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Rational choice theorists have long been ambivalent about the rationality postulate. Although many agree that humans have imperfect foresight and inaccurate understandings of the world within which they act, no satisfactory approach relaxing the rationality postulates exists. In this article, we apply a new method that allows us to model directly rational action when agents have incomplete or inaccurate mental models of their world. In particular, we utilize the game theoretic notion of self-confirming equilibrium. The self-confirming equilibrium framework allows us to model an environment where a player's predictions about one another's behavior are inaccurate. It also allows us to model a common aspect of disputes; viz., that both sides believe they are acting reasonably while the other side is acting unreasonably. Finally, the approach allows a type of surprise in which a player's mis-conjectures about another's behavior results in behavior that was not anticipated. We apply this framework to the problem of the American Revolution, helping to resolve several unexplained puzzles in the historical literature. Historians of the Revolution emphasize the role of ideas in underpinning the revolutionary crisis. From the rational choice standpoint, a critical omission in the literature is that historians do not connect the realm of ideas with the realm of action. We demonstrate how the framework we propose can more directly shed light on three aspects absent in the existing literature. First, to explain why either side fought about abstract ideals or how those ideals were connected to the realm of action, and thus why the two sides failed to come to some accommodation despite their differences. Second, to explain why the colonists became so incensed over seemingly trivial taxes imposed by the British after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763. And, finally, to explain that if the clash of fundamental ideals led the two sides to armed confiict, how the British and the Americans could be unaware of their profound differences during the previous 100 plus years of cooperation.

Rational choice theorists have long been ambivalent about the rationality postulate. Although many agree that humans have imperfect foresight & inaccurate understandings of the world within which they act, no satisfactory approach relaxing the rationality postulates exists. In this article, we apply a new method that allows us to model directly rational action when agents have incomplete or inaccurate mental models of their world. In particular, we utilize the game theoretic notion of self-confirming equilibrium. The self-confirming equilibrium framework allows us to model an environment where a player's predictions about one another's behavior are inaccurate. It also allows us to model a common aspect of disputes; viz., that both sides believe they are acting reasonably while the other side is acting unreasonably. Finally, the approach allows a type of surprise in which a player's mis-conjectures about another's behavior results in behavior that was not anticipated. We apply this framework to the problem of the American Revolution, helping to resolve several unexplained puzzles in the historical literature. Historians of the Revolution emphasize the role of ideas in underpinning the revolutionary crisis. From the rational choice standpoint, a critical omission in the literature is that historians do not connect the realm of ideas with the realm of action. We demonstrate how the framework we propose can more directly shed light on three aspects absent in the existing literature. First, to explain why either side fought about abstract ideals or how those ideals were connected to the realm of action, & thus why the two sides failed to come to some accommodation despite their differences. Second, to explain why the colonists became so incensed over seemingly trivial taxes imposed by the British after the Seven Years' War ended in 1763. &, finally, to explain that if the clash of fundamental ideals led the two sides to armed conflict, how the British & the Americans could be unaware of their profound differences during the previous 100 plus years of cooperation. Figures, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

For a generation of political scientists witnessing dramatic declines in social and political participation and rising distrust in government at all levels, APSA President Margaret Levi's research program addresses fundamental issues concerning the bases for and effects of legitimacy, compliance, and consent in democratic regimes. Levi's scholarship has made pioneering contributions to understanding enduring questions about the conditions for and consequences of trust and distrust, compliance and resistance, and individual versus collective action. Animating this research agenda are Levi's commitment to greater authentic democratic participation, enhancing trust between the governed and those who govern, and the quest for social justice.

1. Limited access orders: an introduction to the conceptual framework / Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry R. Weingast -- 2. Bangladesh: economic growth in a vulnerable LAO / Mushtaq H. Khan -- 3. Fragile states, elites, and rents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) / Kai Kaiser and Stephanie Wolters -- 4. Seeking the elusive developmental knife-edge: Zambia and Mozambique -- a tale of two countries / Brian Levy -- 5. Limited access orders: the Philippines / Gabriella R. Montinola -- 6. India's vulnerable maturity: experiences of Maharashtra and West Bengal / Pallavi Roy -- 7. Entrenched insiders: limited access order in Mexico / Alberto Diaz-Cayeros -- 8. From limited access to open access order in Chile, take two / Patricio Navia -- 9. Transition from a limited access order to an open access order: the case of South Korea / Jong-Sung You -- 10. Lessons: in the shadow of violence / Douglass North, John Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry Weingast