Suchergebnisse

This thesis is written within the contemporary classical institutional economics tradition. The intention has been to provide insight into how different institutions can enable us to avoid harmful effects and generate beneficial effects on the environment and food security from genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This is done by analysing how institutions influence perspectives on GMOs, the GMOs that are developed and commercialized, as well as our ability to handle possible uncertain and unknown effects of GMOs. The thesis consists of 4 papers. Paper 1 analyses scientists' perspectives on the release of GMOs into the environment, and the relationship between their perspectives and the institutional context that they work within, e.g. their place of employment (university or industry), funding of their research (public or industry) and their disciplinary background (ecology, molecular biology or conventional plant breeding). Q-methodology is employed to examine these issues. Two distinct perspectives are identified by interviewing 62 scientists. Perspective 1 is characterised by a moderately negative attitude to GMOs and the uncertainty and ignorance involved are emphasised. Perspective 2 is characterised by a positive attitude to GMOs and it is emphasised that GMOs are useful and do not represent any unique risks compared to conventional crops. The results show a strong association between scientists' perspective on GMOs and the explanatory variables training, funding and place of employment. Paper 2 analyses how different institutional structures shape the research and development (R&D) of GMOs. Whether this R&D is conducted within companies, cooperatives or public research organisations is expected to influence the type of crops and traits that are developed and therefore the effects on society and ecosystems that potentially could follow from the use of GMOs. This issue is analysed empirically by statistical analysis of 1323 notifications for field trials with GMOs in the EU. The results show that the type of R&D organisation influences strongly the traits and crops that are developed. Paper 3 analyses how the type of regulation for marketing of GMOs influences which GMOs that are commercialised. The EU and Norway have assessed the release of GMOs as commercial products quite differently. Of twenty four notifications approved by the EU, Norway has approved four, rejected ten, and has ten pending. The paper examines whether these differences could be explained by different judgments concerning the effects to be prevented and encouraged, response to uncertainty and and the burden of proof defined. Norwegian rejections are found to be explicable by the combination of no real benefit to society, lack of scientific knowledge, and involved risks. The main explanation for the EU approvals is that they see no reason to believe that there will be any adverse effects on health and the environment. Paper 4 analyses how capable three different governance regimes are for adequate handling of uncertain and unknown effects of GMOs. GMOs are characterized by strong uncertainty. This implies that procedures for identification, reduction and monitoring of uncertainty, as well as how to treat irreducible uncertainty will be highly incomplete. Governance mechanisms that facilitate cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality (communicate with the intention of reaching agreement exclusively via the force of better arguments) are therefore needed. The three governance regimes compared are: GMOs are produced by private firms and these firms are made liable for harm (GR1), GMOs are produced by private firms and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR2), GMOs are produced by public research organisations and the government decides whether the crops should be marketed (GR3). GR3 will be stronger in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality than GR2. Public research organisations have fewer conflicts of interest with the government than private firms, and academic norms are important as opposed to firms where commercial norms are important. Difficulties in proving harm and identifying the responsible firm will make GR1 weak in cooperative adaptation and communicative rationality. Based on the results of this thesis it is advised that consideration of the environment and food security justify institutional reforms concerning how we decide which GMOs that should be released into the environment and how we organise the R&D of GMOs. My analysis suggests that it is important to involve scientists from several disciplines in public marketing decisions on new technologies and that information about the contextual background of the scientists is relevant in these decisions. There are strong arguments for changing current practise where those that apply for marketing approval of GMOs also produce the risk assessment prior to marketing and the post marketing monitoring. It is further important to increase public GMO research to secure scientific advices and development of products that are independent from the priorities of the industry and to a greater extent could serve public needs. ; Denne avhandlinga er skrevet innenfor en moderne, klassisk institusjonell økonomisk tradisjon. Hensikten har vært å frambringe kunnskap om hvordan ulike institusjoner kan gjøre oss i stand til å unngå skadelige og å frambringe gunstige effekter av genetiske modifiserte organismer (GMOer) på miljø og matvaresikkerhet. Dette er gjort ved å analysere hvordan institusjoner påvirker perspektiver på GMOer, hvilke GMOer som utvikles og kommersialiseres, samt vår evne til å håndtere usikre og ukjente effekter av GMOer. Avhandlinga består av 4 artikler. Artikkel 1 analyserer 62 forskeres syn på effekter av GMOer, og sammenhengen mellom synet deres og den institusjonelle konteksten de arbeider i, i form av type arbeidsplass (universitet eller industri), finansiering av forskning (offentlig eller privat) og fagdisiplin (økologi, molekylær biologi, eller tradisjonell planteforedling). Ved bruk av Q-metode ble to ulike syn identifisert. Syn 1 innebar en moderat negativ holdning til GMOer og vektla usikkerhet og uvitenhet. Syn 2 innebar en positiv holding til GMOer og vektla at GMOer er nyttige og ikke vesentlig forskjellige fra konvensjonelle landbruksvekster. Resultatene viser en sterk sammenheng mellom forskeres syn på GMOer og forklaringsvariablene utdanning, finansiering og type arbeidsplass. Artikkel 2 analyserer hvordan ulike institusjonelle strukturer former forskning og utvikling (F&U) av GMOer. Vi forventa at om denne F&U blir gjort enten i private bedrifter, landbrukssamvirker, eller offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner påvirker hvilke arter og egenskaper som blir utvikla og dermed hvilke samfunns- og miljøeffekter som kan følge fra GMOer. Vi studerte dette ved hjelp av statistisk analyse av 1323 søknader om feltforsøk med GMOer i EU. Resultatene viser en sterk sammenheng mellom type forskningsorganisasjon og hvilke arter og egenskaper som blir utvikla. Artikkel 3 analyserer hvordan type regulering for omsetning av GMOer påvirker hvilke GMOer som blir godkjent for kommersiell bruk. Den europeiske unionen (EU) og Norge har vurdert søknader om omsetning av GMOer forskjellig. Av 24 søknader som er godkjent av EU, har Norge godkjent fire, avvist ti og ikke tatt stilling til ti. Artikkelen analyserer om disse forskjellene kan forklares med ulike vurderinger av hvilke effekter som er ønska og uønska, hvordan man reagerer på usikkerhet og uvitenhent og hva som er en rimelig bevisbyrde. De norske avslaga kan forklares med at de ikke kunne se at GMO-søknadene hadde samfunnsmessig nytteverdi eller var bærekraftige, samt at de vektla uheldige miljøeffekter og mangel på vitenskapelig kunnskap. Hovedforklaringen på godkjennelsene i EU er at de ikke fant noen grunner til at skadelige effekter ville inntreffe. Artikkel 4 analyserer hvor egna tre ulike regimer er for å håndtere usikre og ukjente effekter av GMOer. Stor usikkerhet knytta til GMOer medfører at prosedyrer for å identifisere, redusere og overvåke usikkerhet, samt hvordan man skal håndtere ikkereduserbar usikkerhet blir ufullstendige. Styringsmekanismer som legger til rette for samarbeidsvilje og kommunikativ rasjonalitet (kommunikasjon som har til hensikt å oppnå enighet ved bruk av argumenter) blir derfor viktig. Følgende tre regimer er sammenligna: GMOer produseres i private bedrifter og disse bedriftene er ansvarlige for eventuelle skader (R1), GMOer produseres i private bedrifter og myndighetene bestemmer hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet (R2), GMOer produseres i offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner og myndighetene bestemmer hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet (R3). Det er sannsynlig at R3 vill føre til bedre samarbeidsvilje og mer kommunikativ rasjonalitet enn R2. Offentlige forskningsorganisasjoner har færre interessekonflikter med myndighetene enn de private, og de er i større grad karakterisert av akademiske normer. Kommersielle normer har derimot en større plass i private bedrifter. Vanskeligheter med å bevise skade og skadegjører kan føre til at R1 gir svak samarbeidsvilje og lite kommunikativ rasjonalitet. Funnene i avhandlingen innebærer at dersom hensyn til miljø og matvaresikkerhet er viktige, bør man gjennomføre institusjonelle endringer av hvordan man beslutter hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes i markedet og hvordan samfunnet organiserer F&U av GMOer. Min analyse antyder at det er viktig å involvere forskere fra ulike disipliner i offisielle beslutninger om hvilke GMOer som kan omsettes og at informasjon om den kontekstuelle bakgrunnen til disse forskerne er relevant. Det er sterke argumenter for å endre dagens praksis hvor de som søker om å få omsette GMOer i markedet også gjennomfører risikovurderingen og overvåkningen. Det synes videre viktig å øke andelen offentlig GMO-forskning for å sikre vitenskapelige råd som er uavhengige av industrienes prioriteringer og som i større kan tjene samfunnets interesser.

As the world is preparing to scale up its efforts to combat global climate change, groups are increasingly recognizing the vital role forests play in maintaining ecological, social, economic and cultural well-being. They are beginning to affirm more that forest tenure plays a fundamental role in determining the fate of the world's forests. In many countries, questions are raised on whether tropical forests should be publicly, commonly or privately owned. For many countries the forest management policies will likely involve a combination of: i) protected areas of sufficient size to provide habitat protection, and in a contiguous pattern; ii) forest concessions with enforceable performance-based management criteria; iii) community forests and community forest concessions managed by communities and indigenous groups. The challenge is to undertake the land use planning commitment and implementation to achieve this in the face of pressure from internal and external interests. Forest concessions of various types are the dominant form of forest tenure in almost all the forest countries of West and Central Africa. They are also the dominant types of forest tenure in Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Cambodia). In South America, Peru and Bolivia introduced forest concession as a possible tenure model in the early 90's with the strong support of international NGOs. In Brazil, after two failed attempts, the government has passed its new forest management law in 2006. Bolivia and Brazil have much in common regarding forest tenure conflicts and challenges to enforce new rules in the forestry sector. Forest concession implementation in these countries has generated many expectations and investments in law changes.This research work focuses on the main barriers faced by Bolivian and Brazilian forest authorities in implementing forest concession on the scale initially planned. The studies required a mapping of the property rights regimes over forest and forest resources as well as a theoretical approach of economic sociology. This approach, which provides elements to evaluate the process of social market construction, is dependent upon four essential factors: property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange and conceptions of control. The political-cultural approach emphasizes the historic perspective of the markets to understand the role of dominant groups and challengers in action arenas. It also considers the participation of social actors like governments, firms and consumers, among others, and their incentives for cooperative actions based on the cognitive ties that bind them. This empiric study focused on each country's geographically-delimited regions of Amazon: in the Bolivian lowlands region and in the Brazilian Cuiabá-Santarém Highway (namely BR-163). That's because they are the main targets for forest concession implementation. We show in this study that under a tenure uncertainty scenario, in which there are battles for territorial pieces and political alliances are forged that prefer other land use (and forests uses also) patterns the forest concessions implementation on a large scale will be jeopardized in these territories. ; Les forêts (tempérées et tropicales) couvrent près de quatre milliards d'hectares de la planète (FAO, 2005, 2009). On estime que la plupart de ces forêts (75%) sont dans le domaine publique et sont administrées par les gouvernements nationaux, locaux ou régionaux (RRI et OIBT, 2009). Dans plusieurs pays, développés et en voie de développement, la concession forestière est un moyen d'accorder et de règler les droits de propriété sur ces forêts publiques (Gray, 2000, 2002, White et Martin, 2002). La concession est un acte juridique pris par une autorité publique qui attribue à une personne privée, un droit d'utilisation ou un privilège (FAO, 1999, p.8). Dans la législation brésilienne, ainsi que dans le droit français, cette définition comprend également l'idée que l'acte de concession porte sur la délégation des droits et des devoirs du gouvernement à un agent privé. Cette relation est médiatisée par un contrat et implique la nécessité d'un paiement pour le concessionnaire (Karsenty, 2007, Brésil, 2006). Au niveau international, les plus anciennes expériences de concessions forestières sont dans les pays de l'Afrique (de l'ouest et centrale). Dans ces régions, les études montrent l'adoption du modèle depuis la fin du XIXe siècle (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2001). On estime qu'il y a environ 55 millions d'hectares de forêts publiques affectés dans six pays de la région d'Afrique centrale (Cameroun, Gabon, Congo, République Démocratique du Congo, la République Centrafricaine et Guinée Equatoriale) (Karsenty, 2007). En Asie, les concessions forestières couvrent 69 millions d'hectares. Sur ce total, 38 millions d'hectares sont situés en Indonésie (Gray, 2002, RRI, 2008, l'OIBT, 2005). Dans ce pays, les concessions sont devenues la principale méthode de répartition des droits sur les forêts pendant le régime de Suharto (Singer, 2009). Dans les forêts tropicales d'Amérique, les études rapportent l'existence de concessions sur une surface de 34 millions d'hectares de forêts (OIBT, 2005). Ces zones sont au Suriname, au Guyana, au Venezuela et au Guatemala (avec une prédominance des concessions aux communautés et seulement deux concessions industrielles), la Colombie, la Bolivie et le Pérou. Récemment, le Brésil, a adopté ce modèle pour gérer une partie de ses forêts publiques. L'évaluation globale de la mise en oeuvre du système est d'environ 158 millions d'hectares dans le cas des forêts tropicales. Par rapport aux forêts tempérées, les zones avec les plus grandes surfaces sur concession sont au Canada. Bien qu'étant l'un des principaux moyens d'attribuer les droits de propriété sur les forêts, un vif débat politique et académique persiste sur les avantages et les inconvénients de cette option (Hardner et Rice, 2000, Gray, 2002, Boscolo et Vincent, 2000, Karsenty et al., 2008). En dépit de l'investissement et de soutiens internes et externes, la Bolivie et le Brésil ont rencontré des difficultés à poursuivre la mise en oeuvre des concessions. La Bolivie a mené ses réformes juridiques et mis en oeuvre quelques concessions à la fin des années 90. Le Brésil, après deux tentatives avortées (dans les années 70 et au début de 2000) a reussi à faire des réformes et adopter une nouvelle loi sur la gestion forestière, y compris l'établissement de concessions, en 2006 (gouvernement de Luis Inacio Lula da Silva). Le plan initial du gouvernement bolivien était d'en affecter 22 millions ha principalement pour la production de bois. Cependant, sur cette même zone, les peuples indigènes ont déjà revendiqué une surface d'environ 20 millions ha pour la démarcation de leurs Terres Communautaires D'Origine (TCO). Selon les données officielles, en 2007 les concessions forestières attribuées aux industries de la Bolivie totalisaient un peu plus de 5 millions ha (attribués en une seule fois, en 1997, sans appel d'offre concurrentiel). Les concessions communautaires totalisaient un peu plus de 600.000 ha. En outre, les permis de déboiser dans les forêts privées se sont accrus et la délimitation des Terres Communautaires D'Origine a progressé. Au Brésil, les objectifs initiaux de l'attribution des concessions étaient ambitieux. Depuis 2002, le Programme Forestier National (PNF) a voulu étendre la surface sur l'amenagement forestier en Amazonie brésilienne comme stratégie pour combattre l'accroissement du déboisement. Au début des années 2000, l'objectif était d'atteindre une superficie de 15 millions ha sous gestion durable des forêts en Amazonie jusqu'à 2010. Une partie de cette zone était située dans les forêts nationales déjà classées. D'autres parties étaient dans les terres publiques couvertes par des forêts, mais souvent déjà occupées (terras devolutas da União e dos Estados). À la fin de 2009, le total des concessions forestières au Brésil s'élève à 96.000 ha de forêt attribués à trois entreprises dans une Forêt Nationale dans l'Etat de Rondonia. Au début de 2010 un deuxième et un troisième appel d'offre ont été lancés. Ces appel d'offre comprenait une surface d'environ 480.000 ha dans deux Forêts Nationales dans l'État du Pará. Face à cette situation de difficile application de la politique de concessions forestières dans les deux pays, ce travail demande: pourquoi la politique de concessions forestières en Bolivie et au Brésil, malgré les attentes et des investissements significatifs, est-elle si peu avancée par rapport aux objectifs de la mise en oeuvre prévue dans les deux pays? Le travail a impliqué la mobilisation de deux approches théoriques et méthodologiques. La première d'entre elles était l'application de la matrice d'analyse des modes d'appropriation et gestion du foncier et des ressources forestières. Cet outil , résulte de la réunion de deux cadres analytiques principalement de la contribution de Schlager et Ostrom (1992), et du travail d'un anthropologue du droit, Etienne Le Roy (1996). L'utilisation de la matrice a permis de réaliser une cartographie des modes d'appropriation et de gestion des forêts et un aperçu de la gamme des acteurs qui possèdent ou revendiquent des droits d'occupation et d'utilisation dans les deux études de cas. En complément, l'approche politique-culturelle, développée par le sociologue américain Neil Fligstein (1990, 1996, 2001) a fourni un cadre permettant de discerner l'organisation sociale de production de bois dans les deux cas étudiés et de trouver les acteurs et les dynamiques des groupes en compétition pour le territoire de l'Amazonie. Ce cadre théorique a permis également d'envisager comment ces acteurs mettent en forme les droits de propriété, les structures de gouvernance, les règles d'échange et les conceptions de contrôle qui régissent les relations sociales dans ces territoires. La conclusion principale de ce travail est que les gouvernements n'ont pas assez pris en compte la diversité des acteurs qui occupent, historiquement, le territoire forestier de la Bolivie et du Brésil. La modestie des réalisations en matière de développement des concessions est due aux meilleures compétences sociales et à la plus grande force politique des acteurs qui se positionnent contre le nouveau régime de concessions. Ainsi, ces acteurs cherchent à défendre leurs intérêts et à assurer leur position tandis que les acteurs favorables (les "challengers") ne sont pas assez fort politiquement pour changer le statu quo en ce qui concerne la manière d'occupation, d'utilisation et de gestion des terres forestières.

