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Russia's war against Ukraine has accelerated international competition for influence in Africa. Structural weaknesses and post-pandemic instabilities continue to threaten achievements in the fields of democratic governance, peace and security, as well as development. We present a select list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2023.
Politics: Democratic quality will depend on the nature of polls, as the electoral calendar is heavily packed. Important general elections that could trigger social unrest are scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe.
Peace and security: Against the backdrop of continued structural-conflict risks, Jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions pose a major security challenge that may spill over to neighbouring states, especially from the Sahel to West African coastal countries. The recent ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region could be a first positive step towards peace.
International arena: Amid Russia's war against Ukraine, many African governments were reluctant to join the international coalition condemning the Putin regime. Continued Western pressure on African countries to isolate Russia fosters African agency. At the same time, we expect to see an intensifying "new scramble for Africa" that includes both China and Middle Eastern countries.
Socio-economic development: African countries will slowly rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic's socio-economic effects, but high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth. Progress on joint efforts to counter the climate crisis remains slow.
Western support for African countries in their struggle for democracy, peace and security, as well as development requires a "new start" that focuses on prevention rather than ad hoc responses to current crises. The European Union and United States should avoid lapsing into Cold War habits of only assisting African governments if they "break away" from Russia. Germany needs to formulate a sound Africa policy that balances values and national interests with realistic assessments of the policy's potential in light of bigger players like China.

Fears that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to massive deaths in sub-Saharan Africa have not materialised. However, the region will not be spared from its effects in 2021 regardless. Many challenges unrelated to the pandemic persist and are likely to be aggravated by the coronavirus outbreak, putting at risk previous progress made. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2021. Fighting the Pandemic: As the world watches the race over vaccines and the start of mass vaccination, it remains doubtful that vaccinations will be available on the African continent anytime soon. Rising infection rates give reason to worry, and 2021 has already seen new lockdown measures that again hit the already poor and vulnerable. Conflicts: Jihadism will fuel further conflict while additional conflict potentials in Central Africa and elsewhere need to be watched closely too, especially in Ethiopia given it is on the verge of civil war and state disintegration. Politics: COVID-19-related restrictions may increase authoritarian tendencies. In several countries - including Ethiopia, The Gambia, Uganda, and Zambia - crucial elections will be held in 2021 that pose the risk of further democratic backsliding. Africa's giant Nigeria may see a continuation of the EndSARS protests. Development: The current crisis entails important risks for Africa's economic outlook, including the delay of regional integration, increasing government debt, and the drying-up of foreign investment flows. Poverty will remain on the rise, while the food crisis is likely to be exacerbated. Regarding the pandemic, it will be key that Africa gets its share of vaccines. European Union-Africa relations deserve a reset at the upcoming Africa-EU summit that is likely to be mainly concerned with the economic fallout of the pandemic. After Donald Trump's demise, it remains to be seen whether the new United States Africa policy will overcome "Africa apathy" or will instead turn the continent into a battleground in the expanding rivalry with China.

Bürgerkriege in Mali, Nigeria und Südsudan scheinen das Bild vom "Kriegskontinent Afrika" zu bestätigen. In den letzten Jahren mehren sich in Wissenschaft und Medien jedoch Stimmen, die einen Rückgang organisierter Gewalt weltweit und auch im subsaharischen Afrika konstatieren. Inwieweit lassen sich diese Behauptungen belegen?


Berücksichtigt man unterschiedliche Dimensionen von Gewalt und analysiert das zuverlässigste empirische Material, dann zeigt sich, dass die Häufigkeit aktiver Konflikte von 1990 bis 2013 nicht substanziell gesunken ist. Allerdings kann die These bestätigt werden, dass die absolute und relative Intensität der Konflikte seit 1990 signifikant nachgelassen hat.

Die Zahlen sprechen eine deutliche Sprache: Während im Jahr 1990 von 100.000 Einwohnern des subsaharischen Afrika noch über 70 Menschen in bewaffneten Konflikten starben, waren es 2013 nur noch 12. Der Trend ist seit Beginn der 2000er Jahre relativ stabil und entspricht, etwas verzögert, der weltweiten Entwicklung. Zwischenstaatliche Konflikte sind eine extreme Seltenheit geworden. Allerdings ist dies kein unumkehrbarer Trend.

Diese Analyse beruht auf Schätzungen zu sogenannten "Gefechtstoten", Menschen, die direkt durch Kriegshandlungen getötet wurden. Die Schätzungen sind zwar mit einiger Ungenauigkeit behaftet, es spricht aber wenig dafür, dass die Anzahl der indirekten Kriegsopfer gleichzeitig überproportional gestiegen ist.

Für den Rückgang der Gewaltintensität werden verschiedene Ursachen diskutiert. Besonders plausible Erklärungen sind die zunehmenden Bemühungen der Afrikanischen Union zur Lösung von Konflikten und der Einsatz von UN-Friedenstruppen sowie – von der westlichen Öffentlichkeit weitgehend unbeachtet – Fortschritte in der Demokratisierung und sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung vieler afrikanischer Staaten.

Die westliche Öffentlichkeit sollte das Klischee des "Kriegskontinents Afrika" korrigieren. Die Wissenschaft bleibt aufgerufen, Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen für Frieden zu identifizieren, die dann durch Politik und Zivilgesellschaft umgesetzt werden können.

