Bewegungsfreiheit von PalästinenserIn-nen, dem Bau von Siedlungen, der Zerstörung von Häusern, Gewalt und Inhaftierungen. Die Verwendung der Grounded Theory und des induktiven Denkens als methodische Ansätze ermöglichte es, verallgemeinerbare Aussagen zum Zustand palästinensischen claim-makings treffen zu können. Diese Verallgemeinerungen beruhen auf der Analyse von Sekundärquellen und Daten, die im Rahmen von Interviews mit VertreterInnen nichtstaatlicher Organisationen in Israel/Palästina erhoben wurden. Die durchgeführte Analyse macht deutlich, dass nicht eine einzelne Maßnahme oder Bedingung palästinensisches claim-making behindert, sondern eine komplexe, vielschichtige und zielgerichtet implementierte Struktur. Diese verringert einerseits den Lebensraum von PalästinenserInnen durch Besatzung und Zerstörung und schränkt andererseits den zivilen Raum ein, indem sie ihnen grundlegende Rechte und fundamentale Freiheiten verwehrt. Obwohl die konkreten Auswirkungen palästinensischer acts of subjecthood marginal sind, tragen sie dazu bei, den Widerstand gegen politische Unterdrückung zu stärken und fortzusetzen. Angesichts der Verletzung von Völkerrecht und der Missachtung zahlreicher UN-Resolutionen durch die israelische Regierung, der Niederlagen von Menschenrechtsorganisationen vor israelischen Gerichten, der Unterdrückung von Institutionen im Westjordanland durch die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde und die Besatzungspolitik können acts of subjecthood die derzeitigen Machtstrukturen nicht aufbrechen. Dennoch sind die anhaltende Beharrlichkeit nichtstaatlicher Akteure, Forderungen zu artikulieren und Rechte einzufordern und die Gründung neuer Initiativen und Organisationen essenziell für die Stärkung gesellschaftlicher Resilienz sowie die Dokumentation von Ungerechtigkeiten und Rechtsverletzungen. Diese Akteure legen so den Grundstein für einen möglichen gesellschaftspolitischen Wandel in der Zukunft. ; Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation war es zu untersuchen, wie palästinensisches claim-making, also die Artikulation von Forderungen bzw. die Geltendmachung von bestimmten Rechten, vor dem Hintergrund der anhaltenden israelischen Besatzung und Repressalien durch die palästinensische politische Führung im Westjordanland durchgesetzt werden kann. Dabei soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, welche Kanäle nichtstaatliche Akteure nutzen, um ihre Ansprüche geltend zu machen, welche Möglichkeiten sich ihnen dafür bie-ten und vor welchen Herausforderungen sie stehen. Der Untersuchungszeitraum erstreckt sich dabei vom Osloer Friedensprozess Mitte der 1990er Jahre bis hin zum sogenannten Great March of Return im Jahr 2018. Die im Gebiet des heutigen Israel/Palästina lebenden PalästinenserInnen bedienten sich in Zeiten ausländischer Einflussnahme, z.B. während der britischen Besatzung im vergangenen Jahrhundert, verschiedenster Widerstandsformen und -strategien. Jedoch haben die Osloer Abkommen zwischen der israelischen Regierung und der palästinensischen Führung die dezentrale und partizipative Mobilisierung der palästinensischen Gesellschaft erschwert, die andauernde Enteignung von PalästinenserInnen begünstigt und ihre Rechte bis zum heutigen Tag weiter eingeschränkt. Die heutige palästinensische Gesellschaft im Westjor-danland ist daher durch Zersplitterung, geografische und gesellschaftliche Segregation und doppelte Unterdrückung durch die israelische Besatzung sowie die Palästinensische Auto-nomiebehörde gekennzeichnet. Zudem führt die Etablierung verschiedener geografischer Entitäten, in denen PalästinenserInnen unterschiedlichen Formen israelischer Herrschaft, Regularien und Eingriffsrechten unterworfen sind, dazu, dass palästinensisches claim-making auch formalrechtlich eingeschränkt ist. Um die Aktivitäten nichtstaatlicher Akteure in diesem Kontext beschreiben zu können, werden häufig das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft oder das der acts of citizenship herangezogen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird jedoch argumentiert, dass diese Konzepte nur be-dingt auf den Status Quo im Westjordanland anwendbar sind und palästinensisches claim-making nicht hinreichend verstehen und beschreiben können. Im Laufe des Forschungspro-zesses hat sich daher das Konzept der acts of subjecthood als neuer theoretischer Ansatz herausgebildet, der claim-making in repressiven Kontexten beschreibt, in denen nichtstaatliche Akteure nur geringen Handlungsspielraum haben, ihre Forderungen durchsetzen zu können. Durch diese "Theorie-Brille" ermöglicht meine Forschung einen neuartigen Blick auf den israelisch-palästinensischen Konflikt und trägt auf diese Weise zu einem besseren Verständnis von claim-making-Aktivitäten im Westjordanland bei. Darüber hinaus bettet die vorliegende Arbeit acts of subjecthood in den größeren Kontext des Siedlungskolonialismus ein. Dieser beschreibt eine Form des Kolonialismus, die darauf abzielt, eine einheimische Bevölkerung durch die der Kolonialmacht zu ersetzen. Im Westjordanland manifestiert sich der israelische Siedlungskolonialismus in der Einschränkung der Bewegungsfreiheit von PalästinenserInnen, dem Bau von Siedlungen, der Zerstörung von Häusern, Gewalt und Inhaftierungen. Die Verwendung der Grounded Theory und des induktiven Denkens als methodische Ansätze ermöglichte es, verallgemeinerbare Aussagen zum Zustand palästinensischen claim-makings treffen zu können. Diese Verallgemeinerungen beruhen auf der Analyse von Sekundärquellen und Daten, die im Rahmen von Interviews mit VertreterInnen nichtstaatlicher Organisationen in Israel/Palästina erhoben wurden. Die durchgeführte Analyse macht deutlich, dass nicht eine einzelne Maßnahme oder Bedingung palästinensisches claim-making behindert, sondern eine komplexe, vielschichtige und zielgerichtet implementierte Struktur. Diese verringert einerseits den Lebensraum von PalästinenserInnen durch Besatzung und Zerstörung und schränkt andererseits den zivilen Raum ein, indem sie ihnen grundlegende Rechte und fundamentale Freiheiten verwehrt. Obwohl die konkreten Auswirkungen palästinensischer acts of subjecthood marginal sind, tragen sie dazu bei, den Widerstand gegen politische Unterdrückung zu stärken und fortzusetzen. Angesichts der Verletzung von Völkerrecht und der Missachtung zahlreicher UN-Resolutionen durch die israelische Regierung, der Niederlagen von Menschenrechtsorganisationen vor israelischen Gerichten, der Unterdrückung von Institutionen im Westjordanland durch die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde und die Besatzungspolitik können acts of subjecthood die derzeitigen Machtstrukturen nicht aufbrechen. Dennoch sind die anhaltende Beharrlichkeit nichtstaatlicher Akteure, Forderungen zu artikulieren und Rechte einzufordern und die Gründung neuer Initiativen und Organisationen essenziell für die Stärkung gesellschaftlicher Resilienz sowie die Dokumentation von Ungerechtigkeiten und Rechtsverletzungen. Diese Akteure legen so den Grundstein für einen möglichen gesellschaftspolitischen Wandel in der Zukunft.
