Suchergebnisse

Capital tax competition is analyzed in a model with a single private and a locally supplied public consumption good. As a benchmark case necessary conditions for efficient interregional tax structures are derived and contrasted with the outcome of beggar thy neighbor strategies. If households are immobile an intervention of a central government can be justified to raise efficiency of the NASH equilibrium. In contrast, NASH equilibria are efficient if households are imperfectly mobile because regions have incentives to ensure an efficient interregional resource allocation via granting interregional transfer payments.

We review the literature on the public choice approach to explaining redistribution policies. The focus is on policies that are pursued with the sole reason to redistribute initial endowments. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to redistribution in democracies. In democratic settings, generic redistribution games lack equilibria. Structure-inducing rules that give rise to realistic redistribution patterns may concern the underlying economic model, political institutions, and firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of the voters. We present the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

AbstractThis paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. The paper shows that a "no‐distortion‐at‐the‐top" result, which is standard in models with restricted entry, may also appear in a contestable market. Depending on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can also be a sustainable equilibrium. However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is not guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable "distortion‐at‐the‐top" result is possible.

Capital tax competition is analyzed in a model with a single private and a locally supplied public consumption good. As a benchmark case necessary conditions for efficient interregional tax structures are derived and contrasted with the outcome of beggar thy neighbor strategies. If households are immobile an intervention of a central government can be justified to raise efficiency of the NASH equilibrium. In contrast, NASH equilibria are efficient if households are imperfectly mobile because regions have incentives to ensure an efficient interregional resource allocation via granting interregional transfer payments.

The confinement of neutral beam injection (NBI) particles in the presence of n = 3 resonant magnetic perturbations (RMPs) in 15 MA ITER DT plasmas has been studied using full orbit ASCOT simulations. Realistic NBI distribution functions, and 3D wall and equilibria, including the plasma response to the externally applied 3D fields calculated with MARS-F, have been employed. The observed total fast-ion losses depend on the poloidal spectra of the applied n = 3 RMP as well as on the absolute toroidal phase of the applied perturbation with respect to the NBI birth distribution. The absolute toroidal phase of the RMP perturbation does not affect the ELM control capabilities, which makes it a key parameter in the confinement optimization. The physics mechanisms underlying the observed fast-ion losses induced by the applied 3D fields have been studied in terms of the variation of the particle canonical angular momentum (δPϕ) induced by the applied 3D fields. The presented simulations indicate that the transport is located in an edge resonant transport layer as observed previously in ASDEX upgrade studies. Similarly, our results indicate that an overlapping of several linear and nonlinear resonances at the edge of the plasma might be responsible for the observed fast-ion losses. The results presented here may help to optimize the RMP configuration with respect to the NBI confinement in future ITER discharges. ; Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (grant BES2013-065501) ; EUROfusion Consortium grant agreement No. 633053 ; European Union's Horizon 2020 (grant agreement No. 805162) ; Academy of Finland project No. 324759

This article examines recent developments in a literature referred to as `the new institutionalism'. After reviewing some of the consequences for the study of institutions of the behavioral revolution and the elaboration of Arrovian theories of social choice, the author develops the theory of structure-induced equilibrium and explores the two sides of the institutional coin - an examination of the consequences of institutional structure and an explanation of the development of institutional structure.

We incorporate a wage bargaining structure in a dynamic general equilibrium model and show how this feature changes short and long-run properties of equilibria compared with a perfectly competitive setting. We discuss how employment, capital, and income shares respond to wage setting shocks and show that adjustment dynamics depend decisively on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. Values of the elasticity below unity add persistence, tend to preserve stability, and lead to empirically plausible adjustment patterns. By contrast, values above unity introduce additional volatility, thereby making steady states potentially unstable.

Abstract
We consider a society in which each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two activities. Agents are organized in a social network, and each activity generates complementarities between neighbors. We find multiplicity of equilibrium for high intensity of interaction, and we characterize equilibria in terms of specialization and polarization. Overall, results reveal the crucial role played by network geometry. The results also suggest that the structure of the social network should be taken into account for the design of a public policy in favor of a specific activity.

We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output determines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative environmental effects of production more than offset the gain in consumer surplus.

We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output determines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative environmental effects of production more than offset the gain in consumer surplus.

The main contribution of this paper is to place smooth infinite economies in the setting of the equilibrium manifold and the natural projection map à la Balasko. We show that smooth infinite economies have an equilibrium set that has the structure of a Banach manifold and that the natural projection map is smooth. We define regular and critical economies, and regular and critical prices, and we show that the set of regular economies coincides with the set of economies whose excess demand function has only regular prices. Generic determinacy of equilibria follows as a by-product.

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.

Cover -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Freedom and Unfreedom in Palestine -- 1.2 Scantily-Documented Pass Systems -- 1.3 Overivew of the Book -- 2. Registration and Denationalisation -- 2.1 The Census -- 2.2 The Population Registry -- 2.3 Feigning Authority -- 2.4 Denationalisation -- 3. Blacklists -- 3.1 Paper Blacklists and Executions -- 3.2 Blacklists as Hierarchies of Discrimination -- 4. Coercion and Collaboration -- 4.1 Withholding Rights as Coercion -- 4.2 Trading Rights for Needs -- 4.3 Informants and Collaborators -- 5. Movement Restriction and Induced Transfer -- 5.1 Entrenching Movement Restrictions -- 5.2 Induced Transfer -- 5.3 Enhanced Movement for Colonists, Restricted Movement for Indigenous Palestinians -- 6. The Health System -- 6.1 Collapsing Public Health Structures -- 6.2 Health System Shutdown -- 7. Education -- 7.1 Collapsing Education Structures -- 7.2 Education System Shutdown -- 8. Conclusion -- 8.1 Review of the Book -- 8.2 Looking Forward -- Notes -- Index.

AbstractIn this paper the choice of risky debt maturity structure is analyzed in a sequential game framework. The focus is on the set of viable equilibria when there are no transaction costs associated with the choice of debt maturity structure. It is shown that when changes in firm value are independent over time, both short‐ and long‐term debt pooling are Nash sequential equilibrium outcomes. However, only the short‐term debt pooling outcome satisfies the universal divinity refinement. Relaxing the assumption of independent changes in firm value, it is demonstrated that a separating equilibrium in which higher‐quality firms issue short‐term debt and low‐quality firms issue long‐term debt may exist. Furthermore, conditions exist under which long‐term debt pooling is the universally divine outcome.

Underground structures are being constructed at an increasing rate in seismic prone areas, to facilitate the expanding needs of societies. Considering the vital role of this infrastructure in densely populated urban areas and interurban transportation networks, as well as the significant losses associated with potential seismically induced damage, its assessment against seismic hazard is of great importance for stakeholders, operators, and governmental bodies. This paper presents a state-of-the-art review of current developments in the assessment of seismic vulnerability of tunnels and underground structures. Methods for the development of fragility functions for the assessment of bored tunnels in rock or alluvial, and cut and cover tunnels and subways in alluvial, against ground seismic shaking and earthquake-induced ground failures are presented. Emphasis is placed on the estimation of the capacity of the examined structures, the selection of appropriate intensity measures to express seismic intensity, the development of rational probabilistic seismic demand models and the estimation of epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, related to the seismic fragility of underground structures. Through the discussion, acknowledged gaps in the relevant literature are highlighted.