Wie die meisten lateinamerikanischen Großstädte zeichnet sich die Peripherie von Porto Alegre durch ein dynamisches und ungeregeltes Siedlungswachstum in Form von Landbesetzungen und illegalen Parzellierungen aus. Mit Hilfe von Methoden der qualitativen Sozial¬forschung werden anhand einer Fallstudie insbesondere die damit verbundenen städtischen Umweltkonflikte analysiert und deren Einbeziehung in kooperative Planungsverfahren untersucht. Die Prozesse des ungeregelten Siedlungswachstums am Stadtrand von Porto Alegre sind vor allem durch Wanderungsprozesse innerhalb der Stadt, die ausgrenzende Wirkung des städtischen Immobilienmarktes sowie durch fehlgeschlagene städtische Siedlungspolitik bedingt. Die Zersiedung am Standrand führt in Porto Alegre aus umweltplanerischer Sicht zu einem Raumnutzungskonflikt mit Belangen des Naturschutzes. Das hängt vor allem damit zusammen, dass sich die informellen Siedlungen auf den aus Umweltgesichtspunkten empfindlichen Bereichen konzentrieren, die für den Immobilienmarkt keinem Wert haben. Davon ist besonders die Hügelkette am unmittelbaren Stadtrand betroffen, die sich durch ein sehr artenreiches Wald-Grasland-Mosaik auszeichnet. Trotz fortschrittlicher Entwicklungen in der Stadtpolitik versagen die politischen Instrumente bisher weitgehend, diesem Landnutzungskonflikt entgegen zu wirken. Besonders die Widersprüche zwischen umwelt- und siedlungspolitischer Maßnahmen führen zu unwirksamen Verwaltungshandeln. In einem Kontext, in dem Sanktionen und restriktive Maßnahmen nicht greifen, werden kooperative Instrumente als Alternative gesehen, um in diesem komplexen Konfliktfeld staatliches Handeln zu ermöglichen. Der Schwerpunkt der dieser Arbeit liegt in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines derartigen partizipativen Planungsansatzes, raumbezogene Umweltkonflikte verhandelbar zu machen. Die Bewertungen basieren auf einer umfassenden Fallstudie zu einem vom Stadtplanungsamt in Porto Alegre initiierten Verfahrens der Bürgerbeteiligung. In dem in der Fallstudie untersuchten Projekt geht es darum, in einem kooperativen Planungsprozess gemeinsam mit den Bewohnern den Stadtentwicklungsplan für ein informelles Siedlungsgebiet in der Peripherie zu aktualisieren. Es soll definiert werden, welche Bereiche für die zukünftige Besiedlung geeigneten sind und in welchen Bereichen der Schutz der natürlichen Vegetation Vorrang hat. Insgesamt kann der partizipative Ansatz als wesentlicher Fortschritt zu den in der brasilianischen Stadtplanung nach wie vor gängigen technokratischen Planungspraxis gesehen werden. Durch das Verfahren konnte bei den teilnehmenden Bewohnern und den beteiligten Behördenvertretern ein gemeinsames Problemverständnis erreicht werden. Letztere entwickelten durch die direkte Auseinandersetzung mit der Lebensrealität in den informellen Siedlungen eine realistische Problemsicht. Doch die Fallstudie zeigte auch zahlreiche Hindernisse eines derartigen kooperativen Planungsprozesses auf. Als besonders negativ stellte sich die fehlende Einbindung der Ergebnisse des Beteiligungsprozesses in die formalen Stadtplanungsprozesse und die ad¬ministrativen Routinen heraus. Es besteht weiterhin eine Kluft zwischen dem Beteiligungsverfahren und den Entscheidungsprozessen der einzelnen Fachbehörden. Die fehlende institutionelle Integration des Partizipationsprojektes in die gesamte Verwaltungsstruktur stellt ein zentrales Hindernis dar. Ein grundsätzliches Dilemma derartiger Planungsprozesse in einem so hochdynamischen Kontext wie informelle Siedlungen besteht außerdem darin, nicht auf die eigentlichen Ursachen der Siedlungsexpansion einwirken zu können. Der Handlungsdruck von zuziehenden Neusiedlern kann nicht entschärft werden. Kooperative Ansätze reichen nicht aus, um staatliche Handlungsdefizite zu kompensieren. Vielmehr bedarf es gleichzeitig zur Demokratisierung der Entscheidungsprozesse einer Stärkung der staatlichen Institutionen, um so die Umsetzung präventiver Maßnahmen des Siedlungsbaus zu ermöglichen. Dennoch lässt sich mit den Interviewdaten belegen, dass es durch Beteiligungsprozesse zu einer Eigendynamik kommen kann. Das gestärkte Selbstbewusstsein der Bürgervertreter als politische Akteure gibt Grund zur Hoffung, dass langfristig über den Weg des Empowerment der am stärksten von städtischer Umweltdegradierung betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen eine Verbesserung der städtischen Umweltqualität erreicht werden kann. ; Like most Latin American cities the outskirts of Porto Alegre are facing a fast growing uncontrolled urban expansion, characterized by fragmentary settlement structure, squatter settlements and unauthorized land divisions. On the basis of empirical social research using qualitative methods this study analyses the related urban environmental conflicts as well as their incorporation in a participatory planning process. The sprawl of informal urbanization in the periphery of Porto Alegre is mainly due to intra-urban migration processes, segregative effects of the local real estate market and ineffective urban policy. As the informal settlements concentrate in vulnerable areas, like steep slopes and river banks that have no value on the real estate market, the urban fragmentation in the periphery causes environmental conflicts with concerns of nature conservation. The hills adjacent to the urban area, which are characterized by a species-rich mosaic of forests and grassland are especially affected by this urban encroachment. Besides progressive changes in local governance, so far public policy widely fails in counteracting these land use conflicts. Especially contradictions between environmental and urban policies lead to ineffective regulatory action. In a context where restrictive measures are not feasible, collaborative instruments are seen as an alternative in order to influence settlement development. This study analyses the opportunities and limitations of such participatory approaches as far as environmental conflicts related to urban encroachment are concerned. These evaluations are built on an extensive case study on a pilot project of the department for urban planning in Porto Alegre. In a participatory process the local planning authority aims at the collective development of directives for further urban development in cooperation with the local population. This action plan contains a detailed zoning in areas appropriate for settlement and areas to be preserved as natural areas inappropriate for housing. Generally speaking the studied participatory planning project has to be considered a substantial progress in making urban planning in the periphery of Brazilian cities more responsive to the real problems in these areas. Particularly bearing in mind that technocratic planning attitudes are still common in Brazilian planning institutions, this pilot project means an important step forward in creating a new relationship between public agencies and the residents of the illegal settlements. It helps to develop a common understanding of the problems and a shared vision for future settlement development. According to the case study a participatory approach implies a vast potential for institutional learning and capacity building for the individual public servant. As the participating public sector officials directly are confronted with the demands of marginalized social groups in the informal settlements they obtain a more realistic perception of the most urgent problems in these areas. However, the case study identified many limitations of such a collaborative planning approach. A key problem consists in the missing integration of the participation project's results into administrative routines and formal planning processes. The institutional gap between the participatory process and the decisions of the technical authorities prevented the political efficiency of the project and can be considered as the central constraint. Furthermore a fundamental dilemma of the collaborative planning process within the highly dynamic context of informal settlements lies in its inadequacy to influence underlying driving forces for settlement expansion. For instance, the participatory approach is not able to incorporate to integrate potential future squatters, the main actors of further informal urban expansion, as participants. All in all it became clear that collaborative approaches alone are not sufficient to compensate the shortcomings in governmental action. The democratization of the decision-making process has to go along with consolidation of the institutional framework, in order to enable preventive measures of settlement development. Nevertheless the interview data proves that participatory process can instigate the local stakeholders to demand more accountability of the technical authorities regarding their needs. In the long run the strengthened self-esteem of the dwellers of informal settlements as political actors raises hope for improvement of urban environmental quality by empowering the stakeholders most affected by urban environmental degradation.Como a maioria das metrópoles latino-americanas a periferia de Porto Alegre se caracteriza por uma urbanização descontrolada e uma estrutura urbana fragmentada, composta por ocupações e loteamentos irregulares. Através de métodos de pesquisa social qualitativa, investigaram-se especificamente os conflitos ambientais urbanos relacionados bem como a integração destes em processos cooperativos de planejamento. A urbanização descontrolada na periferia de Porto Alegre resulta sobretudo de processos de migração intra-urbana, da segregação sócio-espacial devido à estrutura do mercado imobiliário, assim como de políticas urbanas fracassadas. Do ponto de vista do planejamento ambiental, a fragmentação urbana periférica leva a conflitos ambientais, pois as ocupações informais se concentram nas áreas ecologicamente mais sensíveis, que não têm valor no mercado imobiliário. Isto se reflete principalmente no processo acelerado de ocupação na cadeia dos morros que circunda o espaço urbanizado e que se caracteriza por mosaico de floresta subtropical e campos ricos em espécies endêmicas. Apesar de uma tendência progressiva na política urbana de Porto Alegre os instrumentos políticos falham ao não conseguir interferir nestes conflitos relacionados ao uso da terra. Analisando-se como as políticas urbanas e ambientais da administração local respondem à cidade informal da periferia, vêem-se claramente as contradições na atuação das instituições governamentais. Num contexto onde medidas restritivas não funcionam, instrumentos cooperativos são apontados como alternativas para viabilizar gestão urbana na cidade informal O enfoque deste trabalho é a avaliação das limitações e possibilidades de instrumentos participativos para gerenciar conflitos sócio-ambientais relacionados ao espaço urbano. Isto foi examinado através de um estudo de caso extenso sobre um projeto de planejamento urbano participativo iniciado pela secretaria de planejamento municipal de Porto Alegre (SPM). Este projeto se focaliza na atualização do plano diretor num bairro periférico em cooperação com a população atingida. O objetivo é definir as áreas que são aptas para ocupação urbana e onde para a proteção da vegetação natural é prioridade. A abordagem participativa representa um avanço significativo, uma vez que se consegue construir um entendimento comum dos problemas locais entre os moradores e os funcionários públicos. Estes últimos, sobretudo, ganharam com isso uma visão realista dos problemas das ocupações informais através da confrontação direta e contínua com os moradores. Por outro lado, a falta de integração dos resultados do processo participativo na atuação das diferentes secretarias na região restringe significativamente a eficácia do projeto. Existe um abismo entre o processo participativo e os processos decisórios das secretarias setoriais, sendo esta falta de integração institucional uma das principais limitações identificadas neste estudo de caso. Além disso, um dilema fundamental de tais processos de planejamento num contexto de urbanização acelerado é o fato de não se poder interferir nas causas desta expansão urbana informal. Não se consegue modificar a pressão dos novos ocupantes que se mudam para esta região. Processos cooperativos não conseguem compensar os déficits institucionais. Além da democratização do planejamento urbano, é necessário um fortalecimento das instituições locais, possibilitando a implementação de medidas preventivas de política urbana. Apesar disso, os dados das entrevistas sustentam que um processo participativo pode levar a uma dinâmica própria. O fortalecimento da auto-estima dos participantes como atores políticos pode, em longo prazo, levar a uma melhoria da qualidade ambiental urbana, pois desta maneira os grupos mais atingidos pela degradação ambiental conseguem reivindicar o atendimento das suas demandas pelo poder público.

In the present work the author reviews the two scientific monographs and twenty scientific articles in which the history of the Lithuanian legal system is investigated. The author aspires to elucidate how did the main subsystems of the Lithuanian legal system – legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence – appeared and developed up to the end of the 20th century in the context of evolution of the Western legal tradition. The basic methods of research used in the works are historical, comparative and teleological. The main theses of the reviewed scientific monographs and articles are these: The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was created by the Government on the basis of the national Lithuanian law and some elements of the custom Slav law. Substitution of the custom Slav law for the Lithuanian public and private law took place in those provinces in the 14th-16th centuries. The custom Slav law hampered forming of the system of law of the GDL. It was created finally in the middle of the 16th century. The law of the GDL was a medieval estate law. Estate is a legal phenomenon and law determines signs and features of any estate. Main sign of any estate is rights leaved to him by law and protected by state. Estate system, that is an organization of society into classes rigidly divided for political purposes and defined primarily by law, is based on a legal inequality of estates. Any estate is a stable order closed to outsiders. In order to belong to estate any person must correspond to certain conditions determined by law. At the same time any person can belong to a few different social groups but only to one estate. The estate system of the GDL was formed finally in the middle of the 16th century. It was defined by the Second Statute of Lithuania and consisted of four estates: nobility, clergy, peasantry and townspeople. The nobility and the clergy were privileged. They governed the state and exploited bondsmen. In the towns which obtained the Magdeburg Law the townsmen were free, but haven't political rights and privileges. The author believes that all persons were subjects of medieval law of Lithuania, but their legal capacity was not equal. This inequality was determined by law. Volume of legal capacity of these persons depended upon their age, sex, citizenship, religion and estate. It could be changed in accordance with law. Under certain conditions loss of legal capacity also was able. Collective subjects of law were the GDL itself (not its government bodies or officials), the people of Lithuania as a political unit (not estates or ethnographic nations), political confederations of noblemen (if they were sanctioned by the Grand Duke), self-governing territorial units (counties, towns, etc.), guilds organized by craftsmen and merchants and self-governing religions communities. The author believes that a land-ownership in the GDL was divided. Two persons held the same land. One of them was an immediate owner, the second was a superior owner of the land. An immediate owner's right to dispose the land was limited by a superior owner's rights to this land. In the 14th-first half of the 16th century an ancestral land was the main form of land-ownership in the GDL. At first an ancestral land was owned without obligation of vassalage. Since the beginning of the 16th century an owner of an ancestral land was obliged to military service from his land. Since the 14th century a benefice was the second form of feudal land-ownership in the GDL. Gradually a benefice turned into a feud. In 1566 the Second Statute of Lithuania gave the equal rights to all owners of ancestral lands and feuds. They got the freedom to dispose all their lands, but were obliged to military service from their real estate. In the middle of the 16th century the domain of the Grand Duke was divided into the State lands and Throne lands. The Grand Duke's freedom to dispose these lands was limited. Up to the middle of the 16th century there were no permanent circuit courts for land disputes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All state courts heard land cases in their permanent quarters and moved in locality to survey borders only if it was very necessary. The Government of the GDL stimulated activity of arbitration and village courts and set them to resolve land disputes in locality. The first permanent circuit court (Sub-Chamber court) for boundary disputes was established in every county during the court reform in 1564-1566. Up to the middle of the 16th century jurisdiction of the Church determined by canons was very wide and came into collision with jurisdiction of the State. Besides clergymen and other subjects of the Church spiritual courts prosecuted noblemen, peasants and townsfolk. Competence of secular and spiritual courts was delimited clearly by the Third Statute of Lithuania. In accordance with this Statute spiritual courts could prosecute noblemen, peasants and townsfolk only if a certain case was bound up with religion or marriage. The medieval conception of formal evidences existed and dominated in the GDL from the 13th century up to the 18th century. The court was passive because all evidences were collected and produced by the plaintiff or by the defendant, and legal force of any evidence was determined by Lithuanian custom law and by the Lithuanian Statutes. The author believes that compurgators were not eye-witnesses of crime or event, there testified on oath only about good name of somebody. Compurgators swore together with plaintiff or defendant. Witnesses testified to or against somebody without oath. The legal status of witnesses and compurgators determined by the Lithuanian custom law and the First Lithuanian Statute was partly corrected by the Second and the Third Lithuanian Statutes in 1566 and 1588. Dietsky office appeared in the Ancient Slav State about the 11th century. From the 13th century onwards this office functioned in the GDL. Vizh office was instituted in the end of the 15th century or in the beginning of the 16th century in the GDL. Dietsky and Vizh were court officers executed judgements. Vizh was also official witness in criminal and civil cases. Vozny office was established in the GDL during the judicial reform in 1564-1566. Vozny was an important official of a court of law. He used to be elected by county noblemen. His duty was to inspect damages, wounds, and to witness at a trial. He was an executor of court's sentences. The number of lawyers who took scholastic degrees increased in the GDL in the 16th century. They developed legal terminology, introduced the written form of contracts and elaborated many legal acts. The Lithuanian Statutes should be regarded as the acme of progressive legal theoretical thought and practical activity. They surmounted the codification of the legislation of the GDL and brought the country to the leading position among other European countries. Yet the high standard, progressive spirit and intrinsic humanistic ideas by themselves did not mean that the Statutes were properly applied. In the 16th century, the lack of qualified lawyers complicated application of the Lithuanian Statutes. The legal sophistication of judges was often rather poor. Even members of the Lithuanian Tribunal of the GDL were not professional lawyers. The requirement constituted in the Lithuanian Statutes that only nobility were eligible to the position of judges was hardly observed because for a long time there had been not a single law school or college in the GDL. Why the Faculty of Law had not been founded in the Vilnius Jesuits' Academy before 1641? The author believes that the problem may be viewed in the context of international relations between the Kingdom of Poland and the GDL. In the year of the foundation of Vilnius University, one more event important for the legal development of GDL took place: creation of the highest appeal court – Lithuanian Tribunal. Polish landlords did not tolerate the steps strengthening the statehood of Lithuania. Creation of the Lithuanian Tribunal was a difficult victory of the GDL nobility. It is quite possible that concession to the University of Krakow and recognition of Polish monopoly in preparing lawyers were the cost paid for the mentioned victory. It seemed then more important to have their own appeal court than to prepare lawyers in the GDL. In the one article the author aspires to elucidate what was a medieval university – integral part of the town or feudal benefice, what were professors ant students – full fledged citizens of the town or aliens, and what were courts of the university – State or private, secular or ecclesiastical. The author established that any university in the Middle Ages was a self-governing professional corporation similar with guild or craft. Doctors and scholars (like merchants or craftsmen) elected rector and some others officials who governed and administered justice. Mostly university was an integral part of the town; professors ant students could exercise their rights on an equality with citizens of the town. Sometimes university was ruled by the Bishop or King as a feudal benefice independent from the town magistrates and courts (in this case the relations between town citizens and students were exceptionally strained). A very ample jurisdiction was allowed to the Rector's court, extending to all civil cases and all criminal cases except such as involved mutilation (in those criminal cases the jurisdiction of the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges was recognized). Rector was required to suppress quarrels between students and townsmen, or among the students themselves. If Rector failed to punish offenders, a scholar or doctor was amenable to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. The Bishop always reserved to himself spiritual jurisdiction over professors ant students. An appellate civil jurisdiction was reserved to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. It should be recognized that the legal system