El planteamiento de esta tesis surge de la preocupación por la pasividad del sujeto democrático. Por ello busco un sujeto que sea capaz de actuar políticamente, ciñéndome al análisis de la Realidad efectuado por Agustín García Calvo. Respecto a la metodología, la recopilación bibliográfica ha sido fundamental para conseguir una visión global: sus numerosos artículos, charlas, seminarios, tertulias o recitaciones poéticas dan muestra de su actividad febril. He juzgado oportuno incluir una gran variedad de citas textuales, que pretenden dejar patente su estilo, para volver a hacer hablar a sus textos, sin convertirlos en algo que se sabe, en historia del pensamiento. Busco el razonamiento en sí, más que las conclusiones. He dividido el trabajo en nueve partes: En la introducción comento el proceso de gestación, las peculiaridades del pensamiento que abordo, y hago algunas referencias generales. En la parte dedicada a la biografía, el contexto ideológico y a las influencias, muestro un panorama general de su obra. Inserto a AGC en su contexto histórico, valiéndome de los recuerdos y anécdotas de innumerables compañeros de camino, que además reflejan su labor de contra-educación. Hablo de sus discípulos, especialmente de Savater y de su momento de ruptura con "el maestro", así como de los movimientos con los que le tocó lidiar, aunque ninguno de ellos tenga un verdadero carácter definitorio. Todo lo contrario sucede con los autores que aparecen en el siguiente capítulo, «¿Qué escucha?». He seleccionado a estos autores por su marcada influencia en AGC y los he hecho aparecer teniendo en cuenta el orden de sus lecturas. La tercera parte inicia una línea más temática. Está dedicada a la razón común, al lenguaje, al pensamiento, y para ello me he centrado en su libro sobre los fragmentos de Heraclito, que abarca razón general, política y teológica, ya que es un elemento fundamental en su análisis de la Realidad. En la cuarta parte se distingue entre la Política de Arriba y la política del pueblo, terminando con una crítica de las instituciones. En ella repaso su análisis de los principales conceptos, como Estado, Progreso o Democracia y de las instituciones a ellos ligadas: Sujeto, Familia, Filosofía o Ciencia, Amor, Pareja y Automóvil. Comento su labor en contra de la Política mediante el método de preguntar "¿qué es?" y de decir "no", buscando la acción contenida en el habla o analizando el Caos y el Orden. En la quinta parte, abordamos cómo la Educación, el Saber y algunos ejemplos de contra-educación muestran su vinculación con el des-aprendizaje. Aclaro cuál es su concepto de Saber y qué es lo que sabe un niño antes de ser sometido a la Pedagogía, a la Enseñanza y a la Urbanidad. Finalmente tratamos de la contra-educación, de su papel en el pronunciamiento estudiantil y de sus comentarios al respecto. En la sexta parte hablo de las tácticas, y lo hago teniendo en cuenta su pensamiento sobre la violencia, la organización, la reproducción o las relaciones entre teatro y política. Finalizo con unas reflexiones sobre "lo bueno". Las tres últimas partes están dedicadas a la Conclusión, la bibliografía y a una serie de anexos. En relación con la conclusión, he subrayado la imposibilidad de que aparezca un sujeto que sea capaz de acción dentro de esta Realidad democrática. Por ello la única opción es atacarla para eliminar la creencia y la sumisión al Poder, e intentar recuperar lo que nos queda de pueblo. Sólo desde lo común se realiza una acción política, y la forma de conseguirlo es mediante la contra-educación que se dirige directamente contra el Saber, que es base de la Realidad, de aquello que se sabe. A este respecto AGC fomenta la razón común y la desobediencia, tratando de despertar la negación que se opone al dominio de la Realidad. Pretendo llegar a un punto de partida que permita la acción, a la vez que llamo a nuestra disciplina filosófica para que revise sus orígenes y cometido, para que retorne al momento en que la actividad de filosofar no tenía nombre ni contaba con verdades inmutables. The approach of this dissertation is brought about by the growing worries about the passivity of the democratic subject. Therefore, I look for a subject that may act politically, circumscribing this search to the analysis of reality carried out by Agustín García Calvo. As for methodological issues, gathering bibliography has been essential to achieve a global perspective: his numerous articles, talks, seminars, conversations, or readings of poetry show us his feverish activity. I have deemed adequate to include a great variety of quotations, which may highlight his style, in order to make his texts speak anew, without turning them into something already known, into the history of ideas. I strive here for the very reasoning, more than any possible conclusion. I have divided the paper in nine parts: The introduction focuses on the process of development, the peculiarities of the thought I am dealing with, and some general considerations. The biographical section, which includes his ideological background and influences, shows a global overview of his works. AGC is embedded in his historical context by means of memories and anecdotes provided by his abundant fellow travellers, who also underline his work of counter-education. Here I mean his disciples, especially F. Savater and his breaking point with "the master", as well as the movements he had to deal with, even though those were never of a final nature. Quite the opposite happens with the authors appearing in the following chapter, 'What is he listening to?' I have selected those authors because of their strong influence on AGC, and they make their appearance according to AGC's reading order. The third part begins a more thematic line. It is devoted to common reason, to language, to thinking, and I have therefor focused on his book on the fragments by Heraclitus, which encompasses general, political, and theological reason, constituting a vital chunk of his analysis of Reality. The fourth part distinguishes between Upstairs Politics and people's politics, to end in a thorough critique of institutions. I review there his analysis of the main concepts, such as State, Progress, or Democracy, as well as their inherent institutions: Subject, Family, Philosophy or Science, Love, Coupling, and Automobile. I also consider his work against Politics by means of his asking "what is that?" and his saying "no", as a way to search for the political action underlying speech acts, or by analysing Chaos and Order. The fifth part focuses on how Education, Knowledge, and some examples of counter-education show their link with un-learning. I clarify what his concept of Knowledge implies, and what is what a child knows before being subjected to Pedagogy, Teaching, and Civility. Finally, I deal with counter-education, his role in students' demonstrations, and his comments thereon. The sixth part is centred on tactics, taking very much into account his thinking about violence, organisation, reproduction, or the links between drama and politics. I close with some considerations on what "the good" is. The last three parts comprise the Conclusion, the bibliography, and a series of attachments. With regards to the conclusion, I have underscored the impossibility for a subject to appear and be able to act within this democratic Reality. The only option then is to undermine it to be rid of submission to Power and other beliefs, and to try and get back whatever is left from us as people. Only from what is common we can accomplish true political action; and the way to achieve that goal is by means of counter-education, which aims directly against Knowledge, which is the basis for Reality, for what is known. In that regard, AGC fosters common reason and disobedience, trying to awaken the negation that opposes the domination of Reality. I intend to get to a starting point that allows for action and, at the same time, I urge our discipline –philosophy- to revise its origin and purposes, so it can return to the time in which philosophical activities did not have a name, and neither unassailable truths.
El problema que enfrenta esta investigación es la percepción de los niños y las niñas que no suelen ser consultados sobre la forma en que conciben el mundo y los elementos que se requieren para su bienestar. En este sentido, se pregunta a los niños por el significado de la niñez, de la calidad de vida y por la calidad de la educación. La metodología mediante la cual se trabajó con los niños, se basa en obtener sus narrativas y sus dibujos en procesos de diálogo en los que ellos pudieron discutir sobre estos temas y nos ofrecieron sus enunciados y sus dibujos. El marco teórico respecto a las principales categorías que se trabajan en la tesis intenta profundizar en el concepto de infancia que se aborda históricamente y sobre la niñez escolarizada. Además, se examina críticamente la perspectiva que concibe al niño en función de lo que será cuando ya no sea niño (moratoria). La infancia es considerada aquí como una representación social, porque no es algo evidente ni natural. A continuación, se discute el asunto de la perspectiva de derechos que surge en la posguerra colombiana y que es una perspectiva importante, pero no suficiente para tratar la infancia. Finalmente, se consideran los espacios de encierro infantil, en función de la seguridad. Respecto a la calidad de vida, se examinan los trabajos relativos al desarrollo humano y el desarrollo sostenible en relación con la satisfacción de todas las necesidades humanas. Se examinan las dimensiones y los indicadores con los que se mira la calidad de vida en general, y luego, la calidad de vida en la infancia. En relación con la calidad de la educación, se enfrenta la dicotomía entre calidad y cobertura educativa, especialmente en un país que requiere altos niveles educativos en función de su desarrollo. Las políticas públicas relacionadas con la cobertura y la evaluación de la educación reducen a esta a la preparación para el trabajo, en una perspectiva de competencias. La percepción infantil, en cambio, se refiere a otros aspectos diferentes a los previstos en las políticas. Los resultados se presentan de acuerdo con las expresiones de los niños, consignadas en sus enunciados y en sus dibujos, que son interpretados mediante un análisis textual y gráfico. En este orden, los niños definieron la niñez como juego. Aquí incluyen: juegos con otros, los juguetes, juegos con los padres, juegos electrónicos. Cuando los niños dicen lo que quieren ser "cuando sean grandes", no expresan un proyecto de vida, sino un deseo actual sobre algo que no pueden realizar. La calidad de vida la ubican en sus relaciones familiares, porque, para las niñas y los niños que entrevistamos en este trabajo, son los padres quienes les proporcionan todo lo que necesitan para vivir. En ese espacio, encuentran que la violencia, que identifican con el conflicto, deteriora la calidad de vida, y esta puede darse entre los padres, de los padres con ellos y entre los compañeros. Además, relacionan la calidad de vida con el cuidado del medio ambiente natural, en el cual se incluyen. Reclaman la posibilidad de comunicación con los padres y los demás miembros de la familia y con los compañeros. Piensan que para que haya una buena convivencia se necesita tolerancia y respeto. Para ellos, las aulas son signo de calidad educativa, dependiendo del estado de la construcción. En la relación entre la calidad de vida y la calidad educativa se refieren a la felicidad como propósito de la infancia, en una perspectiva eudemonista y no deontológica. Ellos quieren ser felices ahora. La discusión sintetiza los conceptos de niñez y de calidad de vida de acuerdo con las perspectivas infantiles frente a las teorías más recurridas. Es preciso saber que la guerra que ha azotado al país durante más de 6 décadas ha dejado marcas en los niños y en las instituciones que influyen en el significado de la familia y de la escuela. El medio ambiente es un tema central para los niños que revelan una conciencia en la que el ser humano no es el centro del planeta sino que está integrado a un sistema que reclama respeto y cuidado. Los niños revelan en muchos comentarios una distancia epistemológica que les permite una perspectiva analítica frente a algunas actuaciones que les da un poder de reflexión y de crítica. La