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As the current chair of BRICS, Russia is pursuing a rather extensive agenda related to finance that includes enhancing the role of member countries in the international monetary and financial system and developing interbank cooperation and settlements in national currencies. BRICS is an intergovernmental organization founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa that recently expanded and now includes Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. There has also been discussion of a potential BRICS currency as part of a strategy of de-dollarization — the substitution of the dollar as the primary currency for international financial transactions. The U.S. trade war with China, as well as U.S. sanctions on China and Russia, are central to this ongoing discussion.Although much U.S. media attention was paid to the enhancement of military and political cooperation during the summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing earlier this month, financial issues also figured high on the agenda. The Russian delegation included Putin's new defense minister, Andrei Belousov, whose appointment is believed to help ensure that the Russian economy better serves the strategic needs of the military. Russia's Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and the governor of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, also participated. Nabiullina's participation was particularly noteworthy as she does not regularly accompany Putin on overseas visits. However, her participation would have been crucial for any discussion regarding sanctions workarounds and Moscow's interest in de-dollarization. Also noteworthy was Putin's mention that trade turnover between the two countries in 2023 increased by some 25 percent, reaching over $227 billion. He was also keen to underscore that 90 percent of bilateral trade between the two countries was conducted in rubles and/or yuan. It must be mentioned that Chinese banks are under increasing pressure from the U.S. to stop funding these arrangements. In any case, Putin's observations were clearly intended not only for the Chinese leadership but also for the "global majority" or Global South as well to promote global joint Sino-Russian initiatives, such as de-dollarization, which have received increased support recently. Indeed, it was probably no coincidence that during Putin's visit it was announced that Beijing dumped a total of $53.3 billion of U.S. Treasuries and agency bonds combined in the first quarter, according to calculations based on the latest data from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Belgium, often seen as a custodian of China's holdings, also disposed of $22 billion of Treasuries during the same period. These figures underscore China's continuing commitment to de-dollarization.As of March 2024, over half (52.9%) of Chinese payments were settled in RMB while 42.8% were settled in U.S. dollars. Furthermore, according to data released by the People's Bank of China, China's gold reserves rose to 2264.87 tons in the first quarter of 2024, up from 2235.39 tons in the fourth quarter of 2023.This is double the share from the previous five years. According to Goldman Sachs, foreigners' increased willingness to trade assets denominated in RMB continues to contribute to de-dollarization in favor of China's currency. Early last year, Brazil and Argentina announced that they would begin allowing trade settlements in RMB. With the onset of the global de-dollarization trend, numerous countries have sped up diversifying their reserves by augmenting their gold holdings and adopting local currencies for international transactions.At the ASEAN finance ministers and central banks meeting in Indonesia in March, policymakers discussed cutting their reliance on the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro and moving to settlements in local currencies instead. And, in early April, Indian media widely reported that the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had announced that India and Malaysia were starting to settle their trade in the Indian rupee. India already conducts most of its energy trade with Russia in rupees or rubles.As de-dollarization accelerates, the BRICS nations continue efforts to establish a new reserve currency backed by a basket of their respective currencies. BRICS members have not developed their own currency; however, a BRICS blockchain-based payment system is in the works, according to Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov in March 2024. The payment system, referred to as the BRICS Bridge, would connect member countries' financial systems using payment gateways for settlements in central bank digital currencies. Ideally, a BRICS currency would allow these countries to assert their economic independence while competing with the existing international financial system. The current system is dominated by the U.S. dollar, which accounts for about 90 percent of all currency trading. Until recently, nearly 100 percent of oil trading was conducted in dollars; however, in 2023, one-fifth of oil trades were reportedly conducted with non-dollar currencies.The potential impact of a new BRICS currency on the U.S. dollar remains uncertain, with experts debating its potential to challenge the dollar's dominance. According to an article on Nasdaq.com, "Any such currency, if stabilized against the dollar, would weaken the power of U.S. sanctions, by reducing the influence of the dollar globally…weakening the status of the dollar as a global currency and mitigating risks associated with global volatility due to the lessening of dependence on the dollar…As more countries would seek alternatives to the dollar this would only accelerate the trend toward de-dollarization."In a recent interview, Sergey Ryabkov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, revealed that the de-dollarization agenda would take center stage at the BRICS summit scheduled to take place in Russia in October 2024. The alliance will become stronger after the summit, ushering developing nations into a "whole new ball game." The BRICS has also created the BRICS Bank in 2015. Now known as the New Development Bank, or NDB, it mobilizes resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and other emerging market economies and developing countries. In 2021, the NDB expanded its membership and admitted Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay as new members. In March its board of directors concluded its 43rd meeting at its headquarters in Shanghai. During meetings a robust project pipeline for 2024 was discussed, aligned with the development objectives of NDB's member countries.Although the threat of de-dollarization and a digital BRICS currency do not appear imminent, there is no doubting the commitment, particularly by China and Russia, to the creation of an alternative to the existing financial architecture underpinned, as it is, by the U.S. dollar. If successful, the addition of a competing system could prove particularly enticing to countries in the Global South and would hopefully lead U.S. policy makers to exercise greater restraint regarding the use of sanctions as a foreign policy hammer, especially given the current domestic environment of inflationary pressure and ever-growing national debt.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is causing an unprecedented global impact on cities across the world. This guidance note aims to support cities in developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to effectively and immediately respond to the crisis, and to "build back better" in the short and medium terms. It is anchored to the principles outlined in ADB's Strategy 2030 Operational Plan for Priority 4: Making Cities More Livable and also considers the public health and economic impacts of the pandemic. The guidance note is one of a series produced by ADB for key sectors and thematic areas.