In the present work the author reviews the two scientific monographs and twenty scientific articles in which the history of the Lithuanian legal system is investigated. The author aspires to elucidate how did the main subsystems of the Lithuanian legal system – legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence – appeared and developed up to the end of the 20th century in the context of evolution of the Western legal tradition. The basic methods of research used in the works are historical, comparative and teleological. The main theses of the reviewed scientific monographs and articles are these: The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was created by the Government on the basis of the national Lithuanian law and some elements of the custom Slav law. Substitution of the custom Slav law for the Lithuanian public and private law took place in those provinces in the 14th-16th centuries. The custom Slav law hampered forming of the system of law of the GDL. It was created finally in the middle of the 16th century. The law of the GDL was a medieval estate law. Estate is a legal phenomenon and law determines signs and features of any estate. Main sign of any estate is rights leaved to him by law and protected by state. Estate system, that is an organization of society into classes rigidly divided for political purposes and defined primarily by law, is based on a legal inequality of estates. Any estate is a stable order closed to outsiders. In order to belong to estate any person must correspond to certain conditions determined by law. At the same time any person can belong to a few different social groups but only to one estate. The estate system of the GDL was formed finally in the middle of the 16th century. It was defined by the Second Statute of Lithuania and consisted of four estates: nobility, clergy, peasantry and townspeople. The nobility and the clergy were privileged. They governed the state and exploited bondsmen. In the towns which obtained the Magdeburg Law the townsmen were free, but haven't political rights and privileges. The author believes that all persons were subjects of medieval law of Lithuania, but their legal capacity was not equal. This inequality was determined by law. Volume of legal capacity of these persons depended upon their age, sex, citizenship, religion and estate. It could be changed in accordance with law. Under certain conditions loss of legal capacity also was able. Collective subjects of law were the GDL itself (not its government bodies or officials), the people of Lithuania as a political unit (not estates or ethnographic nations), political confederations of noblemen (if they were sanctioned by the Grand Duke), self-governing territorial units (counties, towns, etc.), guilds organized by craftsmen and merchants and self-governing religions communities. The author believes that a land-ownership in the GDL was divided. Two persons held the same land. One of them was an immediate owner, the second was a superior owner of the land. An immediate owner's right to dispose the land was limited by a superior owner's rights to this land. In the 14th-first half of the 16th century an ancestral land was the main form of land-ownership in the GDL. At first an ancestral land was owned without obligation of vassalage. Since the beginning of the 16th century an owner of an ancestral land was obliged to military service from his land. Since the 14th century a benefice was the second form of feudal land-ownership in the GDL. Gradually a benefice turned into a feud. In 1566 the Second Statute of Lithuania gave the equal rights to all owners of ancestral lands and feuds. They got the freedom to dispose all their lands, but were obliged to military service from their real estate. In the middle of the 16th century the domain of the Grand Duke was divided into the State lands and Throne lands. The Grand Duke's freedom to dispose these lands was limited. Up to the middle of the 16th century there were no permanent circuit courts for land disputes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All state courts heard land cases in their permanent quarters and moved in locality to survey borders only if it was very necessary. The Government of the GDL stimulated activity of arbitration and village courts and set them to resolve land disputes in locality. The first permanent circuit court (Sub-Chamber court) for boundary disputes was established in every county during the court reform in 1564-1566. Up to the middle of the 16th century jurisdiction of the Church determined by canons was very wide and came into collision with jurisdiction of the State. Besides clergymen and other subjects of the Church spiritual courts prosecuted noblemen, peasants and townsfolk. Competence of secular and spiritual courts was delimited clearly by the Third Statute of Lithuania. In accordance with this Statute spiritual courts could prosecute noblemen, peasants and townsfolk only if a certain case was bound up with religion or marriage. The medieval conception of formal evidences existed and dominated in the GDL from the 13th century up to the 18th century. The court was passive because all evidences were collected and produced by the plaintiff or by the defendant, and legal force of any evidence was determined by Lithuanian custom law and by the Lithuanian Statutes. The author believes that compurgators were not eye-witnesses of crime or event, there testified on oath only about good name of somebody. Compurgators swore together with plaintiff or defendant. Witnesses testified to or against somebody without oath. The legal status of witnesses and compurgators determined by the Lithuanian custom law and the First Lithuanian Statute was partly corrected by the Second and the Third Lithuanian Statutes in 1566 and 1588. Dietsky office appeared in the Ancient Slav State about the 11th century. From the 13th century onwards this office functioned in the GDL. Vizh office was instituted in the end of the 15th century or in the beginning of the 16th century in the GDL. Dietsky and Vizh were court officers executed judgements. Vizh was also official witness in criminal and civil cases. Vozny office was established in the GDL during the judicial reform in 1564-1566. Vozny was an important official of a court of law. He used to be elected by county noblemen. His duty was to inspect damages, wounds, and to witness at a trial. He was an executor of court's sentences. The number of lawyers who took scholastic degrees increased in the GDL in the 16th century. They developed legal terminology, introduced the written form of contracts and elaborated many legal acts. The Lithuanian Statutes should be regarded as the acme of progressive legal theoretical thought and practical activity. They surmounted the codification of the legislation of the GDL and brought the country to the leading position among other European countries. Yet the high standard, progressive spirit and intrinsic humanistic ideas by themselves did not mean that the Statutes were properly applied. In the 16th century, the lack of qualified lawyers complicated application of the Lithuanian Statutes. The legal sophistication of judges was often rather poor. Even members of the Lithuanian Tribunal of the GDL were not professional lawyers. The requirement constituted in the Lithuanian Statutes that only nobility were eligible to the position of judges was hardly observed because for a long time there had been not a single law school or college in the GDL. Why the Faculty of Law had not been founded in the Vilnius Jesuits' Academy before 1641? The author believes that the problem may be viewed in the context of international relations between the Kingdom of Poland and the GDL. In the year of the foundation of Vilnius University, one more event important for the legal development of GDL took place: creation of the highest appeal court – Lithuanian Tribunal. Polish landlords did not tolerate the steps strengthening the statehood of Lithuania. Creation of the Lithuanian Tribunal was a difficult victory of the GDL nobility. It is quite possible that concession to the University of Krakow and recognition of Polish monopoly in preparing lawyers were the cost paid for the mentioned victory. It seemed then more important to have their own appeal court than to prepare lawyers in the GDL. In the one article the author aspires to elucidate what was a medieval university – integral part of the town or feudal benefice, what were professors ant students – full fledged citizens of the town or aliens, and what were courts of the university – State or private, secular or ecclesiastical. The author established that any university in the Middle Ages was a self-governing professional corporation similar with guild or craft. Doctors and scholars (like merchants or craftsmen) elected rector and some others officials who governed and administered justice. Mostly university was an integral part of the town; professors ant students could exercise their rights on an equality with citizens of the town. Sometimes university was ruled by the Bishop or King as a feudal benefice independent from the town magistrates and courts (in this case the relations between town citizens and students were exceptionally strained). A very ample jurisdiction was allowed to the Rector's court, extending to all civil cases and all criminal cases except such as involved mutilation (in those criminal cases the jurisdiction of the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges was recognized). Rector was required to suppress quarrels between students and townsmen, or among the students themselves. If Rector failed to punish offenders, a scholar or doctor was amenable to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. The Bishop always reserved to himself spiritual jurisdiction over professors ant students. An appellate civil jurisdiction was reserved to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. It should be recognized that the legal system

In the present work the author reviews the two scientific monographs and twenty scientific articles in which the history of the Lithuanian legal system is investigated. The author aspires to elucidate how did the main subsystems of the Lithuanian legal system – legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence – appeared and developed up to the end of the 20th century in the context of evolution of the Western legal tradition. The basic methods of research used in the works are historical, comparative and teleological. The main theses of the reviewed scientific monographs and articles are these: The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was created by the Government on the basis of the national Lithuanian law and some elements of the custom Slav law. Substitution of the custom Slav law for the Lithuanian public and private law took place in those provinces in the 14th-16th centuries. The custom Slav law hampered forming of the system of law of the GDL. It was created finally in the middle of the 16th century. The law of the GDL was a medieval estate law. Estate is a legal phenomenon and law determines signs and features of any estate. Main sign of any estate is rights leaved to him by law and protected by state. Estate system, that is an organization of society into classes rigidly divided for political purposes and defined primarily by law, is based on a legal inequality of estates. Any estate is a stable order closed to outsiders. In order to belong to estate any person must correspond to certain conditions determined by law. At the same time any person can belong to a few different social groups but only to one estate. The estate system of the GDL was formed finally in the middle of the 16th century. It was defined by the Second Statute of Lithuania and consisted of four estates: nobility, clergy, peasantry and townspeople. The nobility and the clergy were privileged. They governed the state and exploited bondsmen. In the towns which obtained the Magdeburg Law the townsmen were free, but haven't political rights and privileges. The author believes that all persons were subjects of medieval law of Lithuania, but their legal capacity was not equal. This inequality was determined by law. Volume of legal capacity of these persons depended upon their age, sex, citizenship, religion and estate. It could be changed in accordance with law. Under certain conditions loss of legal capacity also was able. Collective subjects of law were the GDL itself (not its government bodies or officials), the people of Lithuania as a political unit (not estates or ethnographic nations), political confederations of noblemen (if they were sanctioned by the Grand Duke), self-governing territorial units (counties, towns, etc.), guilds organized by craftsmen and merchants and self-governing religions communities. The author believes that a land-ownership in the GDL was divided. Two persons held the same land. One of them was an immediate owner, the second was a superior owner of the land. An immediate owner's right to dispose the land was limited by a superior owner's rights to this land. In the 14th-first half of the 16th century an ancestral land was the main form of land-ownership in the GDL. At first an ancestral land was owned without obligation of vassalage. Since the beginning of the 16th century an owner of an ancestral land was obliged to military service from his land. Since the 14th century a benefice was the second form of feudal land-ownership in the GDL. Gradually a benefice turned into a feud. In 1566 the Second Statute of Lithuania gave the equal rights to all owners of ancestral lands and feuds. They got the freedom to dispose all their lands, but were obliged to military service from their real estate. In the middle of the 16th century the domain of the Grand Duke was divided into the State lands and Throne lands. The Grand Duke's freedom to dispose these lands was limited. Up to the middle of the 16th century there were no permanent circuit courts for land disputes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All state courts heard land cases in their permanent quarters and moved in locality to survey borders only if it was very necessary. The Government of the GDL stimulated activity of arbitration and village courts and set them to resolve land disputes in locality. The first permanent circuit court (Sub-Chamber court) for boundary disputes was established in every county during the court reform in 1564-1566. Up to the middle of the 16th century jurisdiction of the Church determined by canons was very wide and came into collision with jurisdiction of the State. Besides clergymen and other subjects of the Church spiritual courts prosecuted noblemen, peasants and townsfolk. Competence of secular and spiritual courts was delimited clearly by the Third Statute of Lithuania. In accordance with this Statute spiritual courts could prosecute noblemen, peasants and townsfolk only if a certain case was bound up with religion or marriage. The medieval conception of formal evidences existed and dominated in the GDL from the 13th century up to the 18th century. The court was passive because all evidences were collected and produced by the plaintiff or by the defendant, and legal force of any evidence was determined by Lithuanian custom law and by the Lithuanian Statutes. The author believes that compurgators were not eye-witnesses of crime or event, there testified on oath only about good name of somebody. Compurgators swore together with plaintiff or defendant. Witnesses testified to or against somebody without oath. The legal status of witnesses and compurgators determined by the Lithuanian custom law and the First Lithuanian Statute was partly corrected by the Second and the Third Lithuanian Statutes in 1566 and 1588. Dietsky office appeared in the Ancient Slav State about the 11th century. From the 13th century onwards this office functioned in the GDL. Vizh office was instituted in the end of the 15th century or in the beginning of the 16th century in the GDL. Dietsky and Vizh were court officers executed judgements. Vizh was also official witness in criminal and civil cases. Vozny office was established in the GDL during the judicial reform in 1564-1566. Vozny was an important official of a court of law. He used to be elected by county noblemen. His duty was to inspect damages, wounds, and to witness at a trial. He was an executor of court's sentences. The number of lawyers who took scholastic degrees increased in the GDL in the 16th century. They developed legal terminology, introduced the written form of contracts and elaborated many legal acts. The Lithuanian Statutes should be regarded as the acme of progressive legal theoretical thought and practical activity. They surmounted the codification of the legislation of the GDL and brought the country to the leading position among other European countries. Yet the high standard, progressive spirit and intrinsic humanistic ideas by themselves did not mean that the Statutes were properly applied. In the 16th century, the lack of qualified lawyers complicated application of the Lithuanian Statutes. The legal sophistication of judges was often rather poor. Even members of the Lithuanian Tribunal of the GDL were not professional lawyers. The requirement constituted in the Lithuanian Statutes that only nobility were eligible to the position of judges was hardly observed because for a long time there had been not a single law school or college in the GDL. Why the Faculty of Law had not been founded in the Vilnius Jesuits' Academy before 1641? The author believes that the problem may be viewed in the context of international relations between the Kingdom of Poland and the GDL. In the year of the foundation of Vilnius University, one more event important for the legal development of GDL took place: creation of the highest appeal court – Lithuanian Tribunal. Polish landlords did not tolerate the steps strengthening the statehood of Lithuania. Creation of the Lithuanian Tribunal was a difficult victory of the GDL nobility. It is quite possible that concession to the University of Krakow and recognition of Polish monopoly in preparing lawyers were the cost paid for the mentioned victory. It seemed then more important to have their own appeal court than to prepare lawyers in the GDL. In the one article the author aspires to elucidate what was a medieval university – integral part of the town or feudal benefice, what were professors ant students – full fledged citizens of the town or aliens, and what were courts of the university – State or private, secular or ecclesiastical. The author established that any university in the Middle Ages was a self-governing professional corporation similar with guild or craft. Doctors and scholars (like merchants or craftsmen) elected rector and some others officials who governed and administered justice. Mostly university was an integral part of the town; professors ant students could exercise their rights on an equality with citizens of the town. Sometimes university was ruled by the Bishop or King as a feudal benefice independent from the town magistrates and courts (in this case the relations between town citizens and students were exceptionally strained). A very ample jurisdiction was allowed to the Rector's court, extending to all civil cases and all criminal cases except such as involved mutilation (in those criminal cases the jurisdiction of the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges was recognized). Rector was required to suppress quarrels between students and townsmen, or among the students themselves. If Rector failed to punish offenders, a scholar or doctor was amenable to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. The Bishop always reserved to himself spiritual jurisdiction over professors ant students. An appellate civil jurisdiction was reserved to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. It should be recognized that the legal system