escuela, en el contexto de violencia intrafamiliar y política de la región, es un oasis de paz y de creatividad. Se muestran agradecidos con los profesores por eso. Las conclusiones sintetizan los hallazgos y la discusión respecto a los tres temas trabajados en la tesis: significados de la niñez, significados de la calidad de vida y significados de la calidad de la educación. ; The problem facing this research is the opinion of children who are not usually consulted about the way they conceive the world and the elements that are required for their well-being. In this sense, children are asked about the meaning of childhood, the quality of life and the quality of education. The methodology used to work with the children is based on obtaining their narratives and drawings in dialogue processes in which they could discuss these issues and offer us their statements and drawings. The theoretical framework with respect to the main categories that work in the thesis tries to deepen in the concept of childhood that is approached historically and on schooled childhood. In addition, the perspective that conceives the child based on what it will be when he is no longer a child (moratorium) is critically examined. Childhood is considered here as a social representation, because it is not obvious or natural. Next, we discuss the issue of the rights perspective that emerged in the postwar period and that is an important perspective, but not enough to deal with childhood. Finally, the spaces for child confinement are considered, depending on security. Regarding the quality of life, work related to human development and sustainable development in relation to the satisfaction of all human needs is examined. The dimensions and indicators that look at the quality of life in general, and then the quality of life in childhood are examined. In relation to the quality of education, the dichotomy between quality and educational coverage is faced, especially in a country that requires high levels of education in function of its development. Public policies related to the coverage and evaluation of education reduce education to preparation for work, from a competency perspective. Children's perception, on the other hand, refers to other aspects different from those foreseen in the policies. The results are presented according to the expressions of the children, consigned in their sentences and in their drawings, which are interpreted through a textual and graphic analysis. In this order, the children defined childhood as a game. Here include: games with others, toys, games with parents, electronic games. When children say what they want to be "when they grow up," they do not express a life project, but a current desire about something they cannot do. The quality of life place it in their family relationships, because it is the parents who provide everything they need to live. In that space, they find that violence, which they identify with conflict, deteriorates the quality of life, and this can occur between parents, parents with them and between classmates. In addition, they relate the quality of life with the care of the natural environment, in which they are included. They demand the possibility of communication with parents and other members of the family and with their classmates. They think that for there to be a good coexistence, tolerance and respect are needed. For them, the classrooms are a sign of educational quality, depending on the state of construction. In the relationship between quality of life and educational quality, they refer to happiness as the purpose of childhood, in a eudaemonic and non-deontological perspective. They want to be happy now. The discussion synthesizes the concepts of childhood and quality of life according to the perspectives of children against the most recurrent theories. It is necessary to know that the war that has lashed the country for more than 6 decades has left marks on children and on institutions that influence the meaning of family and school. The environment is a central theme for children that reveal an awareness in which the human being is not the center of the planet but is integrated into a system that demands respect and care. Children reveal in many comments an epistemological distance that allows them a critical perspective in front of some actions that give them a power of reflection and criticism. The school, in the context of intrafamily and political violence in the region, is an oasis of peace and creativity. They are grateful to the teachers for that. The conclusions synthesize the findings and the discussion regarding the three themes dealt with in the thesis: meanings of childhood, meanings of the quality of life and meanings of the quality of education. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
Background Improving survival and extending the longevity of life for all populations requires timely, robust evidence on local mortality levels and trends. The Global Burden of Disease 2015 Study (GBD 2015) provides a comprehensive assessment of all-cause and cause-specific mortality for 249 causes in 195 countries and territories from 1980 to 2015. These results informed an in-depth investigation of observed and expected mortality patterns based on sociodemographic measures. Methods We estimated all-cause mortality by age, sex, geography, and year using an improved analytical approach originally developed for GBD 2013 and GBD 2010. Improvements included refinements to the estimation of child and adult mortality and corresponding uncertainty, parameter selection for under-5 mortality synthesis by spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression, and sibling history data processing. We also expanded the database of vital registration, survey, and census data to 14 294 geography–year datapoints. For GBD 2015, eight causes, including Ebola virus disease, were added to the previous GBD cause list for mortality. We used six modelling approaches to assess cause-specific mortality, with the Cause of Death Ensemble Model (CODEm) generating estimates for most causes. We used a series of novel analyses to systematically quantify the drivers of trends in mortality across geographies. First, we assessed observed and expected levels and trends of cause-specific mortality as they relate to the Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a summary indicator derived from measures of income per capita, educational attainment, and fertility. Second, we examined factors affecting total mortality patterns through a series of counterfactual scenarios, testing the magnitude by which population growth, population age structures, and epidemiological changes contributed to shifts in mortality. Finally, we attributed changes in life expectancy to changes in cause of death. We documented each step of the GBD 2015 estimation processes, as well as data sources, in accordance with Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting (GATHER). Findings Globally, life expectancy from birth increased from 61·7 years (95% uncertainty interval 61·4–61·9) in 1980 to 71·8 years (71·5–72·2) in 2015. Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa had very large gains in life expectancy from 2005 to 2015, rebounding from an era of exceedingly high loss of life due to HIV/AIDS. At the same time, many geographies saw life expectancy stagnate or decline, particularly for men and in countries with rising mortality from war or interpersonal violence. From 2005 to 2015, male life expectancy in Syria dropped by 11·3 years (3·7–17·4), to 62·6 years (56·5–70·2). Total deaths increased by 4·1% (2·6–5·6) from 2005 to 2015, rising to 55·8 million (54·9 million to 56·6 million) in 2015, but age-standardised death rates fell by 17·0% (15·8–18·1) during this time, underscoring changes in population growth and shifts in global age structures. The result was similar for non-communicable diseases (NCDs), with total deaths from these causes increasing by 14·1% (12·6–16·0) to 39·8 million (39·2 million to 40·5 million) in 2015, whereas age-standardised rates decreased by 13·1% (11·9–14·3). Globally, this mortality pattern emerged for several NCDs, including several types of cancer, ischaemic heart disease, cirrhosis, and Alzheimer's disease and other dementias. By contrast, both total deaths and age-standardised death rates due to communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional conditions significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, gains largely attributable to decreases in mortality rates due to HIV/AIDS (42·1%, 39·1–44·6), malaria (43·1%, 34·7–51·8), neonatal preterm birth complications (29·8%, 24·8–34·9), and maternal disorders (29·1%, 19·3–37·1). Progress was slower for several causes, such as lower respiratory infections and nutritional deficiencies, whereas deaths increased for others, including dengue and drug use disorders. Age-standardised death rates due to injuries significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, yet interpersonal violence and war claimed increasingly more lives in some regions, particularly in the Middle East. In 2015, rotaviral enteritis (rotavirus) was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to diarrhoea (146 000 deaths, 118 000–183 000) and pneumococcal pneumonia was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to lower respiratory infections (393 000 deaths, 228 000–532 000), although pathogen-specific mortality varied by region. Globally, the effects of population growth, ageing, and changes in age-standardised death rates substantially differed by cause. Our analyses on the expected associations between cause-specific mortality and SDI show the regular shifts in cause of death composition and population age structure with rising SDI. Country patterns of premature mortality (measured as years of life lost [YLLs]) and how they differ from the level expected on the basis of SDI alone revealed distinct but highly heterogeneous patterns by region and country or territory. Ischaemic heart disease, stroke, and diabetes were among the leading causes of YLLs in most regions, but in many cases, intraregional results sharply diverged for ratios of observed and expected YLLs based on SDI. Communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional diseases caused the most YLLs throughout sub-Saharan Africa, with observed YLLs far exceeding expected YLLs for countries in which malaria or HIV/AIDS remained the leading causes of early death. Interpretation At the global scale, age-specific mortality has steadily improved over the past 35 years; this pattern of general progress continued in the past decade. Progress has been faster in most countries than expected on the basis of development measured by the SDI. Against this background of progress, some countries have seen falls in life expectancy, and age-standardised death rates for some causes are increasing. Despite progress in reducing age-standardised death rates, population growth and ageing mean that the number of deaths from most non-communicable causes are increasing in most countries, putting increased demands on health systems. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. ; We thank the countless individuals who have contributed to the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015 in various capacities. The data reported here have been supplied by the United States Renal Data System (USRDS). Data for this research was provided by MEASURE Evaluation, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Collection of these data was made possible by USAID under the terms of cooperative agreement GPO-A-00-08-000_D3-00. Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of USAID, the US Government, or MEASURE Evaluation. Parts of this material are based on data and information provided by the Canadian institute for Health Information. However, the analyses, conclusions, opinions and statements expressed herein are those of the author and not those of the Canadian Institute for Health information. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics granted the researchers access to relevant data in accordance with licence number SLN2014-3-170, after subjecting data to processing aiming to preserve the confidentiality of individual data in accordance with the General Statistics Law–2000. The researchers are solely responsible for the conclusions and inferences drawn upon available data. The following individuals acknowledge various forms of institutional support. Simon I Hay is funded by a Senior Research Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust (#095066), and grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1119467, OPP1093011, OPP1106023 and OPP1132415). Panniyammakal Jeemon is supported by a Clinical and Public Health Intermediate Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust-DBT India Alliance (2015–20). Luciano A Sposato is partly supported by the Edward and Alma Saraydar Neurosciences Fund, London Health Sciences Foundation, London, ON, Canada. George A Mensah notes that the views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, National Institutes of Health, or the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Boris Bikbov acknowledges that work related to this paper has been done on the behalf of the GBD Genitourinary Disease Expert Group supported by the International Society of Nephrology (ISN). Ana Maria Nogales Vasconcelos acknowledges that her team in Brazil received funding from Ministry of Health (process number 25000192049/2014-14). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez receives institutional support from Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y Ambientales, UDCA, Bogotá, Colombia. Ulrich O Mueller and Andrea Werdecker gratefully acknowledge funding by the German National Cohort BMBF (grant number OIER 1301/22). Peter James was supported by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (Award K99CA201542). Brett M Kissela would like to acknowledge NIH/NINDS R-01 30678. Louisa Degenhardt is supported by an Australian National Health and Medical Research Council Principal Research fellowship. Daisy M X Abreu received institutional support from the Brazilian Ministry of Health (Proc number 25000192049/2014-14). Jennifer H MacLachlan receives funding support from the Australian Government Department of Health and Royal Melbourne Hospital Research Funding Program. Miriam Levi acknowledges institutional support received from CeRIMP, Regional Centre for Occupational Diseases and Injuries, Tuscany Region, Florence, Italy. Tea Lallukka reports funding from The Academy of Finland (grant 287488). No individuals acknowledged received additional compensation for their efforts. ; Peer-reviewed ; Publisher Version
L'objectif de l'étude est d'analyser la nature de la relation appelée « amitié » dans la société de cour de la France du XVIIe siècle, ainsi que ses formes concrètes et ses fonctions. Comme le travail s'appuie sur des sources tirées de l'entourage des princes de Condé, la période étudiée a été limitée en fonction de ces sources ; elle va des années 1620 jusqu'aux années 1680, embrassant la vie du Grand Condé et aussi les décennies de part et d'autre de la Fronde. La première partie expose d'abord l'état de la recherche sur le sujet de l'amitié, tant en histoire que dans les disciplines voisines. Ensuite, elle explique la méthodologie utilisée. Puis, les sources sont décrites ; elles comprennent d'une part des sources manuscrites provenant des archives des Condé à Chantilly, et d'autre part des sources imprimées, surtout des mémoires et des autobiographies. La première partie se termine par la description du contexte historique des phénomènes étudiés. Cela concerne d'une part le milieu nobiliaire et la société de cour, et d'autre part la famille Condé et son entourage ; ce chapitre expose aussi des détails prosopographiques sur les personnages les plus importants qui sont mentionnés tout au long de l'étude. La seconde partie du travail présente l'amitié nobiliaire en France au XVIIe siècle de manière synchronique, analysant donc les différents aspects de ce lien social. La partie s'ouvre sur une analyse sémantique des notions d' « ami » et d' « amitié » dans la période étudiée. Ensuite, les représentations de l'amitié sont décrites, c'est-à-dire les idées, discours, normes et valeurs qui se lient à la notion d'amitié dans la période concernée. Puis, les langages de l'amitié sont étudiés ; il s'agit là de décrire en détail le vocabulaire et la rhétorique utilisés par les nobles dans leurs relations amicales. L'analyse se poursuit avec les pratiques de l'amitié, c'est-à-dire ses rituels et ses gestes ; dans ce contexte sont aussi analysés les objets qui deviennent symboles de l'amitié, par exemple quand ils sont échangés comme cadeaux entre amis. Finalement, les services entre amis sont thématisés, qui se manifestent dans des domaines aussi divers que le politique (avec l'entraide pour obtenir des charges et offices), l'économique (avec des crédits), la protection mutuelle contre la violence (par exemple par des escortes pour voyager), mais aussi quand un ami fait figure de second pour un autre dans un duel ou quand il l'aide pour arranger son mariage. Tandis que la deuxième partie adopte donc une approche synchronique, la troisième partie est dédiée à une approche diachronique de l'amitié. Il s'agit d'insérer les constats sur l'amitié parmi l'aristocratie française du XVIIe siècle dans une histoire de l'amitié dans la longue durée. Les influences de la pensée de l'Antiquité et du Moyen Age sur l'amitié dans la période étudiée ayant déjà été analysées dans le contexte des représentations de l'amitié, le XVIe siècle a été choisi comme point de départ de cette histoire. Dans un premier temps, l'évolution du phénomène amical pendant la Renaissance et l'âge classique est analysée. Ensuite, les mutations de ce lien social pendant les Lumières et le Romantisme sont examinés. Un tournant important se dessine : c'est dans le dernier XVIIIe et le premier XIXe siècle que l'on peut voir l'essor d'une nouvelle pensée sur l'amitié, qui base celle-ci non plus sur la loyauté et l'entraide, mais sur la sincérité et les sentiments profonds. Un épilogue sur l'amitié à l'époque contemporaine et postmoderne termine cette partie : bien que l'on puisse voir des modifications du phénomène amical au long de ces périodes, même la conception de l'amitié qui est dominante dans les sociétés occidentales actuelles reste largement l'héritière de la conception romantique. Il est donc crucial d'historiciser la notion même d'amitié, pour ne pas juger les amitiés de l'époque moderne à l'échelle de l'amitié romantique. Ce n'est que par ce procédé méthodologique qu'il devient possible de comprendre les amitiés plus utilitaires de l'époque moderne, où, en l'absence d'un Etat fort et d'un marché qui permettraient de satisfaire aux besoins matériels de la vie en traitant avec des inconnus, le réseau amical est crucial pour toutes sortes d'affaires pratiques. Dans le cas d'une élite politique telle que l'était la noblesse française du XVIIe siècle, cela concerne particulièrement les carrières que font les aristocrates, les relations de pouvoir entre les nobles à la cour et leur influence politique, tant sur le monarque que sur les autres nobles. Par conséquent, quand on analyse les relations amicales et plus largement les relations sociales dans le milieu étudié ici, on ne peut pas établir une séparation nette entre ce qui est privé, d'une part, et ce qui est public ou politique, d'autre part. Dans le contexte de la cour, toute relation amicale devient alliance politique – et toute alliance politique se doit d'être aussi une relation amicale. ; The aim of this study is to analyze the nature of the relationship that was called "friendship" in 17th-century French court society and its specific forms and functions. As the inquiry is based on sources from the princes of Condé and their entourage, the period which is analyzed has been defined according to these sources; it goes from the 1620s to the 1680s and spans the life of the Grand Condé as well as the decades before and after the Fronde. The first part begins with an overview of the state of research concerning the subject of friendship, in history as well as in neighbouring disciplines. Then, the method is explained. Subsequently, the sources are described; they encompass both manuscript sources from the archives of the princes of Condé in Chantilly and printed sources, particularly memoirs and autobiographies. The first part finishes with a description of the historical context of the phenomena under inquiry. This concerns the milieu of the nobility and the court society, as well as the house of Condé and their entourage; this chapter also exposes prosopographical details about the most important persons who are mentioned in the study. The second part presents aristocratic friendship in 17th-century France under a synchronic perspective, analyzing the different aspects of this social relationship. This part opens with a semantic analysis of the words "ami" (friend) and "amitié" (friendship) in the period under consideration. Subsequently, the representations of friendship are described, that is the ideas, discourses, norms and values that are attached to the notion of friendship in this period. Then, the language of friendship is examined through an in-depth description of the vocabulary and rhetoric used by the nobles in their friendships. The analysis goes on to describe the practices of friendship, that is, its rituals and gestures. In this context, the objects that become symbols of friendship are analyzed, too; that concerns for example gifts that are exchanged between friends. Finally, the services exchanged between friends are examined, which concern domains as diverse as politics (mutual aid in order to obtain posts and titles), economy (credits), mutual protection against violence (for example in form of escorts when friends are travelling), but also the situation when one friend serves as a second at another's duel, or when one friend helps another arrange his marriage. The third part is dedicated to a diachronic analysis of friendship. What has been found out about friendship among 17th-century French aristocrats is now inserted in a history of friendship in the longue durée. As the influences of ancient and medieval thinking about friendship on the friendships of the period under consideration had already been analyzed in the context of the representations of friendship, the 16th century has been chosen as the point of departure of this history. In a first step, the evolution of the phenomenon of friendship during the Renaissance and the French Classical period is described. Then, the changes that this social relationship undergoes during the Enlightenment and the period of Romanticism are examined. An important turning-point becomes visible: during the late 18th and the early 19th century, one can observe the rise of a new thinking about friendship, in which this relationship is no longer based on loyalty and mutual assistance, but on sincerity and deep feelings. An epilogue about friendship during the modern and post-modern periods closes this part: though one can see evolutions of the phenomenon of friendship during these periods, even the conception of friendship that is dominant in today's Western societies is still to a large extent shaped by the heritage of the concept of friendship as developed in the age of Romanticism. It is thus crucial to historicize the notion of friendship itself, in order not to judge the friendships of the early modern age according to the norms and values of romantic friendship. It is only through this methodological procedure that it becomes possible to understand the more instrumental friendships of the early modern age where the network of friendship is crucial for all sorts of practical affairs, as there is neither a strong state nor a well-developed market which would allow satisfying material needs through interaction with strangers. In the case of a political elite like the nobility of 17th-century France, this concerns in particular the careers of the aristocrats, the power relations between the nobles at court and their political influence on the monarch as well as on each other. Thus, if one analyses friendships in the milieu under consideration here, one cannot draw a clear line between what is private on the one hand and what is public or political on the other. In the context of the court, each relationship of friendship becomes also a political alliance – and each political alliance must also be a relationship of friendship.