Migrant communities' homeland-oriented political campaigns are always related to, but often different from, the activism in which local people engage in their homeland setting. In seeking to understand the observed disparities between migrant campaigns and homeland activism, several studies have demonstrated the influence of contextual factors like political opportunity structures on homeland-oriented migrant politics. Complementing these studies are works that focus on changes to identity and belonging associated with migration and resettlement. In this article, I build on these debates by offering a combined analysis of the intersections between, and interplay of, contextual and identity-based factors. I use this analytical approach to examine the case of Sudanese political activists resident in the UK. I demonstrate how forms of belonging emerge here as part of – and not in isolation from – the strategic navigations of multiple political contexts and opportunities. In doing so, I contribute to our understanding of how belonging can be contextualized to serve as an analytical lens for understanding homeland-oriented migrant activism.

Discrimination against the approximately 500,000 African (mostly irregular) immigrants has recently spread in China. During the corona pandemic, it degenerates into a true Afrophobia. Shortly before, five Nigerians in Guangzhou had reportedly tested positive for Covid-19. Africans are widely accused as drug traffickers and criminals. Also, they would endanger China's global competitiveness for Africa's resources through media baiting abroad. Current reports testify the displacement of African migrants from homes and hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), where most of the Africans live. They are dependent on informal, mostly illegal networks in order to be able to stay in the country. In online social networks Afrophobia as cyber racism is particularly pronounced. Thereby, racism is more deeply rooted in the mentality of many Chinese than is commonly assumed. According to a traditional Chinese proverb, the greatest evil to be avoided is 'the destroyed nation and the annihilated race'. In addition, since 2005 land-grabbing by Chinese entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa arose international attention. Its main purpose is to ensure food security in China and to profit from international grain speculation. It was racially legitimized from the start, with slogans such as, only Chinese investments could save Africans from their traditional 'laziness'. This repeats deeply rooted neo-colonial European prejudices of a 'wild, ahistoric and uncivilized Africa'. The prejudices are still associated with a feeling of racial superiority. The social fabric of China has always embodied essential characteristics of the exclusion of 'foreigners', focused on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender. The African Union, various African governments and even the United States have sharply criticized Beijing for mistreating migrants, particularly those from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Racist attacks on Africans in China have an oppressively long tradition, associated with the expansion of bilateral Chinese petty trade in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 2000s and the subsequent influx of African petty traders into China.