Po upadku komunizmu i zakończeniu zimnej wojny wydawało się, że świat na trwałe wchodzi w okres stabilizacji, pokoju i współpracy. Szybko jednak okazało się, że świat narastającej globalizacji ma różne oblicza, także negatywne, co rzutuje na prawie każdą sferę życia, także na bezpieczeństwo. Spadło co prawda zagrożenie nuklearne, ale pojawiły się nowe zagrożenia oraz nasiliły te, które przedtem przesłonięte były rywalizacją Wschód – Zachód. Chodzi głównie o konfl ikty etniczno- -religijne, kulturowe i cywilizacyjne, w tym rozlewające się konfl ikty wewnętrzne w państwach słabych i upadłych, proliferację broni masowego rażenia, niebezpieczne ambicje państw dyktatorskich. Ogromny wpływ na ład międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo miały zamachy 11 września 2001. Zmieniły one percepcję zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa. Terroryzm uznany został za największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa, a ogłoszona przez prezydenta Busha walka z terroryzmem doprowadziła Stany Zjednoczone i prawie cały Zachód do zaangażowania w dwie wojny: w Iraku i w Afganistanie. O ile interwencję w Afganistanie i obalenie reżimu Talibów można uznać za swoiste prawo do samoobrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (a właściwie po uruchomieniu art. 5 traktatu waszyngtońskiego za sprawę całego NATO), bo Al-Kaida, która była organizatorem zamachów 11 września, za przyzwoleniem tego reżimu była na stałe zainstalowana w tym kraju, to już interwencja w Iraku miała wątpliwe podstawy prawne, a właściwie była ona jednostronną decyzją USA, podjętą mimo protestów połowy sojuszników NATO. To co nastąpiło potem, w ramach wojny z terroryzmem, przekształciło się w totalny chaos, przypominający wojnę domową, w Iraku obecnie wygasającą, w Afganistanie zaś, już w warunkach obecności tam Międzynarodowych Sił Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa (ISAF), coraz bardziej nasilającą się. W ostatnich dwóch latach warunki bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, za które w praktyce, w ramach ISAF, odpowiedzialne jest NATO, gwałtownie się pogorszyły. Gwałtownie wzrosła liczba zamachów terrorystycznych, a talibowie odzyskują pozycje, kontrolując już prawie 40% obszaru Afganistanu. Sytuacja w Afganistanie i odpowiedzialność NATO za bezpieczeństwo tego kraju budzi ogromne zaniepokojenie przywódców państw natowskich oraz kierownictwa sojuszu. Staje się to również jednym z centralnych problemów nowej administracji waszyngtońskiej. Trwające już siedem lat i rosnące zaangażowanie NATO i sił koalicyjnych w Afganistanie, pionierskie w ramach misji out of area, mimo zaangażowania ok. 64 tysięcy żołnierzy, sprzętu i idących w miliardy dolarów kosztów operacji nie przynosi jak dotąd, oczekiwanych rezultatów. Dlatego też przygotowana i realizowana jest nowa strategia obecności USA i NATO w Afganistanie. Zaangażowanie NATO w Afganistanie często interpretowane jest jako swoisty test dla Sojuszu, jako wyraz rosnącej odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo globalne, w tym za zwalczanie nowych zagrożeń, takich jak terroryzm, których eskalacja jest także ubocznym skutkiem globalizacji. Autor nie w pełni podziela te opinie, choć niewątpliwie obecność NATO w Afganistanie jest ważną i trudną próbą dla Sojuszu, w tym także dla Polski ze względu na rosnące zaangażowanie sił zbrojnych naszego kraju w tę operację. Sprawa udziału NATO jednak rzutuje na stan bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, eskaluje napięcia i budzi negatywne emocje cywilizacyjno-kulturowe, utrudnia walkę z terroryzmem, kładzie się cieniem na i tak niejasny obraz sytuacji na Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie. Na wiele spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, w tym narodowego poszczególnych krajów (choćby USA), patrzy się przez pryzmat Afganistanu. ; When the cold war ended, after the collapse of communism and when fi nally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread feeling through the world that at long last universal peace had descended on earth. The fear of war in which weapons of mass destruction would be used had vanished. Today's world is a vastly different place. It is a world of globalization, which has both good and bad sides. This inexorable process has extended the opportunities of worldwide interchange. But this same globalization process and associated technology have also brought major new threats and intensifi ed existing ones. The threats we face are seamless, running across the boundaries of defence, foreign affairs, domestic and social life. It has left nations and peoples ever more vulnerable to phenomena ranging from international crime and terrorism through to cyber-attacks, health pandemics, energy politics, resource shortages and fi nancial crisis. We are facing the problem of failed states, WMD proliferations, rough countries challenges. We all have to agree that it was a great impact of 9/11 terrorist hijackers and attacks on security. The perception of international security threats has changed. Terrorism has been recognized as the biggest threat for security. The war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush, has engaged United States and almost the whole West in two wars: in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan case is concerned, one has to recognize the legitimacy of American intervention (as did the UN Security Council), as U.S. had the right to self-defence after Al-Qaeda attacks, operating from Afghan territory. In the case of intervention in Iraq there are far going doubts about its legitimacy. The result was not only the overthrow of both regimes, of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan, but a real mess – if not a civil war – in Iraq. Today, after seven years, the security situation in Iraq has much improved, but in Afghanistan there is ongoing process of violence escalation. In the last years the conditions of security in Afghanistan, for keeping which responsible is ISAF (and practically NATO, being a core of ISAF), has dramatically deteriorated. The number of terrorist attacks has enormously increased and Taliban have regained the control over 40% of Afghan territory. The security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's responsibility for that is the reason of deep concern for both the leaders of NATO member states and Alliance itself. The new American administration has made the confl ict a policy priority. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, including the decision to commit an additional 30 000 U.S. military forces to address the confl ict. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is treated as a kind of test for Alliance and a confi rmation of NATO's rising responsibility for global security, opening new out of area alliance missions. It is also important for Poland, taking in consideration the rising number of Polish troops in Afghanistan. Many questions of global and regional [Middle East] security are treated in the framework of Afghanistan case. ; Многие считали, что после падения коммунизма и окончания холодной войны, мир входит в период стабилизации, мира и сотрудничества. Однако вскоре ока- залось, что в эпоху глобализации мир имеет разные обличия, в том числе нега- тивные, что отражается почти на каждой сфере жизни, в том числе и на безопас- ности. Хотя и уменьшилась ядерная угроза, но появились новые угрозы, а также усилились те, которые ранее, в связи с соперничеством Востока и Запада, на- ходились на втором плане. Главным образом здесь необходимо иметь ввиду эт- ническо-религиозные, культурные и цивилизационные конфликты, в том числе, внутренние конфликты в слабых и распавшихся государствах, распространение оружия массового уничтожения, опасные шаги диктаторских государств. Огромное влияние на международный порядок и безопасность оказали террористические акты 11 сентября 2001 года. Они полностью изменили вос- приятие угроз безопасности. Терроризм был признан самой большой угрозой безопасности, а провозглашенная президентом Бушем война с терроризмом вовлекла Соединённые Штаты и почти весь Запад в ведение двух войн: в Ира- ке и в Афганистане. Если интервенцию в Афганистане и свержение режима та- либов еще можно признать своеобразным правом на самозащиту Соединённых Штатов (а имея ввиду 5 статью Вашингтонского договора делом всего НАТО), поскольку Аль-Каида, ответственная за организацию терактов 11 сентября, с согласия режима талибов имела постоянные базы в этой стране, то интер- венция в Ираке имела очень слабые юридические основания и в действитель- ности она была односторонним решением США, принятым вопреки протестам половины союзников НАТО. То, что произошло в рамках войны с терроризмом, позже превратилось в тотальный хаос, приведший к ослабевающей гражданс- кой войне в Ираке, и усиливающейся войне в Афганистане, происходящей в ус- ловиях присутствия там Международных сил содействия безопасности (ISAF). В последние два года безопасность в Афганистане, за которую в действитель- ности в рамках ISAF, несет ответственность НАТО, сильно ухудшилась. Возрос- ло количество террористических актов, а талибы контролируют уже почти 40% территории Афганистана. Ситуация в Афганистане и ответственность НАТО за безопасность этой стра- ны, вызывает огромное беспокойство глав государств членов НАТО, руководс- тва союза, а также становиться одной из главных проблем новой вашингтон- ской администрации. Продолжающееся уже семь лет и растущее присутствие НАТО и коалиционных сил в Афганистане, не взирая на контингент численностью около 64 тысяч солдат, современную технику и исчисляющуюся в миллиар- дах долларов стоимость операции, пока не принесло ожидаемых результатов. В связи с чем, подготавливается и реализуется новая стратегия присутствия США и НАТО в Афганистане. Действия НАТО в Афганистане часто интерпретированы как своеобразный тест для союза, как проявление растущей ответственности за глобальную бе- зопасность, в том числе за борьбу с новыми угрозами, такими как терроризм, эскалация которого в какой-то степени является побочным следствием глоба- лизации. Автор не полностью разделяет такое мнение, хотя, несомненно, при- сутствие НАТО в Афганистане – это важное и тяжелое испытание для союза, в том числе также для Польши, ввиду возрастающего присутствия вооружён- ных сил Польши в этой операции. Вопрос участия в операции НАТО, хотим мы этого или нет, отражается на состоянии международной безопасности, вызыва- ет напряжения и отрицательные цивилизационно-культурные эмоции, затруд- няет борьбу с терроризмом, оказывает влияние на и так непростую ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке. На многие вопросы в сфере глобальной и ре- гиональной безопасности, в том числе и национальной, отдельных стран (даже США), нужно смотреть сквозь призму Афганистана.

