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The characteristic features of modern banking law and its place in the national law. The structure of the legal system. Clarified the issue of banking relationship with the legal rights of the units : the rule of law, the institution of law, sub-sector and the field of law. Methods are defined with respect to the legal regulation of banking, such as a method of government regulations, administrative and regulate the power relations between the NBU and commercial banks, and the method of autonomy, that is, legal equality of the parties where applicable civil legal method of regulating social relations. defined legal acts regulating banking activity. Determined that the banking law is a complex interdisciplinary institute that combines norms of administrative, financial, civil and commercial law governing the relationship between the banks and corporations and individuals, as well as coordinate the relationship between the commercial banks and establish a procedure for submission of commercial banks to the National Bank of Ukraine

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- 1 Law, People, Peoples -- 2 From Hobbes to Rawls: Covenants, Social Contracts and the Law of Peoples -- 3 Historiography of the Present: Collectives, Colonies and the Chronicle of International Law -- 4 Grouphood, Rights and Waldron's Warning: Respecting the Collective -- 5 Statehood, Consent, Complicity: Defining the Collective -- 6 From Peoples to People? Self-determination, Identity, Territory -- 7 Cultures, Attachments, Minorities, Movements -- 8 International Relations and International Law: Rethinking Statehood and Sovereignty -- 9 Toward a Law of People -- References

The common theme of the articles assembled for this issue is a focus on Asian societies and their struggle with the conceptualization of "non-law" and its relation to law. This brief Comment reflects on the construction of the "non-law" as analytical categories in the four contributions. It suggests that the struggle with "non-law" reflects a deeper confusion about the role of law in ordering social relations broadly defined.' Focusing on the "non-law" assumes implicitly that "law" is a useful and well-delineated category for analyzing governance structures within and across states and thus can serve as a benchmark for analyzing "non-law." Closer inspection, however, reveals this assumption is flawed. Governance takes many forms in any society, and law or legislation is only one of them. Moreover, the function and form of formal law has changed in many settings from one of direct social ordering by way of prohibitions, punishments, and the like to one of creating space for cooperation among multiple actors and adaptations in governance structures over time. Further, the level of formal versus informal law in a society and in the governance of certain aspects of social life is fairly irrelevant absent a debate over the substantive goals that governance shall achieve. Put differently, the focus on law versus non-law evades the more challenging task of considering the normative agenda underlying choices among different governance mechanisms and their use in practice.

Taking a cue from Professor Laurence Tribe's decision to abandon the third edition of his constitutional law treatise, the organizers of this symposium have asked us to address whether constitutional law is in crisis. I am agnostic on that question, although I think that there has been a turn in the wrong direction. But if there is a crisis, I know who to blame. If constitutional law is in crisis, it is our fault. The legal academy has erased the distinction between law and politics, used its expertise for political advantage rather than for elucidation, and mis-educated a generation of lawyers. We thus should not be surprised if judges have, as Professor Ristroph suggests, lost their faith in the Constitution. We have led them into the wilderness.