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That didn't take long. In fact, what took so long for a challenge to come to Louisiana's recent reapportionment attempt that probably won't do much in the short term but could have an enormous impact long term?
Wednesday, a suit was filed against the state for its new congressional map carved into existence at the legislative special session in January. That plan deliberately created two majority-minority districts, with residents who identify at least partially as black holding narrow majorities, out of the six. It replaced a map with a single M/M district in a state where just about a third of residents identified as at least partially black that was under litigation with Middle District of Louisiana judge Shelly Dick, a Democrat former Pres. Barack Obama appointee who showed little patience for the existing map with her threatening to impose her own two M/M map as a result of a rushed ruling in 2022.
That decision became bolstered by the U.S. Supreme Court's Allen v. Milligan ruling last year, which consented to a special three-judge panel in Alabama, which had a black population of about a quarter, that determined a one-of-seven M/M plan by the state violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. That ruling gave preference to race as a means of reapportionment over other principles such as compactness, contiguity, and community of interests preserved, by injecting race as something defining a community's interest.
The problem for Louisiana was the solution stumped for by Republican Gov. Jeff Landry and GOP legislative majorities looked awfully similar to the map invalidated in Hays v. Louisiana three decades ago, except drawn with six districts instead of seven. The compliant draws attention to that, perhaps not surprisingly as the same lead lawyer in that case headlines the just-filed Callais v. Landry.
No surprise as well that the filing savages the current map, drawing attention to characteristics that make it no more constitutional, if not even less so, than the rejected map back then. It piles on that the 2022 map so criticized by Dick even fares better than the 2024 map on certain quantifiable criteria of quality. In passing, it makes clear leftist critics of the 2022 map who hypocritically swooned over the 2024 map by that reaction ratify the fact that race had a predominant role in the latter's construction, which clearly violated Hays' admonition that race cannot play such a role absent compelling circumstances obviously missing in this case.
Nor does the outcome of Allen look promising to salvage the new map. While the Supreme Court accepted the special panel's (these are required when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body) reasoning to invalidate the previous one-of-seven M/M plan, it thereupon produced a new map that explicitly rejected a two M/M plan in favor of one also a single M/M plan except a second district was created as a generous "opportunity" district or one with a black plurality (which had a 47 percent black proportion; a previous state attempt to create one at 40 percent the panel turned away). This map's districts score well on compactness and contiguity, plus separate more communities of interest than both of Alabama's rejected plans but not to absurd lengths.
By contrast, Louisiana skipped that possibility of having an additional opportunity district (one special session bill would have created two). Instead, it produced the two M/M map which, the text of the complaint illustrates extensively, has severe contiguity problems (multiple districts kept together at some points by borders only 1,500-2,000 yards wide), registers terrible quantified compactness scores, and does substantial violence to communities of interest, slicing up every single one of the state's major cities between two districts except Bossier City.
Note as well that it was a district court in Alabama, just as happened in Louisiana, that invalidated the former map, because the challenge presented was both one under law (the VRA) and the Constitution (14th Amendment) and the district court, and thus succeeding courts, addressed only the claim under law. The special panel provided the constitutional parameters for a new map once under law the old map was cast aside. The constitutional question of the entire approach wasn't directly adjudicated and, as Assoc. Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted in a concurrence, ripe for visiting that could tank the Section 2 jurisprudence that declared the old Alabama map infirm and by extension threatened Louisiana's previous one.
However, the Callais challenge is strictly on constitutional grounds, treading the well-worn path of Hays. This invites not only the virtually-certain binning of the new Louisiana map, but also it opens up the possibility that the Kavanaugh concurrence will be explored in the process that could put Section 2 into forced retirement and actually permit the state to reinstate something like the old map.
Yet that won't be likely for 2024. As it is a constitutional challenge where the district court – the Western where it is assigned to David Joseph, the district's former attorney and a Republican former Pres. Donald Trump appointee – plays a lesser role of coordination and handling preliminary matters, giving a bit of a head start, little time remains in a practical sense.
That's because of the Purcell Principle the Court has enunciated where it won't change electoral boundaries too close to an election. The forthcoming election calendar suggests that everything involved in invalidating the map will have to be wrapped up by the end of May, in order for the state administratively to revert back to the map just set aside and be ready for the gathering of petitions by candidates to qualify. Four months would be tough.
By 2026, the present map will be history and districts at that time will look more like the map recently shunted aside. It's far less certain that will be the case for elections conducted this year.