"Am 9. Dezember kamen bei einer Regierungsoffensive gegen Tuareg-Rebellen der Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) sieben Zivilisten ums Leben. Seit Anfang des Jahres sind Armeeposten und Infrastruktur rund um Uranminen in der Landesmitte wiederholt Ziel von MNJ-Angriffen. Dem Land droht eine Neuauflage des gewaltsamen Konfliktes der 1990er Jahre. Die Anfang 2007 gegründete MNJ ist Hauptträger der Tuareg-Rebellion. Ihre Hauptforderungen betreffen - ähnlich wie in den 1990er Jahren - eine größere Beteiligung an den Urangewinnen, ein umfassendes Entwicklungsprogramm und die politische Dezentralisierung zugunsten der Tuareg-Region. Der Konflikt hat mehrere Ursachen, die vor allem in der historisch gewachsenen politischen und ökonomischen Unzufriedenheit der Tuareg zu finden sind. Sollte die neue Rebellion einen ähnlichen Verlauf wie der erste Aufstand der Tuareg nehmen, droht die 'Konfliktfalle' einer verheerenden Armuts- und Gewaltspirale. Das Land kann der 'Konfliktfalle' nur entkommen, wenn die Forderungen der Rebellen ernst genommen werden. Dazu sind deutliche Entwicklungserfolge in Bildungs- und Bevölkerungspolitik, Fortschritte bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung und der Aufbau einer effektiveren Verwaltung sowie ein höherer Anteil der Uraneinnahmen für die Bevölkerung in den Fördergebieten notwendig." (Autorenreferat)

Democracy will remain under pressure in Africa, with key elections coming up in 2024. While conflict risks could intensify, the decline of Western influence will continue. Structural socio-economic challenges are likely to persist despite economic growth. The Africa Cup of Nations will be a highlight at the beginning of the year. We present here a list of "Ten Things to Watch in Africa" in 2024. Politics: With the recent wave of military coups, democracy has come under pressure. Further coups remain a risk, especially in countries with politicised militaries and political crises. Important general elections will, inter alia, be held in Ghana and South Africa where heavy losses for the ruling parties are expected. Peace and security: Coups are often connected to armed conflicts. The spillover of jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions in West Africa will be a major security challenge. In the Horn of Africa, the ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region seems to be holding but the country remains instable. Internationally: Similar to Russia's war on Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict also divides African governments. The relative decline of Western influence is likely to continue, not least regarding military presence. Growing anti-immigration sentiment in Europe has made migration a salient issue in African-European relations. Socio-economic development: African economies are set to experience continued growth that will, however, vary across countries, while debt remains a formidable challenge. Green deals are likely to remain sluggish.

"Ende November 2008 kamen im nigerianischen Jos bei Unruhen zwischen Christen und Muslimen etwa 400 Menschen ums Leben; Ende Februar 2009 forderten weitere Zusammenstöße in Bauchi elf Todesopfer. Im Anschluss an die unerwartet blutige Orgie der Gewalt in Jos, die durch den umstrittenen Ausgang einer Local-Government-Wahl ausgelöst wurde, rief der Nigeria Inter-Religious Council zum friedlichen Zusammenleben von Menschen unterschiedlicher Religionszugehörigkeit auf. Die Unruhen in Jos zeigen exemplarisch, dass Religion im subsaharischen Afrika nicht nur bei der gewaltsamen Eskalation von Konflikten, sondern - was oft übersehen wird - dass sie auch bei den Anstrengungen eine Rolle spielt, Konflikte zu befrieden und einzudämmen. Mit Religion allein können gewaltsame Konflikte im subsaharischen Afrika (und anderswo) nicht erklärt werden. Gewaltkonflikte werden primär durch sozioökonomische und politische Faktoren verursacht. Jedoch kann Religion die Gewaltdynamik sowie die Intensität und die Dauer von Konflikten nachhaltig beeinflussen. Religion kann in Konflikten Legitimationsgrundlage für das Verhalten von Akteuren sein. Einerseits kann Gewalt durch religiöse Ideen gerechtfertigt werden, andererseits fördern religiöse Werte das Engagement für den Frieden. So werden in manchen Fällen Konflikte durch die Mobilisierung religiöser Identitäten verschärft, in anderen Fällen wirken interreligiöse Initiativen an der Entschärfung von Konflikten mit. Um belastbare Aussagen über die Rolle von Religion in Gewaltkonflikten im subsaharischen Afrika zu erlangen, sind noch zahlreiche Forschungsfragen zu beantworten: Dazu gehört vor allem, unter welchen konkreten allgemeinen Bedingungen und auf welche Weise religiöse Faktoren zu Eskalation oder Deeskalation beitragen. Erst das Wissen über diese Bedingungen wird ermöglichen, die eskalierende Wirkung religiöser Faktoren in Afrika und anderswo zu vermeiden und Religion als Friedensressource nutzbar zu machen." (Autorenreferat)

Is the dominance of one political party a problem in an emerging democracy, or simply an expression of the will of the people? Why has one-party dominance endured in some African democracies and not in others? What are the mechanisms behind the varying party-system trajectories? Considering these questions, the authors of this collaborative work use a rigorous comparative research design and rich case material to greatly enhance our understanding of one of the key issues confronting emerging democracies in sub-Saharan Africa

This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.

This article presents ViEWS – a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated.