El estudio a continuación propuesto se enmarca dentro del campo de investigación relacionado con las fuerzas que delimitan la asignación locativa de las actividades residencial y terciaria en el interior de la ciudad tradicional. Estas actividades normalmente se implantan en el límite de las libertades que el planeamiento urbanístico establece para cada una de ellas. No obstante, su relación e interacción espacial mantienen en gran medida la estabilidad productiva y el equilibrio del sistema interno de la ciudad. En este sentido, el propósito general de la presente tesis es dimensionar y enlazar las causas y resultados de la congruencia entre las actividades residencial y terciaria dentro de un espacio urbano definido a partir de un contexto locacional existente. De lo anterior se desprende que el estudio de un entorno urbanístico y formalmente concluido, invariablemente, exigirá tomar posición frente a una situación que marcha impulsada por un flujo equilibrado de inercia económica y funcional. De hecho: la hipótesis general de este trabajo se empeña en demostrar la capacidad de las actividades residencial y terciaria en cuanto a su positiva influencia en la renovación potencial de la estructura urbana en el espacio central de la ciudad de Barcelona. La investigación establece un marco teórico relacionado con la valoración apreciativa de la extensión o concentración, de la actividad terciaria en un contexto físico-espacial. En orden a demostrar su favorable repercusión sobre el producto inmobiliario residencial. Mediante un estudio empírico, se clarificará en que medida el uso terciario del suelo urbano condiciona el valor del producto inmobiliario residencial, y como la utilización mixta del suelo puede repercutir sobre un medio ambiente concreto. Provocando un plusvalor o una suboptimización de la función residencial y del producto arquitectónico. Metodológicamente, se plantea el análisis e identificación de las singularidades contextuales de los valores inmobiliarios residenciales expuestos a procesos de terciarización. Y como estas externalidades pueden actuar económicamente sobre el segmento central de la ciudad de Barcelona. A partir de este horizonte conceptual y metodológico, se pueden tratar algunas cuestiones de gran interés y actualidad urbanística como es: el incremento de plusvalía que experimenta el producto inmobiliario central al verse influido tanto por un efecto coyuntural -que incrementa el precio del producto edificado-, como también por una acción terciarizadora - aleatoria o específica- que aumenta el valor y calidad del entorno construido. Este supuesto académico entiende la ciudad como un producto espacial edificado. Sin que ello presuma, de ningún modo, entenderla sólo como una mercancía sujeta a procesos de naturaleza financiera y proyectual vinculada a un modelo de producción neocapitalista. En este sentido, el espíritu académico que impulsa la presente tesis se encuentra en: viabilizar una vía de predicción y diagnóstico para la implementación y diseño de políticas de planificación residencial en relación con el efecto positivo que origina una acción económica dirigida -en este caso la terciaria- sobre un espacio céntrico. En orden a conocer de que manera y ante que condiciones o acciones económicas específicas tiende a ocurrir una cierta reacción o transformación urbanística-residencial espacialmente cuantificable. Consiguiendo, con ello, identificar en que medida las condiciones en el producto inmobiliario residencial resultan alteradas por la acción terciaria de un modo concreto. Y cómo debido a esta acción se verá también afectado el comportamiento espacial de la ciudad central y de los valores urbanos en un nivel general. Así, la investigación sostiene que: la plusvalía inmobiliaria de los espacios centrales es el agente principal de conservación y reproducción urbana. Y que el excedente económico generado en el interior de la ciudad permite potenciar y mejorar el espacio construido contribuyendo a producir nuevas centralidades en la ciudad. ; The study proposed in this doctoral thesis it is framed inside the investigation field with the forces that locate the assignment of the residential and tertiary activities into the traditional city of Barcelona. These activities are usually implanted in the limit of the freedoms that the urban planning allow for each one of them. Nevertheless, their relationship and space interaction maintain, in great measure, the productive stability and the balance of the inner city. In this sense, the purpose of the present thesis is to measure and connect the causes and results of the location consistency between the residential and tertiary activities defined into the central urban space. In fact, the study of a inner city environment will demand to take position in front of a situation that goes impelled by a balanced flow between urban economic and urban functions. The hypothesis of this work attemp to demonstrate the capacity of the residential and tertiary activities to its positive influence in the potential renovation of the urban structure in the inner city space. The investigation establishes a theoretical topic related with the appreciative valuation of the extension, or concentration, of the tertiary activity. Located in a physical and space context in order to demonstrate their positive repercussion in fornt of the real state product. By means of an empiric study, it will be clarified the tertiary use of urban land. And also will be measure the value of the real state product into the inner city environment. That cause a increased value, or a devaluation, of the residential product. The analysis make oneself clear the identification of contextual singularities between residential real state values and tertiary processes pre sent in Barcelona city. Starting from this conceptual and methodological horizon, it can be able to explain some questions of great interest: like the appreciation increment value of the central real state product, or the influenced of a locative effect that increases the price and quality of the urban center built environment. This supposition understands the city like a built space product. In this sense, the academic spirit that impels the present thesis is: to viability a prediction and a diagnostic for the implementation of a political residential planning. In connection with the positive effect that originates an economic action directed into a central space. In this way, the thesis sustains that: the real state appreciation of the central space of Barcelona is the main agent of conservation for urban reproduction. And that the internal economic generated inside the inner city improve the built space, contributing to produce news and betters downtown areas in the city. ; Postprint (published version)
Membres du Jury M. Louis Brigand, Professeur à l'université de Bretagne occidentale, examinateur M. Jean-Christophe Gay, Professeur à l'université Montpellier III, rapporteur M. Jean-Claude Giacottino, Professeur à l'université de Provence, examinateur M. Christian Huetz de Lemps, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, président du jury M. Philippe Pelletier, Professeur à l'université Lyon II, rapporteur M. André-Louis Sanguin, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, tuteur de l'HDR ; The research volume entitled "Research on the small insular spaces and their regional organisation" comprises two parts. The first is centred around a dual question : what is an island ? What are its scientific specificies ? These questions have haunted a number of research scientists and others will probably continue to pose them. Three main entries have enabled us to delimit these questions. A first chapter will be engaged in the study of basic concepts which are isolation, size, insularity, insularism and islandness before positing a definition of what an island is or at least what small island spaces are. The two other chapters deal with the wider themes of fragmentation, periphericity ,dependence and vulnerability. Short of being perfectly specific to islands, these themes enable nevertheless the definition of these terms using a systemic method. The second part is more methodological and inductive. It will contribute to the reflection of what regionalisation is in general (chapter one) and on regionalisation in island milieu in particular (chapter two). The posit at the start, which should lead to the completion of an analysis on regional organisation, is that of the lack of conceptual tools and empirical evidence. One is doubly preoccupied, on the one hand by the need to draw the quintessence of our analytical descriptions of the terrain of study of regional island cooperation in the world and, on the other hand, by the need to elaborate a detailed schema (chapter III) which has a general outlook, using specific influences. The approach is both diachronic and synchronic. This schema of the regional cooperation system which we have designed is applicable to other spaces than those of islands. It presents the advantage of being able to adapt itself to various forms of regionalisation which are organised between States around continents, oceans and seas held in common. It seems today evident that the process of regional cooperation is an integral part of development and the integration of nation states into the international system. The most vulnerable of states, whether they be islands or not, like the superpowers, are all engaged in similar enterprises of economic or political development and integration. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to dictate laws or to establish norms which would regulate these regonal relations and even less international. The conclusion to this paper, in order to be qualified for Competence to supervise research (doctorate level), is a constructive proposition opening onto concrete perspectives of application of our past and future research work. It is based on the principle that the dispersion and the fragmentation on a national level of data and human resources concern small states and territories. It will focus on the possibility of setting up a Research and Study Centre of Small States in the World in order to federate research scientists as well as their documentary and financial resources. ; Ce mémoire d'habilitation à diriger des recherches se compose de trois volumes. Le premier est la synthèse, avec ses lignes de forces et ses faiblesses, avec ses contradictions et ses accords, de nos activités scientifiques, pédagogiques et administratives sur la période 1989-2003. Le second est un travail original de recherche dont nous produisons ici un résumé. Le troisième est un recueil de nos publications (24 articles, un ouvrage et 12 comptes rendus de lecture). Le volume de recherche intitulé "Recherches sur les petits espaces insulaires et sur leurs organisations régionales" se compose de deux parties. La première s'articule autour d'une double interrogation : qu'est-ce une île ? qu'en est-il de ses spécificités scientifiques ? Ces questions de nombreux chercheurs se les sont posées et d'autres après eux les aborderont sans doute encore. Trois entrées principales nous ont permis de cerner ces questions. Un premier chapitre s'attelle à retravailler les concepts de base que sont l'isolement, la taille, l'insularité, l'insularisme et l'îléité pour déboucher sur une définition possible de l'île ou tout au moins des petits espaces insulaires. Les deux autres chapitres s'articulent autour des grands thèmes de la fragmentation, de la périphéricité, de la dépendance et de la vulnérabilité. À défaut d'êtres parfaitement spécifiques aux îles, ces thèmes permettent néanmoins de les qualifier en adoptant une démarche systémique. La deuxième partie est davantage méthodologique et inductive que la première. Elle contribue à une réflexion sur la régionalisation en général (chapitre I) et sur la régionalisation en milieu insulaire en particulier (chapitre II). Le constat de départ, pour mener à bien une analyse des organisations régionales, est celui d'une carence d'outils conceptuels et des lacunes empiriques. La préoccupation est double, d'une part tirer une quintessence de nos descriptions analytiques de terrain de l'étude de la coopération régionale insulaire dans le monde et, d'autre part, élaborer un schéma explicatif (chapitre III) ayant une portée générale à partir des influences particulières rencontrées. L'approche est aussi bien diachronique que synchronique. Le schéma du système de coopération régionale que nous avons conçu est applicable à d'autres espaces que ceux qui sont insulaires. Il présente l'avantage de s'adapter aux diverses formes de régionalisation qui s'organisent entre États d'un même ensemble continental ou autour des océans et des mers. Il est aujourd'hui évident que les processus de coopération régionale sont une composante majeure du développement et de l'intégration des États-nations au système international. Les États les plus vulnérables, qu'ils soient ou non insulaires, comme les superpuissances, sont tous engagés dans des entreprises similaires d'approfondissement et d'intégration économique ou politique. Néanmoins, il semble difficile de dicter des lois et d'établir des normes qui régiraient les relations régionales et a fortiori internationales. La conclusion de ce travail d'habilitation à diriger des recherches est une proposition constructive ouvrant sur des perspectives concrètes d'application de nos recherches passées et à venir. Elle se fonde sur le constat de la dispersion et la fragmentation au plan national des données et des ressources humaines concernant les petits États et territoires. Il s'agirait donc de créer un Centre d'études et de recherche sur les petits États dans le monde (CÉRPÉM) pour fédérer les chercheurs, les ressources documentaires et financières.
Membres du Jury M. Louis Brigand, Professeur à l'université de Bretagne occidentale, examinateur M. Jean-Christophe Gay, Professeur à l'université Montpellier III, rapporteur M. Jean-Claude Giacottino, Professeur à l'université de Provence, examinateur M. Christian Huetz de Lemps, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, président du jury M. Philippe Pelletier, Professeur à l'université Lyon II, rapporteur M. André-Louis Sanguin, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, tuteur de l'HDR ; The research volume entitled "Research on the small insular spaces and their regional organisation" comprises two parts. The first is centred around a dual question : what is an island ? What are its scientific specificies ? These questions have haunted a number of research scientists and others will probably continue to pose them. Three main entries have enabled us to delimit these questions. A first chapter will be engaged in the study of basic concepts which are isolation, size, insularity, insularism and islandness before positing a definition of what an island is or at least what small island spaces are. The two other chapters deal with the wider themes of fragmentation, periphericity ,dependence and vulnerability. Short of being perfectly specific to islands, these themes enable nevertheless the definition of these terms using a systemic method. The second part is more methodological and inductive. It will contribute to the reflection of what regionalisation is in general (chapter one) and on regionalisation in island milieu in particular (chapter two). The posit at the start, which should lead to the completion of an analysis on regional organisation, is that of the lack of conceptual tools and empirical evidence. One is doubly preoccupied, on the one hand by the need to draw the quintessence of our analytical descriptions of the terrain of study of regional island cooperation in the world and, on the other hand, by the need to elaborate a detailed schema (chapter III) which has a general outlook, using specific influences. The approach is both diachronic and synchronic. This schema of the regional cooperation system which we have designed is applicable to other spaces than those of islands. It presents the advantage of being able to adapt itself to various forms of regionalisation which are organised between States around continents, oceans and seas held in common. It seems today evident that the process of regional cooperation is an integral part of development and the integration of nation states into the international system. The most vulnerable of states, whether they be islands or not, like the superpowers, are all engaged in similar enterprises of economic or political development and integration. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to dictate laws or to establish norms which would regulate these regonal relations and even less international. The conclusion to this paper, in order to be qualified for Competence to supervise research (doctorate level), is a constructive proposition opening onto concrete perspectives of application of our past and future research work. It is based on the principle that the dispersion and the fragmentation on a national level of data and human resources concern small states and territories. It will focus on the possibility of setting up a Research and Study Centre of Small States in the World in order to federate research scientists as well as their documentary and financial resources. ; Ce mémoire d'habilitation à diriger des recherches se compose de trois volumes. Le premier est la synthèse, avec ses lignes de forces et ses faiblesses, avec ses contradictions et ses accords, de nos activités scientifiques, pédagogiques et administratives sur la période 1989-2003. Le second est un travail original de recherche dont nous produisons ici un résumé. Le troisième est un recueil de nos publications (24 articles, un ouvrage et 12 comptes rendus de lecture). Le volume de recherche intitulé "Recherches sur les petits espaces insulaires et sur leurs organisations régionales" se compose de deux parties. La première s'articule autour d'une double interrogation : qu'est-ce une île ? qu'en est-il de ses spécificités scientifiques ? Ces questions de nombreux chercheurs se les sont posées et d'autres après eux les aborderont sans doute encore. Trois entrées principales nous ont permis de cerner ces questions. Un premier chapitre s'attelle à retravailler les concepts de base que sont l'isolement, la taille, l'insularité, l'insularisme et l'îléité pour déboucher sur une définition possible de l'île ou tout au moins des petits espaces insulaires. Les deux autres chapitres s'articulent autour des grands thèmes de la fragmentation, de la périphéricité, de la dépendance et de la vulnérabilité. À défaut d'êtres parfaitement spécifiques aux îles, ces thèmes permettent néanmoins de les qualifier en adoptant une démarche systémique. La deuxième partie est davantage méthodologique et inductive que la première. Elle contribue à une réflexion sur la régionalisation en général (chapitre I) et sur la régionalisation en milieu insulaire en particulier (chapitre II). Le constat de départ, pour mener à bien une analyse des organisations régionales, est celui d'une carence d'outils conceptuels et des lacunes empiriques. La préoccupation est double, d'une part tirer une quintessence de nos descriptions analytiques de terrain de l'étude de la coopération régionale insulaire dans le monde et, d'autre part, élaborer un schéma explicatif (chapitre III) ayant une portée générale à partir des influences particulières rencontrées. L'approche est aussi bien diachronique que synchronique. Le schéma du système de coopération régionale que nous avons conçu est applicable à d'autres espaces que ceux qui sont insulaires. Il présente l'avantage de s'adapter aux diverses formes de régionalisation qui s'organisent entre États d'un même ensemble continental ou autour des océans et des mers. Il est aujourd'hui évident que les processus de coopération régionale sont une composante majeure du développement et de l'intégration des États-nations au système international. Les États les plus vulnérables, qu'ils soient ou non insulaires, comme les superpuissances, sont tous engagés dans des entreprises similaires d'approfondissement et d'intégration économique ou politique. Néanmoins, il semble difficile de dicter des lois et d'établir des normes qui régiraient les relations régionales et a fortiori internationales. La conclusion de ce travail d'habilitation à diriger des recherches est une proposition constructive ouvrant sur des perspectives concrètes d'application de nos recherches passées et à venir. Elle se fonde sur le constat de la dispersion et la fragmentation au plan national des données et des ressources humaines concernant les petits États et territoires. Il s'agirait donc de créer un Centre d'études et de recherche sur les petits États dans le monde (CÉRPÉM) pour fédérer les chercheurs, les ressources documentaires et financières.
El estudio a continuación propuesto se enmarca dentro del campo de investigación relacionado con las fuerzas que delimitan la asignación locativa de las actividades residencial y terciaria en el interior de la ciudad tradicional. Estas actividades normalmente se implantan en el límite de las libertades que el planeamiento urbanístico establece para cada una de ellas. No obstante, su relación e interacción espacial mantienen en gran medida la estabilidad productiva y el equilibrio del sistema interno de la ciudad. En este sentido, el propósito general de la presente tesis es dimensionar y enlazar las causas y resultados de la congruencia entre las actividades residencial y terciaria dentro de un espacio urbano definido a partir de un contexto locacional existente. De lo anterior se desprende que el estudio de un entorno urbanístico y formalmente concluido, invariablemente, exigirá tomar posición frente a una situación que marcha impulsada por un flujo equilibrado de inercia económica y funcional. De hecho: la hipótesis general de este trabajo se empeña en demostrar la capacidad de las actividades residencial y terciaria en cuanto a su positiva influencia en la renovación potencial de la estructura urbana en el espacio central de la ciudad de Barcelona. La investigación establece un marco teórico relacionado con la valoración apreciativa de la extensión o concentración, de la actividad terciaria en un contexto físico-espacial. En orden a demostrar su favorable repercusión sobre el producto inmobiliario residencial. Mediante un estudio empírico, se clarificará en que medida el uso terciario del suelo urbano condiciona el valor del producto inmobiliario residencial, y como la utilización mixta del suelo puede repercutir sobre un medio ambiente concreto. Provocando un plusvalor o una suboptimización de la función residencial y del producto arquitectónico. Metodológicamente, se plantea el análisis e identificación de las singularidades contextuales de los valores inmobiliarios residenciales expuestos a procesos de terciarización. Y como estas externalidades pueden actuar económicamente sobre el segmento central de la ciudad de Barcelona. A partir de este horizonte conceptual y metodológico, se pueden tratar algunas cuestiones de gran interés y actualidad urbanística como es: el incremento de plusvalía que experimenta el producto inmobiliario central al verse influido tanto por un efecto coyuntural -que incrementa el precio del producto edificado-, como también por una acción terciarizadora - aleatoria o específica- que aumenta el valor y calidad del entorno construido. Este supuesto académico entiende la ciudad como un producto espacial edificado. Sin que ello presuma, de ningún modo, entenderla sólo como una mercancía sujeta a procesos de naturaleza financiera y proyectual vinculada a un modelo de producción neocapitalista. En este sentido, el espíritu académico que impulsa la presente tesis se encuentra en: viabilizar una vía de predicción y diagnóstico para la implementación y diseño de políticas de planificación residencial en relación con el efecto positivo que origina una acción económica dirigida -en este caso la terciaria- sobre un espacio céntrico. En orden a conocer de que manera y ante que condiciones o acciones económicas específicas tiende a ocurrir una cierta reacción o transformación urbanística-residencial espacialmente cuantificable. Consiguiendo, con ello, identificar en que medida las condiciones en el producto inmobiliario residencial resultan alteradas por la acción terciaria de un modo concreto. Y cómo debido a esta acción se verá también afectado el comportamiento espacial de la ciudad central y de los valores urbanos en un nivel general. Así, la investigación sostiene que: la plusvalía inmobiliaria de los espacios centrales es el agente principal de conservación y reproducción urbana. Y que el excedente económico generado en el interior de la ciudad permite potenciar y mejorar el espacio construido contribuyendo a producir nuevas centralidades en la ciudad. ; The study proposed in this doctoral thesis it is framed inside the investigation field with the forces that locate the assignment of the residential and tertiary activities into the traditional city of Barcelona. These activities are usually implanted in the limit of the freedoms that the urban planning allow for each one of them. Nevertheless, their relationship and space interaction maintain, in great measure, the productive stability and the balance of the inner city. In this sense, the purpose of the present thesis is to measure and connect the causes and results of the location consistency between the residential and tertiary activities defined into the central urban space. In fact, the study of a inner city environment will demand to take position in front of a situation that goes impelled by a balanced flow between urban economic and urban functions. The hypothesis of this work attemp to demonstrate the capacity of the residential and tertiary activities to its positive influence in the potential renovation of the urban structure in the inner city space. The investigation establishes a theoretical topic related with the appreciative valuation of the extension, or concentration, of the tertiary activity. Located in a physical and space context in order to demonstrate their positive repercussion in fornt of the real state product. By means of an empiric study, it will be clarified the tertiary use of urban land. And also will be measure the value of the real state product into the inner city environment. That cause a increased value, or a devaluation, of the residential product. The analysis make oneself clear the identification of contextual singularities between residential real state values and tertiary processes pre sent in Barcelona city. Starting from this conceptual and methodological horizon, it can be able to explain some questions of great interest: like the appreciation increment value of the central real state product, or the influenced of a locative effect that increases the price and quality of the urban center built environment. This supposition understands the city like a built space product. In this sense, the academic spirit that impels the present thesis is: to viability a prediction and a diagnostic for the implementation of a political residential planning. In connection with the positive effect that originates an economic action directed into a central space. In this way, the thesis sustains that: the real state appreciation of the central space of Barcelona is the main agent of conservation for urban reproduction. And that the internal economic generated inside the inner city improve the built space, contributing to produce news and betters downtown areas in the city. ; Postprint (published version)
Membres du Jury M. Louis Brigand, Professeur à l'université de Bretagne occidentale, examinateur M. Jean-Christophe Gay, Professeur à l'université Montpellier III, rapporteur M. Jean-Claude Giacottino, Professeur à l'université de Provence, examinateur M. Christian Huetz de Lemps, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, président du jury M. Philippe Pelletier, Professeur à l'université Lyon II, rapporteur M. André-Louis Sanguin, Professeur à l'université Paris-Sorbonne, tuteur de l'HDR ; The research volume entitled "Research on the small insular spaces and their regional organisation" comprises two parts. The first is centred around a dual question : what is an island ? What are its scientific specificies ? These questions have haunted a number of research scientists and others will probably continue to pose them. Three main entries have enabled us to delimit these questions. A first chapter will be engaged in the study of basic concepts which are isolation, size, insularity, insularism and islandness before positing a definition of what an island is or at least what small island spaces are. The two other chapters deal with the wider themes of fragmentation, periphericity ,dependence and vulnerability. Short of being perfectly specific to islands, these themes enable nevertheless the definition of these terms using a systemic method. The second part is more methodological and inductive. It will contribute to the reflection of what regionalisation is in general (chapter one) and on regionalisation in island milieu in particular (chapter two). The posit at the start, which should lead to the completion of an analysis on regional organisation, is that of the lack of conceptual tools and empirical evidence. One is doubly preoccupied, on the one hand by the need to draw the quintessence of our analytical descriptions of the terrain of study of regional island cooperation in the world and, on the other hand, by the need to elaborate a detailed schema (chapter III) which has a general outlook, using specific influences. The approach is both diachronic and synchronic. This schema of the regional cooperation system which we have designed is applicable to other spaces than those of islands. It presents the advantage of being able to adapt itself to various forms of regionalisation which are organised between States around continents, oceans and seas held in common. It seems today evident that the process of regional cooperation is an integral part of development and the integration of nation states into the international system. The most vulnerable of states, whether they be islands or not, like the superpowers, are all engaged in similar enterprises of economic or political development and integration. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to dictate laws or to establish norms which would regulate these regonal relations and even less international. The conclusion to this paper, in order to be qualified for Competence to supervise research (doctorate level), is a constructive proposition opening onto concrete perspectives of application of our past and future research work. It is based on the principle that the dispersion and the fragmentation on a national level of data and human resources concern small states and territories. It will focus on the possibility of setting up a Research and Study Centre of Small States in the World in order to federate research scientists as well as their documentary and financial resources. ; Ce mémoire d'habilitation à diriger des recherches se compose de trois volumes. Le premier est la synthèse, avec ses lignes de forces et ses faiblesses, avec ses contradictions et ses accords, de nos activités scientifiques, pédagogiques et administratives sur la période 1989-2003. Le second est un travail original de recherche dont nous produisons ici un résumé. Le troisième est un recueil de nos publications (24 articles, un ouvrage et 12 comptes rendus de lecture). Le volume de recherche intitulé "Recherches sur les petits espaces insulaires et sur leurs organisations régionales" se compose de deux parties. La première s'articule autour d'une double interrogation : qu'est-ce une île ? qu'en est-il de ses spécificités scientifiques ? Ces questions de nombreux chercheurs se les sont posées et d'autres après eux les aborderont sans doute encore. Trois entrées principales nous ont permis de cerner ces questions. Un premier chapitre s'attelle à retravailler les concepts de base que sont l'isolement, la taille, l'insularité, l'insularisme et l'îléité pour déboucher sur une définition possible de l'île ou tout au moins des petits espaces insulaires. Les deux autres chapitres s'articulent autour des grands thèmes de la fragmentation, de la périphéricité, de la dépendance et de la vulnérabilité. À défaut d'êtres parfaitement spécifiques aux îles, ces thèmes permettent néanmoins de les qualifier en adoptant une démarche systémique. La deuxième partie est davantage méthodologique et inductive que la première. Elle contribue à une réflexion sur la régionalisation en général (chapitre I) et sur la régionalisation en milieu insulaire en particulier (chapitre II). Le constat de départ, pour mener à bien une analyse des organisations régionales, est celui d'une carence d'outils conceptuels et des lacunes empiriques. La préoccupation est double, d'une part tirer une quintessence de nos descriptions analytiques de terrain de l'étude de la coopération régionale insulaire dans le monde et, d'autre part, élaborer un schéma explicatif (chapitre III) ayant une portée générale à partir des influences particulières rencontrées. L'approche est aussi bien diachronique que synchronique. Le schéma du système de coopération régionale que nous avons conçu est applicable à d'autres espaces que ceux qui sont insulaires. Il présente l'avantage de s'adapter aux diverses formes de régionalisation qui s'organisent entre États d'un même ensemble continental ou autour des océans et des mers. Il est aujourd'hui évident que les processus de coopération régionale sont une composante majeure du développement et de l'intégration des États-nations au système international. Les États les plus vulnérables, qu'ils soient ou non insulaires, comme les superpuissances, sont tous engagés dans des entreprises similaires d'approfondissement et d'intégration économique ou politique. Néanmoins, il semble difficile de dicter des lois et d'établir des normes qui régiraient les relations régionales et a fortiori internationales. La conclusion de ce travail d'habilitation à diriger des recherches est une proposition constructive ouvrant sur des perspectives concrètes d'application de nos recherches passées et à venir. Elle se fonde sur le constat de la dispersion et la fragmentation au plan national des données et des ressources humaines concernant les petits États et territoires. Il s'agirait donc de créer un Centre d'études et de recherche sur les petits États dans le monde (CÉRPÉM) pour fédérer les chercheurs, les ressources documentaires et financières.