Aus der Einleitung: Die Ereignisse rund um die deutlich verspätete Einführung der LKW-Maut in Deutschland und die deutlich gewordenen Schwächen des mit dem Betreiberkonsortium TollCollect geschlossenen Vertrages haben das Thema 'Public Private Partnerships (Öffentlich-Private Partnerschaften)' in das Bewusstsein einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit gerückt. Insbesondere stellte sich hier konkret die Frage, ob das allgemein vertretene Postulat 'die Privatwirtschaft sei auf jeden Fall leistungsfähiger und kostengünstiger als der Öffentliche Dienst' noch bestehen bleiben kann und wie gut sich der öffentliche Partner einer PPP über vertragliche Regelungen gegen vom privaten Partner verursachte Misserfolge schützen und seine gerechtfertigten finanziellen Ansprüche verfolgen kann. Während das plakative Thema 'Maut-Chaos' über viele Monate den deutschen Blätterwald beherrschte, blieb in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit relativ unbeobachtet, dass zunächst auf Seiten einzelner Bundesländer (z.B. Nordrhein-Westfalen ab Oktober 2001) und dann auch auf der Seite der Bundesverwaltung (ab November 2004) sog. Task Forces PPP gegründet wurden, die die Nutzung des Instrumentes Öffentlich-Private Partnerschaften im Rahmen der Verwaltungsmodernisierung verstärkt vorantreiben sollen. In Nordrhein-Westfalen waren es die Kommunen als hauptsächliche Träger von Investitionen in die öffentlicher Infrastruktur, die mit Unterstützung der Landesregierung erste Pilotprojekte durchführten. Das Konstrukt PPP als dritter Weg zwischen konventioneller Selbsterstellung durch den öffentlichen Dienst und Privatisierung vormals öffentlicher Dienstleistungen ist allerdings keine deutsche Erfindung. In Europa auf diesem Gebiet seit langem führend ist Großbritannien, wo die damalige konservative Regierung bereits 1992 die sog. Private Finance Initiative (PFI) als Möglichkeit, öffentliche Aufgaben durch private Partner planen, bauen, (vor)-finanzieren und betreiben zu lassen, entwickelte. Allerdings machte erst die seit 1997 amtierende Labour-Regierung verstärkt von dem neuen Instrument Gebrauch. Die beiden Regionen Nordrhein-Westfalen und Schottland wurden ausgewählt, weil erstere zu den deutschen Bundesländern gehört, die das Thema PPP in Deutschland offensiv vorantreiben, und zweitere, weil das Instrument dort bereits seit etwa einem Jahrzehnt angewendet wird und dementsprechend viele – sowohl positive als auch negative – Erfahrungen vorliegen. Ganz aktuell haben die Regierungen beider Regionen Ende Januar 2005 einen Aktionsplan über eine intensivierte Zusammenarbeit unterschrieben, die im Themenfeld 'Verwaltungsmodernisierung' auch die Nutzung des 'großen Erfahrungsvorsprungs Schottlands bei PPP-Modellen' berücksichtigen soll. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, im komparativen Vergleich zwischen den beiden Europäischen Regionen Nordrhein-Westfalen und Schottland darzustellen, welche Argumente aus politisch-rechtlicher aber insbesondere auch aus finanzpolitischer Sicht dafür bzw. dagegen sprechen könnten, das Instrument PPP/PFI verstärkt zur Lösung der finanziellen Probleme Europäischer Regionen heranzuziehen. Hierbei ist insbesondere auch zu berücksichtigen, dass die Regierungen der Europäischen Regionen unter Einwirkung verschiedener politischer Einflüsse (Stichwort: Mehrebenensystem des Regierens in Europa) agieren müssen und ihre Haushalte daher auch aus verschiedenen Quellen finanziert werden. Weiterhin soll die Arbeit darstellen, ob es – sofern man sich dafür entscheidet – unter den verschiedenen Varianten von PPP/PFI eine aus Sicht der finanziellen Belastung der öffentlichen Haushalte günstigere Variante gibt, weil sie die sich aus einer PPP möglicherweise ergebenden Gewinne nicht auf private Anteilseigner aufteilt, sondern diese wieder in den Haushalt des öffentlichen Partners reinvestiert (sog. Non-Profit Distributing Organisation / NPDO). Die Masterarbeit definiert zunächst den Begriff PPP und dessen häufigste Variante PFI. Nach einer Beschreibung der verfassungsrechtlichen und finanzpolitischen Besonderheiten der beiden Regionen und einer Darstellung der Beziehungen zwischen EU-Ebene und regionaler Ebene, geht sie auf den Vergleich der Implementierung des Instrumentes PPP/PFI in Nordrhein-Westfalen und Schottland ein. Dabei werden die Argumente der jeweiligen Protagonisten (Regierungen, Parlamente, Parteien, Gewerkschaften, Beratungsunternehmen, Rechnungshöfe) ausgewertet. Aus den gemachten Erfahrungen in beiden Regionen wird eine Aussage abgeleitet, ob und wenn ja, in welchen Fällen, PPP/PFI die Haushaltsprobleme Europäischer Regionen lösen können und welche Variante von PPP/PFI die für den Steuerzahler günstigste sein kann. Im Einzelnen wird in Kapitel 1 definiert, was unter den Begriffen PPP und PFI zu verstehen ist und welche weiteren Varianten von PPP existieren, die jedoch im Rahmen dieser Masterarbeit nicht näher behandelt werden. Kapitel 2 beinhaltet eine verfassungsrechtliche Darstellung der beiden Europäischen Regionen und die Auswirkungen, die sich hieraus für die jeweilige Haushaltssituation ergeben. Der Begriff 'Region' wird dabei sowohl für Schottland als auch Nordrhein-Westfalen – ungeachtet der staatsrechtlichen Stellung eines deutschen Bundeslandes – verwendet und ist im Sinne des statistischen Begriffes der NUTS1-Region zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch verdeutlicht, wie groß die jeweilige Einflussnahme durch den Zentralstaat (in Schottland) bzw. den Bundesstaat (in Nordrhein-Westfalen) ist. In Kapitel 3 wird dargestellt, welche Bedeutung die Regionen in Europa in Bezug auf die EU-Ebene haben, welchen Einfluss sie über den Ausschuss der Regionen nehmen können und wie sie über Struktur- und Regionalbeihilfen unter Umgehung der nationalen Ebene durch die EU (teil)-finanziert werden. Auch der Zusammenhang zwischen EU-Politiken und PPP wird hier erklärt. In Kapitel 4 werden die politisch-institutionellen, rechtlichen und organisatorischen Rahmenbedingungen für PPP/PFI in beiden Regionen und deren Auswirkungen auf dieses Modell beschrieben. Der britische Public Sector Comparator (PSC) als dort allgemein verwendeter Wirtschaftlichkeitsmaßstab wird kurz erläutert. Kapitel 5 gibt einen kurzen historischen Überblick über die Strategie der Einführung und Umsetzung von PPP/PFI in beiden Regionen, während in Kapitel 6 die realisierten und geplanten PPP/PFI auf regionaler und kommunaler Ebene dargestellt werden und ihre quantitative Bedeutung für die jeweiligen – insbesondere kommunalen – Haushalte herausgearbeitet wird. Die umfangreiche Diskussion der Vor- und Nachteile von PPP/PFI durch die jeweiligen Protagonisten wird in Kapitel 7 behandelt. Naturgemäß ist hier der Anteil, den die Diskussion in Schottland einnimmt bzw. eingenommen hat, aufgrund des deutlich längeren Erfahrungshorizontes, größer. Kapitel 8 würdigt schließlich die Geeignetheit von PPP/PFI zur Lösung der Finanzprobleme Europäischer Regionen kritisch und zieht Schlussfolgerungen, ob dieses Instrument zur Lösung der Finanzprobleme europäischer Regionen angewendet werden sollte.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Inhaltsverzeichnis: 0.Einführung1 1.Was verbirgt sich hinter den Begriffen Public Private Partnership (PPP) und Private Finance Initiative (PFI)?3 1.1Definition der Begrifflichkeiten3 1.1.1Public Private Partnership (PPP)3 1.1.2Private Finance Initiative (PFI)4 1.1.3Non-Profit Distributing Organisation (NPDO)4 1.1.4Weitere PPP-Varianten6 1.2Welche Ziele werden mit PPP/PFI angestrebt?7 2.Verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der Regionen Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen8 2.1Verfassungsrechtliche Stellung und Finanzsituation Schottlands und seiner Kommunen8 2.2Verfassungsrechtliche Stellung und Finanzsituation Nordrhein-Westfalens und seiner Kommunen12 2.3Vergleich von verfassungsrechtlicher Stellung und finanzpolitischer Strukturen in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen einschließlich der jeweiligen Kommunen16 3.Bedeutung der Regionen in Europa im Hinblick auf die EU-Ebene18 3.1Einflussnahme verschiedener Politikebenen auf die Regionen Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen18 3.1.1Einflussnahme von EU und britischer Zentralregierung auf Schottland18 3.1.2Einflussnahme von EU und deutscher Bundesregierung auf Nordrhein-Westfalen19 3.2Einflussnahme Schottlands und Nordrhein-Westfalens auf die jeweilige Europapolitik ihrer Staaten20 3.2.1Mitwirkungsmöglichkeiten Schottlands bei der britischen Europapolitik20 3.2.2Mitwirkungsmöglichkeiten Nordrhein-Westfalens bei der deutschen Europapolitik21 3.2.3Mitwirkung Schottlands und Nordrhein-Westfalens im Ausschuss der Regionen (AdR) und bei der Konferenz der Regionen mit Gesetzgebungsbefugnissen (RegLeg)22 3.3Einflussnahme der verschiedenen Politikebenen auf Finanzierungsmodelle wie PPP/PFI23 4.Politisch-Institutionelle, rechtliche und organisatorische Rahmenbedingungen für PPP/PFI24 4.1Rahmenbedingungen der Einführung von PPP/PFI in Schottland24 4.2Rahmenbedingungen der Einführung von PPP/PFI in Nordrhein-Westfalen25 4.3Vergleich der politisch-institutionellen, rechtlichen und organisatorischen Rahmenbedingungen in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen26 5.Einführung und Umsetzung von PPP/PFI in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen27 5.1PPP/PFI in Schottland27 5.2PPP/PFI in Nordrhein-Westfalen29 5.3Vergleich der Einführungs- und Umsetzungsszenarien in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen31 6.Umfang realisierter und geplanter PPP/PFI auf der jeweiligen regionalen und kommunalen Ebene32 6.1Finanzielle Bedeutung von PPP/PFI für die regionalen und kommunalen Haushalte in Schottland32 6.2Finanzielle Bedeutung von PPP/PFI für die regionalen und kommunalen Haushalte in Nordrhein-Westfalen34 6.3Einfluss von PPP/PFI auf die Haushalte in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen36 7.Bewertung der Vor- und Nachteile von PPP/PFI in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen37 7.1Bewertung der Vor- und Nachteile von PPP/PFI aus jeweiliger Regierungssicht37 7.2Haltungen der Parteien in Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen zu PPP/PFI39 7.3Behandlung der Vor- und Nachteile von PPP/PFI in den jeweiligen Parlamenten und deren Ausschüssen42 7.4Bewertung der Vor- und Nachteile von PPP/PFI aus Sicht der jeweiligen Gewerkschaften des öffentlichen Dienstes44 7.5Einschätzung von Vor- und Nachteilen von PPP/PFI durch Beratungsunternehmen, Banken und Unternehmerverbände47 7.6Beurteilung der Wirtschaftlichkeit von PPP/PFI durch die jeweiligen Rechnungshöfe50 7.7Erfahrungen mit PFI-Projekten in Schottland54 8.Geeignetheit der Instrumente PPP bzw. PFI, um die Finanzprobleme der Europäischen Regionen Schottland und Nordrhein-Westfalen zu lösen57Textprobe:Textprobe: Kapitel 4, Politisch-Institutionelle, rechtliche und organisatorische Rahmenbedingungen für PPP/PFI: Sowohl die Mitgliedstaaten als auch ihre Regionen müssen europäisches Recht bei der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge zwingend beachten. Die Europäische Kommission hat im Bereich des öffentlichen Vergaberechts bereits auf die Verbreitung von PPP reagiert; sie hat hierzu ein innovatives Vergabeverfahren eingeführt, das eigens auf die Vergabe 'besonders komplexer Aufträge' und somit auf bestimmte Formen von PPP zugeschnitten ist. Dieses neue Verfahren, das als 'wettbewerblicher Dialog' bezeichnet wird, ermöglicht den öffentlichen Stellen, mit den Bewerberunternehmen Gespräche zu führen, um die am besten geeigneten Lösungen zu ermitteln. Zuvor war häufig das Verhandlungsverfahren nach Artikel 7 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie 93/37/EWG gewählt worden. Dieses ist jedoch nur ausnahmsweise zulässig und nicht für Fälle gedacht, in denen solche Unwägbarkeiten auftreten wie etwa Probleme mit der vorherigen Preisfestlegung aufgrund der Tatsache, dass die rechtliche und finanztechnische Konstruktion sehr komplex ist. Das neu eingeführte Verfahren des wettbewerblichen Dialogs nach Richtlinie 2004/18/EG wird dann eingeschlagen, wenn der öffentliche Auftraggeber objektiv nicht in der Lage ist, die für seinen Auftrag und seine Ziele geeigneten technischen Mittel zu bestimmen, oder wenn er objektiv nicht in der Lage ist, ein Projekt rechtlich und/oder finanztechnisch zu konzipieren. Das Verfahren gewährleistet, dass die Erörterung sämtlicher Auftragsaspekte mit den Bewerbern im Verlauf der Definitionsphase ausreichend flexibel verlaufen kann. Rahmenbedingungen der Einführung von PPP/PFI in Schottland: Der Schwerpunkt der schottischen Regionalregierung liegt ebenso wie der der britischen Regierung in der Förderung des Öffentlichen Dienstes. Dabei übernahm sie den gleichen pragmatischen Kurs bei der Nutzung privater Finanzierung. Den Empfehlungen des Finanzausschusses des schottischen Parlaments folgend, mussten alle PPP-Verträge in Schottland Garantien von den privatwirtschaftlichen Betreibern verlangen, dass die Bezahlung und die Arbeitsbedingungen der versetzten öffentlichen Angestellten nicht nachteilig beeinflusst würden. Grenzüberschreitende Rangeleien zwischen der Regierung in Edinburgh und der in London blieben selten, so dass Kritiker behaupteten, die Regionalregierung habe die Tradition des Schottland-Ministeriums, Politik-Initiativen der britischen Regierung für den schottischen Bedarf zu 'tartanisieren', weitergeführt. Während diverse Gremien und Verfahren wie zum Beispiel der Gemeinsame Ministerielle Ausschuss oder die Vereinbarung von Konkordaten zu verschiedenen Themen das enge Arbeitsverhältnis zwischen britischer Regierung und schottischer Regionalregierung erleichtern, bleibt unklar, wie Finanzstreitigkeiten gelöst würden, insbesondere bei dem in hohem Maße zentralisierten System der Überwachung öffentlicher Ausgaben und der eingeschränkten eigenen Einnahmen Schottlands. Devolution kann zwar als ein Schritt in Richtung einer föderalen Verfassung gesehen werden, aber das britische Parlament behält die höchste Staatsgewalt und somit die Zuständigkeit für die gesamtwirtschaftliche Steuerung, einschließlich Wechselkurspolitik, Geldpolitik und Finanzpolitik. Für einen unitarischen Staat typisch, wird kein Versuch unternommen, öffentliche Einnahmen und Ausgaben je Region auszugleichen: Einige Regionen tragen weniger zu den Einnahmen pro Kopf bei als andere und einige erhalten nach Maßgabe des Bedarfs Zuweisungen in größerer Höhe. Trotz Devolution gibt es, solange das Vereinigte Königreich ein Einheitsstaat bleibt, keinen Anlass die schottischen Ausgaben auf die Mittel zu beschränken, die aus Einnahmen in Schottland erzielt werden können, oder sie auf einen strikten Einwohneranteil zu stützen. Um die Wirtschaftlichkeit eines PPP/PFI-Projektes gegenüber einer konventionellen Beschaffungsvariante zu rechtfertigen, wurde in Großbritannien ein Public Sector Comparator (PSC) als fiktiver Vergleichsmaßstab entwickelt. Er bildet alle Kosten, Erlöse und Risiken der besten machbaren und finanzierbaren Projektlösung bei Erstellung durch die öffentliche Hand als Barwert ab. Dabei werden alle Kosten des Projekts (z.B. Projektentwicklung, Planung, Errichtung), die Betriebs- und Unterhaltungskosten (inkl. Abschreibungen) und die Finanzierungskosten sowie die 'übertragbaren' (z.B. Baukostenrisiko) und 'nicht übertragbaren' (z.B. Gesetzesänderungsrisiko) Risiken erfasst. Für jedes Risiko werden Kosten und Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit gebildet; aus diesen ergibt sich ein Erwartungswert. Schließlich wird ein Barwert berechnet, indem Kosten und Risiken als Zahlungsströme über die gesamte Laufzeit des Projekts ermittelt und diskontiert werden. Abschließend wird dem berechneten PSC der Barwert der Kosten der PPP-Variante (periodische Leistungsentgelte und zurückbehaltene Risiken) gegenübergestellt. Rahmenbedingungen der Einführung von PPP/PFI in Nordrhein-Westfalen: In Nordrhein-Westfalen bestand nicht die Notwendigkeit wie in Schottland, die gleiche PPP-Politik wie die Bundes- bzw. die Zentralregierung zu verfolgen. Aufgrund des föderalen Aufbaus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland war auch nicht der Bund die treibende Kraft bei der Einführung von PPP/PFI, sondern der Anstoß hierzu kam aus Nordrhein-Westfalen. Gleichwohl ist es natürlich schon rein aus Gründen der Rechtssicherheit und Vergleichbarkeit erforderlich, in Deutschland einheitliche Maßstäbe z.B. bei der Beurteilung der Wirtschaftlichkeit von PPP/PFI einzuführen. Dieser Aufgabe hat sich das Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen im Jahre 2003 angenommen und bis zum September des Jahres einen entsprechenden Praxis-Leitfaden PPP erstellen lassen. Insofern wurde auch in Deutschland eine Kongruenz der PPP/PFI-Politiken von regionaler und zentral-/bundesstaatlicher Ebene verfolgt, nur eben nicht top-down wie in Großbritannien, sondern der föderalen Grundordnung entsprechend bottom-up. Zwar soll der Länderfinanzausgleich gleichartige Lebensverhältnisse in allen Ländern herstellen; gleichwohl bestehen deutliche Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen 'reicheren' und 'ärmeren' Bundesländern. Jedes Bundesland steht demzufolge in der Verantwortung, selbst Strategien zu entwickeln, um seine Verwaltungstätigkeit kostenoptimal zu entwickeln. Insofern besteht im föderalen System Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein deutlich größerer Anreiz als z.B. im unitarischen System Großbritannien, in dem die regionalen Budgets nach Bedarf zugewiesen werden, aus eigenem Antrieb heraus Alternativen zur bisherigen Eigenerstellung öffentlicher Aufgaben zu untersuchen und zu erproben. Zwingend erforderlich für die Anwendung alternativer Modelle wie PPP/PFI ist es aber auch in Deutschland, deren größere Wirtschaftlichkeit gegenüber der konventionellen Aufgabenwahrnehmung nachzuweisen. In Deutschland gibt es allerdings bislang noch keinen anerkannten, betriebswirtschaftlichen Kriterien genügenden Bewertungsmaßstab wie den – wenn auch nicht unumstrittenen – PSC. Auf Seiten der öffentlichen Hand in Deutschland bestehen insbesondere noch Schwierigkeiten, die für einen Wirtschaftlichkeitsvergleich relevanten Daten zu ermitteln. Als erforderlich wurde jedoch die Entwicklung und Einführung eines einheitlichen Verfahrens zum Vergleich der Wirtschaftlichkeit angesehen. Ohne einen derartigen Bewertungsmaßstab sei ein fairer Wirtschaftlichkeitsvergleich zwischen traditionellen Beschaffungen der öffentlichen Hände und PPP-Modellen nicht möglich. Entscheidend für den Wirtschaftlichkeitsvergleich ist, dass sämtliche tatsächliche Kosten des Projekts über die gesamte Lebensdauer exakt untersucht und transparent dargestellt werden. Mit der Einführung eines doppischen Rechnungswesens über das 'Neue Kommunale Finanzmanagement' soll in Nordrhein-Westfalen die Kameralistik auf kommunaler Ebene abgeschafft und eine erhebliche Verbesserung der vorhandenen Datenbasis erreicht werden. Die ausschließliche Orientierung des Wirtschaftlichkeitsvergleichs an den Finanzierungskonditionen der öffentlichen Hand führe aber zu falschen Ergebnissen, wenn der Private Projektrisiken übernehme, da die öffentliche Kreditaufnahme ohne jede Verbindung zu Projektrisiken erfolge und daher nominell günstiger sein müsse als die private Refinanzierung. Die auch bei traditioneller Realisierung vorhandenen und bislang nicht transparenten Projektrisiken müssten im Rahmen von PPP-Projekten daher gesehen werden.

Charles F. Doran, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations; Director del Global Theory and History Program y Director del Center for Canadian Studies, en The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, fue entrevistado por nuestro editor, Guzmán Castro, estudiante visitante en dicha casa de estudios y alumno del Dr. Doran. En las décadas de 1960 y 1970, Charles Doran comenzó a trabajar en lo que se transformaría en una de las corrientes teóricas más dinámicas de la disciplina: power cycle theory. El ciclo de poder en la teoría de Doran representa las capacidades de un estado relativas a las capacidades de poder del resto de los miembros nucleares del sistema internacional. Dicho ciclo pasa por las etapas de crecimiento, maduración y caída, dentro del cual son de vital importancia cuatro puntos críticos: lower turning point, first inflection point, upper turning point, second inflection point. Cada uno de estos períodos críticos supone una inversión abrupta en la estructura de capacidades relativas del país en cuestión. Adicionalmente, las expectativas y roles de política exterior de los estados están sustentados en la estructura de poder subyacente. Cuando uno de estos períodos críticos aparece, las expectativas y los roles sufren severas transformaciones. Es así que las adaptaciones que deberían sufrir los roles y las expectativas, para seguir siendo coherentes con la estructura de poder, son difíciles de implementar. Si muchos estados dentro del sistema están pasando por períodos críticos, existe lo que Doran llama "systems transformation," que se caracteriza por una gran incertidumbre y ansiedad, factores que pueden derivar en "guerras extensivas." A diferencia de otras corrientes ya discutidas en nuestra sección, power cycle deja lugar para la administración pacífica de estas grandes transformaciones –i.e. la guerra no es un resultado determinado de antemano. Para ello, argumenta Doran: "governments must understand that the bounds of the system, competition from even the smallest competitor for share of power and role, will force even the most vigorous rising state to peak in power share and, ultimately decline." Comprender esto limitaría las fantasías de "unlimited growth (and) temptation of preventive attack," facilitando así los ajustes necesarios para mantener la estabilidad y la paz. Para profundizar esta breve introducción a la teoría véanse los links indicados al final. A continuación presentamos la primera parte de la entrevista con el Profesor Charles F. Doran. (Traducción del inglés, Guzmán Castro).Enfoques: ¿Cuál es para usted el o los principales desafíos para las relaciones internacionales en el siglo XXI?Charles Doran: El mayor reto para las relaciones internacionales está en decidir cómo manejar la cambiante estructura del sistema internacional. En algún momento, la estructura del sistema va a comenzar a cambiar rápidamente, como sucedió en muchas otras ocasiones: antes de la Primera Guerra Mundial; en el período de entre guerras, en la década de 1980, y como sucederá en el futuro. El gran desafío para las relaciones internacionales es operar esa transformación de manera pacífica, sin las crisis o catástrofes que han sido moneda corriente en el pasado. A su vez, elaborar marcos para pensar la relación entre el cambio tecnológico y la política internacional es un desafío de primera importancia. Si bien dicha interrelación es, sin dudas, muy difícil de proyectar, el potencial que tiene para modificar las relaciones internacionales es inmenso. Especialmente en temas de sistemas armamentísticos, que en el cambio de su vida modificarán el carácter actual de las relaciones internacionales. Un ejemplo: qué pasa si, aún en contra de nuestros mayores esfuerzos, se establece un sistema de coordinación armamentístico espacial, es decir, qué pasa si se militariza el espacio. Esto cambiaría la naturaleza de la guerra, de la seguridad y de la paz. Los asuntos tecnológicos deben ser tenidos en cuenta. No obstante, los desafíos y cuestiones clásicas van a seguir en el tapete: democracia, derechos humanos, etc., éstas nunca van a quedar obsoletas, y deben ser integradas a un entendimiento de las relaciones internacionales en pos de mantener el orden y la estabilidad. Suelo ser bastante optimista en cuanto al progreso en las relaciones internacionales: si se mira al sistema hoy, durante el último medio siglo hemos vivido un período de crecimiento y paz sin precedentes. Creo que es acertado decir que las personas tienen hoy más posibilidad de elegir quién las representa, que en el pasado. Sin embargo, la pregunta es: ¿hacia dónde va esto? Vamos a un incremento de estas cualidades, hacia una meseta o hacia un retroceso…difícil saberlo. Por último, está el tema de los grandes países que están emergiendo en la estructura del sistema internacional: China, India, Brasil, y posiblemente algunos en África, aunque más a largo plazo. La cuestión es cómo dichos países se van haciendo su lugar en la política internacional de manera de promover sus intereses nacionales, pero sin amenazar a sus vecinos –y eventualmente al sistema en su totalidad-, participando del orden y colaborando en el mantenimiento de la estabilidad mundial. Estos son tiempos desafiantes y de cambios; aunque mucha gente se reúse a entenderlo por el velo que impone el seguir viviendo en el largo medio siglo post-1945. E: Moviéndonos al área académica, ¿Cuál es el debate más relevante para disciplina? C.D.: Al responder esta pregunta no puedo escapar a las influencias de mi propio trabajo y la literatura y corrientes de pensamiento cercanas a éste. Sin embargo, me quedan pocas dudas que el debate más interesante está en los estudios dinámicos de las relaciones internacionales; no en los trabajos estáticos del neorrealismo, y en los, en parte, áridos debates entre realistas, idealistas y constructivistas; debates que discuten de una manera básica las relaciones internacionales y que no nos llevan muy lejos en el entendimiento de la política internacional, especialmente, y este es un asunto primordial, en cuanto a las prioridades y principales preocupaciones que los policy-makers deben considerar. E: ¿Podríamos decir, entonces, que el mayor potencial se encuentra en esta visión dinámica de las relaciones internacionales? C.D.: Sí. Nuevamente, la literatura más prometedora es la aquella que lidia con los cambios estructurales que están sucediendo en el sistema, pero que además trabaja con un enfoque a los problemas de policy e intenta ayudar a los policy-makers a tomar decisiones. Sin embargo, la idea no es aislar todo el resto de la literatura clásica. Todo lo contrario. Se la debe incorporar en un sentido acumulativo. El entendimiento del balance de poder; la noción de que se pueden crear regímenes que cumplan importantes tareas para el sistema y los países. El esfuerzo para integrar conceptos como la disuasión en una era en donde la proliferación de armas nucleares está en incremento, pero a la vez revisándolos para aggiornarlos luego del fin de la Guerra Fría; el esfuerzo por mirar no sólo las relaciones entre democracias –como hace la teoría de la paz democrática- que es fácil y familiar, sino analizando qué pasa con las relaciones entre democracias y no democracias, ya que los autoritarismos van a seguir existiendo, nos guste o no. En contraposición con lo que mi buen amigo y colega, el Profesor Fukuyama ha predicho. Estas relaciones son las más problemáticas y las más ricas para estudiar.E: ¿Cuáles diría usted que fueron las influencias más significativas que ha tenido –libros, personas, eventos, etc.- para arribar a donde ahora se encuentra en la disciplina?C.D.: Debo decir que uno de los libros más influyentes ha sido el trabajo de Ludwig Dehio, "The Precarious Balance." Este fue escrito en un tiempo en que el país del que Dehio era un orgulloso ciudadano, Alemania, estaba en una profunda crisis. Esta reseña es importante, un colega y mentor, aquí en SAIS, Robert Osgood, me señaló algo que voy a recordar siempre, me dijo: "La más grande y útil teoría es la que emerge en el contexto nacional del propio teórico, y es el incentivo de elaborarla para explicar lo que le pasa a su país lo que le da vigor," creo que esa idea suele ser cierta. Alemania se encontraba en un estado de crisis que se había extendido por décadas: en este momento específico estaba en medio de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Dehio intenta dar respuesta a la pregunta de por qué Alemania estaba en esa particular posición, reconociendo que otros países también habían vivido situaciones similares; es decir, encontrando un cierto patrón histórico. Su estudio fue un profundo análisis en el marco de la historia diplomática pero dando claras y relevantes respuestas en términos de policy. Vea la segunda y última parte de la entrevista la semana próxima.Algunas publicaciones y links del Prof. Doran:"Life After Easy Oil," in The American Interest (2008); "Economics, Philosophy of History, and the 'Single Dynamic' of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft," in International Political Science Review (2003);Democratic Pluralism at Risk: Why Canadian Unity Matters, and Why Americans Care (2001); The NAFTA Puzzle (1994); Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End (1991); The Gulf, Energy and Global Security: Political and Economic Issues (1991); Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today (1983); Myth, Oil and Politics (1978); The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath (1971); y más de 100 artículos refereados. Perfil del Profesor Doran en la página web de SAIS: http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/directory/bios/d/doran.htm Perfil completo: http://charles.doran.home.att.net/background.htm *Candidato a la Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato di TellaBuenos Aires, Argentina