Introduction Although average injury rates are decreasing, large inequalities continue to exist between countries within the European Union. Mortality rates from injury for children aged 0-19 in Lithuania in 2014 were 19/100,000 whereas in Spain the rate was 4/100,000. Within countries the picture is mixed and children's injury risk is related to factors such as their socio-economic status or the education level and employment status of their parents. The impact of these factors means that important inequalities exist within countries in localised pockets of poverty and deprivation but also in wealthy areas. Better prevention of child injury is thus needed; however, it is a multi-sectoral undertaking. Risk factors are multi-faceted: social, environmental, and economic. Responsibility for controlling these risk factors transcends traditional policy sectors. Child injury prevention also occurs at multiple levels of governance; from local action to initiatives at international (European or global) level. Furthermore, injury prevention requires participation from the public and private sector and from civil society. This thesis explores the space between research and practice in the field of child safety in Europe. The research focuses upon the challenges for decision makers to analyse their local situation, choose interventions and put them into practice. Method The thesis focuses on four domains of child injury: road; water and home safety; and intentional injury prevention. Data collection for Chapters Three, Four and Six occurred between 2011 and 2014 within the framework of the EU-funded project; 'Tools to Address Childhood Trauma and Children's Safety' (TACTICS). Participants were also involved in the TACTICS project and came from 27 countries of the WHO European Region. Chapters Two and Five are based on literature reviews conducted outside the framework of the TACTICS project. The theoretical underpinning of the thesis is based first: upon the Public Health Approach to injury prevention from Sleet et al., that underlines the importance of both an evidence-based approach and evidence-based practice within injury prevention. Second: the governance for health framework by Kickbusch and Gleicher which proposes the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to effective health governance. Third: the six stages of implementation proposed by Fixsen et al., theoretically guides the process of implementation. A combination of research methods was used throughout. Literature reviews guided the direction of the thesis and informed the content of the models and tools proposed. Quantitative and qualitative data was generated to identify the different sectors implicated in child injury prevention. A public health ethical framework was applied to an existing child safety intervention to explore ethical considerations. Finally, qualitative data was analysed using thematic content analysis to explore the process of implementation. Results A practical tool for use at the local level to address the cross-cutting nature of child injury prevention was developed. The tool is based on Haddon's matrix and takes a life-course approach to injury prevention. It was developed for use by multi-sector stakeholders at the local level to better understand the complexity of child injury and develop multi-sectoral solutions. Twenty-seven different policy sectors were found to be implicated in child safety. Of these 27 sectors nine sectors were identified as 'core' sectors: Education; Health; Home Affairs; Justice; Media; Recreation; Research; Social/Welfare Services; Consumers Core sectors were considered applicable across the whole of child safety. Child safety reference frameworks (CSRF) were developed for use at the sub-national level. CSRF, can be used to inform policy makers about possible evidence-based child safety interventions, to assess the state of affairs in the region and to compare the situation regionally, nationally, internationally or over time. An ethical assessment of an intervention for child safety in the home highlights the relevance of public health ethics to child safety interventions. A thematic content analysis of facilitators and barriers for the adoption, implementation and monitoring of child safety interventions resulted in the identification of eight themes found to be applicable, to a varying degree, throughout the three phases of the process: Management and collaboration; Resources; Leadership; Nature of the intervention; Political, social and cultural environment; Visibility; Nature of the injury problem; Analysis and interpretation. Conclusion The findings demonstrate the multi-sectoral nature of child injury prevention and the challenges of implementation within an issue of such complexity. With a greater uptake of interventions it is hoped that the inequalities between and within countries could be reduced. The findings and tools presented in this thesis may help stakeholders at the local and regional levels to take action to protect children from injury.