ÖZETAralarındaki coğrafi ve kültürel yakınlığa rağmen tarihten gelen bazı ön yargıların etkisi ile Türkiye ve Suriye arasında iyi komşuluk ilişkileri kurmak mümkün olmamıştır. Türkiye, Cumhuriyetin ilanından itibaren bütün komşuları ile "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh" parolası esasına dayanan politikalar izlemiştir. Buna karşılık Suriye başta Hatay'ın ilhakı olmak üzere Arap Milliyetçiliği'nin anavatanın sınırlarını Toroslar'a kadar genişletme düşüncesini rehber edinmiş ve Türkiye aleyhine olabilecek her türlü faaliyetin destekçisi veya sempatizanı olmuştur.Bugün Türkiye ile Suriye arasında başta Bölücü Terör Örgütüne sağladığı destek olmak üzere, Fırat Nehri sularının paylaşımı, Hatay üzerindeki hak iddiaları, Asi Nehrinin sularının kesilmesi, Türk azınlığın durumu, karasularının tespiti ve kara sınırlarının işaretlenmesi gibi sorunlar mevcuttur. Suriye'nin uzlaşmaz tutumu ve diyalog eksikliği nedeniyle en basit sorunların bile çözümü mümkün olmamıştır.Türkiye'nin jeopolitik konumundan dolayı, bölgede bir güç olmasını istemeyen devletler; Suriye'nin politik ve siyasi zayıflığından faydalanıp bu ülkeyi kullanarak Türkiye aleyhine gelişen durum ve dengeleri destekler bir tutum içerisindedirler. Bu çerçevede; Suriye'nin, GAP'ın hayata geçirilmesi sonucu, Fırat ve Dicle sularının kendisine karşı bir koz ve baskı aracı olarak kullanacağı düşüncesiyle ortaya çıkardığı sınırı aşan sular sorunu, Türkiye'yi bölmeyi amaçlayan PKK terör örgütünü meselelerin kendi isteği doğrultusunda çözümlenmesi için bir manivela olarak kullanmak istemesi, Hatay'ın bir Arap toprağı olduğunu suni olarak gündeme getirmesi ve uluslar arası platformda Türkiye'ye karşı davranışları başlıca sorunlardır. Suriye; Türkiye'yi köşeye sıkıştırmak ve zayıf düşürmek suretiyle bölgede bir güç olmasına engellemek istemektedir. Su sorunu yapay bir sorundur. Suriye'nin Hatay'a yönelik tasavvurları da Suriyeli Arap halka mal olmuş bir politika olmayıp, daha ziyade yönetimin gündem de tuttuğu bir meseledir.Sınıraşan sular konusu Türkiye'nin su pazarlığına girmemesi gereken bir konudur. Suriye ile Irak'ın Matematiksel paylaşım tezi yerine, üçüncü ülkelerin dahil olmayacağı ve egemenlik hakların tartışılmasını gündeme getirecek yükümlülüklere girmeden bilimsel esaslara dayanan Üç Aşamalı Planın uluslar arası bilimsel ve siyasi platformlarda tanıtılması, destek sağlanması ile ilgili girişimler sürdürülmelidir.Türkiye'yi İsrail ile işbirliğine yönelten temel unsur ise, yaşamsal nitelikteki ulusal çıkarlarıdır. İsrail ile yapılan anlaşmalar Türkiye'ye çevresinden, özellikle Suriye ile İran'dan yönelen tehditlere karşı ek bir caydırıcı unsur oluşturmuş ve bölge dengelerini Türkiye lehine çevirmiştir. Türkiye ile İsrail arasında askeri alanda sağlanacak yakınlaşmanın gelecekte ilişkilerimizi güçlendireceği ve iki ülke arasında stratejik yakınlaşma sağlayacağı, bunun sonucu olarak bölgede barış rüzgarlarının eseceği değerlendirilmektedir.Son zamanlarda Suriye, Türkiye'ye yönelik terör örgütlerini desteklemeyi ve bu yolla taviz koparmayı amaçlamıştır. Asala'dan sonra Bölücü Terör Örgütüne verdiği destek günümüzde artık basit sınır tecavüzü veya çete hareketi boyutunu aşarak "Silahlı Saldırı" durumuna ulaşmıştır. Komşu devletlerin desteğine engel olunmadıkça Bölücü Terör Örgütünü ortadan kaldıramayacağını anlayan Türkiye, 1998 yılında kararlı tutumu sayesinde Suriye'yi resmen Bölücü Terör Örgütüne destek sağlamaması konusunda anlaşma imzalamaya zorlayabilmiştir.Türkiye ile Suriye arasındaki sorunlar çözümlenemeyecek problemler değildir. Sorunlar Türkiye'den kaynaklanmadığı gibi Türkiye tarafından halledilemeyecek kadar güç de değildir. Önemli olan husus Türkiye'nin gücünün farkında olması ve bu sorunları çözebilme iradesini oluşturabilmesidir. SUMMARYAlthough there is geographical and cultural proximity between Turkey and Syria, because of some prejudices coming from history, a good neighbourhood relationship could not be set up . From the foundation of Turkish Republic, Turkey has been followed the policies that based on the "Peace at Home, Peace at the World" watchword principle. Controversially, Syria has been taken guide the thought for the expand of the Arabic Nationalism's motherland borders to Toros Mountains, (the annexation of Hatay is a good example for this) and also Syria has become the supporter and likeminded to all facilities that are hostile to Turkey . Today, between Turkey and Syria, the following problems are existing; firstly Syria's support to Dividing Terror Organization, the sharing of Fırat River Water, The rights claims over Hatay, cutting the water of Asi River, the condition of Turkish minority, determination of territorial waters and signing of continent borders . Because of unrecognised attitude of Syria and dialog deficiency, even basic problems can not be solved. Because of the geopolitics position of Turkey, Some Countries, that do not want Turkey as a Power at the region, use Syria, profit by its political and diplomatically weakness, so that they have an attitude that support the developing conditions and balances hostile to Turkey. At this frame, the following problems are existing; The passing over the border water problem, which existing from the Syria's thoughts about the Turkey's using the Fırat and Dicle waters against them as trump and restraint tool (as a result of GAP), using the PKK Dividing Terror Organization as a tool for solving the problems in favour of Syria, usually getting the thought of the region of Hatay as an Arabic land, and attitudes to Turkey at the international platforms. Syria wants to block Turkey for not being a power with abort weak and squeeze to corner. Water problem is not a real problem. Syria's thoughts against to Hatay is not a thought of' Syria s Arabic Common People, but it is the Administrative Authority's thoughts. Turkey should not negotiate about the Waters, that passes through the border . At the place of the mathematical thesis of the sharing between Iraq and Syria, the 3 level plan, that based on the scientific notions, should introduce at the scientific and political international platforms and should look for supports about it. The basic elements, that manage the cooperation between Turkey and Israel, is the national interests (so important for the Turkish Republic). The agreements (done with Israel) has become a element that causing the esp. the threats of Syria and Iran to give up a plan and has turn round the regional balance to Turkey. The proximity at the military area between the Turkey and Israel will empower the relationship between this two country at the future and will lead strategically proximity between them and as a result of this there will be peace winds at the region. Nowadays, Syria intends the support the terror organizations against to Turkey and with this way taking concession. After Asala, support to Dividing Terror Organization, today this become to "Armed Attack" not a simple border attack or guerrilla warfare. Finally, Turkey has realized that without preventing the support of original countries to Dividing Terror Organization, the termination of this organization is impossible, so that in 1998 Turkey force Syria to sign an agreement about not supporting the Dividing Terror Organization formally. Problems between Turkey and Syria can be solved. Problems do not a fault of Turkey and these are not so hard to solve. The important subject is that Turkey should become the aware of its power and develop the solving ability will power.
There have been tremendous pressures in the 1990s to change the character and functions of the state in developed and developing countries alike. Multilateral financial agencies and neoliberal analysts question the state's nationalistic, hierarchical, redistributive and interventionist character, which they believe is partly responsible for poor service delivery and economic performance in many countries. They seek to transform the state into a market-friendly, lean, managerial, decentralized and customer-oriented institution. However, the core elements of reforms are sometimes contradictory as different social forces drive them in different contexts. There are tensions between, on the one hand, concerns for market efficiency and deregulation, and issues of accountability and equity, on the other. This paper provides an overview of the major issues, trends and problems in public sector reform. The Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development does not spell out concrete strategies of public sector reform for achieving the goals of poverty eradication, employment promotion and social integration. The state's capacity to produce the desired results was generally taken for granted. But will efforts to reform the state along pro-market lines facilitate governments' pursuit of development? Are states likely to assume and sustain their responsibilities in providing good, affordable services to their citizens? The paper addresses these issues in seven sections. The first section introduces the basic argument. Section II examines four global issues that are driving public sector reforms: financial globalization, fiscal deficits, the adjustment programmes of multilateral agencies, and democratization. Sections III to VI discuss the various components of public sector reform, which are fiscal stability, managerial efficiency, capacity building and public accountability. Reforms dealing with fiscal stability apply to all states, although they may vary across countries. In general, fiscal reforms are the most consistently pursued reforms, and have implications for public sector employees, state capacity and social development. They deal with issues of downsizing or expenditure reduction, privatization and tax reform. Public expenditure reforms reflect differences in expenditure patterns, with the reforms in industrialized countries focusing on welfare and social services and those in developing countries on capital expenditures and government administration. Privatization, a central component of downsizing, is now a global phenomenon. More than $300 billion worth of state assets were transferred to the private sector between 1988 and 1996 around the world. Governments are surely disengaging, even if unevenly, from direct ownership of public enterprises. There are however, welfare, unemployment, ethnic and nationalist problems associated with privatization. The data suggest that although governments grew, albeit slowly, up to the early 1990s, it seems that for some regions, central governments were beginning to shrink in the mid-to-late 1990s. The massive cuts in education and health provisioning suffered by low-income countries in the 1980s have not been sufficiently offset by the efforts of the 1990s, which seek to protect social sectors from state contraction. Reforms in the area of managerial efficiency focus on organizational restructuring and introduction of market or quasi-market principles in the delivery of services. They address three main issues: decentralized management and creation of executive agencies out of monolithic bureaucracies; performance contracts for employees; and contracting out of services to the private sector. The most comprehensive reforms in efficiency promotion are in OECD countries, with Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom as the lead reformers. However, aspects of these reforms are being applied in many developing and transition countries, especially those that are heavily donor dependent. As these reforms deal with institutional issues, there is often a wide gap between expressed goals and concrete outcomes. Pre-reform methods of work, weak capacity, and market failures constrain policy implementation. Capacity-building reforms are restricted largely to developing countries, especially the "least developed countries" most of which are in Africa. They address issues relating to the technical capacities of civil servants in policy analysis and implementation; management of recurrent costs to ensure sustainability of projects; and pay reforms to motivate staff. Despite their importance in promoting development and other reforms, capacity-building reforms have not received the sustained attention they deserve. Section VII concludes the paper by focusing on three issues that may help ensure that reforms are accountable to society and sensitive to the political realities of states, especially those with weak institutions. First, public sector reforms need sound political pacts or coalitions. The vast majority of countries that are implementing reforms are also grappling with complex programmes of democratization, which seek to lay the ground rules for the way their societies are governed. There are governance issues that have not been satisfactorily resolved in a large number of low-income countries, which raise serious questions about their capacities to implement far-reaching state reforms. In most cases, the drive for reform is more external than internal as governments are forced to meet conditions set by donors for loan disbursements. Market-oriented managerial reforms will be difficult to implement in countries that have not established a professional civil service. Without this, market reforms may further fragment the state systems of low-income countries and encourage more corruption therein. However time-consuming they are to promote, dialogue and coalitions, or social and political pacts, are essential elements of effective modern statecraft. They facilitate the establishment of sound and durable administrative systems. Second, reform governments and multilateral agencies should also try to understand and support some of the enduring missions of states, which are nation-building in multi-ethnic societies, rapid industrialization with an appropriate role for the state in facilitating the process, social equity and wealth distribution. Although costly mistakes were made in the past in many countries, these goals are at the heart of the aspirations of broad masses of people seeking to create developmental, humanistic and harmonious societies. The failure to pay sufficient attention to them in the last decade-and-a-half of market reforms may go a long way in explaining the high incidence of failed states, civil wars and stagnant development in large parts of the world today. Third, for reforms to be institutionalized and serve the public good, they must also allow pressures to be brought to bear on public managers in service delivery. Among the instruments that have emerged for the attainment of these goals are Citizens' Charters, Ombudsmen and service delivery surveys. Parliamentary plurality, press freedom, independent judiciaries, mass-based political parties and civic action are also central to public accountability.