In the present work the author reviews the two scientific monographs and twenty scientific articles in which the history of the Lithuanian legal system is investigated. The author aspires to elucidate how did the main subsystems of the Lithuanian legal system – legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence – appeared and developed up to the end of the 20th century in the context of evolution of the Western legal tradition. The basic methods of research used in the works are historical, comparative and teleological. The main theses of the reviewed scientific monographs and articles are these: The law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) was created by the Government on the basis of the national Lithuanian law and some elements of the custom Slav law. Substitution of the custom Slav law for the Lithuanian public and private law took place in those provinces in the 14th-16th centuries. The custom Slav law hampered forming of the system of law of the GDL. It was created finally in the middle of the 16th century. The law of the GDL was a medieval estate law. Estate is a legal phenomenon and law determines signs and features of any estate. Main sign of any estate is rights leaved to him by law and protected by state. Estate system, that is an organization of society into classes rigidly divided for political purposes and defined primarily by law, is based on a legal inequality of estates. Any estate is a stable order closed to outsiders. In order to belong to estate any person must correspond to certain conditions determined by law. At the same time any person can belong to a few different social groups but only to one estate. The estate system of the GDL was formed finally in the middle of the 16th century. It was defined by the Second Statute of Lithuania and consisted of four estates: nobility, clergy, peasantry and townspeople. The nobility and the clergy were privileged. They governed the state and exploited bondsmen. In the towns which obtained the Magdeburg Law the townsmen were free, but haven't political rights and privileges. The author believes that all persons were subjects of medieval law of Lithuania, but their legal capacity was not equal. This inequality was determined by law. Volume of legal capacity of these persons depended upon their age, sex, citizenship, religion and estate. It could be changed in accordance with law. Under certain conditions loss of legal capacity also was able. Collective subjects of law were the GDL itself (not its government bodies or officials), the people of Lithuania as a political unit (not estates or ethnographic nations), political confederations of noblemen (if they were sanctioned by the Grand Duke), self-governing territorial units (counties, towns, etc.), guilds organized by craftsmen and merchants and self-governing religions communities. The author believes that a land-ownership in the GDL was divided. Two persons held the same land. One of them was an immediate owner, the second was a superior owner of the land. An immediate owner's right to dispose the land was limited by a superior owner's rights to this land. In the 14th-first half of the 16th century an ancestral land was the main form of land-ownership in the GDL. At first an ancestral land was owned without obligation of vassalage. Since the beginning of the 16th century an owner of an ancestral land was obliged to military service from his land. Since the 14th century a benefice was the second form of feudal land-ownership in the GDL. Gradually a benefice turned into a feud. In 1566 the Second Statute of Lithuania gave the equal rights to all owners of ancestral lands and feuds. They got the freedom to dispose all their lands, but were obliged to military service from their real estate. In the middle of the 16th century the domain of the Grand Duke was divided into the State lands and Throne lands. The Grand Duke's freedom to dispose these lands was limited. Up to the middle of the 16th century there were no permanent circuit courts for land disputes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. All state courts heard land cases in their permanent quarters and moved in locality to survey borders only if it was very necessary. The Government of the GDL stimulated activity of arbitration and village courts and set them to resolve land disputes in locality. The first permanent circuit court (Sub-Chamber court) for boundary disputes was established in every county during the court reform in 1564-1566. Up to the middle of the 16th century jurisdiction of the Church determined by canons was very wide and came into collision with jurisdiction of the State. Besides clergymen and other subjects of the Church spiritual courts prosecuted noblemen, peasants and townsfolk. Competence of secular and spiritual courts was delimited clearly by the Third Statute of Lithuania. In accordance with this Statute spiritual courts could prosecute noblemen, peasants and townsfolk only if a certain case was bound up with religion or marriage. The medieval conception of formal evidences existed and dominated in the GDL from the 13th century up to the 18th century. The court was passive because all evidences were collected and produced by the plaintiff or by the defendant, and legal force of any evidence was determined by Lithuanian custom law and by the Lithuanian Statutes. The author believes that compurgators were not eye-witnesses of crime or event, there testified on oath only about good name of somebody. Compurgators swore together with plaintiff or defendant. Witnesses testified to or against somebody without oath. The legal status of witnesses and compurgators determined by the Lithuanian custom law and the First Lithuanian Statute was partly corrected by the Second and the Third Lithuanian Statutes in 1566 and 1588. Dietsky office appeared in the Ancient Slav State about the 11th century. From the 13th century onwards this office functioned in the GDL. Vizh office was instituted in the end of the 15th century or in the beginning of the 16th century in the GDL. Dietsky and Vizh were court officers executed judgements. Vizh was also official witness in criminal and civil cases. Vozny office was established in the GDL during the judicial reform in 1564-1566. Vozny was an important official of a court of law. He used to be elected by county noblemen. His duty was to inspect damages, wounds, and to witness at a trial. He was an executor of court's sentences. The number of lawyers who took scholastic degrees increased in the GDL in the 16th century. They developed legal terminology, introduced the written form of contracts and elaborated many legal acts. The Lithuanian Statutes should be regarded as the acme of progressive legal theoretical thought and practical activity. They surmounted the codification of the legislation of the GDL and brought the country to the leading position among other European countries. Yet the high standard, progressive spirit and intrinsic humanistic ideas by themselves did not mean that the Statutes were properly applied. In the 16th century, the lack of qualified lawyers complicated application of the Lithuanian Statutes. The legal sophistication of judges was often rather poor. Even members of the Lithuanian Tribunal of the GDL were not professional lawyers. The requirement constituted in the Lithuanian Statutes that only nobility were eligible to the position of judges was hardly observed because for a long time there had been not a single law school or college in the GDL. Why the Faculty of Law had not been founded in the Vilnius Jesuits' Academy before 1641? The author believes that the problem may be viewed in the context of international relations between the Kingdom of Poland and the GDL. In the year of the foundation of Vilnius University, one more event important for the legal development of GDL took place: creation of the highest appeal court – Lithuanian Tribunal. Polish landlords did not tolerate the steps strengthening the statehood of Lithuania. Creation of the Lithuanian Tribunal was a difficult victory of the GDL nobility. It is quite possible that concession to the University of Krakow and recognition of Polish monopoly in preparing lawyers were the cost paid for the mentioned victory. It seemed then more important to have their own appeal court than to prepare lawyers in the GDL. In the one article the author aspires to elucidate what was a medieval university – integral part of the town or feudal benefice, what were professors ant students – full fledged citizens of the town or aliens, and what were courts of the university – State or private, secular or ecclesiastical. The author established that any university in the Middle Ages was a self-governing professional corporation similar with guild or craft. Doctors and scholars (like merchants or craftsmen) elected rector and some others officials who governed and administered justice. Mostly university was an integral part of the town; professors ant students could exercise their rights on an equality with citizens of the town. Sometimes university was ruled by the Bishop or King as a feudal benefice independent from the town magistrates and courts (in this case the relations between town citizens and students were exceptionally strained). A very ample jurisdiction was allowed to the Rector's court, extending to all civil cases and all criminal cases except such as involved mutilation (in those criminal cases the jurisdiction of the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges was recognized). Rector was required to suppress quarrels between students and townsmen, or among the students themselves. If Rector failed to punish offenders, a scholar or doctor was amenable to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. The Bishop always reserved to himself spiritual jurisdiction over professors ant students. An appellate civil jurisdiction was reserved to the town Magistrates, King's or Bishop's judges. It should be recognized that the legal system

These complète en allemand : Konflikte um Wasser in Marokko: ökologische und soziopolitische Konfliktursachen sowie Möglichkeiten der Konflikttransformation (Résumé long en français de 73 pages) ; Water scarcity increasingly provokes conflicts with often violent tendencies. As water management is determined by socio-political structures, governance plays a key role in the emergence and resolution of these conflicts. Based on a case-study of water conflicts in Morocco, the key objective of the present study is to understand how different political, ecological and socio-economic factors interact in the dynamics of these disputes. The first of the nine chapters introduces the topic by reviewing the possibilities of measuring water scarcity and its impact. This is done by exploring the situation in the MENA-region, and by analysing the security implications at the international level as well as in the context of broader security concepts. The second chapter evaluates the value of three theoretical approaches to the study of water conflicts: common pool resources theories, environmental security approaches, and conflict research. On the basis of this assessment, the third chapter presents a specific analytical and methodological approach by adapting theories of conflict transformation to the study of water conflicts. Four working hypotheses are developed regarding the root causes of water conflicts, the type of farmers most affected and the potential for mediation. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse potential root causes of water conflicts in Morocco. Chapter 4 concludes that the political system with the particular role of the king and his alliances with rural elites is challenged by the lack of legitimacy of democratic institutions, the increasing influence of civil society and religious actors, and the emergence of new economic elites. Chapter 5 analyses water and agricultural policies in Morocco and concludes that water scarcity, the effects of trade liberalisation, and incomplete decentralisation processes contribute to increasing social disparities and may fuel conflict. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the case of water conflicts in the Souss region in Southern Morocco. The region is highly affected by water scarcity. At the same time, it is of strategic importance to the export-oriented, lucrative citrus fruit production. In this context, the study analyses the increasing marginalisation of small farmers and the problems of public water management, which is challenged by influential private investors and illegal drilling. It also examines the pilot project ElGuerdane for water mobilisation and distribution through a public-private partnership in irrigation. The analysis reviews the project's technical and financial aspects, and its political and environmental implications. Chapter 7 introduces a typology of water conflicts developed on the basis of the author's field research. It then presents the results of the empirical investigations including a large number of expert interviews, the study of six cases of water conflicts, and about 100 standardised interviews with farmers. The chapter concludes that an important marginalisation process of small farmers takes place in the valley, reveals that these farmers are also more often affected by conflicts over irrigation and drinking water, and examines the success of different mediators in this context. Chapter 8 points to the significance of these results for larger socio-political processes in the country and reveals four key trends characterising the changes in the relationships between society, king and government. Furthermore, the perspectives for water conflict transformation and the need for further research are developed. The last chapter presents a practical concept for enhancing conflict sensitivity in the water sector and for preventing violent escalation of tensions. It proposes three overall objectives in this regard: (a) understanding water conflicts as factors of socio-political (de-)stabilisation; (b) identifying conflict potentials and supporting transformation processes; and (c) dealing constructively with water conflicts. Concrete measures are proposed for the implementation of each of these objectives. Finally, the conclusion reviews the main challenges in the study of water conflicts and summarises the key findings. ; La pénurie croissante en eau douce provoque de plus en plus souvent des conflits parfois violents. Compte tenu de la forte influence des structures sociopolitiques locales sur la gestion de l'eau, l'émergence et le traitement des conflits, au delà du contexte environnemental, sont surtout une question de gouvernance. Le travail présent cherche à répondre aux trois questions de recherche centrales suivantes : (1) Quelles sont les causes politiques, écologiques et socio-économiques structurelles de l'émergence et de l'escalade des conflits autour de l'eau ? (2) Quelles sont les possibilités de médiation, de prévention et de transformation de ces conflits que nous pouvons développer sur la base des connaissances acquises à travers l'étude de cas? Et (3) comment une étude de cas locale peut-elle contribuer au développement d'une approche théorique plus générale et quels enseignements pour l'approche méthodologique pouvons-nous en tirer? L'objectif essentiel de ce travail est de comprendre, à l'exemple du Maroc, comment différents facteurs politiques, sociaux, économiques influencent l'émergence et le déroulement des conflits autour de l'eau. L'étude est organisée en neuf chapitres. Dans un premier temps, nous introduisons la thématique et l'état de la recherche. Au delà de l'impact de la pénurie en eau dans la région du Proche et Moyen Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord nous analysons également le rôle politique particulier de l'agriculture irriguée et les implications sécuritaires de la pénurie. Le deuxième chapitre évalue l'état de la recherche dans trois domaines proches de notre problématique : la recherche sur la sécurité environnementale, les théories de la gestion des biens communs, et la recherche sur les conflits. Sur la base de notre constat des forces et des faiblesses des théories existantes, nous développons notre approche d'analyse et méthodologique et présentons nos hypothèses de travail (chapitre 3). Celles-ci assument qu'une combinaison de processus de marginalisation écologique et socio-économique provoque les conflits autour de l'eau. Nous présumons aussi que le succès d'initiatives de médiation dans ces conflits dépend de la légitimité des intervenants, et que les organisations locales jouent un rôle important à cet égard. Les chapitres 4 et 5 sont consacrés à l'analyse des structures politiques et socio-économiques du Maroc dans le but d'identifier de potentielles causes structurelles de conflits. Le système politique et la position particulière du roi ainsi que ses alliances traditionnelles avec les élites rurales se trouvent au centre du quatrième chapitre. Nous concluons que le système socio- politique marocain se trouve aujourd'hui dans un processus de mutation conditionné par la faible légitimité des institutions démocratiques, la popularité croissante des acteurs de la société civile mais aussi de groupements religieux, et l'émergence d'une nouvelle élite. Le cinquième chapitre se concentre sur les changements dans la politique de l'eau et de l'agriculture et des conflits potentiels qui en résultent. Nous identifions la pénurie en eau, la libéralisation économique, une décentralisation inachevée et les grandes disparités entre les zones rurales et urbaines comme problèmes cruciaux et potentiellement conflictuels du développement rural. L'étude de cas dans la zone du Souss au Sud du Maroc se trouve au centre des chapitres 6 et 7. Dans le sixième chapitre, nous analysons la situation paradoxale de la simultanéité d'une forte dégradation des ressources eau et terre dans la région d'une part, et de son importance stratégique pour les cultures agricoles hautement rentables d'autre part. Dans ce contexte, nous étudions également la marginalisation croissante des petites exploitations agricoles ainsi que les problèmes de la gestion de l'eau. Par ailleurs, nous analysons le projet pilote d'un partenariat public-privé pour l'irrigation. Au-delà de l'étude du montage financier et technique de ce projet, nous révélons également ses implications politiques et environnementales. Dans cette étude de cas, nous avons procédé à l'étude de sources bibliographiques mais surtout aussi à de nombreuses enquêtes de terrain. Le septième chapitre introduit d'abord notre typologie des conflits autour de l'eau et présente ensuite les résultats des enquêtes. Nous concluons entre autres qu'un profond décrochement entre petites et grandes exploitations agricoles a eu lieu dans les dix dernières années et qui s'accentue encore aujourd'hui. Par ailleurs, nous révélons la fréquence de l'affectation des petites, moyennes et grandes exploitations par différents types de conflits d'eau et évaluons le succès de différents médiateurs. Finalement, sur la base de ces données et compte tenu de l'impact du projet de partenariat public-privé, nous évaluons le potentiel de conflits présent et à venir dans cette région. Dans les chapitres 8 et 9, nous tirons les conclusions de notre étude de cas. Nous présentons premièrement les enseignements méthodologiques et analysons ensuite les tendances majeures concernant la continuité et le changement des relations entre la société marocaine, le gouvernement et le roi. Nous concluons le huitième chapitre par une analyse des possibilités d'une transformation des conflits autour de l'eau. Le neuvième et dernier chapitre présente un concept pratique pour l'évaluation et la prévention des conflits autour de l'eau. Dans ce but, nous développons trois principes suivis d'une série de mesures pour leur mise en oeuvre: (1) le développement et la réalisation d'une compréhension globale de la politique de l'eau, (2) un meilleur diagnostic des conflits autour de l'eau et de leurs causes structurelles, ainsi que le soutien à leur transformation, et (3) une modification de la manière d'appréhender les conflits, orientée vers leur potentiel innovateur et de coopération. Finalement, nous résumons les résultats principaux de notre travail, signalons les défis essentiels liés aux conflits de l'eau à l'avenir et proposons des pistes de réflexion pour de nouvelles recherches dans ce domaine.

