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The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of�offense�(imposition of control, compellence, exhaustion) and�defense(repellence, deterrence by punishment, assertive disarmament). Any theory of victory must combine the two, but success for both sides in a conflict is easier to achieve in the defensive than in the offensive aspect.

The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of�offense�(imposition of control, compellence, exhaustion) and�defense(repellence, deterrence by punishment, assertive disarmament). Any theory of victory must combine the two, but success for both sides in a conflict is easier to achieve in the defensive than in the offensive aspect.

The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of offense (imposition of control, compellence, exhaustion) and defense (repellence, deterrence by punishment, assertive disarmament). Any theory of victory must combine the two, but success for both sides in a conflict is easier to achieve in the defensive than in the offensive aspect. Adapted from the source document.

Intro -- Half Title -- Also by Roya Hakakian -- title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- To the Reader -- Comment -- 1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- 9 -- 10 -- 11 -- 12 -- 13 -- 14 -- 15 -- 16 -- 17 -- 18 -- 19 -- Epilogue -- Time Line -- Glossary -- Characters -- Note on Sources -- Selected Articles and Bibliography -- Radio, Television, Films, Audiovisual, Memos, and Electronic Material

This study examined what factors were predictive of who volunteers for sex offender treatment (self-selection) as well as who enters treatment after volunteering (administration selection). Research participants included 404 treatment volunteers and 387 nonvolunteers to treatment who were convicted of a sexual offense involving minors within the federal prison system. Maximum likelihood probit estimation procedures indicated that when compared with nonvolunteers, treatment volunteers were more likely to be recommended by a judge to receive treatment at the time of sentencing, had received prior treatment for sexually deviant behavior, reported higher levels of motivation to change their sexually deviant behavior, and had lower rates of a substance use disorder in the year prior to incarceration. Of those persons who initially volunteered, 62% were accepted and entered treatment, 16% were denied entry to treatment by program staff, and 22% refused treatment after being accepted to the waiting list. When compared with those who were accepted and entered treatment, motivation was the only predictor of being denied admission into treatment by program staff and for refusal of treatment once accepted. The findings emphasize the need to control for selection bias in treatment outcome studies and the importance of examining the role of motivation in treatment volunteerism and treatment entry for sexual offenders.

Pros and cons of an amnesty program directed at East German individuals who spied against West Germany or committed similar political crimes during the communist era; 6 articles.

Political repression in the US is examined historically, & studies of the Reagan administration's (1981-1989) response to what it perceived as a terrorist threat are discussed. Attitudes of the broader US Left toward the ideas & acts of radicals are also considered, & the nature of the organizational structure of the antiterrorist program is explored. The contribution of the Carter administration (1977-1981) to developing what was to become the Reagan administration's counterterrorist program is considered, & the limits to the Carter administration's liberalism are noted. The development of internal security policy by the Reagan administration is recounted, & the targets of the domestic counterterrorism program are described. Antiterrorist activities during the Reagan years are considered, together with congressional oversight of that program, & the treatment in prison of apprehended radicals is described. 100 References. F. S. J. Ledgister