The tobacco industry is a potent force in Albany. Since 1983 (not including 1988-89, were data are not available) tobacco interests spent $1.3 million on campaign contributions to candidates and political party committees. Of this, $277,905 went to legislative candidates, $38,650 went to candidates for constitutional office, and the remaining $1 million went to party committees. The members of the 1997-98 legislature who collected the most money from campaign contributions were Assemblymember Jeffrey Klein(D-Bronx)($16,275), Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver (D-Manhattan)($10,425), Assemblymember Michael Bragman (D-Onondaga)($8,420), Senator Ronald Stafford (R-Plattsburgh)($7,500), and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno (R-Brunswick)($7,300). The tobacco industry spent $5.9 million on lobbying expenditures between 1992 and 1998. Of the $998,884 contributed to party committees between 1983 and 1998 (not including 1988-89), $815,840 (81.7%) was donated after 1994, when contributors realized that contributions to party committees were unlimited. As in other states, the tobacco industry donates more to Republicans than Democrats; Republican party committees received $752,709 (75%) of the money between 1983-98, while Democrats received $191,175 (19%). The information we have on tobacco industry political activity is incomplete and underestimates the magnitude of tobacco industry activity. Between 1998 and 1999, the tobacco industry was found to have under-reported its lobbying expenses on several occasions. In 1998, the Tobacco Institute admitted to under-reporting by $443,572 and in 1999, Philip Morris admitted to under-reporting lobbying expenses 15 times over the period 1993-96. These developments indicated that the lobbying law was ineffective at providing accurate information for public disclosure, and prompted a revision of the law in 1999. However, the revision is insufficient to prevent this kind of influence to be accumulated by an industry such as the tobacco industry. These contributions are having an effect on policy making. On the average, for each $1000 contributed to an individual legislator, that legislator scored 1.82 points more pro-tobacco on a 0 to 10 scale. At the same time, legislators who support the tobacco industry are rewarded; for each 1 point more pro-tobacco, contributions increase by an average of $380. Republican legislators were more pro-tobacco than Democrats by an average of 1.39 points. As in most states, in New York State, progress in tobacco control begins at the local level. New legislation is generally passed first on Long Island, which inspires New York City to do the same. Legislation passed in New York City sparks progress in the upstate area, and until the Pataki Administration, at the state level. The importance of localities passing restrictions to initiate the momentum to pass state legislation is why preemptive state legislation is a major threat to tobacco control in New York State. The documents released through state litigation of the tobacco industry have played a critical role in the passage of tobacco control legislation in the face of an unsympathetic legislature and Governor. Advocates in other states should recognize that researching the documents can help them pressure political leaders and recognize industry front groups. The Long Island counties of Suffolk and Nassau lead the tobacco control movement in the downstate area, whereas Erie County sets the standard upstate. The ASSIST program has been successful in setting up local coalitions and galvanizing against industry tactics. The industry organizes and finances "grassroots" coalitions, and "smokers' rights" groups such as the National Smokers Alliance, mobilizes its Tobacco Action Network, forms alliances with other organizations affected by anti-tobacco bills and finances groups such as the United Restaurant, Hotel, and Tavern Association to oppose clean indoor air legislation. It promotes "studies" claiming that tobacco control legislation will hurt the hospitality business, even though objective studies have consistently shown no effect or a positive effect on the hospitality industry. At the state level the industry has sought to preempt local tobacco control activity; at the local level, the industry tries to pass weak laws promoting "accommodation" to prevent the passage of effective tobacco control policies. New York tobacco control advocates have vigorously – and generally successfully – opposed these efforts. Since 1986, New York City has distinguished itself as a national leader in tobacco control legislation. While its clean indoor air laws have not been the strongest in the country, they are remarkable in light of the city's size and the fact that Philip Morris' corporate headquarters are located in New York City. The city was also one of the first localities to sue the tobacco industry. Both Nassau County and Niagara County Boards of Health enacted regulations (in 1994 and 1998, respectively) to eliminate smoking in restaurants. However, both were overturned in lawsuits sponsored by the tobacco industry. Both rulings determined that the Boards of Health were in violation of the state constitution because they considered economics in their decisions. These decisions have discouraged counties from using Boards of Health to pass clean indoor air regulations. When Republican George Pataki succeeded Democrat Mario Cuomo as governor in 1994, state tobacco control legislation abruptly ceased. Pataki ignored the Health Department's tobacco advisory panel, the Commission for a Healthy New York, and only formulated tobacco control programs when he feared criticism from the media. Between 1990 and 1998 Pataki accepted $8050 from the tobacco industry. In November 1998, forty-six states agreed to a $206 billion dollar settlement with the tobacco industry. The agreement settled the states' claims for smoking-related Medicaid costs. New York State received $25 billion to be paid over 25 years as a result of the settlement agreement. In December 1999, health advocates, working the other interests, were able to increase the tobacco tax by 55 cents and dedicate part of the tobacco settlement funds to fund health care in New York State. New York's cigarette tax of $1.11 per pack is the highest in the nation. Of the approximately $1.5 billion generated annually by the settlement and additional tobacco tax, only $37 million annually is dedicated to the state tobacco control program. During the 1999 legislative session, the New York Medical Society supported the Civil Justice Reform Act which would provide the tobacco industry protection against product liability litigation. The tobacco industry has probably used every strategy they have developed in fighting tobacco control policies in New York State. Despite these daunting challenges, advocates have achieved many notable successes and recognized and avoided counterproductive compromises. They have done so by exposing tobacco industry front groups and affiliations and holding politicians and organizations accountable for their actions.
The tobacco industry is a major political and legal force in Florida through campaign contributions, public relations efforts, lobbying and litigation, which at least from the late 1970s, has had a centralized political organization in Florida that defends and promotes its political and economic interests at the local and state levels of government. Although the industry has operated in the open in some political campaigns, it has also operated quietly behind the scenes, often through front groups, in various other state and local political campaigns. In Dade County in 1979, GASP of Miami ran a clean indoor air initiative without the active support of the local affiliates of the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Despite being outspent by the tobacco industry 90 to 1, GASP only lost by 820 votes. Had the health groups provided public and political support, the initiative may well have won, substantially increasing the momentum for clean indoor air ordinances in Florida and elsewhere. Prior to 1985, there were numerous ongoing local efforts to pass and enact a wide variety of local clean indoor ordinances. These efforts subsided considerably after the passage of the preemption clause in the weak Florida Clean Indoor Air Act (FCIAA) of 1985 which, at first, was supported by the American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and American Heart Association. Since the passage of FCIAA, the tobacco industry has been able to stop all efforts by the three health groups and sympathetic politicians to repeal the preemption clause. After the passage of campaign contribution limit laws in 1991 in Florida, tobacco industry campaign contributions have been redirected away from individual candidates and to the two major political parties. In the 1993-1994 election cycle, the industry gave the largest amount of contributions with $475,000 given to the parties compared to $95,856 to political candidates. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which gave $382,500 to the Republican Party. These contributions in conjunction with others has reinvigorated the two major parties as political power brokers who provide their candidates with advertising, technical assistance, and paid staff. During the 1997-1998 electoral cycle, the tobacco industry's total campaign contributions were $398,194, with $310,250 given to the two major political parties in comparison to $84,194 for legislators. The Republican Party received $227,250 compared to the Democratic Party which received $82,500. The largest contribution to a political party came from Philip Morris, which contributed $125,000 to the Republican Party. In August 1997, Florida and the industry settled a Medicaid fraud lawsuit. Under the terms of the settlement, the industry agreed to pay Florida $11.3 billion, end outdoor billboards, pay for public anti-tobacco campaigns, remove vending machines from places accessible to children, end tobacco advertising on buses and trains, complete an anti-tobacco youth campaign within two years of the settlement, and not name the industry in anti-tobacco ads. Due to further negotiations with the industry, on September 11, 1998, the amount paid to Florida was increased to $13 billion and restrictions on the two year time limit regarding the youth anti-smoking campaign and specifically naming the industry in anti-tobacco advertisements were lifted. After February 1998, Florida began an effort to establish a $200 million youth anti-smoking campaign called the Tobacco Pilot Program in an effort to meet the two year deadline. The Tobacco Pilot Program has engaged in an extensive media campaign known as the "Truth Campaign" which began in late April 1998 and included tough in-your-face print, billboard, and media advertisements which ran throughout Florida. The major theme of this campaign is that Florida youth should choose "Truth" rather than use tobacco and be targets of industry advertising manipulation in the use of tobacco. A report released on March 17, 1999 by the Florida Department of Health, Office of Tobacco Control regarding the progress of the Tobacco Pilot Program indicated that the Tobacco Pilot Program and its anti-tobacco media advertising campaign, in less than a year, had a substantial impact on influencing a significant number of Florida teens not to smoke. From February 1998 to 1999, the number of teens who were current smokers (smoked in the last 30 days) dropped from 23.3% to 20.9%. This represented 31,000 fewer Florida teenagers who were current smokers. These results represent the best results ever obtained in a large scale primary prevention program. Although new Republican Governor Jeb Bush publicly called for the continuation of the Tobacco Pilot Program and the Truth Campaign, the program's funding was reduced from $70.5 million to $45.2 million (-36%) for the 1999-2000 Fiscal Year due to legislative votes by Republican colleagues in the House and the Senate to substantially reduce the funding of the program. These cuts were made despite public opinion polls showing that 49% of the public supported the program without any cuts and 30% supported the program with the $8.5 million cut proposed by Governor Bush. Two projects of the Tobacco Pilot Program which are crucial to maintaining the viability of the program including the Truth Campaign and administrative support for the Students Working Against Tobacco (SWAT) also received large budgetary reductions. While the Tobacco Pilot Program received substantial funding cuts in the 1999 Legislative Session, funding for the American Heart Association's Youth Fitness Program of $3 million and $1 million for the Just The Facts program which was derived from the $45.2 million Tobacco Pilot Program budget, would have reduced the amount of funding for projects directly oriented towards tobacco control efforts to $41.2 million for 1999-2000. On May 27, 1999, Governor Bush vetoed these two diversionary projects, as well as the $2.5 million Sports for Life project which was related to tobacco control, further reducing the program's funding of projects directly related to tobacco control efforts from $70.5 million to $38.7 million (-45.1%). For the past twenty years, a consistent pattern has emerged with respect to the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association missing key political opportunities that would have significantly advanced anti-tobacco efforts and public health in Florida. These lost opportunities included failing to support GASP of Miami in its 1979 Dade County clean indoor air initiative, supporting the preemption clause in the Florida Clean Indoor Air Act of 1985 which essentially quashed a blossoming grassroots anti-tobacco movement, and failing to forcefully advocate for the Tobacco Pilot Program by holding specific legislators directly and publicly accountable for the substantial funding cuts that occurred in the 1999 Legislative Session.
Mécanisation: son contexte et sa place dans le développement agricole La production agricole et le transport dans les régions rurales requièrent de l'énergie dont les sources qui nous intéressent sont triples: l'énergie humaine, l'énergie animale, et l'énergie fournie par les engins à moteur, le choix entre ces sources d'énerétant essentiellement circonstanciel. Ces trois sources d'énergie peuvent être complémentaires et coexister au sein d'un même foyer, d'une même exploitation ou d'une même communauté rurale. La mécanisation agricole fait appel à tout un outillage et à des engins à moteur qui renforcent l'efficacité du travail humain. Le choix entre les outils et les sources d'énergie pouvant convenir à une opération donnée dépend du travail à effectuer et de facteurs d'importance relative tels que les préférences des utilisateurs, le coût, la et les performances techniques des diverses options. Une houe manuelle pourra par exemple convenir parfaitement la production légumière intensive mais dans le cas de gros travaux, l'énergie humaine sera, à elle seule, insuffisante car le travail qu'elle permet sera généralement lent et fatigant. En revanche, les animaux de trait ou les engins moteurs pourront considérablement augmenter la productivité du travail humain et améliorer la qualité de vie des femmes, des hommes et des enfants. La mécanisation agricole n'est toutefois pas une fin en soi; son but est de donner à la production agricole les moyens d'un développement durable et socialement salutaire, le matériel utilisé n'étant qu'un Clément faisant partie de systèmes d'exploitation souvent très complexes. L'utilité d'un outil particulier dans une région donnée, tant pour les bienfaits sociaux et les possibilités de développement durable qu'il peut procurer, sera déterminée par un ensemble de facteurs sociaux, économiques et giques. On peut confondre mécanisation, motorisation et tractorisation Le tracteur ne constitue qu'une option parmi d'autres. En Afrique subsaharienne, les expériences de mécanisation les plus convaincantes ont été tentées avec des animaux de trait. Dans le contexte du séminaire du CTA et du présent rapport, on entend par mécanisation le recours à un ensemble de technologies qui font appel l'énergie humaine, animale et aux engins à moteur. Actuellement, on ne peut qu'estimer l'importance relative des diverses options de mécanisation agricole en Afrique. On sait par exemple que le gros du travail agricole (peut-être 80%) se fait à la seule force du travail humain. On s'accorde pour dire que les animaux de trait font jusqu'à 20% des tâches agricoles et qu'en Afrique tropicale, seule une petite fraction de l'ensemble des travaux est réalisée à l'aide de tracteurs. Au cours des dix dernières années, les programmes d'ajustement structurel ont, du point de vue économique, changé la face de l'agriculture africaine. En effet, la rentabilité des exploitations, petites et grandes, a été lourdement affaiblie par les divers remaniements effectués au niveau des prix, des valeurs monétaires, des services publics et des politiques gouvernementales. Par ailleurs, les conditions avantageuses 6 Intégrer la mécanisation dans les stratégies de développement durable de l'agriculture dont bénéficiaient les fabricants, importateurs, distributeurs et réparateurs d'engins agricoles ne sont plus les mêmes aujourd'hui. Dans de nombreux pays, les exploitants ont fait appel aux programmes de développement et aux gouvernements pour qu'ils leur accordent une aide à la mécanisation. Dans certaines régions, les exploitants ont pu démontré qu'il existait une réelle demande économique pour une mécanisation reposant sur la traction animale etlou les tracteurs. En d'autres endroits par contre, ce type de mécanisation est encore de l'ordre du rêve, n'étant à l'heure actuelle pas du tout viable du point de vue éco- En outre, les services publics chargés de la valorisation de la mécanisation agricole ont souffert d'importantes réductions budgétaires, et certaines activités que ces services menaient ont été sévèrement critiquées car elles ne s'inscrivaient pas suffisamment dans la durée et ne produisaient donc pas d'effets durables. La mécanisation agricole peut avoir une influence importante sur la production et l'évolution des systèmes d'exploitation; toutefois, le rôle qu'elle est appelée à jouer dans le cadre des stratégies de valorisation agricole à nationale n'a pas toujours été clairement défini. Dans le cadre d'une étude commandée par le CTA en 1996 sur les expériences de mécanisation en Afrique, Dominique Bordet et René Rabezandrina, chargés de réaliser cette étude en collaboration avec la FAO, ont fait d'emblée les observations suivantes: Les services de location de tracteurs assurés par le secteur public ont échoué partout en Afrique. L'utilisation des tracteurs du secteur privé s'est révélée rentable pour les larges exploitations contrairement aux petites exploitations, qu'il s'agisse de propriétaires individuels ou de coopératives, ou des services de location assurés par le secteur privé. Par ailleurs, la dévaluation des monnaies a considérablement augmenté le prix des tracteurs par rapport la valeur des récoltes. Les tracteurs et les engins à moteur fournis dans le cadre des programmes aide n'ont pas été de grand service car souvent inadéquats etlou ne donnant pas de résultats durables. En outre, l'intérêt porté ces engins a eu pour effet de détourner les ingénieurs agronomes de travaux sur des technologies plus adaptées aux effets plus durables. Les artisans forgerons ont été largement oubliés dans la mesure où les engins agricoles (tels que à traction animale et microtracteurs) ont été importés ou sont fabriqués dans de grands ateliers centralisés. La fourniture d'outillage agricole se fait largement à l'appréciation des services publics et non par rapport à la demande réelle des agriculteurs. La recherche suit une logique très hiérarchisée d'amont en aval et ne tient pas suffisamment compte des réalités sociales, économiques et environnementales des systèmes d'exploitation pratiqués en Afrique. La traction animale est une grande réussite sur les terres de savanes (son utilisation en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone a quintuplé entre 1960 et 1995). Intégrer la mécanisation dans les stratégies de développement durable de l'agriculture 7 Certaines formations au profit des forgerons, et la mise en place de certains mécanismes de fabrication décentralisée, ont donné des résultats encourageants. Le rapport provisoire traite des facteurs qui ont une influence majeure sur les choix opérés en Afrique en matière de mécanisation agricole, notamment les facteurs sociaux, économiques, politiques et techniques. L'étude se termine par une série de recommandations portant sur l'intégration de la mécanisation dans les stratégies de développement agricole. Parmi les thèmes traités figurent l'élaboration d'une stratégie de la mécanisation, le rôle des secteurs public et privé, la réorganisation des services publics, le rôle prépondérant des divers partenaires (agriculteurs, artisans, ONG), et les réseaux.