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The regional reverberations of the Israel-Gaza war demonstrate why the White House should scrap, not reinforce, America's outdated and unnecessarily provocative troop presence in Syria and Iraq. President Joe Biden should redeploy these forces to a safer position offshore and leave it to self-interested Syrians and Iraqis to prevent ISIS from reemerging. As Biden's own policy on Afghanistan demonstrated — and as I observed on the ground earlier this fall — withdrawing U.S. soldiers and Marines can bolster American security by turning the fight against Islamic State over to well-motivated local belligerents while freeing up U.S. personnel to serve in more vital areas. Likewise, pivoting out of Syria and Iraq will not make Americans any less safe, but it will deny local militias, and their presumptive patrons in Iran, the chance to use unneeded outposts for leverage over our national strategy. Since October 17, some 900 U.S. troops in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq have been taking fire from Iran-linked militias and, subsequently, drawing retaliatory air support, including an attack by a C-130 gunship that killed eight members of the Kataib Hezbollah group in Iraq last week. The U.S. service members are the lingering footprint of Operation Inherent Resolve, which began in 2015 to defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and succeeded in 2019 in eliminating the physical ISIS caliphate, thereby reducing ISIS to "a survival posture" without territory. Rather than taking the win and packing up, the Trump and Biden administrations kept in place some troops, who have become a recurring target of opportunity for Iran and its surrogates during moments of tension. In the past five weeks, the Iran-linked militants' rockets and one-way attack drones have injured over sixty of these Americans. The prolonged American deployment, driven by policy inertia more than strategic necessity, has added tinder to a potential U.S.-Iranian conflagration that would eclipse the Israel-Gaza War. One Pentagon official has remarked in defiance, "Iran's objective… has been to force a withdrawal of the U.S. military from the region… What I would observe is that we're still there [in Iraq and Syria]." This reluctance to relinquish former ISIS territory to independently-minded governments recapitulates the mindset that made the Afghanistan and Iraq wars so unnecessarily costly. Rather than cutting its losses, the White House and Pentagon have doubled down, with two aircraft carrier groups in the Eastern Mediterranean, an airstrike on an Iran-linked weapons depot in Syria, and an additional 1,200 troops for staffing regional air defenses, and now strikes inside Iraq — over the objections of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose coalition is linked to Kataib Hezbollah. When it comes to escalating or winding down U.S. military interventions, the deciding factor should not be what Iran's leaders want in largely deserted corners of Iraq and Syria, but what policies best serve American interests. On this question, Biden's controversial decision in 2021 to pull all U.S. forces from Afghanistan offers an important lesson. As I have seen firsthand, complete withdrawal can serve Washington's counterterrorism and strategic goals, even if the policy cedes physical terrain to governments with which U.S. officials do not see eye to eye. When the Israel-Gaza war broke out the weekend of October 7, I was wrapping up an uneventful three weeks of visiting what were once the deadliest zones of America's recent wars: Kabul, Kandahar, and Helmand provinces in Afghanistan; and the cities of Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Mosul in Iraq. I traversed dozens of Taliban and Iraqi government checkpoints, as I toured cities and rural areas without any sense of threat from officials or terrorists. The physical security I experienced in both countries dispels the most common fear about withdrawing American troops, that exiting will increase the danger to Americans and our interests while strategically advantaging recalcitrant governments. It is difficult to overstate the level of internal stability Afghanistan has enjoyed since August 2021. In the wake of America's flawed evacuation from Kabul airport, analysts and policymakers expected the country to implode and spread armed conflict onto its neighbors and the world. Instead, political violence in Afghanistan plummeted by 80% in the first year after American forces left. Crucially, the Taliban's security forces curbed the threat of mass-casualty attacks by Islamic State's local offshoot, accomplishing in a matter of months what the Pentagon and CIA had been trying to achieve since 2015. While yes they are under the thumb of the oppressive Taliban regime, Afghans are experiencing their longest respite from war since the Soviet Army invaded on Christmas Eve 1979. Meanwhile, U.S. forces that would be committed to high-risk, low-reward combat missions in land-locked Afghanistan are available for "deterring and responding to great-power aggression." If the Taliban can hobble Islamic State's operations in an impoverished agrarian country with a supposedly "weak and failing state" ripe for transnational jihadism, there is every reason to expect the armed forces of Syria and Iraq can be equally effective. The Syrian military, backed not only by Iran but also Russia, has the wherewithal and materiel to deal with the dead-enders of ISIS's defunct caliphate. Next door, last year's spike in oil prices allowed Baghdad to adopt the largest budget in its history, including $23 billion for the security sector. Further, I can report that the roadways of Iraq are festooned with billboards of the "martyred" Iranian special forces commander Qasem Soleimani. His ubiquitous visage, in addition to al-Sudani's high-profile visit to Tehran after Secretary of State Blinken's furtive November 5 drop-in, puts paid to the idea that American boots on the ground can "check Iranian influence" in Iraq or other Shia-led states such as Syria. ISIS has long since been defeated and Operation Inherent Resolve should be shuttered at the first opportunity. The August 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan offers a vivid — if unexpected — precedent for making this timely and prudent shift. This further demonstrates that letting local actors handle Islamic State fighters — and whatever lands those jihadists claimed — will not empower America's challengers, but can enable a nimbler U.S. foreign policy.
Ilya Gerasimov finds a conflict between the empirical material presented in Omer Bartov's book "Anatomy of a Genocide: The Life and Death of a Town Called Buczacz" (New York, 2018) and the explanatory model proposed by the author. In the Galician town of Buczacz, where Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles had lived together for centuries, local gentile residents actively participated in the Holocaust, and later in the Ukrainian–Polish ethnic cleansings. Bartov's explanation of fratricide during World War II is based on a teleological vision of primordial interethnic tensions that gradually escalated to the boiling point. Gerasimov argues that the book leaves two key questions unanswered: Why was the Holocaust so deadly in a region that had not known a prehistory of anti-Jewish violence (if "neighbors" were its most numerous perpetrators, as Bartov argues)? And why did gentile "neighbors" so massively turn against the local Jews (if the Holocaust was orchestrated and supervised by the Nazis, as the book demonstrates)? Inspired by Bartov's rich ethnography of the Holocaust in Buczacz, Gerasimov offers his own answers to these questions. He proposes an understanding of genocide (including the Holocaust) that views the participation of longtime members of the same social network ("neighbors") as a typical factor rather than a scandalous aberration. In this model, the driving force behind genocide is not entrenched hatred of the Other based on potent nationalism. Rather, it is a desire to join a kindred community at any cost by the aspiring members of a crumbling national project – compromised by the wartime threat to national sovereignty and the absence of political institutions of participatory democracy due to a foreign occupation or dictatorial regime; a national project, whose promise of unity is shattered by civil war and the absence of a common language capable of formulating and communicating the criteria of national belonging. It is not ancient xenophobic animosity that leads to genocide but a very recent and rapidly developed longing for membership in a legitimate national community. Hence the central role of "neighbors" in genocide as an instrument of "negatively" drawing new boundaries of a political community by stigmatizing those former members of the old polity who could be most easily identified as "aliens" or "enemies of the people." ; Илья Герасимов полагает, что эмпирический материал, представленный в книге Омера Бартова ("Анатомия геноцида: жизнь и смерть города, который назывался Бучач", Нью-Йорк, 2018), противоречит объясняющей модели, предложенной автором. В галицийском городке Бучач, где евреи, украинцы и поляки жили вместе на протяжении столетий, местные жители-христиане приняли активное участие в Холокосте, а затем и в украинско-польских этнических чистках. Объяснение Бартовом массового уничтожения соседей в годы второй мировой войны основано на телеологическом видении постепенной эскалации давних межэтнических конфликтов до уровня открытого насилия. Герасимов показывает, что книга оставляет без ответа два ключевых вопроса: как объяснить максимальную интенсивность Холокоста в регионе, не имевшем предыстории насилия по отношению к евреям (если именно "соседи" составили основную массу преследователей евреев, как утверждает Бартов)? И почему "соседи" столь единодушно ополчились против местных евреев (если, как показывает книга, Холокост был организован и координировался нацистами)? Опираясь на плотное описание Бартовом Холокоста в Бучаче, Герасимов предлагает собственные ответы на эти вопросы. Он рассматривает участие в геноциде давних членов одной социальной сети ("соседей") как типичный и даже основополагающий фактор, а не как скандальное отклонение. Движущей силой геноцида в этой модели оказывается не укорененная ненависть мощного националистического движения к Другому, а желание примкнуть к сообществу "своих", стремление любой ценой доказать свою причастность к рассыпающемуся национальному проекту в ситуации угрозы национальному суверенитету. В условиях войны и отсутствия демократических политических институтов из-за иностранной оккупации или диктаторского режима, когда обещанное национальное единство подорвано гражданской войной и отсутствием самого общего языка, способного сформулировать и распространить критерии принадлежности к единой нации, – это стремление доказать свою причастность нации выражается через убийство "чужака" в пределах досягаемости, то есть соседа. Не древняя традиция ксенофобской вражды ведет к геноциду, а недавнее и стремительно развивающеесястремление примкнуть к легитимной национальной общности. Этим объясняется центральная роль "соседей" в осуществлении геноцида как попытки проведения новых границ политического сообщества "негативно" – через стигматизацию бывших членов прежнего политического пространства, которых проще всего объявить "чужаками" или "врагами народа". ; Ілля Герасимов вважає, що емпіричний матеріал, представлений у книжці Омера Бартова («Анатомія геноциду: життя і смерть міста, що називалось Бучач», Нью-Йорк, 2018), суперечить моделі, запропонованій автором. У галицькому містечку Бучач, де євреї, українці та поляки жили разом упродовж століть, місцеві жителі-християни взяли активну участь у Голокості, а потім і в українсько-польських етнічних чистках. Пояснення Бартовим масового знищення сусідів у роки Другої світової війни засноване на телеологічному баченні поступової ескалації давніх міжетнічних конфліктів до рівня відкритого насильства. Герасимов показує, що книга залишає без відповіді два ключові питання: як пояснити максимальну інтенсивність Голокосту в регіоні, який не мав передісторії насильства по відношенню до євреїв (якщо саме «сусіди» становили основну масу переслідувачів євреїв, як стверджує Бартов)? І чому «сусіди» настільки одностайно виступили проти місцевих євреїв (якщо, як показує книжка, Голокост був організований і координувався нацистами)? Спираючись на насичений опис Бартовом Голокосту в Бучачі, Герасимов пропонує власні відповіді на ці запитання. Він розглядає участь у геноциді давніх членів однієї соціальної мережі («сусідів») як типовий і навіть основоположний фактор, а не як скандальне відхилення. Рушійною силою геноциду в цій моделі виявляється не вкорінена ненависть потужного націоналістичного руху до Іншого, а бажання приєднатися до спільноти «своїх», прагнення будь-якою ціною довести свою причетність до національного проєкту, що розсипається, у ситуації загрози національному суверенітету. В умовах війни і відсутності демократичнихполітичних інститутів через іноземну окупацію або диктаторський режим, коли обіцяна національна єдність підірвана громадянською війною і відсутністю самої спільної мови, здатної сформулювати і поширити критерії приналежності до єдиної нації, – це прагнення довести свою причетність через убивство «чужинця» в межах досяжності, тобто сусіда. Не давня традиція ксенофобської ворожнечі веде до геноциду, а нещодавнє і стрімко розвинене прагнення приєднатися до легітимної національної спільноти. Цим пояснюється центральна роль «сусідів» у здійсненні геноциду як спроби проведення нових кордонів політичного співтовариства «негативно» – через стигматизацію колишніх членів старого політичного простору, яких найпростіше оголосити «чужинцями» або «ворогами народу».
