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This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions

This paper is a comparative study in two countries, Malaysia and Indonesia concer ning the principal agent relationship where the contract zakat zakat in terms of urgency,both in terms of worship and socio-economic demands good management and professional zakat. Indeed, the management of Zakat since the time of the Prophet until the fall of the Islamic caliphate is the responsibility of the government. But lately zakat management models in some Muslim countries be varied, are managed by countries like Yemen and Malaysia. There is also the countries that make charitable contributions through private management including Kuwait, Bangladesh and South Africa. Interestingly, as one of the Muslim countries, zakat management in Indonesia is carried out by the government and also the private sector simultaneously.

ABSTRACTThis study enhances the principal-agent model by incorporating a multilevel perspective and differences among agency situations. A theoretical discussion is developed using a proposed intersection of methodological focuses and a descriptive-exemplificative hypothetical analysis. The analysis is applied to public expenditure social control in representative democracies, and as a result, a principal-agent model unfolds that incorporates a decision-making perspective and focuses on formulation, negotiation, articulation, and implementation competencies. Thus, it is possible to incorporate elements into the principal-agent model to make it more permeable to individual, group, and societal idiosyncrasies with respect to public expenditure social control.

Principal–agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms "pathological delegation." In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.

We test a repeated principal–agent relationship with hidden actions in the laboratory. At each period, the principal offers payments to the agent in order to induce him to provide the high effort level. The agent can accept or reject the offer; if he accepts it, he can choose the high or the low effort level. We observe that offered payments are higher than predicted by the subgame‐perfect equilibrium, and higher in the partners' than in the strangers' design. Furthermore, agents strategically reject inequitable offers in early rounds in order to induce principals to increase payments in the subsequent rounds.

This article explores the utility of using principal-agent analysis-both at the level of the Commission and the European Union (EU) as a whole-to explain EU decision making in the negotiations between the European Union and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement of 1999. The article argues that the internal Commission negotiations, which are often overlooked in analyses of EU trade negotiations, need to be analyzed. It demonstrates that both the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa were heavily influenced by those Directorates-General (DGs) most affected by these policy decisions. Moreover, the EU negotiators, who had developmental interests because of their location within DG Development, were particularly influential. Adapted from the source document.

Strategic planning is well entrenched in colleges and universities around the globe. It is not only essential for effective resource allocation but in some jurisdictions, legislation requires that strategic plans be submitted to government as part of the funding approval process. The difficulties associated with strategic planning and indeed planning in general in colleges and universities has not gone unexplored. It is our contention and the thesis of this paper that the failure to develop and execute strategic plans flows from the distinctive aspects of the principal-agent framework within which many higher education institutions work. Understanding and responding to the deficiencies that beset this model in higher education should improve the effectiveness of planning.

Following the rising profile of trafficking in persons globally and Nigeria's position as a critical country in the African region, significant—though insufficient and poorly spent—funding has been deployed towards tackling the problem. This funding, however, is provided in a 'principal-agent' relationship by donors to the government of Nigeria and anti-trafficking organisations. Donors (the principals) fund organisations (the agents) to do work they deem important, though organisations tend to have significantly different needs and preferences for the funding. The consequence is that interventions paid for by these funds are 'not fit for purpose', making their outcomes often invisible, undesirable or unsustainable. An ancillary and critical issue related to anti-trafficking funding in Nigeria is accountability, or rather a lack of accountability. Where key actors in addressing trafficking are not accountable to beneficiaries, they miss out on critical feedback to help them improve services or design appropriate interventions.Intervenciones contra la trata en Nigeria y el Modelo de Ayuda Agente-PrincipalResumenSiguiendo el creciente perfil internacional de la trata de personas a nivel global, así como la posición de Nigeria como un país fundamental en la región de África, son significativos -aunque insuficientes y débilmente utilizados- los esfuerzos de financiación que se han desplegado para afrontar el problema. Esta financiación sigue una relación de principal-agente entre los donantes que financian al gobierno de Nigeria y las organizaciones contra la trata. Los donantes (los principales) financian organizaciones (los agentes) para hacer el trabajo que ellos consideran que es importante, a través de organizaciones que contemplan necesidades y preferencias de financiación significativamente diferentes. Como consecuencia, las intervenciones financiadas por estos financiadores están diseñadas "sin encajar en las necesidades", haciendo que sus resultados con frecuencia sean invisibles, indeseables o no sostenibles en el tiempo. Una cuestión secundaria, pero sin embargo fundamental, relacionada con la financiación contra la trata en Nigeria es la rendición de cuentas o, mejor dicho, la falta de rendición de cuentas. Cuando los actores principales en la lucha contra la trata no tienen que rendir cuentas frente a los beneficiarios, se pierde la capacidad de aprender de los éxitos y fracasos de las actividades ya implementadas, lo que ayudaría a mejorar los servicios o diseñar intervenciones adecuadas.

Europe is a heavyweight in global finance. But does it have a presence in global financial governance to match? This paper employs a principal-agent approach to analyse patterns of policy-making delegation in the EU to explore this question. It finds a U-shaped relationship between the extent of delegation and the 'European presence' in global financial governance: when member states either remain in control of policy or delegate extensive competencies, European stakeholders are well represented. In contrast, intermediate levels of delegation can undermine the European presence by tying member states' hands without sufficiently empowering supranational agents to fill the gap. Patterns of delegation are traced to the heterogeneity of member state interests and the pre-existence of international governance arrangements. These arguments about the origins and consequences of delegation patterns are supported by evidence from three core domains of financial governance: banking regulation; accounting standards; and capital market regulation. Adapted from the source document.