As a general rule, criminal defendants whose cases made it to the Supreme Court between 1967 and 1991 must have thought that, as long as Justice Thurgood Marshall occupied one of the nine seats, they had one vote for sure. And Justice Marshall rarely disappointed them – certainly not in cases of any broad constitutional significance. From his votes and opinions, particularly his dissents, many were quick to conclude that the Justice was another of those "bleeding heart liberals," hostile to the mission of law enforcement officers and ready to overlook the gravity of the crimes of which the defendants before him had been convicted. A short conversation with the man would have put any such assumptions to rest. One needed only to sense his pride in his son John's work as a Virginia State Trooper,' his respect for clever but honest prosecutors, or his hostility and contempt for drug traffickers ("dopers" he would call them), to be sure that Justice Marshall had little sympathy for outlaws, and much for those trying to enforce the law. Furthermore, there was no disjunction between the Justice's privately expressed sentiments and public utterances. It is true that many of his criminal procedure opinions, had they become law, might have made it more difficult to convict criminal defendants. His legal positions, however, seem to have been rooted, not in any overarching ideology of limited government, but in an intense awareness, based upon long experience, that those who wield the authority of the state are but human actors. Just as he respected those who exercised this authority with decency and integrity, he sought to ensure that those who did not would not prevail. He was also keenly aware of the humanity of those against whom the forces of the state were arrayed, and he recognized that illegitimate coercion can arise as easily from a suspect's fear of official misconduct as it can from actual misconduct. Justice Marshall's jurisprudence in criminal cases was not merely a product of his own experiences, but what he had learned about the realities of the criminal justice system before taking his seat at the Supreme Court surely informed the approach he took to criminal cases. This was not someone prone to speak in abstract terms about finetuning the scales of justice. While a student at Howard Law School, he participated in one of the earliest clinical programs in criminal law and worked as an assistant to Charles Houston on death penalty cases. When he began a private practice in Baltimore, he took on many criminal cases, and his first appearance before the Supreme Court was in a capital case." The NAACP had, since its inception, waged a campaign against racial inequities in the administration of criminal justice, and Thurgood Marshall played a leading role in this campaign, first at the NAACP and then at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. No one would call him a desk-bound general. Travelling around the country, and especially the deep South, he learned about local law enforcement practices from clients, sheriffs, prosecutors, and judges." While, on at least one occasion, he may narrowly have escaped violence at the hands of police officers, he was also the beneficiary of police work. Later, he often spoke with affection about the Texas Rangers who protected him on some of his trips, and would tell of mobs that sometimes pursued him. Marshall's tenure as Solicitor General may have given him an even greater appreciation of law enforcement interests in criminal cases. Indeed, in one of his few unsuccessful appearances before the Supreme Court, he argued the government's position in Westover v. United States, a companion case to Miranda v. Arizona. lthough Justice Marshall's experiences offered him a unique perspective on the criminal process, the Warren Court's progress before Marshall took the bench somewhat limited his impact as a Justice on this area of the law. By 1967, when Thurgood Marshall became an Associate Justice, the Warren Court had rendered many of the landmark decisions that transformed the constitutional landscape in the area of criminal procedure. Over the previous half dozen years, the Court had decided Mapp v. Ohio, holding that state courts must exclude evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures; Gideon v. Wainwright, establishing the right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings; Massiah v. United States, extending the right to counsel to defendants' encounters with police and police informants after criminal proceedings commence; and Miranda v. Arizona, holding that the police must advise individuals taken into custody, even prior to the commencement of formal proceedings, of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel, and that the police may not interrogate suspects unless they knowingly and voluntarily waive those rights. While the outcome of some of these cases might be traced, directly or indirectly, to the work of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund under Thurgood Marshall's leadership, he played no role as a Justice in deciding them. During the twenty-four years of Thurgood Marshall's tenure, the task of the Court in the area of criminal procedure largely was to fill in a picture whose broad outlines already had been painted. Justice Marshall may have seen his mission as essentially a conservative one: ensuring that the constitutional safeguards that the Court had already announced had meaning in the world he had seen before becoming a Justice – the world where poor and unsophisticated defendants, often victims of societal discrimination, found their fates, and sometimes their lives, placed in the hands of police officers, prosecutors, judges, juries, and even defense lawyers who had yet to heed the Court's ringing calls for equality, fairness, and individual treatment. We aspire to a government of "laws not men," but Marshall understood how bias or misunderstanding could infect a criminal justice system of laws and men. And he understood how individuals would implement, be affected by, or react to the Court's decisions interpreting and applying constitutional provisions. Repeatedly, and, as the years went on, often in dissent, Justice Marshall reminded his brethren of the human interactions at the heart of the criminal process and argued, often unsuccessfully, for a jurisprudence that wo uld limit the ability of human actors to corrupt that process.
The purpose of this Field Experience document is to chronologically record all of the work necessary to plan for and successfully carry out the first-ever Statewide Principals' Conference on Instructional Leadership. In fact, that was the exact title of the Conference, "THE PRINCIPAL AS THE INSTRUCTIONAL LEADER." The proposal request for the funds for this conference was made to the Illinois State Board of Education through the federal government's Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title IV, Part C Division. It was that group, after having submitted our request to a Committee of Readers, who approved the request and agreed to allow our Center for Educational Improvement to have the funds. The amount asked for and approved was $20,000. This money, the proposal emphasized, was to be spent totally on resources that would be needed for the conference. It was to be a "bare-bones conference," which meant there was to be no money spent on dinners or entertainment of any type for the attendees. All of the money was to be used to reimburse the speakers and pay for the activities that developed because of the instructional leadership theme of the conference. This accounting and related documentation was the Field Experience of this writer, Dan Mash, Director of the Illinois Center for Educational Improvement (ICEI), who acted in the positions of Chairman of the Planning Committee and Coordinator of this particular conference. It is very important to note that while the Attachments to this paper seem "endless,'' they are a small portion of the actual paperwork needed to accomplish this conference. The need for this conference had become apparent sometime earlier, because, as the Illinois Center for Educational Improvement moved into its third year of operation, it had become increasingly clear that building principals in the region served were inundated with operational problems. All of these nitty-gritty concerns left little or no time for those principals to assume the very necessary and critical role as instructional leaders to the students and particularly to the staffs in their attendance centers. The East Central Region of the Illinois Center for Educational Improvement decided to try to change that priority by making the principals more aware of their roles as instructional leaders. Thus, this Field Experience and this product. This manual is actually a documented description of what was done to meet this much needed priority. The objectives and, if the conference was successful, the outcomes of this conference were as follows: 1. Because of the strength and attractiveness of the conference and the absence of any registration fee, to gather as many principals as possible from all over the state. 2. To stress that principals become aware of and accept the critical importance of their becoming effective in the major roles of instructional leadership. An undertaking of the magnitude and scope of a Statewide Principals' Conference should never be and was not taken lightly. In addition to the amount of people who need necessarily to be involved in the planning and the number of people who have to be part of the input for a conference such as this, there are a myriad of details to carry out. To have speakers of national prominence that you would hope would please a vast majority of those who would be attracted to such a conference, is indeed a job of gigantic proportions. The logistics in arranging the necessary formal business contracts for their appearances and the arrangements for their travel, meals, and lodging are almost mind boggling. The point of attendance attraction is a most important one. In this day and age, it is not enough to speak of our students being satiated with top-flight entertainment from television and the movies. The same is essentially true of the principals. Today, they are not going to be attracted to anything that does not carry the allure and glamour of speakers that have "name recognition" or are known in the education profession as renowned experts. To have a conference that would hopefully attract the numbers that were attracted to this particular one takes a lot of the so-called "star quality" of the presenters. The attraction, also, must assure these sophisticated, potential attendees that there will be a conference that will cover the items that they want covered and will present them with enough quality and depth in the proper amount of time so that they feel that something has been accomplished during the conference. Fortunately for this conference, the evaluations bore out the fact that these goals were achieved by the conference planners and particularly by the Director/Coordinator and his staff. It is important that this good effort continue. Therefore, this Center's recommendation for next Fiscal Year, 1982, if federal funds allow, will be to undertake the task of developing an Inservice Conference. This presently dreamed of conference is the result of the evaluations of the Principals' Conference as one that would lend itself to the methods and process of inservicing staff, a natural and logical follow up to the principal who is an instructional leader. It is no secret that with reduced district budgets, teachers today are remaining longer in one, usually their original, district. Statistics show that there is very little mobility among teachers today. In addition, Reduction in Force is resulting in those with seniority remaining on teaching staffs while those who are newer teachers are being cut. The teachers who remain need to be constantly retrained, reinvigorated and reinforced in their teaching skills, their teaching methodology, and their effectiveness as teachers. The conference that we will recommend we have in the fall of 1981 will be on the process of inservice for staff development. It will not be our intention to go into any cognitive learning areas. It will only be to stress process so that administrators such as superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, curriculum directors, staff development directors, and others with similar administrative responsibilities will be able to know better how to plan and structure more effective inservicing of their staff. This constant reteaching by districts and nonpublic schools must be instigated, reinforced and continued if education as we know it, or perhaps would hope that it would be, is to continue serving the children of our country in the face of the adversities that are mounting toward education and educators today.