학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :국제대학원 국제학과(국제협력전공),2019. 8. 김태균. ; Gender essentialism is a notion that women are the vulnerable or mothers or untapped resources for economic development on the belief that women's essence is given and universal. Women have been discriminated by gender and transnational organizations for women and feminists demanded the international community to fight the gender-based discrimination against women and the international community agreed to do it. For example, the Beijing Platform for Action declared in 1995 address how to fight the gender-based discrimination with transformation of the prescribed gender roles. The gender-based discrimination can result from gender essentialism that favors masculinism, so feminists insisted that gender equality with transforming the prescribed gender roles to construct new gender roles is necessary for gender equality. Accordingly, many countries which agreed to the Beijing Platform for Action adopted policies and strategies for gender equality and the international development cooperation business also started to provide international development assistance for gender equality. The development assistance is, however, dependent on domestic politics and policies that could be not coherent with the global norms. Besides, the meaning of gender equality can be conveniently fixed, shrunk, stretched, and bent for national interests. Therefore, the discourse of gender equality is important for setting up an orientation of policies related to gender equality. In the case of South Korea, domestic policies have been disadvantageous to women and gender essentialism was conceived in policies. Besides, Korean ODA governance is based on a government-initiated network at which the government's agendas are set prioritized. Therefore, the government's discourse and policies of gender issues are highly connected to Korean ODA for gender equality. According to the findings of this study, from Lee Myung-bak administration that was affected by the previous administrations to Moon Jae-in's administration, Korean policies conceived gender essentialism. Thus, KOICA's ODA projects for gender equality have not gender-sensitive. Therefore, the discourse of gender equality needs to be discussed to challenge gender essentialism. ; 젠더 본질주의란, 여성의 본질은 이미 정해져 있고 보편적이라는 믿음 하에 여성을 취약층 또는 어머니 또는 경제 성장에 이용되지 못 한 자원으로 만 보는 관념을 의미한다. 여성은 젠더 그리고 여성을 위한다는 전통적인 기관들에 의해 차별을 받아왔고 여성주의자들은 국제사회가 젠더에 기반한 여성에 대한 차별에 대응하기를 요구했다. 국제사회는 이에 동의하였다. 예를 들어, 1995년에 선언된 베이징 행동강령은 미리 정해진 젠더 역할로 인한 젠더 기반한 차별에 대해서 어떻게 대응할 것인지에 대한 내용이 기재되어 있다. 젠더에 기반한 차별은 남성주의에 유리한 젠더 본질주의 로부터 비롯될 수 있다. 그러므로 여성주의자들은 미리 정해진 젠더 역할을 변화시키는 성평등으로 새로운 젠더 역할을 형성하는 것이 성평등을 위해 필수적이라고 보았다. 따라서, 베이징 행동강령에 동의한 많은 국가들은 성평등을 위한 정책과 전략을 받아들였고 국제개발협력 분야는 성평등을 위한 국제개발협력을 제공하기 시작했다. 하지만 개발협력은 국내의 정책과 정치에 영향을 받으므로 국제 규범과 일치하기 어렵다. 그러므로 성평등의 의미는 국내의 이익에 부합한 방식으로, 편리하게 고정되고, 축소되고, 늘어나고, 구부려질 수 있다. 따라서, 성평등에 대한 담론은 성평등에 대한 정책의 방향을 설정하기 위해서 매우 중요하다. 대한민국의 경우에, 국내 정치는 여성에게 불리했으며 젠더 본질주의는 정책에 녹아 있었다. 게다가 한국의 공적개발원조 거버넌스는 정부중심의 네트워크로, 정부의 의제들이 우선시되었다. 그리하여 정부의 젠더에 대한 정책 및 담론은 한국의 성평등에 대한 공적개발원조에도 연결되게 되었다. 본 연구의 발견에 따르면, 이전 정부들의 영향을 받은 이명박 정부부터 문재인 정권까지의 정부들은 한국의 적책들은 젠더 본질주의를 품고 있었다. 그러므로 한국의 성평등에 대한 담론은 젠더 본질주의를 타파하기 위해 논의될 필요가 있다. ; Ⅰ. Introduction 1 1.1 Purpose of Research and Research Questions 1 Ⅱ. Literature Review 3 2.1. From Discussion on Gender Equality of Development to Implementation of Gender Mainstreaming by International Community and South Korea 3 2.2. The Discourse of the Equality between Women and Men over Gender Equality Relevant with Gender Essentialism 8 2.3. Korean Domestic Policies Connected to the Korean ODA Policies through Korean Government-Initiated Network 16 Ⅲ. Analytical Framework and Methodology 19 3.1. Analytical Framework 19 3.2. Research Methodology 26 Ⅳ. Gender Blind Policies by LEE Myung-baks Administration and ODA for Global Korea 29 4.1. The Discourse of Gender Equality in Korean Policies until Lee Myung-baks Administration 29 4.2. The Discourse Dynamics of Gender Equality in the Policies by Lee Myung-bak Administration Related to ODA 35 4.3. The Discourse of Gender Equality in the Strategies of ODA During Lee Myung-bak Administration 45 Ⅴ. Gender Blind Policies of Park Geun-hyes Administration and ODA for Gender Equality for the Better Life for Girls 50 5.1. The Discourse of Gender Equality in Korean Policies until Park Geun-hyes Administration 50 5.2. The Discourse Dynamics of Gender Equality in the Policies by Park Geun-hye Administration Related to ODA 55 5.3. The Discourse of Gender Equality in the Strategies of ODA at Park Geun-hye Administration 65 Ⅵ. Conflict between Feminism and Masculinism During Moon Jae-ins Administration and Its Influence on ODA for Gender Equality 69 6.1. The Discourse of Gender Equality in Korean Policies until Moon Jae-ins Administration 69 6.2. The Discourse Dynamics of Gender Equality in the Policies by Moon Jae-in Administration Related to ODA 74 6.3. The Discourse of Gender Equality in the Strategies of ODA at Moon Jae-ins Administration 80 Ⅶ. KOICAs ODA Projects for Gender Equality Conceiving Gender Essentialism from Lee Myung-bak Administration to Moon Jae-in Administration 83 7.1. The Targeted Projects for Gender Equality from 2012 to 2019 83 7.2. The New Village Movement Projects Marked 1 or 2 by the DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker 85 7.3. The Green Growth Projects Marked 1 or 2 by the DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker 88 7.4. Better Life for Girls Projects Marked 1 or 2 by the DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker 90 7.5. Project for response to gender-based violence between 2018-2019 92 Ⅶ. Conclusion 94 8.1. Discussion 94 8.2. Recommendation 96 8.3. Limitation 98 References 100 Abstract in Korean 110 ; Master
Dentro de las oportunidades que tienen las personas en proceso de reintegración es la inclusión a la vida laboral, no obstante la sociedad debe ser realista y tener claro que no todas las personas con interés en su inclusión a la sociedad ni a la vida laboral se platean los mismos objetivos, Quizá algunas de estas personas se plantean el objetivo de comenzar una nueva vida, dejando atrás todas las situaciones de violencia, terrorismo, asesinatos, extorsiones y para ello se empeñaran de manera íntegra y con amplios deseos de superación. Otros pretenderán encontrar nuevas formas de delinquir, vincularse laboralmente a una empresa, preferiblemente del sector de la seguridad, donde ven un punto de partida para seguir delinquiendo, al incorporarse a los servicios de seguridad están conociendo las debilidades y falencias de una empresa y podría ser la oportunidad de seguir con beneficios sin mayor esfuerzo, tal como lo hicieron en su vida delictiva, es aquí cuando surge una pregunta; ¿la sociedad está dispuesta a aceptar esta incorporación sin discriminación y de ser así es posible que sea la seguridad privada un punto de partida laboral para estos ciudadanos? Es importante resaltar que en el proceso de inclusión en la sociedad, tomando como única referencia la vida laboral, según el acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera en el punto 1.3.3. Estímulos a la producción agropecuaria y a la economía solidaria y cooperativa. Asistencia Técnica. Subsidios. Crédito. Generación de ingresos. Mercadeo. Formalización laboral, afirma en uno de sus apartes: Formalización laboral rural y protección social: el Gobierno Nacional fortalecerá al máximo el sistema de protección y seguridad social de la población rural, con un enfoque diferencial y teniendo en cuenta la situación particular de las mujeres. A la luz de las normas de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT) de las que Colombia es parte y con el propósito de garantizar el trabajo digno y os derechos de los trabajadores y trabajadoras del campo, y su protección social (protección a la vejez, maternidad y riesgos laborales). (Pág. 28. 