Suchergebnisse

Examines the cooperative regime established by the Jan. 1993 Kirkenes Declaration, and its failure to produce a common identity among various northern European/Russian populations. Highlights impact of the 1994-95 Barents Region program on Russian youth and the East-West dichotomy; region-building, self and other, alleged "we-hood", and cultural aspects.

No aspect of the Russian–Ukrainian war has proved more unexpected than the revelation that Ukrainian national identity both ethnic and civil is far stronger than almost anyone thought, while Russian national identity is far more fragmented and weak than most expected. That was especially surprising to many because Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on the assumption that Ukrainians are not a "real" nation unlike Russians and that his actions were advancing the interest of what the Kremlin leader chooses to call "the Russian world". One result of this discovery has been that the Kremlin has had to take Ukrainian identity more seriously. Another has been that it has gone to great lengths to promote Russian national identity via state-controlled media, but the latter effort has come up short because Moscows ability to promote Russian identity is limited by the same three factors that have restricted previous Russian rulers: the fundamental weakness of Russian identity, the tensions inherent between identities the state supports and those it fears, and the reactions of the increasingly numerous non-Russian nationalities to any ethnic Russian identifications.

This article is the first comparative study of the policies taken by Russian and Ukrainian émigré's, governments and intellectuals towards the legacy of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. The article analyses how these differing approaches have contributed to diverging national identities in Russia and Ukraine which preceded, and were reinforced by, the 2014 crisis in their relations and war between both countries. Stalinization was not a central question for Russian émigrés and was supported by 50 out of 69 years of the USSR and since 2000 by the Russian state. Ukrainian émigrés were more influential and the state actively supported de-Stalinization over the majority of 25 years of independent statehood that integrated de-Stalinisation with national identity and since 2015, de-communization.

This study analyses the problems associated with bilingual teaching mathematics in national-Russian schools of the Russian Federation. In particular, problems associated with the Russian and Yakut language interference and the mixing of language codes that negatively affect the acquisition of subject knowledge are indicated. Based on the analysis of the speech corpus of bilingual students, the paper revealed the need for the purposeful development of mathematical speech in a primary school. The role of the principle of relying on the native language of schoolchildren in the conditions of bilingual teaching mathematics is determined and the inadmissibility of mixing language codes is justified. The main characteristics of the basic communicative qualities of mathematical speech and the criteria for assessing their level of formation are given. A system of mathematical problems has been developed and presented in the form of parallel textual bodies in two languages (bi-texts) with an indication of the basic communicative qualities of mathematical speech, the development of which they are aimed at. This paper is useful for familiarizing with the potential of bi-texts in a bilingual learning environment. The work shows the process of developing special mathematical problems presented in the form of bi-texts; the presented experience can be applied in the training of other subjects in the conditions of national-Russian bilingualism