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Portrait mounted on verso of half-title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

"Serial no. 106-104." ; Shipping list no.: 2000-0284-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Abstract
This article examines the effect of fiscal slack on government corruption using the US states in the period from 1998 to 2012 as a research sample. Fiscal slack in the US states is commonly referred to as "rainy day funds" (RDFs), which are intended as countercyclical reserve funds for government‐wide purposes. Theoretically, bureaucracy models predict that fiscal slack might catalyze the embezzlement or misuse behaviors of bureaucrats, who are considered to be budget maximizers. However, formally established and rules‐bound RDFs may function as a "strongbox" that curbs officials' discretionary power, reduces uncertainty in fiscal slack management, and ultimately restrains embezzlement and misuse behaviors. Empirically, we use the incidences and durations of natural hazards as instrumental variables for RDF balances to address the potential endogeneity problems. We find that state RDFs help reduce government corruption, especially when they are regulated by relatively looser deposit rules and stricter withdrawal rules.
Evidence for Practice

State RDFs function as a "strongbox" for governments' unspent budgetary resources and negatively affect the degree of government corruption.
A one‐standard‐deviation increase in per capita RDF balances reduces corruption‐related convicted officials per million population by approximately 3 or, measured in an alternative way, reduces corruption‐related convicted officials per thousand government employees by approximately 44–50.
The efficacy of state RDFs in curbing government corruption is contingent on the associated rules of operation. Specifically, RDFs bound by relatively looser deposit rules and stricter withdrawal rules reduce government corruption to a greater extent.

One of the greatest achievements in the process of political transformation in Poland involves the broad decentralization of the public authorities, where a larger number of independent entities with public competences exist alongside a single center. Decentralization is embodied by self-government, which has therefore become an important element of the democratic regime co-creating a network of links related to the distribution of power, property and resources across society. Undoubtedly, self-government which works in favor of citizens' groups being organized as corporations contributes to the increased efficiency of public authorities in the territorial and special dimension. Based on this, self-government should be understood not as a unidimensional entity involved only in territorial relations. There is also special self-government, established according to different criteria, which plays an important role in the system of the representation of the interests of defined circles. It is divided into professional self-government and, first and foremost, business self-government. Importantly, self-governments should be approached from a slightly different angle – not only in the administrative and institutional context, but also from the point of view of the realization of the interests of organized social groups, that is in terms of governance, which can improve the functioning of local authorities, for instance as concerns the emergence of metropolitan areas. The harmonious development of all forms of self-government, irrespective of the type of bonds connecting its members, as well as the consolidation of participatory processes, is one of the prerequisites for a stable democratic regime.

Environmental governance in many high-income democracies relies to some extent on self-regulation by the private sector. Yet, this policy mode is contested and proponents of top-down government regulation argue that voluntary corporate sustainability commitments remain shallow and rarely are more than greenwashing. I assess to what extent firms' business conduct is subject to societal checks and balances, in particular, whether public support for regulation constitutes a control mechanism of corporate contributions to environmental goods. I rely on an original survey experiment (N = 2112) conducted with a representative sample of the Swiss voting population. The analysis shows that accusing firms of greenwashing reduces both citizens' perceived effectiveness of self-regulation and perceived synergy of corporate profits and environmental protection. However, this attitudinal shift only translates into modest updates in respondents' policy preferences. As a result, short-run shifts in public support for regulation are an unlikely societal control mechanism of business conduct.

The theory of fiscal federalism asserts that fiscal decentralization increases government effectiveness, reduces government budgets, and reduces corruption when used as a means of government reform. However, counter‐arguments have been made that such an approach has diverging effects according to the level of national development. We have attempted herein to carry out an empirical analysis to examine these theories. Data from 17 developed and 17 developing states were obtained in order to conduct a regression analysis of various indicators. The results revealed that fiscal decentralization reduced government effectiveness in developed countries. Important determinants for government effectiveness were the quality of regulation and the rule of law. When responsibility for expenditure and revenue were devolved, budgets expanded in both developed and developing countries. Fiscal decentralization deterred corruption in advanced states, whereas greater autonomy in spending increased malfeasance in the developing world.

One impact is most felt by the government in the era of globalization, the 21st Century, and publicadministration reform, the public demands to improve the quality of service received from the government. Inother words, people get "excellent service" from the government. Community demands are not excessive,therefore during this "paradigm to serve" from the government bureaucracy, in fact, reverse the "paradigmserved". Although many critics and even blasphemy against the slow pace of public service provided thegovernment bureaucracy, but it seems not much significant change. The slowness of service, based onobservations and assessments of experts, among others, as a result of the path length that must be taken to anactivity (work procedures convoluted), deviant attitudes and behavior of government bureaucracy, weaksupervision immediate superior, systems and management style tend to be authoritarian, centralized authorityand power, professionalism, limited facilities and infrastructure, as well as other things. The question thatthen arises is how the efforts of the government, so that the service provided to the community is increasing itsquality. This is important, therefore, the public has a right to get excellent service from the government. Atleast three criteria for excellent service quality measures, namely: "faster, better, and cheaper", a highlycoveted community. Associated with these things, the following will be presented on "Excellent Service".

During the 19th century, and particularly the early years following the French Revolution, many theorists sought to completely redefine how government functioned, in hopes of bringing about a lasting new change to society. Even within this context, it is hard to imagine a more radical proposal for the functioning of government than Rousseau's Social Contract. The idea of a government with complete authority over all matters of society, yet consistently 'checked' through the power of the 'general will', and yearly assemblies comprised of every citizen in society, is one theory that has not had much influence on Western democracies. In stark contrast to this, was the version of government put forth by John Locke, which while agreeing with Rousseau concerning the dangers of the 'state of nature', or an un-governed population, presented what has appeared to be the template for Western democracies today. A form of government not based on absolute power, but instead on a series of 'standing laws', specifically designed to counter this very thing. This essay investigates these two opposing viewpoints, proposed by Rousseau and Locke in The Social Contract, and the Second Treatise of Government. Special thanks to Professor Michael Wallack of the Political Science department at Memorial University for his information concerning both these theorists and their respective views of government.