Part three of an interview with Musa Ali of Fitchburg, Massachusetts. Topics include: Different job he held and businesses he owned. How he brought his children to the U.S. Where his children were educated and what they do for work. How he has been treated in the U.S. What churches he attends. What marriage customs are like. ; 1 SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Uh, he say, "Give me $10 more and me wash dishes." I say, "No, my friend, me like wash dishes." And he can't kick me out because I'm the boss. SPEAKER 1: Boss, right. [Laughs] ALI: And I start working in the kitchen. This Chinese is a short fellow. What he do, I write in my. with Arabic language. I write what he do. Every time, what he do-do, I write it until I learned all the cook. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: I fired the cook, I hired dishwasher. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: And I start cooking for two and a half years Chinese food. SPEAKER 1: Wow, you stayed that one. ALI: I stayed two and a half years. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. And after, American government send me to Russia. SPEAKER 1: For what? ALI: Business. SPEAKER 1: Business? [Laughs] ALI: And I went to Russia and I have to sell my business. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: I sold it, I think, $11,000. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: The restaurant. I stayed six months, less than a few days to six months. When I came back, I find the place go to pieces. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. And I took over. I be. I-I bought it $450. SPEAKER 1: Back? You bought it? ALI: Back. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] Yeah. 2 ALI: And then we changed it from Chinese to American again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yeah. And I took it over. I bought it $450. I fire all the help and I hire good girls, nice-looking girls. She wants to take picture in Fox and Hound, if you know that place, Fox and Hound Nightclub in Quincy. She take picture and take the picture, put your picture in a match. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah? ALI: She's a beautiful girl. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Big, tall, hair up to. I hire her behind the counter and I see a lot of customers look at her. And her dance is very, very good and after. Uncle Sam again, called me up again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Send me back to Palestine. SPEAKER 1: Business again? ALI: Business again. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I have to sell it. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I sold it. When I came back again, I have to take hairdresser. I went to school. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? You went to school? ALI: A hairdresser. Yeah. SPEAKER 1: Where was this, did you go to school? ALI: In Boston. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Academy something school. Yes. And I took a license. And after when we talk, I became. me and Harry J. Sullivan, and Harry L. Barker, we had a meeting together and I said, "I'd like to get my business back to be doctor." He said, "Ali, you can't. You have to 3 go to school." I went to Harvard College. When I went to Harvard College, naturally they talk big words, the dean of the college. I don't understand. I go to library. In state hospital, you have a beautiful library, American here. I went to library and that's where the boys who were in the same class with me, some of them were in the army too, you know, and started to look at dictionary what this word mean. I don't understand even the meaning of the word. I look what's the meaning of this word way back two or three times. I got lost. I said, "I don't want to lose my time in the government." The government pay for the school and gave me $125 a week. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. They pay me $125 a week and I don't understand nothing. That's why I thought make the government pay money for nothing and I don't understand nothing. It make you feel ashamed. Number two, it make you feel ashamed, an intelligent man, you don't understand English. It looks bad. SPEAKER 1: It's not an easy language. ALI: That's right. I say, "Okay, forget it." See? And I open sponge business. SPEAKER 1: Sponge? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: They call it [unintelligible - 00:03:40] Sponge Company in Boston. That's my name. Yes. I have 250 men diver for me. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah? ALI: Yes, in Boston. I made good business. Yes. And I have a boat go to Middle East and come back. Yes, with captain. I go with them once in a while. I've done a very good business. Yes. And after, I sold the business and I came to Fitchburg. 4 SPEAKER 1: Well, all this time you were in Boston, were you still living with your brother? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: No? You moved out? ALI: I move out. I live alone. I hire apartment, one doctor. I mean, doctor. him and I, we live together. SPEAKER 1: But you still didn't have enough family to bring your family over here? ALI: No, I bring my family. SPEAKER 1: When did you bring your family? ALI: In 1946, I bring my son. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Just your son or.? ALI: My son, the one who died. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: I bring him; I put him in high school in Boston. After, I put him in Northeastern College. After, I put him to Harvard College. Yes. SPEAKER 1: Did you bring your wife or the rest of the.? ALI: No, my wife she. SPEAKER 1: She had died. ALI: In 1948. SPEAKER 1: And what about the rest of your children? ALI: Lived with my mother and father. My father, he lived 107. SPEAKER 1: To 107 years old? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: And the other children lived with him? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Why did you just bring the one boy and not the others? Because. ALI: No, no, because he's old enough. He was 17. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. 5 ALI: And the other one was younger. He didn't need mother. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, they had to be taken care of while he was work. ALI: We have to be [unintelligible - 00:05:07]. If I bring with me women here. because I hear here, in old country, they say he's a playboy. SPEAKER 1: Oh, yeah. ALI: And I don't want to say that. I don't want somebody give me a bad name. I don't want no woman to live with me with my children. You see? Right away, they say, "It's not for his children – he playboy." SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I don't like that. See? I bring my son then he finish and I bring other son when he grow when I came to Fitchburg here. In 1950, I bring my other son. And after, I bring my daughter. See? And my son, that number two, he don't like the school. I put him in Fitchburg High School here three months and I walk with him – I don't take him in a car, walk with him – he go to school, inside. He see when I go and he walk out. He don't go to school. SPEAKER 1: Do they speak English at all? ALI: A little bit. SPEAKER 1: A little bit. Yeah. ALI: Because down there, they teach you A, B, C, D, open the door, close the door, thank you, goodbye, how are you, you know. SPEAKER 1: He just didn't like it. ALI: He don't like the school. We have to learn some trade. He said, "I like to be mechanic." I put him to mechanic here in [unintelligible - 00:06:25] summer school, a mechanic. I put him there, two weeks, he said, "Too dirty." SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: And I said, "All right." And he start to smoke. I beat him up. And he see me a few time I go to Fidelity Bank, to Mr. Barrett. He 6 ask him, he say, "My father need $200, Mr. Barrett. Can you give me please?" Mr. Barrett did give him $200, the president of the bank. SPEAKER 1: Oh, geez. ALI: He took $200 and he took the bus from here to Boston. He was only five months in this country. And he went to Boston by bus. And from Boston, he took the taxi to the airport and he took the airplane to Dearborn, Michigan. This boy here, you met him, Abdullah? SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: He's the one who was there in Dearborn, Michigan, because he came the same day, this my nephew, because. both cousin. And he went to see him. He started work with him. From there, he went to volunteer to the air force, American Air Force, four years. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. What's he doing today? ALI: Now, he wants to work with me, barber. I put him in school here to be barber because he don't like. SPEAKER 1: He came back, yeah. ALI: He came back. He get married and he get six kid now. I put him to work with me for 14 years, you know, barber. I gave him $225 a week, five days, for barber. He was [Unintelligible - 00:08:01] for me in barbershop here. SPEAKER 1: In Fitchburg? ALI: In Fitchburg. And after the business dropped down because everybody gets. starts to get long hair. And then he left. He went to Somerville. He bought packages store, you know, variety store. And he bought house there, see. And now, he has then. making a good living. SPEAKER 1: What about your daughter? How did.? ALI: My daughter, she got married. SPEAKER 1: So she came here? 7 ALI: No. I send her to Harvard College. I want to be doctor. Because I found out you can't open a hospital, you can't do nothing until you be doctor. And I was thinking, "She's young and she know English." I put her in Harvard College, took a medical degree, and she get doctors. And I work on her hair. And after two or three years, could be, maybe, I get my practice license doctor, too. See? And she went over a year and a half. And I was her hairdresser myself in Fitchburg here. She don't like to be doctor. She said, "Dad, I don't like it – too hard for me. Can I take hairdressing and work with you?" I said, "Okay." I put her hairdresser, in a school. She stays seven months in school and then she got her practice license, hairdresser. And she came work with me in Fitchburg as hairdresser. She don't like it. I said, "What do you want?" She said, "Well, let me work with you in the house." I have a house. SPEAKER 1: Take care of your house? ALI: My house. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: I put her in the house. Then she hit 18, 19 and I said, "Now, you can't stay like this. You have to be married." I send her back to old country. She met my cousin. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: It was an arranged type of marriage? ALI: Yes. Yes. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. Your other boy got married though. That wasn't arranged, was it? ALI: Arranged by my father. SPEAKER 1: Oh, it was? ALI: Yes. I send them there from here, from the air force. SPEAKER 1: So he married an Arab? ALI: Yes. 8 SPEAKER 1: And your other son, he went to a school here? ALI: Yes, he went to Northeastern College. He went to Harvard College. SPEAKER 1: For any special thing? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: To be a doctor? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: Number one, he was engineer, see. And after, he took, I don't know what kind of thing. He took another one. Subject, he took another subject. And after, he went to the air force. He once worked for the government intelligence service six and a half years, see. And after he get discharged, he came here. He opened supermarket in Detroit, Michigan. And the American government went after him, took him. He went on postmaster in Saudi Arabia. After, they took him back to ambassador. Two months ago, the American government, they want me to go back. They came here to the barbershop and ask me to follow. I thought about it. They want me to go back to the service. SPEAKER 1: They want you, too? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? And you said no? ALI: No. I told them the story about when that tourist was hunting. Do you remember? SPEAKER 1: I think. ALI: One Arabian champion and one German champion went to hunt. They say, "There can't be two champions. There got to be one." When he went to Germany, he say, "Okay, you're my guest tomorrow morning." Next morning, they went to hunt. The German fellow took the eagle with him – pheasants, they're called pheasants. He let the pheasant cock, cock, cock, and all the 9 pheasant come in. German fellow, he took the gun and shot five. He said, "Boy, that's why you're champion?" He says, "Well, that's my limit now. Five minute, five pheasants. Let's go back home." He said, "Before you go, you want to sell me the pheasant? He said, "It cost too much money." He said, "Why?" "Because they take me a long time to teach them, making the pheasant come in and after I kill them, he come in with them. You know, because they're dead and it becomes alive and put them with me and go home. It cost me too much time and money." He said, "I don't care. How much you want to sell it?" He said, "A thousand mark." He said, "Here's a thousand mark, my friend." Look at him, the smartest man. He said, "I'll buy it. The German fellow, he said, "A thousand marks for one pheasant is a lot of money." He took it, and the Arabian man, he took the gun and shot him, he kill him. He said, "Why you kill him?" He said, "Well, he's not worth to live. He doesn't deserve to live." He said, "Why?" He said, "He double-cross his kind." SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: Double-cross his kind. The German fellow, he always said, "You're right." He said, "He's not worth to live." Am I going against my people? No. And I told that story to the people who come to see me. They say, "You're still American." I say, "I don't care. Still, I'm Arabian blood." SPEAKER 1: Yeah, you can't go against your people. ALI: I can't. SPEAKER 1: When you started to live in this area, did you look for a neighborhood of your own nationality or weren't there enough people? ALI: No, when I came here, I don't find nobody except one man, I told you, Mr. Joseph. He's Lebanese and he's Catholic. And the Catholic, they don't like the Muslim. 10 SPEAKER 1: They don't? No? ALI: No. This people here that came tonight, they don't like Muslims. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: But just he work for me one time. When he came to this country to. he didn't have no license. I took him with me to Boston and I help him out to get his license. And he work with me one year, see. And I give him good money. But, of course, I'm Muslim, he quit. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right, after I give him license. He work in the plastic. He come and his finger all burned here because of the plastic. SPEAKER 1: The chemicals? ALI: Because I get factory in New Hampshire. SPEAKER 1: You have a factory now? ALI: Yeah, I sold it. SPEAKER 1: Oh, you sold it? ALI: Yeah, last year. I get plastic factory, Green, in New Hampshire? SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: That's my name. SPEAKER 1: Geez. You have a lot of things going. Well, how did the people treat you when you came into this area? ALI: Well, like I say, when I came here, I think I told you I met that man, Mr. [Lowell], and I took him home, I make Christmas dinner. I told you a story about it. And when I ask him to get. I give him $2 and dinner with us. She took it the wrong way. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, to be a waitress. ALI: Yeah, and after I went to First Baptist Church, where is the library now exactly, I make dinner for 250. When we were finished, I show you the papers here. I fed him next year. I asked him, he said, no, he get to be only a Baptist member, a First Baptist Church member. I said, "No, my friend, every man, the Greek, Italian, 11 Jews, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, I don't care who it is, over 6 years, they are invited. We call the mother, father of the town or the city. I invite everybody. And I have cars, transportation. I have. each car, two people to bring man or woman in wheelchair and put them in a car. When they come out, they can bring them to the dinner. And I have nurses; I hire 10 nurses. Every time I went to [unintelligible - 00:15:28] Hospital with my high English. I have a hard time even to rent 10 girls, to hire girls to feed the people and wash them out and send them back. Even one fellow is named Father O'Brien. He was in charge of the Saint Camilla Church. He was a waiter. And he didn't believe it. He came, kiss me, and hug me two or three time in my cheek. He say he never see that in his life and he was waiter with the George Burke last time and the policemen in five minutes, city council – waiters. And Father O'Brien, he volunteered. He say, "Honest to God, Mo, I give one man five times, you know, what's called second, second, second, five dishes. He eat five dishes in all, all men. And this man, he never eat before." I said, "That's what I would love to have. I want people to eat." The last time, last year, when I get. I get 15 years in Fitchburg here. The last time was 2,200 people. It was on TV, channel 4, 5, and 7. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: Yes, ma'am. SPEAKER 1: I don't remember. ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: A year ago? ALI: Yes. No, eight years ago. SPEAKER 1: Oh, eight years ago. ALI: Yes. Then they take me to the court. I have 500 letters. Over 10 letter come in from Tokyo, Japan. SPEAKER 1: Really? 