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Robert Holmes is one of the leading proponents of nonviolence in the United States, and his influence extends to the rest of the world. However, he has never presented his views on nonviolence in full-length book form. The Ethics of Nonviolence brings together his best essays on the topic, both classic works and more obscure pieces, as well as several important essays that have never been published. Holmes started his career by following Dewey and James, and then turned toward metaethics. The Vietnam War finally led him toward moral problems related to war and violence. For the last forty year

Abstract
Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have developed a rich 'biocultural theory' of the nature and causes of moral progress (and regress) for human beings conceived as evolved rational creatures with a nature characterized by 'adaptive plasticity'. They characterize their theory as a thoroughly naturalistic account of moral progress, while bracketing various questions in moral theory and metaethics in favor of focusing on a certain range of more scientifically tractable questions under some stipulated moral and metaethical assumptions. While I am very much in agreement with the substance of their project, I wish to query and raise some difficulties for the way it is framed, particularly in connection with the claim of naturalism. While their project is clearly naturalistic in certain senses, it is far from clear that it is so in others that are of particular interest in moral philosophy, and these issues need to be more carefully sorted out. For everything that has been argued in the book, the theory on offer may be only a naturalistic component of a larger theory that must ultimately be non-naturalistic in order to deliver the robust sort of account that is desired. Indeed, there are significant metaethical reasons for believing this to be the case. Moreover, if it turns out that some of the assumptions upon which their theory relies require a non-naturalist metaethics (positing irreducibly evaluative or normative properties and facts) then even the part of the theory that might have seemed most obviously naturalistic, i.e., the explanation of how changes in moral belief and behavior have come about, may actually require some appeal to non-naturalistic elements in the end.

In The Fundamentals of Ethics, Fifth Edition, author Russ Shafer-Landau employs a uniquely engaging writing style to introduce students to the essential ideas of moral philosophy. Offering more comprehensive coverage of the good life, normative ethics, and metaethics than any other text of its kind, this book also addresses issues that are often omitted from other texts, such as the doctrine of doing and allowing, the doctrine of double effect, ethical particularism, the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, moral error theory, and Ross's theory of prima facie duties. Shafer-Landau carefully reconstructs and analyzes dozens of arguments in depth, at a level that is understandable to students with no prior philosophical background.

The original essays in this book address Harry Frankfurt's influential writing on personal identity, love, value, moral responsibility, and the freedom and limits of the human will. Many of Frankfurt's deepest insights come from exploring the self-reflective nature of human agents and the psychic conflicts that self-reflection often produces. His work has informed discussions in metaphysics, metaethics, normative ethics, and action theory. The authors, recognized for their own contributions to the understanding of human agency, defend their original philosophical positions at the same time that they respond to Frankfurt's. Each essay is followed by a response from Frankfurt, in which he clarifies and elaborates on his views.

Negli ultimi anni il dibattito circa i metodi della filosofia politica è stato caratterizzato dal moltiplicarsi di opzioni diverse in merito al rapporto tra teoria normativa e metaetica. In particolare ha avuto successo l'idea che le teorie normative siano autonome rispetto alle questioni filosofiche di secondo ordine. In questo articolo è presentato e discusso il dibattito sul quietismo, sia nella sua versione ridotta per cui la metaetica è di per sé normativa, sia in quella ampia, per cui considerazioni metaetiche sono inutili e controproducenti alla teoria normativa. Sullo sfondo di questo dibattito è presentata e discussa la posizione metodologica di Rawls. L'obiettivo è quello di capire se la proposta rawlsiana dell'indipendenza della teoria morale e del method of avoidance sia soddisfacente. Infine, un nuovo punto di vista sui benefici della metaetica per la teoria normativa viene presentato e difeso. ; In recent years the philosophical debate about the methods of political philosophy has been characterized by an increasing number of different options concerning the relation between normative theory and metaethics. In particular, the idea that normative theories are autonomous from second-order issues has gained great attention. In this article, the debate about quietism is presented and analysed, both in its restricted version, according to which metaetichs simply is part of normative theory, and in its broad one, according to which metaethical considerations are counterproductive for normative theories. Drawing from this debate, Rawls's methodological position is presented. The aim is to understand whether the rawlsian project about the independence of moral theory and the method of avoidance is satisfactory. In conclusion, a new point of view on the benefits metaethics can offer to normative theory is defended.

In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, ""moral black holes". The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.

Existen diferentes servicios que los filósofos morales pueden prestarles a los juristas. Los mismos son variados y ha sido explicitados en diferentes trabajos. La hipótesis de este trabajo es que la relación inversa también es cierta. Existen tres maneras viciadas de hacer filosofía moral que los juristas pueden ayudar a combatir. La primera consiste en la obsesión metaética fundada en un sesgo escéptico hacia cualquier reflexión sustantiva. La segunda es el diletantismo activista de aquellos que sin ninguna preparación teórica se dedican a hablar de problemas morales y políticos. La tercera consiste en una forma de reflexión filosófica que en su afán de encontrar los principios supremos ha perdido todo contacto con la experiencia moral humana. El contacto con los juristas puede ayudar a combatir estos vicios, prestando de este modo la reflexión jurídica un servicio a la Filosofía Moral. ; Moral philosophy may help Jurisprudence in several forms. The services that Moral Philosophy may offer to Jurisprudence have been explored in different works. This paper advances the hypothesis that the inverse relation is also true. There are three flawed ways of doing moral philosophy that lawyers can help fight. The first is the meta ethics obsession based on a skeptical bias against any substantive reflection. The second is the activist dilettantism of those who talk about moral and political issues without having any theoretical background. The third is a form of philosophical reflection that on the way to looking for the supreme principles of morality it has lost touch with any human moral experience. Contact with lawyers can help fight these vices. This is a service that legal reflection may offer to Moral Philosophy.

