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This paper developed from ideas discussed at the Dagstuhl Seminar 19381(Application-Oriented Computational Social Choice), 2019. ; International audience ; We propose a generalisation of liquid democracy in which a voter can either vote directly on the issues at stake, delegate her vote to another voter, or express complex delegations to a set of trusted voters. By requiring a ranking of desirable delegations and a backup vote from each voter, we are able to put forward and compare four algorithms to solve delegation cycles and obtain a final collective decision.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Chapter 1: The Election System -- Chapter 2: Types of Elections -- Chapter 3: The Constitution -- Chapter 4: The Electoral College -- Chapter 5: Popular and Electoral Votes -- Chapter 6: Eligibility and Ways to Vote -- Visual Summary: The Voting System in Action -- Glossary -- For More Information -- Index -- Back Cover

The introduction of technology into voting systems can bring a number of benefits, such as improving accessibility, remote voting, and efficient, accurate processing of votes. A voting system that uses electronic technology in any part of processing the votes, from vote capture and transfer through to vote tallying, is known as an e-voting system. In addition to the undoubted benefits, the introduction of such technology introduces particular security challenges, some of which are unique to voting systems because of their specific nature and requirements. The key role that voting systems play in democratic elections means that such systems must not only be secure and trustworthy, but must be seen by the electorate to be secure and trustworthy. This chapter emphasizes the challenge to reconcile the secrecy of the ballot, with demonstrable correctness of the result. © 2013 Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

In recent decades psychologists have shown that the standard model of individual choice is often violated as choices are influenced by the decision context. We propose that voting behavior may be similarly influenced & we introduce a theory of context-dependent voting. Context-dependence implies that preferences over any pair of alternatives may depend not just on the two options but on the entire choice set. With an analysis of data gathered during the 1996 U.S. congressional election we confirm the presence of a significant context-dependent effect on voting behavior. In addition, we demonstrate that, when applied to a simple, standard model of electoral competition, context-dependent voting yields an equilibrium in which only two candidates compete & adopt divergent policy platforms, thereby deterring additional entry. The equilibrium is simultaneously consistent with policy divergence & the stability of two-party political systems that underlies Duverger's Law. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

It has been suggested that voting may be an "expressive" action taken without regard to any hope of actually influencing election outcomes on the margin. However, there has been no real-world evidence brought to bear on the question of whether the propensity of an individual to vote & the propensity of that same individual to engage in other forms of "expressive" behavior are correlated in any statistically meaningful sense. Drawing from longitudinal data found in the National Election Surveys, we report compelling evidence of a strong, positive relationship between what we term "political expressiveness" & the act of voting. 1 Table, 1 Appendix, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.

This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.

This paper presents computer simulations of voting rules: Plurality rule, Approval voting and the Copeland and Borda rules, with voters voting sincerly or strategically. Different ways of generating random preference profiles are introduced: Rousseauist cultures are suitable for common interest project assessment; Impartial cultures are standard in Social Choice Theory; Distributive cultures and Spatial Euclidean ones are standard in Political Science.