12 ALI: That's right. I still got that mail. From Tokyo, Japan they thank me. They never see that man who do all that dinner, 82 turkey. I bought the smallest turkey, 35 pound from C.A. Cross. I don't know if you remember that name. It was a wholesale when you go to Wayland Park in your right-hand side. I bought. when I have my own restaurant. I have restaurant in [Parma], big dining. And I have the hotel. [Unintelligible - 00:17:29] I told you. And I had. SPEAKER 1: Barry? ALI: Barry. I have restaurant in [unintelligible - 00:17:37]. See, I have different places. And I buy a lot of food from them. And I ask Mr. Cross, young fellow, I say, "I want to make dinner." He say, "I hear about it." I say, "I want you to give me wholesale." He say, "Yes." He give me 82 turkeys but it's special because you have to order especially that big turkey. And nobody wanted that turkey, 38 and 40 pound, not 10, 15 pound. The smallest was 38 pound, see. I bought it and put them at table. And then the TV man, he came and took the picture. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: Yeah, he didn't believe it. One man, he volunteered to buy this stuff and cook them and slice them. He don't believe it. And nobody helped me here. And after, took me to the court. I told you that. They want to know where I got my money and what reason. I told them. SPEAKER 1: They just didn't know you could do something like that because you want to do it for people, to help them. ALI: I want it. I've done it in London. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: I fed in London in 1943. I fed 1,500 people in London. And the mayor of London, his name is Mr. Johnson—I not forgot it, old man with one eye—he worked with me all night long. And the 13 English is, everybody know, cold-blooded. But he's hot blooded. He worked with me. But the American here, nobody work with me. SPEAKER 1: No one helped you? ALI: Nobody. And even took me to the court. They want to know where I got my money. SPEAKER 1: So the people just weren't very friendly to you? ALI: No. No. Can you believe.? What reason, I can't tell you – just jealous because I run for politics here, for mayor? SPEAKER 1: When was that? ALI: Huh? SPEAKER 1: What year was that? ALI: I forget. Eight years ago since I start to run for mayor, this trouble starts in the city. SPEAKER 1: So do you still find a little bit of hostility now even? ALI: A little bit. I know they don't like me. Look now, I have a building, main street building – Dr. Rosenberg here, Dr. Benton here, and my building in the middle. Number one, I paint it white. They came and give me help, you see. "You can't paint it white. You have to paint it blue." I had one argument with my neighbor. I said, "Okay, I paint it blue but not dark blue, light blue." Dr. Benton and the dentist's wife, they came and they both gave me, "Are you blind? We're not this color." I say, "You told me blue. It is blue." He said, "No, it's light blue." I say, "Yes. It's barbershop. I want to grab people eyes, look. I don't want it dark." He said, "Where do you buy your paint?" I told him, "From Academy Paint Store." His name Phil, the manager, they went to see him. He said, "Phil?" He say, "Yes." He say, "We want a paint for Mr. Ali." He say, "Sure. No?" He say, "Yes." He say, "We need paint." They pick up the color – dark, dark blue. I could swear to God it's black. And he say, "[Unintelligible -14 00:20:51]. Is he color blind? He's stupid." He, he, he to the end. And then he came home to the office and he called me up. He say, "Ali?" I say, "Yes." "We got you the paint." I thought he pay for the paint. No. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. They wouldn't pay? ALI: No. He just pick up the color for me. I went to Phil. He said, "Ali, how do you live with this wife?" I said, "Why?" He said, "She call you stupid, she call you colorblind, she call you." I say, "That's not – you know how the women. They don't want to hear me. I didn't say nothing. SPEAKER 1: You didn't say it wasn't your wife? [Laughs] ALI: No. And he said, "What color?" He said, "This one." I said, "My gosh! Nobody died in my barbershop." SPEAKER 1: [Laughs] ALI: It's black. He say, "That's the wife. She." I say, "Give me that green." He says, "She's going to divorce you." I say, "Good. I like her to divorce me. I'll find another one." I painted it green. And since that time, he don't talk to me. He called me everything. We have a fire in that building. Fellow's name [unintelligible - 00:21:59]. He's the headman or the building inspector. He send me a letter by police – not by post office or by mail – by the police. I have to start remodeling my building before eight hours. If not, he can [unintelligible - 00:22:16] to make my building. I start for eight hours after the fire, start work on my building, three years ago. Now, Dr. Rosenberg is still there now. The window broke, the door broke. There's snow inside, frozen pipe. They didn't tell him, "You have to remodel your building." Why? He's a white man. I'm a white man. He's an American citizen. I'm an American citizen. He pay tax. I pay tax. I pay $800 tax – this year, $2,100 tax. But why they can't send him letter, "You have to fix this building." I went to John [unintelligible - 00:23:00]. I 15 said, "Mr. John, cousin," I say, "Will you please write letter to Dr. Rosenberg? He don't want to fix his building?" "All right, I can't force him. I'm not the City Hall." I say, "Can you give me permit at least for the window? Because it froze my pipe and I can't afford it. Even last week, when I was in old country, the pipe froze. They have to call the policeman; they have to call the fireman to close my water. It was leaking, fifth floor to the cellar, my pipe. It cost me $1,000. And they won't help me to [sell]. They won't help me. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: No. When I went to John [unintelligible - 00:23:41], he charged me $10. He wrote me a letter, a typewritten letter, good English, to Dr. Rosenberg to ask him permit, to give me permit. I buy the wood; I hire the carpenter, just for the window to hold the air. You sue me for $25,000. SPEAKER 1: They can do that? ALI: Yes. Now, I'm under court for $25,000 and that passing, what's that called in English? SPEAKER 1: Damages? ALI: No, pass. SPEAKER 1: Trespassing? ALI: Trespassing. And I send them up by mail, by lawyer. They charge me $10. See? SPEAKER 1: And they're going to sue you? ALI: They sue me already. My lawyer, Solomon, too, is Jewish; Dr. Rosenberg is Jewish. I say, "Two Jewish fight each other." See? To show you I'm not wanted here. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. You said something about you became an American citizen. When did you become one? Do you remember? 16 ALI: 1942 and they took me to intelligence service. Because you can be intelligence service; you have to be citizen. I took my citizen in Durham, North Carolina. SPEAKER 1: Yeah? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Really? Did you ever become involved in… well, there was no Muslim Church around here. You said that. where is the church? ALI: We have a church in Quincy. We have a church in New York. We have a big church in Washington, D.C. We have a church in Dearborn, Michigan. We have church in Detroit, Michigan. We have church in Cleveland, Ohio. SPEAKER 1: But none really that. do you go to churches around here? ALI: I go to every church. I go to Saint [unintelligible - 00:25:13], I go to Christ Church, I go to Saint Georgia's Church [unintelligible - 00:25:20], I go to Baptist Church. now they move it. It was here. They move it in John Fitch Highway [unintelligible - 00:25:30] down when you go to New Hampshire. Ashby? SPEAKER 1: Oh, Ashby? ALI: In the middle. We have a garage there, a new garage, in the church up the hill, building new. I go there. I go to Jew synagogue. SPEAKER 1: So you're really involved in all of them? ALI: I go to everyone. I don't mind. SPEAKER 1: It doesn't make any difference? ALI: No, we have one God in this world, like I told you yesterday. We have one God in this world, see. SPEAKER 1: Did you ever become involved in any social activities while you did those, you know. like you did the Christmas dinners with people. Anything else that you. any social activities like. did lots of Muslims ever get together and have like dates? ALI: No. SPEAKER 1: Nothing like that? 17 ALI: We have Arabian dance in Boston because [unintelligible - 00:26:14] get married, or [ring show] from Egypt, Lebanon, Beirut, [unintelligible - 00:26:19]. SPEAKER 1: But nothing in this area? ALI: Not in this area, because not much here people. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: The most 25, 30 people, just young boys. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. What were some of the things that you miss most about home, back in Arabia? Like did you miss the food or the.? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: Do you still cook Arabian food? ALI: I cook any kind but I can't cook Arabian food. SPEAKER 1: You can't? ALI: I can't cook Arabian food. SPEAKER 1: No? ALI: No. I have to go some time in Worcester. They call it [El Morocco]. You've been there? SPEAKER 1: I've heard of it, yeah. ALI: I go there sometime when I want Arabian food. But sometime, invite me, somebody like this people here, Lebanese, sometime invite me. I eat Arabian food. Sometime, I go to my son, I go to my nephew, see. SPEAKER 1: Do you miss that kind of food though? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: You're becoming adjusted to American food though? ALI: Yeah, I like American food. SPEAKER 1: [Unintelligible - 00:27:15]. ALI: Anything to fill your belly. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: That's all. SPEAKER 1: Do you miss the customs and things like that? 18 ALI: I wear it here. Yes. SPEAKER 1: You were telling me about the marriage customs. I thought that was kind of interesting, you know, how you don't get. like in your country, you don't even see them. ALI: No, you don't see them. SPEAKER 1: Each other before you're married. ALI: See, down there, like I say, I like the custom this way. And I like American custom like we talked yesterday because independent. how you look at it. Number one, down there, you can't have no girlfriend, no boyfriend, only through by your mother, by your father. See, you're married. Okay. When you're married, like I say, depending on your class, how much money you're worth; if you're worth money enough because the money belong to you because you belong to your wife, $2,000. You buy silk handkerchiefs. It's got to be white silk handkerchiefs. You give to the girl's father. The girl father count them. You have to replace it, match it. SPEAKER 1: Match it, yeah. ALI: He put $2,000, you put $2,000. He put $5,000, you put $5,000. He put $10,000, you put $10,000. The girl father, you have to match it. And he call the mother and he give the mother. The mother and the daughter, they go outside next day, buy jewelry, furnishing. SPEAKER 1: Stuff for the house? ALI: Stuff for the girl, for her future. Okay. And after, the boy, he invites everybody. Like I told you, we have dance three nights, see, until 12 or 1 o'clock in the morning. They bring like guitars in old country but call that oud. SPEAKER 1: Oud? ALI: Oud is different. It's round. SPEAKER 1: It's round? Yes. 19 ALI: Yes, beautiful. See? And they play sometime until 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning. Poem. SPEAKER 1: Singing? ALI: Yeah. And people have good time drinking coffee and cinnamon. SPEAKER 1: Yeah, cinnamon. ALI: Oh, beautiful. I love it. SPEAKER 1: But no liquor or nothing? ALI: No liquors, absolutely none. SPEAKER 1: It's against the religion? ALI: If you get caught with empty can beer in your hand or your body, three months in jail without court. SPEAKER 1: Because of your religion? ALI: That's right. SPEAKER 1: Really? ALI: That's right. Now, I can tell you now. But in my time, you see, you can. not allowed. You remember my nephew when he told you I own the hotel. He get busy because I have nightclub. See? And I bring girl from Africa, Algiers, dancing from. from Italy, dancing and advertising in the papers and radio. And everybody, they want to see something different. Because you have to get [unintelligible - 00:30:06] to bring somebody and I bring a lot of people. And when the bartender. they have three bartender and too busy, see. I have to help them. They say, "Mo, give me Schlitz." "This cousin Schlitz?" "No, no, not this one." "This?" "No, no." I start to pick up. I don't care. Beer is the same thing to me. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Beer is beer. SPEAKER 1: Yeah. ALI: Everyone has a different name, see. I have a cooler. I can put in 30 case, see. And I do not care. I just pick up. "I don't want this 20 one." "Okay, cousin. Open this." "Okay. No, not this one." "Okay, that's the one. Okay." They drive me. but fast. I want it fast. SPEAKER 1: So when you have your wedding celebrations, you just like to sit, have coffee, things like that. ALI: Coffee. SPEAKER 1: That lasts for three days? ALI: Yes. SPEAKER 1: And the girls last three days, too? Separate? ALI: No, together. SPEAKER 1: Oh, together? ALI: Together, but men dance and sing and the girl behind – same area but not together, see. All right. And after, they make dinner. SPEAKER 1: For everybody? ALI: For everybody. Sometime, even four or five towns, depending how you are well known. I don't know what you call in English. How much you are well known. People know you. Two or three towns, sometimes 10 towns. Sometimes, nobody just your neighbors, see. Sometimes, a lot of people come in, 40, 50, 6000 lambs, sometimes two lamb. But like I say, how much people do you know? SPEAKER 1: So you kill a lamb? ALI: You kill them; you cook them, make dinner. And after, we eat dinner. No, before the dinner, we take the boy, ride in a horse, like I told you, and start a race, see. And after half or one hour, the men bring back the horse and they begin with the dance with the sword and poem./AT/mb/ee
Against the backdrop of repeated political violence between Israel and different belligerents in the first and second decades of the 21st century (2003-2017) and by employing a social-psychological theoretical framework, this dissertation explores the effects of political violence on Israelis ' social and national identities. The findings support the discussion of the social consequences of political violence in Israel, be them increased cohesiveness among different social groups (ethnic minority and majority) or social fragmentation and increased polarization between other groups (rich vs. poor or political right vs. left). Whereas Social Identity Theory constitutes the theoretical base for the explored hypotheses, Israeli social place-making practices are also discussed. Topic Whereas a vast amount of literature has been dedicated to the effects of exposure to violence on individuals and groups for over a century, it mainly focuses on type, duration or location of such violence. Since the relevant literature seems to consider the occurrence of political violence a unitary phenomenon, it consistently fails to attend to a most important factor- the aftermath of such violence. By overlooking the discrepancy in violence' aftermath and by neglecting any analysis derived from it, I argue that the comprehensive literature examining the social effects of political violence and post-conflict societies is missing a vital piece of the puzzle. Accordingly, the contribution of this dissertation to the conflict literature is twofold: first, it disaggregates the aftermaths of two common forms of political violence, wars and military operations and explores their effects on individuals, groups and the Israeli society as a whole. Second, it closely examines some of the central assumptions of Social Identity Theory, one of the most comprehensive theories of group relations in the context of concrete political violence. It does so while paying special attention to highly fascinating identity components and basic social building blocks: national identification, social trust and social rifts in Israel. Methods The dissertation employs various methodologies: First, a macro-level, statistical examination of the relationship between different war outcomes and socio-national identities was conducted using two web-based experiments. Second, a qualitative analysis of Zionism in Europe and in Israel's early years complemented a discussion of Israeli narratives of belonging, memory politics, ingredients of national pride and contemporary social challenges. Third, a quantitative micro-level analysis of the effect of successful and unsuccessful military operation on the Israeli society was conducted. The latter utilized a unique, self-compiled database, following an extensive manual content analysis , alongside data originating in annual social surveys conducted in Israel by the Guttmann institute. Knowledge gained The first empirical chapter (chapter four) was set to establish the underlying assumption upon which the dissertation is based; Namely, that different outcomes of political violence have distinctive effects on individual identities. In this chapter, predictions derived from Social Identity Theory were put into an initial macro-level analysis through two original web experiments. The latter explored the effect of different war outcomes (distinguishing between victory, defeat, stalemate and a negotiated agreement) on social and national identities . Whereas the research supported the underlying hypothesis according to which distinctive war outcomes are associated with distinctive effects when national identification is concerned, no significant differences between war outcomes were found in relation to individuals' social identities. These results are consistent with Social Identity Theory and the self-esteem protection/enhancement strategies derived from it (BIRGing and CORFing ); the significant differences between war outcomes (mainly between victories and defeats) are