Moral philosophy may help Jurisprudence in several forms. The services that Moral Philosophy may offer to Jurisprudence have been explored in different works. This paper advances the hypothesis that the inverse relation is also true. There are three flawed ways of doing moral philosophy that lawyers can help fight. The first is the meta ethics obsession based on a skeptical bias against any substantive reflection. The second is the activist dilettantism of those who talk about moral and political issues without having any theoretical background. The third is a form of philosophical reflection that on the way to looking for the supreme principles of morality it has lost touch with any human moral experience. Contact with lawyers can help fight these vices. This is a service that legal reflection may offer to Moral Philosophy. ; Existen diferentes servicios que los filósofos morales pueden prestarles a los juristas. Los mismos son variados y ha sido explicitados en diferentes trabajos. La hipótesis de este trabajo es que la relación inversa también es cierta. Existen tres maneras viciadas de hacer filosofía moral que los juristas pueden ayudar a combatir. La primera consiste en la obsesión metaética fundada en un sesgo escéptico hacia cualquier reflexión sustantiva. La segunda es el diletantismo activista de aquellos que sin ninguna preparación teórica se dedican a hablar de problemas morales y políticos. La tercera consiste en una forma de reflexión filosófica que en su afán de encontrar los principios supremos ha perdido todo contacto con la experiencia moral humana. El contacto con los juristas puede ayudar a combatir estos vicios, prestando de este modo la reflexión jurídica un servicio a la Filosofía Moral.

"In Creating a Shared Morality, Heather Salazar develops a consistent and plausible account of ethical constructivism that rivals the traditional metaethical theories of realism and subjectivism (without lapsing into subjectivism as do previous constructivist attempts). Salazar's Enlightenism argues that all people have moral obligations and that if they reflect well, they will naturally come to care about others as extensions of themselves Enlightenism resolves difficulties within constructivism, builds bridges between the two traditional Western views of metaethics and employs concepts from Eastern (Buddhist) philosophy. It embraces universal morality while elevating the importance of autonomy, diversity and connectedness. Constructivist enlightenment entails understanding the interdependence of people on others such that we are all co-responsible for the world in which we live"--

In this crisply written book, Hanno Sauer offers the first book-length treatment of debunking arguments in ethics, developing an empirically informed and philosophically sophisticated account of genealogical arguments and their significance for the reliability of moral cognition. He breaks new ground by introducing a series of novel distinctions into the current debate, which allows him to develop a framework for assessing the prospects of debunking or vindicating our moral intuitions. He also challenges the justification of some of our moral judgments by showing that they are based on epistemically defective processes. His book is an original, cutting-edge contribution to the burgeoning field of empirically informed metaethics, and will interest philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in how - and whether - moral judgment works.

Introduction -- Part I. Chapter 1. Reconceptualizing War ; Chapter 2. The Presumption against War ; Chapter 3. Realism and War -- Part II. Chapter 4. Augustine on Ethics and War ; Chapter 5. Anatomy of the Just War Theory ; Chapter 6. Self-Defense and the Alleged Moral Equality of Soldiers ; Chapter 7. Just Cause and the Killing of Innocents -- Part III. Chapter 8. The Vietnam War ; Chapter 9. The Gulf and Iraq Wars in Light of the Just War Theory and Western Imperialism ; Chapter 10. KOSOVO -- Part IV. Chapter 11. The Metaethics of Pacifism ; Chapter 12. Do Pacifism and Just War Theory Converge? -- Part V. Chapter 13. Pacifism and Humanitarian Military Intervention ; Chapter 14. Terrorism, Violence and Nonviolence ; Chapter 15. Existential Pacifism -- Select Bibliography -- Index.

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. The analysis is neutral regarding competing substantive theories of obligation, whether consequentialist or deontological in character. What it seeks to do is generate solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Amongst these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, prima facie obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its normative neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed. This study is a major contribution to metaethics that will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with normative ethical theory

Derek Parfit's long-awaited work On What Matters is a very ambitious, very strange production seeking to defend both a nonreductive and nonnaturalistic but nonmetaphysical and nonontological form of cognitive intuitionism or rationalism and an ethical theory (the Triple Theory) reflecting the convergence of Kantian universalizability, Scanlonian contractualism, and rule utilitarianism. Critics have already countered that Parfit's metaethics is unbelievable and his convergence thesis unconvincing, but On What Matters is a truly Sidgwickian work, the implications of which largely remain to be worked out. Parfit does not go far enough in spelling out exactly what matters and why, what normative reasons we actually have, and where we should go from here, if we take him seriously.