These complète en allemand : Konflikte um Wasser in Marokko: ökologische und soziopolitische Konfliktursachen sowie Möglichkeiten der Konflikttransformation (Résumé long en français de 73 pages) ; Water scarcity increasingly provokes conflicts with often violent tendencies. As water management is determined by socio-political structures, governance plays a key role in the emergence and resolution of these conflicts. Based on a case-study of water conflicts in Morocco, the key objective of the present study is to understand how different political, ecological and socio-economic factors interact in the dynamics of these disputes. The first of the nine chapters introduces the topic by reviewing the possibilities of measuring water scarcity and its impact. This is done by exploring the situation in the MENA-region, and by analysing the security implications at the international level as well as in the context of broader security concepts. The second chapter evaluates the value of three theoretical approaches to the study of water conflicts: common pool resources theories, environmental security approaches, and conflict research. On the basis of this assessment, the third chapter presents a specific analytical and methodological approach by adapting theories of conflict transformation to the study of water conflicts. Four working hypotheses are developed regarding the root causes of water conflicts, the type of farmers most affected and the potential for mediation. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse potential root causes of water conflicts in Morocco. Chapter 4 concludes that the political system with the particular role of the king and his alliances with rural elites is challenged by the lack of legitimacy of democratic institutions, the increasing influence of civil society and religious actors, and the emergence of new economic elites. Chapter 5 analyses water and agricultural policies in Morocco and concludes that water scarcity, the effects of trade liberalisation, and incomplete decentralisation processes contribute to increasing social disparities and may fuel conflict. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the case of water conflicts in the Souss region in Southern Morocco. The region is highly affected by water scarcity. At the same time, it is of strategic importance to the export-oriented, lucrative citrus fruit production. In this context, the study analyses the increasing marginalisation of small farmers and the problems of public water management, which is challenged by influential private investors and illegal drilling. It also examines the pilot project ElGuerdane for water mobilisation and distribution through a public-private partnership in irrigation. The analysis reviews the project's technical and financial aspects, and its political and environmental implications. Chapter 7 introduces a typology of water conflicts developed on the basis of the author's field research. It then presents the results of the empirical investigations including a large number of expert interviews, the study of six cases of water conflicts, and about 100 standardised interviews with farmers. The chapter concludes that an important marginalisation process of small farmers takes place in the valley, reveals that these farmers are also more often affected by conflicts over irrigation and drinking water, and examines the success of different mediators in this context. Chapter 8 points to the significance of these results for larger socio-political processes in the country and reveals four key trends characterising the changes in the relationships between society, king and government. Furthermore, the perspectives for water conflict transformation and the need for further research are developed. The last chapter presents a practical concept for enhancing conflict sensitivity in the water sector and for preventing violent escalation of tensions. It proposes three overall objectives in this regard: (a) understanding water conflicts as factors of socio-political (de-)stabilisation; (b) identifying conflict potentials and supporting transformation processes; and (c) dealing constructively with water conflicts. Concrete measures are proposed for the implementation of each of these objectives. Finally, the conclusion reviews the main challenges in the study of water conflicts and summarises the key findings. ; La pénurie croissante en eau douce provoque de plus en plus souvent des conflits parfois violents. Compte tenu de la forte influence des structures sociopolitiques locales sur la gestion de l'eau, l'émergence et le traitement des conflits, au delà du contexte environnemental, sont surtout une question de gouvernance. Le travail présent cherche à répondre aux trois questions de recherche centrales suivantes : (1) Quelles sont les causes politiques, écologiques et socio-économiques structurelles de l'émergence et de l'escalade des conflits autour de l'eau ? (2) Quelles sont les possibilités de médiation, de prévention et de transformation de ces conflits que nous pouvons développer sur la base des connaissances acquises à travers l'étude de cas? Et (3) comment une étude de cas locale peut-elle contribuer au développement d'une approche théorique plus générale et quels enseignements pour l'approche méthodologique pouvons-nous en tirer? L'objectif essentiel de ce travail est de comprendre, à l'exemple du Maroc, comment différents facteurs politiques, sociaux, économiques influencent l'émergence et le déroulement des conflits autour de l'eau. L'étude est organisée en neuf chapitres. Dans un premier temps, nous introduisons la thématique et l'état de la recherche. Au delà de l'impact de la pénurie en eau dans la région du Proche et Moyen Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord nous analysons également le rôle politique particulier de l'agriculture irriguée et les implications sécuritaires de la pénurie. Le deuxième chapitre évalue l'état de la recherche dans trois domaines proches de notre problématique : la recherche sur la sécurité environnementale, les théories de la gestion des biens communs, et la recherche sur les conflits. Sur la base de notre constat des forces et des faiblesses des théories existantes, nous développons notre approche d'analyse et méthodologique et présentons nos hypothèses de travail (chapitre 3). Celles-ci assument qu'une combinaison de processus de marginalisation écologique et socio-économique provoque les conflits autour de l'eau. Nous présumons aussi que le succès d'initiatives de médiation dans ces conflits dépend de la légitimité des intervenants, et que les organisations locales jouent un rôle important à cet égard. Les chapitres 4 et 5 sont consacrés à l'analyse des structures politiques et socio-économiques du Maroc dans le but d'identifier de potentielles causes structurelles de conflits. Le système politique et la position particulière du roi ainsi que ses alliances traditionnelles avec les élites rurales se trouvent au centre du quatrième chapitre. Nous concluons que le système socio- politique marocain se trouve aujourd'hui dans un processus de mutation conditionné par la faible légitimité des institutions démocratiques, la popularité croissante des acteurs de la société civile mais aussi de groupements religieux, et l'émergence d'une nouvelle élite. Le cinquième chapitre se concentre sur les changements dans la politique de l'eau et de l'agriculture et des conflits potentiels qui en résultent. Nous identifions la pénurie en eau, la libéralisation économique, une décentralisation inachevée et les grandes disparités entre les zones rurales et urbaines comme problèmes cruciaux et potentiellement conflictuels du développement rural. L'étude de cas dans la zone du Souss au Sud du Maroc se trouve au centre des chapitres 6 et 7. Dans le sixième chapitre, nous analysons la situation paradoxale de la simultanéité d'une forte dégradation des ressources eau et terre dans la région d'une part, et de son importance stratégique pour les cultures agricoles hautement rentables d'autre part. Dans ce contexte, nous étudions également la marginalisation croissante des petites exploitations agricoles ainsi que les problèmes de la gestion de l'eau. Par ailleurs, nous analysons le projet pilote d'un partenariat public-privé pour l'irrigation. Au-delà de l'étude du montage financier et technique de ce projet, nous révélons également ses implications politiques et environnementales. Dans cette étude de cas, nous avons procédé à l'étude de sources bibliographiques mais surtout aussi à de nombreuses enquêtes de terrain. Le septième chapitre introduit d'abord notre typologie des conflits autour de l'eau et présente ensuite les résultats des enquêtes. Nous concluons entre autres qu'un profond décrochement entre petites et grandes exploitations agricoles a eu lieu dans les dix dernières années et qui s'accentue encore aujourd'hui. Par ailleurs, nous révélons la fréquence de l'affectation des petites, moyennes et grandes exploitations par différents types de conflits d'eau et évaluons le succès de différents médiateurs. Finalement, sur la base de ces données et compte tenu de l'impact du projet de partenariat public-privé, nous évaluons le potentiel de conflits présent et à venir dans cette région. Dans les chapitres 8 et 9, nous tirons les conclusions de notre étude de cas. Nous présentons premièrement les enseignements méthodologiques et analysons ensuite les tendances majeures concernant la continuité et le changement des relations entre la société marocaine, le gouvernement et le roi. Nous concluons le huitième chapitre par une analyse des possibilités d'une transformation des conflits autour de l'eau. Le neuvième et dernier chapitre présente un concept pratique pour l'évaluation et la prévention des conflits autour de l'eau. Dans ce but, nous développons trois principes suivis d'une série de mesures pour leur mise en oeuvre: (1) le développement et la réalisation d'une compréhension globale de la politique de l'eau, (2) un meilleur diagnostic des conflits autour de l'eau et de leurs causes structurelles, ainsi que le soutien à leur transformation, et (3) une modification de la manière d'appréhender les conflits, orientée vers leur potentiel innovateur et de coopération. Finalement, nous résumons les résultats principaux de notre travail, signalons les défis essentiels liés aux conflits de l'eau à l'avenir et proposons des pistes de réflexion pour de nouvelles recherches dans ce domaine.

Goals The opinion of the National Board of Fisheries is that the following goals should apply for salmon conservation in the Baltic Sea: a) The short-term goal is to eradicate the acute threat to genetic impoverishment or in certain cases actual elimination, which the majority of wild salmon stocks face today. b) The long-term goal is to utilize the entire natural reproduction potential in every salmon carrying river or part of river. An interim goal set by the Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission is that a level of 50 % of the reproduction capacity in each salmon carrying river should be achieved before the year2010. c) The growth potential in the sea should be made better use of than at present. The state of stocks Most of the wild salmon stocks in the Gulf of Bothnia are in a precarious situation. The outbreak of the so-called M74 syndrome in the early nineties has aggravated the position. The syndrome has now caused extensive mortality over a period of five years and shows no signs of abating. The presumption here must therefore be that the level of mortality will continue to be much the same ashitherto. Strict protection measures are therefore required. The EU's so-called Lassen Report recommends on its part a ban on salmon fishery in the Baltic Sea for the year 1997. The advice of ICES (the ACFM report) concerning recommendations for salmon fishery in 1997 is not available until later this year. In the current report the National Board of Fisheries has among other things acted on biological source material similar to what the ICES Baltic salmon working group has had access to. Measures during 1997 a) Total allowable catch (TAC) On account of the critical situation for the majority of stocks of naturally reproducing salmon in the Baltic Sea, where the M74 syndrome will as far as can be judged remain for a number of years to come, a substantial reduction in catches of such salmon is of vital importance. In view of this and bearing in mind the predetermined interim goal that a level of 50 % of the natural reproduction capacity in each salmon carrying river should be achieved before the year 2010, and also observing established Finnish regulations and proposed Swedish measures in the Bothnian Bay, the Nationa lBoard of Fisheries has worked out alternative TAC levels; 206 000, 262 000 and 314 000 salmons respectively, depending on the efficacy of the coastal fishery regulations decided on by Finland and those now proposed by the National Board of Fisheries. With regard to the uncertainty in these calculations, it would seem appropriate to make to choose a TAC for 1997 at the lower end of the stated interval. This assessment assumes that the coastal fishery regulations mentioned are implemented to the full. The National Board of Fisheries also shows what effects an increased share of catches in the Gulf of Bothnia - within an unchanged total Swedish quota - would have on the exploitation of wild salmon stocks. Any such change would entail reduced exploitation of wild salmon, at all events withthe implementation of the new coastal fishery regulations, i.e. the Finnish ones decided on and the Swedish ones here proposed. Changes in the distribution of quotas between the northern and southern Baltic would also have political allocation consequences, for which reason the Board refrains from submitting a proposal on this matter b) Terminal fishing areas and closed areas In certain areas along the coast of the Bothnian Bay, outside rivers with reared stocks, it is intended to set up so-called terminal fishing areas. In these areas, where the proportion of reared salmon is considerably greater, and of wild salmon considerably smaller than average, extensive fishing canbe conducted on reared salmon over along season. In the terminal fishing areas substantial catches can be made of reared salmon which, with the reduced TAC level now proposed, will in futurere turn to spawn to a greater extent than at present. The proposal entails maintaining, or alternatively extending, existing closed areas outside rivers with wild stocks with a continued ban on salmon fishery for 1997. The intention is to ease the restrictionsas soon as the stock situation allows.The precise extent and limits of the closed areas and terminal fishing areas will be more closely defined in the autumn of 1996. c) Closed seasons etc. The National Board of Fisheries proposes differentiated closed seasons during the early summer for the coastal areas of the Gulf of Bothnia, which in this respect would be divided into three areas. The proposal has taken into consideration the recently approved Finnish regulations. Coastal fishery with a fixed open season, as in the Finnish regulations, has very varying effects in years with early and late spawning migration. For the closed seasons to have the greatest possible effect it is therefore intended to lay down an opening date every year which vairies within ± 10 days. This will be based on the close relationship between the winter-spring water temperature in the southern Baltic and the point in time when the salmon spawning migration starts along the coast of northern Sweden. A forecast of the spawning migration period can be made 1-2 months before the fishery starts in the Gulf of Bothnia. d) The National Board of Fisheries intends to reintroduce a ban on fishing with salmon nets and salmon lines north of 59°30'N in the Baltic Sea, starting from the salmon fishing season in 1996. Such a ban prevailed up to the admission of Sweden to the EU. e) Adipose fin clipping The National Board of Fisheries proposes that all reared salmon released in the Baltic Sea area should be fin clipped for a period of preferably 4 years, or alternatively permanently, if the operationturns out well, as an aid to the management of wild and reared salmon. Adipose fin clipping should be formulated as an international project so as best to be able to synchronise the time-limited project and maximise the outcome for future management. f) Delayed release The National Board of Fisheries proposes that the trials with delayed release should now be intensified throughout the actual Baltic Sea. Danish trials off Bornholm have shown very favourable results. Sweden should be able to contribute know-how in the implementation of the trials. The Board is of the opinion that funds should be available from the EU for this matter. Measures from 1998 and onwards a) Implementation of the "salmon package" The National Board of Fisheries proposes that the so-called salmon package, with a central closed area in the actual Baltic Sea and fishing for reared salmon in accordance with the delayed release method, be implemented under joint international action. By this means it is possible both to preserve naturally reproducing salmon stocks and to maintain and in the long run to increase profitable professional fishing for salmon in the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the increased return migration of salmon to the natural salmon rivers will have a considerable effect on employment by facilitating the development of extensive fishing by tourists. b) Greater mesh size If the so-called salmon package is not implemented, a considerable increase in the mesh size of salmon nets is proposed (to a magnitude of 225 mm, similar to what has been proposed in Finland). Research and investigation needs It is proposed that the following projects be implemented: - To be able to minimise catches of wild salmon in the proposed terminal fishing areas, it is important that they are demarcated in the best possible manner. For this to be possible all available information should be utilized to the full. This means that tagging data, information on wild salmon migration etc must be compiled before the final formulation of these areas can take place in the autumn of 1996. - Plans should be drawn up for the implementation of enhancement releases to a greater extent than today if the proposed fishery regulations do not come into force or the measures do not have the desired effect on the size of stocks. The plans should be drawn up in 1996 -1997 and they should be implemented before the year 2000 if the size of stocks does not increase in the way intended. One fundamental objective is that the releases should be temporary. - It should be investigated whether the establishment of goals for the quantity of spawning fish (escapement) for individual wild salmon stocks is a suitable management instrument. It is partly a question of the theoretical background, but also the practical formulation, e.g. measuring how the goal is achieved and consequences for management dependent on whether the goal is achieved or not. - One or two Swedish salmon rivers in the Baltic Sea area should be established as so-called indexrivers, where the salmon stocks are followed particularly closely over a long period. This means among other things that return migration, parr production and smolt migration are monitored annually over a long succession of years. In these rivers survival during various phases of life can be studied closely.