explained by individuals' tendencies to share in the glory of a successful other (to BIRG) following a positively evaluated war outcome, and to distance themselves from an unsuccessful group (to CORF), following a negatively valued war outcome. The non-significant results concerning social identities are consistent with Simmel's conflict hypothesis suggesting that conflicting interactions strengthen the internal cohesion of pre-existing groups. In this regard, it appears as though individuals react to the conflict itself whereas its aftermath did not play any significant role. The overall outcomes obtained thus laid the foundations for an extensive micro-level analysis of the effect of outcomes of political violence on socio-national identities among Israelis. Chapter five refocused the attention on the state of Israel and the Israeli society. It provided a historical analysis of Jewish-Israeli nationalism, rooted in the Zionistic movement in Europe in the late 19th century, which preceded the establishment of the state of Israel. The analysis centered on nation-building processes which took place in Israel's first years, namely, the constructing of a new Jewish-Israeli identity by means of institutionalizing the Hebrew language as an official language, integration of new immigrants and the role of the Israeli defense force as a melting pot. The study of the origins of Israeli national pride, both in the country's first years and in contemporary times, complemented the discussion as it is entwined with both Jewish and Israeli identities. The analysis suggests that while Israel was established as a democracy, it was never a space of ethnic diversity. As the national home for world jury based on a Zionist narrative and highly influenced by the Holocaust, no plurality of ethnic discourses existed in Israel in over 50 years. The research describes the way state-sponsored dominant Jewish and Zionist narratives morphed into a uni-dimensional Israeli identity. This, in turn, prevented Arab-Israelis, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, from being incorporated into the Israeli society. Recurrent political violence as part of the on-going Israeli Palestinian conflict further contributed both to the exclusion of Arab-Israelis from the original Israeli narrative and to the bonding of Jewish Israelis. It was only in the last decades and against the backdrop of significant changes endured by the Israeli society that place-making processes were put on the political and social agenda. Whereas nation and community-building processes are still prominent in contemporary Israel, they now exist side by side a vibrant and vocal discourse of post-Zionism, Jewish secularism and "Israelism" which is not based on Judaism but on an Israeli cultural narrative. Persistent political violence that contributed to social fragmentation in Israel's first decades alongside cultural commonalities between Jewish and Arab Israelis now begin to serve as a common denominator in contemporary Israeli society. If those continue to resonate among Israelis, it is thus not implausible that they would eventually substitute Judaism and Zionism as social unifiers in the process of creating a "same boat" society. Under such circumstances and with diminishing boundaries between Arab and Jewish Israelis, the former will no longer be construed as an "out-group" by the Jewish majority in Israel. Nonetheless, drifting away from the original Jewish integrator and common factor of more than 75% of the country's population may threaten the Jewish communities of Israel with social fragmentation. Consequently, the study of the effect of political violence on both Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Israel set forth in the upcoming chapters is of great importance for the future of Israel. Chapter six set out to examine the relationship between Israelis and their nation-state following different outcomes of Israeli military operations. Special attention was paid to changes in levels of national pride among Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis and new immigrants across a tempestuous ten-year period (2003-2013) and in conjunction with successful and unsuccessful conclusions of Israeli warfare, as perceived by the Israeli public. Using a regressing analysis of data originating in social surveys, the research tested the validity of predictions derived from Social Identity Theory in both the individual and the social levels. Results indicate that the effect of recurrent warfare on national identification among Israelis is highly mitigated by the perceived outcome of such warfare as well as by sub-group membership (ethnic/social majority vs. minority). Consistent with Social Identity Theory, an Israeli military success was highly associated with increased national identification for the general Israeli population. However, contrary to conventional wisdom and to the "minority hypothesis ", the same effect was also registered among Israeli Arabs. While Israeli Arabs, the largest ethnic minority in Israel, might share neither the country's collective Jewish narrative nor its Zionist ethos they are Israeli citizens who nonetheless feel a sense of belonging to the state of Israel . As such, they are a part of a larger in-group which shares personal and economic interests. Those are equally and existentially threatened when Israel is experiencing unsuccessful military operations. This positivistic evidence suggests that Israeli Arabs' identification with the state of Israel lies in the area of "Israeliness that is beyond Jewishness". The analysis also affirmed the existence of an "embedded identity effect" concerning national identification among Jewish Israelis; Israeli Jews, the majority ethnic group in Israel, maintained high national-identification levels regardless of the way the warfare was concluded. This finding is unsurprising considering Israel's Jewish character and the circumstances of its creation. Whilst societies subjected to external threat may unite in the face of a common enemy, chapter seven sought to examine whether this is true in the Israeli context and if so, whether the outcomes of political violence mitigate the effect. Whereas a large scholarship examined the effect of violence on social cohesion and political tolerance in Israel, it mostly focused on Arab-Israelis and immigrant. The research presented in chapter seven studied the effect of discrepant outcomes of Israeli warfare on social cohesion, social tensions and trust between the various communities of Israel (both Jewish and non-Jewish). The research focused on the general level of social trust in society alongside six specific social rifts, prevalent in present-day Israel: the intercommunal rift (between the Israeli Jewish community and the Israeli-Arab community), the Jewish intercommunal rift (between Jews of Ashkenazi and Sephardic/Mizrachi origins), the religious rift (between orthodox and non-orthodox Jewish communities), the ideological/political rift , the socio-economic rift and the nativist tension (between native Israelis and new immigrants). Results revealed a highly significant effect of Israeli military success concerning all six social rifts and a very mild effect concerning social trust. For all but one rift (the Jewish inter-communal rift), successful termination of Israeli warfare was associated with an increased social tension between the different communities in Israel (though in different levels of significance). This unfortunate finding which points to increased fractionalization among the different communities in Israel following Israeli military successes is in line with several other studies examining the effects of political violence on political exclusionism in Israel. Whereas the literature supports the notion that in time of crisis social cohesion increases, it is not surprising to find increased tensions following military successes rather than failures. An exception to the observed rise in social tensions in Israel is the increased cohesion between Ashkenzi and Sephardic/Mizrachi Jews (the Jewish intercommunal rift). The results support the conclusion that the Jewish population, the majority ethnic group in Israel, is united behind the idea that Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people (and possibly a necessary refuge from rising anti-Semitism around the globe). A decrease in Jewish intercommunal tension following Israeli victories supports the cohesive potential of in-group pride and is consistent with the Jewish foundation and Zionistic narrative of Jewish Israelis and with the existence of an embedded Jewish-Israeli identity . As for the national level, a "rally around the flag" effect is a term used to describe the uniting power of common threats. An underlying motive for this surge in national unity is linked to patriotism, as individuals respond to threats by identifying with their in-group . However, when the crisis is over, politics and society quickly revert to normal and existing social rifts resurface. Whereas an unsuccessful termination of an Israeli military operation is likely to induce a "rally around the flag" effect, a military success demonstrates the opposite effect. Consequently, the seemingly rising tensions between various communities in Israel observed following an Israeli military success is consistent with a reverse "rally around the flag" effect and reflects the fractionalized nature of the Israeli society. Another explanation to the observed trend of increased social tensions following a successful warfare may be directly linked to the experience of in-group guilt or shame despite a successful outcome. Such gilt might lead to rising tension between those who are more/less supportive of the outcome, or perhaps feel that more should have been done to achieve a more solid outcome. Finally, the increased tensions may speak to the theorized dynamic at the heart of the present and similar works that reflects the more destructive side of pride and in-group glorification. According to that scholarship, out-group hate can even extend to people perceived to be "hostile minorities ". Whilst the increase in intercommunal tension is expected and in line with the results of similar studies examining the effect of violence or stress on the relationships between Jewish and Arab Israelis, the increase in religious tensions, socio-economic tension and ideological tensions could be reflective of a second circle of out-group hate; Supporters of the political left alongside less observant and wealthier elements of the Israeli society , may experience in-group guilt and possibly shame despite the perceived successful outcome, thus distancing themselves from those experiencing pride at the outcome. The effect of education, in particular higher education, in reducing social tensions and increasing social trust emerges as another important finding of this research. Whether education provides a sense of optimism and control over one's life that allows people to trust, or whether it provides opportunities for contact and networks' creation with others, the study confirms the potential role of education in reducing social tension even in a highly diverse and conflict-torn Israeli society. Moreover, since social divisions may be exploited by political entrepreneurs, and since increasing social tensions might result in the erosion of social capital, raising the alarm would be the first step in directly addressing such important issues (for example, by policy making). Lastly, any serious peace negotiation with a Palestinian leadership would require difficult concessions to be made by both parties. As such, the way towards a peaceful conclusion of the Israeli Palestinian conflict would inevitably depend, among others, on the social strength and cohesion of the Israeli civil society.:Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Background and Motivation . 7 1.1.1 National Identification . 10 1.1.2 Social Trust . 14 1.1.3 Focusing on Israel . 16 1.2 Prologue . 17 1.3 Contribution Scope . 18 1.4 Overview of Aims and Chapters . 20 2. Theoretical Framework: Conflict Research, National Identification and Social Trust Part I: Conflict Research 2.1 Conflict Research . 24 2.1.1 General Theory and Practices . 25 2.1.2 Contemporary Trends and Challenges . 26 2.1.3 Looking Forward . 27 Part II: Belonging, Identity and the Nation 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Identity Formation . 28 Social Belonging and Group Identification . 29 The Sense of Belonging, Nationhood and Statehood . 30 2.4.1 What is a Nation? . 30 2.4.2 National Identification . 32 2.4.3 Hierarchies of National Belonging . 33 2.4.4 The Nation State . 34 2.4.5 Nationhood and Statehood . 35 Conflict Patriotic Affinity: Conceptual Outlines . 38 2.6.1 Between Patriotism and Nationalism . 41 Coping With Threatened Social Identity . 42 and Group Identification . 36 2 3 2.7.1 Social Identity Theory . 42 2.7.2 Basking In Reflected Glory . 45 2.7.3 Cutting Off Reflected Failure . 46 2.7.4 Self-Embedded Social Identity . 48 2.7.5 National Identity of Ethnic Minorities . 50 Part III: Social Trust and Cohesiveness 2.8 Social Capital and Cohesion . 52 2.9 Unraveling the Riddle of Social Trust . 54 2.9.1 Threats to Social Trust and Social Cohesion . 56 3. Methodology 3.1 Macro-level Analysis . 60 3.1.1 Appropriateness . 60 3.1.2 A Short History of Web Experiments . 61 3.1.3 Web Experiments: Advantages and Challenges . 63 3.2. Micro-level analysis . 69 3.2.1 Focusing on The state of Israel and Israeli Society . 69 Contemporary Israeli Media . 72 Military Censorship . 75 3.2.2 Episodes of High Intensity Political Violence . 75 3.2.3 Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence . 77 3.2.4 Relevant Issues Concerning the Use of Survey Data . 78 Vague Concepts . 78 Categorizing Identities . 80 3.2.5 The Israeli Democracy Index . 82 3.2.6 Control Variables . 83 3.3 Framing in Communication and Their Effect on Public Opinion . 84 3.3.1 The Use of Emphasis and Equivalence Framing in Shaping Public Opinion . 85 3.3.2 The Effect of Frames in Shaping Individual Perceptions . 87 3.3.3 Assessing a Frame's Strength in Political Settings . 88 4. The Ending matters: National and Social Identification Following Discrepant War Outcomes 4.1 Introduction . 90 4.2 Experimental Study I . 93 4.2.1 Procedure and Experimental Design . 93 4.2.2 Measures . 95 4.3.3 Results . 95 4.2.4 Discussion . 99 Seriousness Check . 99 National Identity . 100 Social Identity . 102 4.3 Experimental Study II . 103 4.3.1 Using video Vs. Text in Experimental Research . 103 4.3.2 Procedure and Experimental Design . 104 4.3.3 Measures . 105 4.3.4 Results . 106 4.3.5 Discussion . 109 Seriousness Check . 109 National Identity . 109 4.4 Limitations . 110 4.5 Conclusion . 111 5. Focusing on the State of Israel and Israeli Society 5.1 Introduction . 114 5.2 Jewish Nationalism and the Zionist Movement in Europe . 114 5.3 Zionism, National Identity and Hebrew Culture Following the Establishment of The State of Israel . 118 5.3.1 The Israeli Defense Forces . 119 Serving in the Israeli Defense Forces . 120 Education, Socialization and Nation Building . 121 The Effect of the IDF on the Israeli Society . 123 5.3.2 Sport as an Integrative Tool for Shaping Israeli Collective Identity . 129 5.4 The Jewish and Democratic Nature of the State of Israel . 132 4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5 Current Challenges to Contemporary "Israeliness" . 134 5.5.1 Ethnic-religious Classification of Israelis- Between Citizenship and Nationality . 136 5.5.2 Israeli Nationalist Particularism . 137 Israeli Patriotism and Ingredients of Israeli National Pride . 140 5.6.1 Tzedakah, Gemilut Hasadim and Tikun Olam . 141 5.6.2 Mashav . 142 5.6.3 Operation "Good Neighbor" . 144 Conclusion . 148 6. Together We Stand? Perceived Outcomes of Political Violence and National Pride 7. 6.1 Introduction . 150 6.2 Hypotheses . 151 6.3 Data, Measures and Method . 153 6.3.1 Focusing on Israel . 153 6.3.2 Military Operations . 154 6.3.3 Survey Measures: National Identification . 155 6.3.4 Perceived Outcome of Military Operation . 157 6.3.5 Control Variables . 158 6.4 Findings and Discussion . 159 6.4.1 Preliminary Findings . 159 6.4.2 Disaggregating the Israeli Society . 163 6.4.3 Interaction Analysis . 164 6.5 Robustness Checks . 169 6.5.1 Israel's General Situation . 170 6.5.2 Proximity to the Center of Violence . 171 6.6 Conclusion . 172 In Us We Trust? The Effect of Military Operations on Social Cleavages and Social Cohesion in Israel 7.1 Introduction . 174 7.2 Hypothesis . 175 7.3 7.4 6 Data, Measures and Method . 179 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3 7.3.4 The Israeli Society in Context . 179 Military Operations . 181 Perceived Levels of Tension and Trust in the Israeli Society . 183 Perceived Outcomes of Israeli Military Operations . 185 Control Variables . 185 7.3.5 Findings and Discussion . 186 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 Preliminary Findings . 187 The Effect of Individual Level and Country Level Variables on Social Tensions and Social Trust . 189 Examining the Effect of Israeli Military Operation on Inter-group Tensions . 193 Exploring the Rise and Fall of Social Trust . 197 7.4.4 Conclusion . 200 7.5 8. Conclusion . 203 8.1 Limitations . 210 8.2 Going forward: Ideas for Future Research . 213 8.3 Final remarks/Epilogue . 215 9. References . 218 10. List of Figures . 254 Appendices A. The Evolution of Conflict Research in the 20th Century . 255 B. Supplementary Material Chapter Four . 268 B.1 Experiment I . 268 B.2 Experiment II . 274 B.3 Witnessing a Real Conflict as a Potential Covariate . 287 C. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Six . 288 D. Supplementary Material and Robustness Checks, Chapter Seven . 308