Die Ersetzung der gegenwärtigen MAD-Militärdoktrin durch eine neue Doktrin der "defense dominance" wird als erstrebenswert angesehen. Aber die Zeit ist noch nicht reif dafür. Das SDI-Konzept kann - abgesehen von allen technologischen Implementationsschwierigkeiten - nicht als Beitrag zur Entwicklung einer neuen Konzeption von "defense dominance" angesehen werden, weil das Denken heutiger Militärstrategen immer noch im Grundtenor konfrontativ,aggressiv,statt kooperativ ausgeprägt ist. Solange dieser Sachverhalt besteht, kann mit dem Defensiv-Konzept SDI keine Kehrtwendung von MAD zugunsten einer -wünschbareren- Konzeption der "defensive dominance" erzielt werden. (SWP-Shn)

Im Bereich der Rüstungskontrollpolitik finden die bilateralen Verhandlungen der Supermächte das größte Interesse in der Öffentlichkeit. Schon weniger bekannt sind die inneramerikanischen Auseinandersetzungen um die Formulierung einer erfolgversprechenden Verhandlungsstrategie. Am schwierigsten erweist sich der Konsultationsprozess innerhalb der Atlantischen Allianz, d.h. ein Abstimmen der amerikanischen Streitkräfteplanung und Arms control-Politik mit der Verteidigungsplanung der europäischen Verbündeten. Die Autorin versucht eine Klärung des Problems der Verknüpfung einer Rüstungskontrollpolitik zur Verminderung des Nuklearwaffenarsenals mit dem notwendigen Zusammenhalt der NATO und einer weiterhin erforderlichen Glaubwürdigkeit der Abschreckung. (SWP-Btg)

In three decades, international conventions have become a major tool for public action in the field of the environment.They offer the double promise of action that is broadly based on agreement and a strong commitment to collective responsibility.But what is the environmental effectiveness of these commitments? Are they followed by effects?The question arises for international conventions, as for all public, international, national or territorial environmental policies.In response, widespread today's approaches that see negotiation as coordination, cooperation or market principles are lacking. Normative evaluation frameworks are essential in this context, as well as the dimensions of power and strategy.In this perspective of strategic environmental management analysis, it is necessary to carry out fieldwork that clearly enlight the announcements of collective environmental responsibility in one hand and on the other, the concrete evolutions of the state of the environment the acts that cause them.In the case of the Senegal river valley, a vast floodplain of a river that crosses four states, we have analyzed several management measures put in place to take charge of the environment (the Mitigation and Monitoring Environmental Impacts Program of Senegal River Development -PASIE, Rive Gauche Management Plan and Planning -PDRG and Senegalese Environmental Planning: Regional Action Plan for the Environment -PRAE and the Regional Conservation Strategy Of Biodiversity - SRCB). It shows that they are far from taking care of the responsibilities to be assumed, particularly in the context of the Ramsar (wetlands) and biodiversity conventions.The thesis analyzes in depth the causes of this state of affairs. It identifies the consequences and replaces them in the broader picture of the long-term vicissitudes of development actions whose effectiveness and sustainability are highly questionable. ; Les conventions internationales sont devenues en trois décennies un outil majeur de l'action publique en matière d'environnement.Elles offrent la double promesse d'une action qui recueille un large accord et d'un engagement fort de responsabilité collective.Mais quelle est l'efficacité environnementale de ces engagements ? Sont-ils suivis d'effets ?La question se pose pour les conventions internationales, comme pour l'ensemble des politiques publiques, internationales, nationales ou territoriales en matière d'environnement.Pour y répondre les approches très répandues aujourd'hui qui ne voient dans la négociation que des principes de coordination, de coopération ou de marché sont insuffisantes. Des cadres normatifs d'évaluation sont incontournables dans ce contexte, ainsi que la prise en compte des dimensions de pouvoir et de stratégie. Dans cette perspective d'analyse stratégique de la gestion environnementale, il faut un travail de terrain qui mette clairement en regard d'un côté les annonces de prises de responsabilité environnementale collective et de l'autre les évolutions concrètes de l'état de l'environnement et des actes qui les causent.Dans le cas de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal, vaste plaine d'inondation d'un fleuve qui traverse quatre états, nous avons analysé plusieurs dispositifs de gestion mis en place pour prendre en charge l'environnement (le Programme d'Atténuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l'Environnement de la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal –PASIE, le Plan Directeur Rive Gauche et la planification –PDRG et la planification environnementale sénégalaise : Plan Régional d'Action pour l'Environnement –PRAE et la Stratégie Régionale de Conservation de la Biodiversité – SRCB). Il en ressort qu'ils sont très loin de permettre que soient assumées les responsabilités qui incombent, en particulier dans le cadre des conventions RAMSAR (zones humides) et Biodiversité, aux pays concernés et aux bailleurs de fonds.La thèse analyse en profondeur les causes de cet état de fait. Elle en cerne les conséquences et les replacent dans le tableau plus large des vicissitudes sur le long terme d'actions de développement dont l'efficacité et la durabilité sont très discutables.