2016) Hace parte de la estrategia de vinculación laboral, que abarca no solo a los desmovilizados sino a la sociedad en general en donde se pretende brindar la oportunidad de inclusión a la sociedad a un grupo de personas para disminuir los índices de desempleo con las sociedades vulnerables, evitar acciones criminales, de inseguridad entre otros, haciendo frente a un problema social que no solo afecta el ámbito de la seguridad, también afecta el desarrollo económico del país. Es de vital importancia y necesario tener en cuenta la percepción positiva y negativa de los empresarios, de las personas que están encargadas de tomar la decisión de contratar laboralmente, de esta manera se tiene claridad sobre la perspectiva de la reintegración económica de los desmovilizados que entran a competir por un puesto de trabajo formal, de acuerdo a cada una de sus habilidades. ; Among the opportunities that people in the process of reintegration have is inclusion into working life, however society must be realistic and be clear that not all people with an interest in their inclusion in society or working life are plated the same objectives, Perhaps some of these people set themselves the goal of starting a new life, leaving behind all the situations of violence, terrorism, murder, extortion and for that they will work in an integral way and with a broad desire to excel. Others will try to find new ways of committing crimes, to be linked to a company, preferably from the security sector, where they see a starting point to continue committing crimes, when they join the security services they are aware of the weaknesses and weaknesses of a company and could be the opportunity to continue with benefits without greater effort, as they did in their criminal life, is here when a question arises; Is society willing to accept this incorporation without discrimination and if so, is it possible that private security is a starting point for these citizens? It is important to highlight that in the process of inclusion in society, taking as a sole reference work life, according to the final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace in point 1.3.3. Stimuli for agricultural production and the solidary and cooperative economy. Technical assistance. Subsidies Credit. Generation of income. Marketing. Formalization of labor, states in one of its sections: Rural labor formalization and social protection: the National Government will strengthen to the maximum the system of protection and social security of the rural population, with a differential approach and taking into account the particular situation of women. In light of the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) of which Colombia is a party and with the purpose of guaranteeing decent work and the rights of rural workers, and their social protection (protection against old age , maternity and occupational risks). (Page 28. 2016) It is part of the strategy of employment linkage, which covers not only the demobilized but also the society in general where it is intended to provide the opportunity of inclusion to society to a group of people to reduce unemployment rates with vulnerable societies, avoid criminal actions, insecurity among others, facing a social problem that not only affects the security environment, it also affects the economic development of the country. It is vitally important and necessary to take into account the positive and negative perception of employers, of the people who are responsible for making the decision to hire a job, so that there is clarity about the perspective of the economic reintegration of the demobilized persons who enter to compete for a formal job, according to each of their abilities. ; Pregrado
"Leave Nothing to the Imagination: Global Forms of Atrocity After 1945" argues that in the wake of the Nuremberg trials of 1945-1946, through the Eichmann trial in 1961, concern about how to establish evidence for atrocity becomes the major preoccupation for legal representations of human rights violations. I trace how legal discourse becomes dependent on literary modes of representation in order to substantiate the reality of large-scale violence and human suffering in the context of post-1945 human rights legislation. I argue that at key moments, legal arguments turn to fictions and figurations in their attempts to establish the facts of atrocity. Since fiction can create narrative cohesion that the facts themselves cannot support, legal attempts at redress borrow from the imaginative possibilities of fictional techniques for making atrocity legible. Figuration, moreover, fortifies unstable evidence by enlisting facts from other contexts through a logic of resemblance. Herein, I investigate how the dynamic between factual, fictional, and figurative modes of establishing evidence migrates from its epicenter in post-1945 Europe to diverse geographical spaces and geopolitical contexts, where it takes on internationally recognizable markings of atrocity. I look at the intersections between these geographical and geopolitical sites of atrocity, examining the way they borrow, refer to, and complicate one another, and I identify how these aesthetic exchanges constitute attempts to establish evidence in cases where empirical evidence lacks. I look at how the literature of atrocity after 1945 comes to center around this concern about proving the reality of atrocity, and how this happens simultaneously as atrocity becomes an increasingly international concern, subject to new international human rights legislation.This dissertation stands at the intersection of three interdisciplinary conversations: first, how human rights defines a concept of universal personhood; second, comparative genocide studies and, more broadly, comparative atrocity; and third, the nature of evidence in law and literature. The central literary figures that this project engages include Kurt Vonnegut, Antjie Krog, M. NourbeSe Philip, Paul Celan, and Indra Sinha; the central theorists I engage include Hannah Arendt, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gayatri Spivak, and Jacques Derrida. The case studies I include trace out a global trajectory of a discourse of human rights, alongside concern about establishing evidence for human rights violations. In each chapter, I pair literary texts with archival sources, in order to identify how texts in each of these categories maneuver between factual and figurative terms. The formal category that has determined my grouping of primary texts is the category of "legal testimony." My first chapter, "Factuality on Trial: The "Real" Eichmann, The Authenticity of Atrocity, and the Evidence of Evil," examines the Eichmann trials in 1961 and Hannah Arendt's coverage of the trials in her landmark thesis, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Thesis on the Banality of Evil. This chapter focuses on the Holocaust as a new archetype of atrocity in which the idea of "authentic" representation of atrocity becomes unstable. I chronicle a turning point in the concept of legal evidence as it relates to and is used to establish the reality of atrocityMy next chapter, "Fictions of Evidence: Reconciling Truth in Country of My Skull," examines the South African Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearings of 1996-1997. The TRC self-consciously fashioned itself against the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, and did so in front of a global audience. In in the context of the TRC, truth becomes fragmented, and reconciliation requires fictions to supplement those fragments. I examine a particular piece of testimony from Antjie Krog's Country of My Skull to illustrate how legal truth in the TRC hearings may be governed by fictions. I show how at the core of the TRC, the concept of evidence itself is located in a specifically literary imaginary. My third chapter, "Seeing Double in Animal's People: Local Toxins, Global Toxicity and the Universal Bhopal," turns to industrial disaster of 1984 in India caused by an American multinational corporation. Bhopal showcases the challenges of providing evidence for and addressing local mass suffering in that global context. Focusing on Indra Sinha's Animal's People, my chapter examines how this atrocity in Bhopal veers between authenticating itself as atrocity by evidencing its universality, borrowing from facts and stylizations of antecedent atrocity to put Bhopal within the legislative purview of International Human Rights, and simultaneously evidencing its uniqueness, thus taking it outside of the global economy. My fourth chapter, "Textimony: Zong! and the Poetics of Evidence" pushes my argument into poetic form. M. NourbeSe Philip's Zong!, a collection of language poetry, is what the author calls an "untelling." It "untells" the 1781 slave massacre aboard the ship, an atrocity followed by an egregious legal case that framed the atrocity as a property compensation claim pressed by the slave owners. Zong! uses the aesthetic conventions developed by a specifically post-1945 mode of representing atrocity, and a contemporary mode of thinking about human rights and atrocity, and projects these conventions onto a historical event of atrocity—the transatlantic slave trade—that may stand both at the gateway of modern globalization, and as an archetype of atrocity. I consider the politics of comparative memory in a globalized legal context, and the representational and political consequences of a comparative approach to memory that may become competitive. My research intervenes into the discourses of contemporary international human rights concerns, policy development, and the discursive development of moral pedagogy addressing the lessons and the legacy of global atrocity for future responses and ethical import. My intervention into these conversations seeks to understand how, in the context of post-1945 human rights, which I will argue is inherently comparative, modes and methodologies of comparison typically associated with literary discourse—analogy, figuration, and metaphor—alongside fictions themselves, become forms of evidence, and how they come to mobilize some of the great human rights projects of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.