U članku se objavljuje nalaz capsellae reliquiarum iz oltara crkve sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Kaštel Gomilici. Potvrđuje se Farlatijev navod o posveti crkve (podignute nad ostacima ranokršćanske bazilike) koju je izvršio splitski nadbiskup Abšalon 1160. godine. Autor razmatra pitanje njenih titulara iznoseći pretpostavku da je izbor moći pohranjenih u relikvijaru bio svojevrsni politički ulog rečenog nadbiskupa (ugarskog podrijetla) osobito radi činjenice da su u capselli i moći ugarskog sv. Stjepana Kralja, a da su Marija, te sv. Kuzma i Damjan suzaštitnici splitske katedrale. U članku se analiziraju tipološke odlike gomiličkog oltara u odnosu na poziciju sepulchruma, pa ga se uspoređuje s istovremenim u regiji. Autor izvodi široki ekskurs o pojavi kulta sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Splitu, i na teme "svetačke topografije" unutar Dioklecijanove palače na razmeđu kasne antike i ranog srednjeg vijeka. Kaštelanska crkvica, posvećena relikvijama iz splitske katedrale, interpretira se kao svojevrsni relei gradske političke moći u ageru. ; U članku se objavljuje nalaz capsellae reliquiarum iz oltara crkve sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Kaštel Gomilici. Potvrđuje se Farlatijev navod o posveti crkve (podignute nad ostacima ranokršćanske bazilike) koju je izvršio splitski nadbiskup Abšalon 1160. godine. Autor razmatra pitanje njenih titulara iznoseći pretpostavku da je izbor moći pohranjenih u relikvijaru bio svojevrsni politički ulog rečenog nadbiskupa (ugarskog podrijetla) osobito radi činjenice da su u capselli i moći ugarskog sv. Stjepana Kralja, a da su Marija, te sv. Kuzma i Damjan suzaštitnici splitske katedrale. U članku se analiziraju tipološke odlike gomiličkog oltara u odnosu na poziciju sepulchruma, pa ga se uspoređuje s istovremenim u regiji. Autor izvodi široki ekskurs o pojavi kulta sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Splitu, i na teme •svetačke topografije• unutar Dioklecijanove palače na razmeđu kasne antike i ranog srednjeg vijeka. Kaštelanska crkvica, posvećena relikvijama iz splitske katedrale, interpretira se kao svojevrsni relei gradske političke moći u ageru. Recentemente in una piccola cripta sullo stipite dell'altare della chiesa romanica dei Santi Cosma e Damiano a Kaštel Gomilica è stata scoperta una cassettina di piombo (7 x 4 x 3 cm), del cui contenuto e scopo parla l'iscrizione finemente intagliata, in caratteri carolini minuscoli del XII secolo: HIC SVNT RELIQUIIE SCE MARIE VIRIGINIS SCCS MA/RTIRV COSME l ET DAMIANI l ET SCI STEFA/NI REGIS Il ritrovamento è confermato da una fonte di Farlati che riferisce come la chiesa di S. Cosma e Damiano fosse stata consacrata dall'arcivescovo spalatino Absalon nell'anno 1160, e come la sua costruzione fosse stata iniziata dalle monache del convento di S. Benedetto con il permesso del loro predecessore Gaudio (1138-1158). La chiesetta stessa fu innalzata sui resti di una basilica tardoantica, ma gli scavi archeologici hanno dimostrato che nella vita di questa località vi è una chiara discontinuità. Sarà per questo probabile che vi sia stata una ripresa in epoca romanica. Rimane, dunque, inspiegato se già la basilica paleocristiana di Gomilica fosse intitolata ai santi Cosma e Damiano. Considerato che l'articolo mette in luce come le reliquie custodite nella capsella appena scoperta, fossero state prescelte in base ad un certo programma chiave dell'arcivescovo Absalon (è fondamentale l'indicazione: reliquie di santo Stefano Re), l'autore illustra innanzitutto la tradizione del culto di S. Cosma e Damiano all'interno del palazzo di Diocleziano a Spalato. Cvito Fisković ha tormulato di recente l'attraente ipotesi che il culto di S. Cosma e Damiano potesse essere una particolare derivazione - traduzione del culto di Esculapio nel palazzo tardoantico dell'imperatore Diocleziano, che dedicò a tale divinità, secondo la testimonianza di Torna Arcidiacono, il tempietto che sorgeva di fronte al suo mausoleo. Sullo sviluppo del culto cristiano nel Palazzo, oggi si può veramente dire qualcosa di più. L'autore avanza l'ipotesi che le chiesette di S. Teodoro e S. Martino risalgano al tardoantico. Entrambi i titolari hanno carattere specificamente militare. A Spalato il primo è collegato alla guardia bizantina che difendeva la Porta Ferrea del palazzo di Diocleziano. Il secondo, S. Martino - protettore dei soldati, dei sarti e dei tessitori - la chiesetta del quale a Spalato si trova sopra la Porta Aurea, potrebbe essere collegato all'esistenza documentata (proprio nella parte settentrionale del Palazzo) di una bottega per la produzione di tessuti di cui si ricorda il Procurator gynaecii Jovensis Dalmatiae Asphalatho. I gynaecarii erano per lo più condannati - con status di lavoratori. Generalmente parlando, soldati, lapicidi, porporai, tessitori - gli abitanti del Palazzo nei suoi primi secoli - erano il ceto ideale per accogliere il mistero cristiano. L'autore, dunque, pensa che a Spalato come altrove i gynaecarii erano riuniti in una corporazione di cui S. Martino poteva essere il protettore più conveniente. Oltre che dalla diffusione generale del culto di entrambi i santi ricordati in epoca tardoantica, l'ipotesi è convalidata da una notevole concentrazione di spolia paleocristiani presso entrambe le chiesette. L'autore in questo excursus va ancora oltre. Nella letteratura è stato più volte citato il bizzarro racconto di Amiano Marcellino, su come nell'anno 356 una donna denunciasse suo marito Danus e su come fosse stato condannato a morte, per delitto di Jaesa maiestatis avendo rubato la tenda rossa dal sarcofago dell'imperatore nel suo mausoleo. La storia è utilizzata solitamente per provare che Diocleziano fece costruire il tempio ottagonale, che più tardi sarebbe diventato la cattedrale di Spalato, come suo sepolcro e che vi era effettivamente stato seppellito. Non è mai stata, stranamente, posta la questione del motivo per cui Danus rubo il drappo cremisi dalla tomba di Diocleziano, pur essendo evidente che non poteva trattarsi di un furto motivato da interessi venali con la stoffa imperiale color cremisi, non si potevano cucire abiti da portare in pubblico. Si tratto molto probabilmente di un cosciente atto di profanazione, di un intervento di vendetta cristiana sul sarcofago dell'imperatore che per le sue posizioni contrarie al cristianesimo sarebbe rimasto profondamente impresso nella memoria dei secoli successivi come il più efferato persecutore dei cristiani. Lo scritto di Marcellino potrebbe essere proprio la significativa dimostrazione dell'inizio del regolamento dei conti del cristianesimo con le reliquie del paganesimo all'interno del Palazzo. L'autore, continuando, richiama l'attenzione sul fatto che il piccolo concilium sanctorum dei protettori di Spalato con Maria alla testa (la cattedrale è intitolata alla Assunzione di Maria) era costituito da due coppie: accanto a S. Domnio e Anastasio, S. Cosma e Damiano. Nelle analisi delle origini e delle funzioni,:P.ei culti dei santi nell'eta tardoantica è stato fatto notare come molte communità paleocristiane sottolineavano volentieri il fatto di avere nef loro centri più santi, e di scegliere spesso come protettori coppie di santi (Gervasio e Protasio a Milano, Pietro e Paolo a Roma, Felice e Fortunato ad Aquileia . . ). Peter Brown fa rilevare come tale scelta fosse cosciente: "la festività di due santi era la celebrazione della concordia all'interno di una città in potenza profondamente disunita ." L'autore ha trovato un'interessante suggerimento per tale interpretazione nell'analisi del rapporto insolitamente complesso tra S. Grisogono e S. Anastasia a Zara. Nella ricchissima scelta di reliquie che gli poterono essere offerte al principio del IX secolo, quando giunse a Costantinopoli come mediatore tra Carlo Magno e l'imperatore Nicoforo, il vescovo di Zara Donato, scelse certamente con molta attenzione le reliquie di S. Anastasia, in quanto il" suo pari", tutto considerato, doveva già trovarsi a Zara. L'autore ritienne che Donato non ebbe in mente tanto l'unione dopo la morte di Grisogono e Anastasia, quanto una specie di neutralizzazione dell'influenza "ideologica" che avevano in città le reliquie di S. Grisogono, giunte da Aquileia. In verità, le reliquie del santo scomparvero e più tardi furono nuovamente scoperte con un singolare miracolo. Ma qui siamo già di fronte ad un classico topos agiografico - il nuovo ritrovamento del corpo di un santo. Tutto questo excursus serve all'autore per formulare le seguenti osservazioni: se i santi Cosmia e Damiano, come titolari della chiesetta di Gomilica, sono eventualmente anche più antichi della sua consacrazione nel 1160, le reliquie nella capsella ritrovata sono sicuramen te, come le reliquie della Santa Vergine Maria, giunte dalla cattedrale di Spalato - al tempo dell'arcivescovo Absalon che arrivò a Spalato dall'Ungheria, e se ne allontanò con il riaffermarsi del potere bizantino sulla città. Le reliquie di S. Stefano, re d'Ungheria, si possono ritenere, con certezza, come parte del particolare ruolo politico affidato all'arcivescovo, uno dei tanti nella linea filo-ungherese che nel corso del XII secolo stette a capo della cattedrale spalatina. La costruzione della chiesetta a Kaštel Gomilica alla metà del XII secolo e lu sua consacrazione nel 1160, non si svolse, sicuramente, nel vuoto! Faceva parte della nuova politica integrale della chiesa, di un'epoca di consolidamento politico-sociale dei rapporti tra la città e lo spazio retrostante, il tempo che preparò il rinnovamento della maggior parte delle nostre cattedrali, e in cui il numero dei luoghi di culto cristiani nella campagna intorno alle città adriatiche aumentò di colpo. L'autore dà un breve guadro delle tappe più significative che dimostrano quanto il tour de force della città e delle sue chiese riuscì a penetrare nel territorio circostante. Esso fu ricoperto da una rete di chiesette nuove o rinnovate. Tramite la diffusione di particelle di santi trasportate in simili recipienti e cassettine in miniatura, si conquistavano e consacravano nuovi spazi. La chiesa negli spazi extra-urbani diventa un ripetitore del potere cittadino. L' "archeologia devozionale" rinnovava le relazioni con l'epoca eroica del primo cristianesimo. Il topos del ritrovamento e del rinnovamento di una delle località cristiane già consacrate, coincideva a suo modo con il topos del ritrovamento del santo protettore perso. Era questo indubbiamente anche il modo p iù breve di riconnotare uno spazio. Dopo l'interpretazione dell'iscrizione sulla capsella, l'autore, infine analizza le caratteristiche tipologiche dell'altare della chiesa di Kaštel Gomilica.

"This file contains the following press articles: 1) "Facts Kept from Mexico by Carranza. Rigid Censorship has been Placed on Newspapers, Letters and Telegrams"". THE SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, San Antonio, Texas, U.S. August 26, 1919 denounces the censorship imposed by Venustiano Carranza who does not allow a single U.S. newspaper to pass through and warns of the possible Spanish publication of the military pact between Scott and Obregón and notes that this would force Alvaro Obregón to reveal the facts as they were. 2) Statement to the press made by Gen. Obregón comparing his attitude against the hoarders in Mexico City in 1915 and those in 1919 who took the United States Government. 3) ""Mexico's Latest Bid for Attention"". THE LITERARY DIGEST. August 30, 1919. Analysis of the relationship between Mexico and the United States; oil company problems; and the attitude of the Carranza's government toward them. Also analyzes Carrancista politics, his zone of influence, Villa's power, and the inability of the government to apprehend him. 4) """Treaty Opponents Win New Votes; Carranza Warned on Intervention. Conflict is Predicted by Gen. Alvarado"". LOS ANGELES EXAMINER. Los Angeles, Cal., U.S. Sept. 6, 1919. Comments on an open letter that Gen. Salvador Alvarado addresses to Carranza, Gen. Obregón and Gen. González warning them of an imminent U.S. invasion if they do not pacify the population.He accuses Carranza of corruption and pushing his personal agenda; he considers the most serious problems of the country to be: the pacification, the organization of the army, the settlement of internal and external debt, problems concerning oil, complaints, the banking question; he demands that Obregón and González abandon the election campaign. 5) "Mex. Civil War in 6 Months Predicted". EVENING HERALD. Los Angeles, CA, U.S. Sept 6, 1919. He claims that if Mexico does not control banditry, the United States will have to intervene or civil war is inevitable. 6) "Claim Cantu gave U.S. False Report"". LOS ANGELES EVENING HERALD. Los Angeles, CA., U.S. Sept. 10, 1919. Reports of the kidnapping of two American pilots and the authorization that Governor Esteban Cantú gave to American troops to search for the missing pilots in Mexican territory. 7) "The History of the Oilfields. The vicissitudes of the Prospectors and the detestable laws that affect them are aired." Translation of an article (whose original version was not found) from THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR. Tucson, AZ, U.S. Sept. 12, 1919. Report on the statement made by Mr. E.H. Doheny, President of the Mexican Oil Company to the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations of the American Senate, in which he details the history of the oil fields and the vicissitudes they have had to overcome due to banditry as much as laws and decrees issued by Carranza. O'Doheny reports that he has had to pay rebellious bosses to receive protection and suggests that some Americans had received money from the Carranza government to work for Mexico. 8) Gen. Alvaro Obregón's interviews given to Mr. Kent Hunter, representative of the CHICAGO TRIBUNE newspaper. Typed copy in English with questions and responses. Gen. Alvaro Obregón answers questions concerning internal and external politics, and the position he will take on various issues if he is elected President. 9) ""Obregon's Argument is Shallow for the Facts are Against Him"". EL PASO HERALD. El Paso, TX, U.S. Sept. 13-14, 1919. Comments on the message Gen. Obregón gave to the American people in which he recognizes it would have been of great importance if he advocated against a Military intervention of the U.S., only if he becomes President of Mexico; they accuse him of not considering the outrage and death suffered by thousands of US citizens in Mexico and affirm that if a military intervention happens, it is to defend those lives. They acknowledge that Gen. Obregón is interested in harmonious relations with the United States due to the chickpea business he manages with U.S. merchants. 10) ""Plot Charge Traced to Mexico. Author Admits his Evidence Came from Publisher of Carranza Organ"". Information about the statement made by Mr. L.J. Debekker to the subcommittee of the Senate in charge of investigating Mexico. 11) "Obregon's Message". THE SAN ANTONIO LIGHT. San Antonio, TX, U.S. Sept. 15, 1919. Comments on the message given to the American people by Gen. Alvaro Obregón and the politics between the two nations. 12) Telegram signed by the A.P. informing of the progress of the presidential campaigns of Gen. Obregón and Gen. González. / Este legajo contiene los siguientes artículos de prensa: 1) ""Facts Kept from Mexico by Carranza. Rigid Censorship has been Placed on Newspapers, Letters and Telegrams"". THE SANANTONIO LIGHT, San Antonio, Tex., E.U.A. Agosto 26, 1919. Denuncia la censura impuesta por Venustiano Carranza que no permite pasar ni un periódico norteamericano y previene sobre la posible publicación en español del pacto militar celebrado entre Scott y Obregón y advierte que ello obligaría a Alvaro Obregón a revelar tal como fueron los hechos. 2) Declaración a la prensa que hace el Gral. Obregón comparando su actitud contra los acaparadores en la ciudad de México en 1915 y la que en 1919 toma el gobierno de los Estados Unidos. 3) ""Mexico's Latest Bid for Attention"". THE LITERARY DIGEST. Agosto 30, 1919. Análisis de las relaciones México-Estados Unidos; el problema de las compañías petroleras y la actitud del gobierno de Carranza ante ellas. Analiza también la política carrancista, su zona de influencia, el poder de Villa y la ineficacia del gobierno para detenerlo. 4) ""Treaty Opponents Win New Votes; Carranza Warned on Intervention. Conflict is Predicted by Gen. Alvarado"". LOS ANGELES EXAMINER. Los Angeles, Cal., E.U.A. Sept. 6, 1919. Comentan carta abierta que el Gral. Salvador Alvarado dirige a Carranza y a los Grales. Obregón y González advirtiéndoles de una inminente intervención norteamericana si no se dan seguridades a la población. Acusa a Carranza por la corrupción y por su política personalista; considera que los más graves problemas del país son: la pacificación, la organización del ejército, el arreglo de la deuda interior y exterior, el problema del petróleo, el de las reclamaciones, la cuestión bancaria; pide a Obregón y a González que abandonen la contienda electoral. 5) ""Mex. Civil War in 6 Months Predicted"". EVENING HERALD. Los Angeles, Cal., E.U.A. Sept. 6, 1919. Anuncian que si México no controla el bandidaje, los Estados Unidos deberán intervenir o la guerra civil es inevitable. 6) ""Claim Cantu gave U.S. False Report"". LOS ANGELES EVENING HERALD. Los Angeles, Cal., E.U.A. Sept. 10, 1919. Informa del secuestro de dos aviadores norteamericanos y de la autorización que el Gobernador Esteban Cantú da a tropas americanas para que los busquen en territorio mexicano. 7) ""La Historia de los Campos Petroleros. Se ventilan las vicisitudes de los Prospectadores y la Leyes Detestables que los Afectan"". Traducción de un artículo (cuyo original no se encontró) del THE ARIZONA DAILY STAR. Tucson, Ariz. E.U.A. Sept. 12, 1919. Informan de la declaración que rindió el Sr. E.H. Doheny, Presidente de la Compañía Petrolera Mexicana Limitada, ante el Sub-Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado Norteamericano, en la que hace una historia de los campos petroleros y las vicisitudes que han tenido que sortear tanto por el bandolerismo como por las leyes y decretos expedidos por Carranza. Relata O'Doheny como ha tenido necesidad de pagar a jefes rebeldes para recibir protección e insinúa que algunos norteamericanos habían recibido dinero del gobierno de Carranza para trabajar a favor de México. 8) Entrevista concedida al Sr. Kent Hunter, representante del periódico CHICAGO TRIBUNE por el Gral. Alvaro Obregón. Copia mecanográfica en inglés con las preguntas y respuestas. El Gral. Alvaro Obregón contesta preguntas relativas a política interna y externa y a la actitud que adoptará en caso de llegar a ser Presidente, ante diversas cuestiones. 9) ""Obregon's Argument is Shallow for the Facts are Against Him"". EL PASO HERALD. El Paso, Tex., E.U.A. Sept. 13-14, 1919. Comentarios al mensaje que dirigió el Gral. Obregón al pueblo norteamericano en el que se reconoce que tendría gran importancia el que el Gral. Obregón se hubiera pronunciado en contra de la intervención de los E.U.A., únicamente si llegara a ser Presidente de México; lo acusan de no considerar los atropellos y muerte que han sufrido miles de ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos en México y afirman que si se da una intervención es para defender esas vidas; reconocen que el interés que el Gral. Obregón tiene en la buena armonía de las relaciones México-Estados Unidos se debe a que sus negocios de venta de garbanzo los hace con comerciantes norteamericanos. 10) ""Plot Charge Traced to Mexico. Author Admits his Evidence Came from Publisher of Carranza Organ"". Información sobre la declaración que rindió el Sr. L.J. Debekker ante la Sub-Comisión del Senado encargado de investigar a México. 11) ""Obregon's Message"". THE SAN ANTONIO LIGHT. San Antonio, Tex., E.U.A. Sept. 15, 1919. Comentarios al mensaje del Gral. Alvaro Obregón al pueblo de los Estados Unidos y a la política entre ambos pueblos. 12) Cable firmado por la A.P., informando del desarrollo de las campañas para la Presidencia de los Generales Obregón y González."