Image CreditQ. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva pledged to make his country "the Saudi Arabia of renewable energy." Under his leadership, Brazil has become active in discussions about biofuels at the G20 and the Global Biofuels Alliance, including for shipping and aviation. How is Brazil working to overcome obstacles to its goals in the area?A. Sustainable fuels for aviation and maritime transport are crucial indeed, as those are hard-to-abate sectors the world has to decarbonize as fast as we possibly can. And no single country will be able to produce enough clean fuel to replace fossil alternatives at scale. Our main goal is speeding up the development of these fuels in a sustainable way worldwide. This is a priority both of the Global Biofuels Alliance, of which we are a founding member, and of the G20 we currently chair, in particular in the G20 Energy Transitions Working Group.There are obstacles, such as preconceptions about certain technologies, a resistance that is not always science-based. We champion an "agnostic" approach to the energy transition: if a solution is sustainable and low in emissions–be it electric vehicles, solar energy, nuclear, wind, biofuels, synthetic fuels, biogas–it should be adopted wherever it makes sense. What we need are clear and objective sustainability criteria based on the life cycle of the carbon intensity of each option. This is known as "technological neutrality." Cherry-picking is not an option in a crisis lie the climate emergency we are facing.Q. Brazil has enormous potential to play a role in the supply chains for other types of green energy, such solar and wind power, as well as electric vehicles. Considering biofuels are a special focus of Brazil's partnership with the International Energy Agency, are these other sectors also priorities?A. Of course biofuels have been and will be extremely important. But don't get us wrong, they are not a national obsession. We are lucky to have a diversified energy mix. If we look at Brazil's electricity output, it is around 90% clean or renewable. Hydropower has been a major source of clean energy for decades. Recently, solar and wind have grown significantly. They account for 20% of our electricity; a decade ago, they amounted to nearly nothing. Electric vehicles are perhaps not a top priority as they are elsewhere, but this does not mean we do not pay attention to them. Hybrid cars running on ethanol and electric batteries are making a splash in Brazil. Electric buses are becoming more and more common, proving to be a solution in bigger towns and major cities, with a Brazilian company behind their success. As I said earlier, we believe in an "agnostic" approach to decarbonization. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, not even within our own country.Q. In 2021, Brazil issued a decree laying out its strategic mineral policy. The Ministry of Mines and Energy said recently that the policy needed revision. What changes can we expect, and might any of them be related to environmental protection?A. It is not the Foreign Ministry's job to determine domestic policy. But it is our job to lead internationally whenever a policy has a foreign dimension. We work hand in glove with the Ministry of Mines and Energy and other government departments in all areas that have an international dimension. Strategic minerals are key to the energy transition globally and play a central part in increasing electrification and energy storage. This is one policy area in which the domestic and foreign dimensions are particularly intertwined. So this is an area in which the two ministries–Foreign Affairs and Mines and Energy–have been working closely together as a new policy on strategic minerals is being drafted.Brazil is home to considerable deposits of minerals now considered strategic in the context of the energy transition. As a government, Brazil has two major guidelines: we will not be drawn into international value chains as mere exporters of raw materials, and we will not be drawn into "clubs" whose purpose is to exclude countries based on polarizing geopolitical considerations. We want to be a part of reliable and resilient global supply chains of renewable energy, and strategic minerals are an important part of them. Here, too, we are "agnostic." Here, too, we think climate change is far too urgent to be an afterthought.

Image CreditQ. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva pledged to make his country "the Saudi Arabia of renewable energy." Under his leadership, Brazil has become active in discussions about biofuels at the G20 and the Global Biofuels Alliance, including for shipping and aviation. How is Brazil working to overcome obstacles to its goals in the area?A. Sustainable fuels for aviation and maritime transport are crucial indeed, as those are hard-to-abate sectors the world has to decarbonize as fast as we possibly can. And no single country will be able to produce enough clean fuel to replace fossil alternatives at scale. Our main goal is speeding up the development of these fuels in a sustainable way worldwide. This is a priority both of the Global Biofuels Alliance, of which we are a founding member, and of the G20 we currently chair, in particular in the G20 Energy Transitions Working Group.There are obstacles, such as preconceptions about certain technologies, a resistance that is not always science-based. We champion an "agnostic" approach to the energy transition: if a solution is sustainable and low in emissions–be it electric vehicles, solar energy, nuclear, wind, biofuels, synthetic fuels, biogas–it should be adopted wherever it makes sense. What we need are clear and objective sustainability criteria based on the life cycle of the carbon intensity of each option. This is known as "technological neutrality." Cherry-picking is not an option in a crisis like the climate emergency we are facing.Q. Brazil has enormous potential to play a role in the supply chains for other types of green energy, such solar and wind power, as well as electric vehicles. Considering biofuels are a special focus of Brazil's partnership with the International Energy Agency, are these other sectors also priorities?A. Of course biofuels have been and will be extremely important. But don't get us wrong, they are not a national obsession. We are lucky to have a diversified energy mix. If we look at Brazil's electricity output, it is around 90% clean or renewable. Hydropower has been a major source of clean energy for decades. Recently, solar and wind have grown significantly. They account for 20% of our electricity; a decade ago, they amounted to nearly nothing. Electric vehicles are perhaps not a top priority as they are elsewhere, but this does not mean we do not pay attention to them. Hybrid cars running on ethanol and electric batteries are making a splash in Brazil. Electric buses are becoming more and more common, proving to be a solution in bigger towns and major cities, with a Brazilian company behind their success. As I said earlier, we believe in an "agnostic" approach to decarbonization. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, not even within our own country.Q. In 2021, Brazil issued a decree laying out its strategic mineral policy. The Ministry of Mines and Energy said recently that the policy needed revision. What changes can we expect, and might any of them be related to environmental protection?A. It is not the Foreign Ministry's job to determine domestic policy. But it is our job to lead internationally whenever a policy has a foreign dimension. We work hand in glove with the Ministry of Mines and Energy and other government departments in all areas that have an international dimension. Strategic minerals are key to the energy transition globally and play a central part in increasing electrification and energy storage. This is one policy area in which the domestic and foreign dimensions are particularly intertwined. So this is an area in which the two ministries–Foreign Affairs and Mines and Energy–have been working closely together as a new policy on strategic minerals is being drafted.Brazil is home to considerable deposits of minerals now considered strategic in the context of the energy transition. As a government, Brazil has two major guidelines: we will not be drawn into international value chains as mere exporters of raw materials, and we will not be drawn into "clubs" whose purpose is to exclude countries based on polarizing geopolitical considerations. We want to be a part of reliable and resilient global supply chains of renewable energy, and strategic minerals are an important part of them. Here, too, we are "agnostic." Here, too, we think climate change is far too urgent to be an afterthought.

In "(Nearly) nothing to fear but fear itself", a 2009 article for The Economist, French economist Olivier Jean Blanchard argued that in a crisis, policy makers should focus on reducing uncertainty: "Crises feed uncertainty. And uncertainty affects behaviour, which feeds the crisis". Blanchard was writing about the global financial crisis, but his argument also applies to a threat of pandemic. In a world of extreme uncertainty, he wrote, the result is often extreme prudence and the adoption of "better safe than sorry" as the motto. So far, we have seen exactly this response to Covid-19.

This 18th Edition of To Walk the Earth In Safety summarizes the United States' Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) programs in 2018. CWD assistance provides the United States with a powerful and flexible tool to help partner countries manage their stockpiles of munitions, destroy excess small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) and clear explosive hazards such as landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Our assistance also helps countries destroy illicitly-held or poorly-secured man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and mitigate their threat to civilian aviation and public safety. In today's dynamic world, threats to U.S. national security abound. The work carried out by the Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/ WRA) through its CWD programs is essential to protecting civilians and advancing our nation's interests. From my work as a Reserve Naval Officer and as a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I understand the need for a robust effort to secure weapons so they do not fall into the hands of nefrious actors. Stockpiles of excess, poorly-secured, or otherwise at-risk conventional weapons remain a serious challenge to peace and prosperity in many countries. Poorly-secured munitions are illicitly diverted to terrorists and other destabilizing actors. Explosive hazards continue to kill and maim people long after conflicts have ended, preventing the safe return of displaced people and suppressing economic opportunities that are crucial to prosperity and political stability. As long as these dangers persist, it is difficult for communities to recover from conflict. Since late 2015, the United States and our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS have cleared IEDs from critical infrastructure in Iraq and Syria including hospitals, schools, and water pumping stations, facilitating the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in stabilization assistance and humanitarian aid into liberated areas. In this regard, explosive hazard clearance serves as an essential enabler for follow-on stabilization and humanitarian assistance. CWD programs such as this lay the foundation for long-term benefits. U.S. humanitarian demining assistance to Vietnam began in 1993 and helped set the stage for our current bilateral relationship. In the near term, across Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, CWD programs focused on excess and poorly-secured weapons have helped keep those weapons out of the hands of criminals and terrorists. Since 1993, the United States has provided more than $3.4 billion in CWD assistance to over 100 countries. In 2018, we had active CWD programs in 59 countries. These programs are implemented by commercial contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations. United States CWD programs are tied to key U.S. foreign policy priorities and play a direct role in keeping U.S. citizens and our allies safe, while also clearing the way for a stable, secure, and prosperous future in countries that are key to U.S. security interests. Thanks to the U.S. Congress' bipartisan support and generosity of the American people, we can attest that our goal remains a future in which all may walk the earth in safety.