Suchergebnisse

Schroder's statement regarding the role of NATO has driven calls for a more "political" alliance to revitalize the transatlantic relationship after the Iraq debacle. There are numerous good reasons for a stronger dialogue in the framework of NATO. Not only will the EU not be at "eye level" with the US for some time, the collective approach of NATO is qualitatively different than a bilateral process, & the differing membership enables a discussion & military handling beyond the EU states. A central characteristic of a more political NATO is a broader, more comprehensive strategic debate, which will facilitate the embedding of military operations in broader political strategies for post conflict concerns & encourage dialogue with other governmental & non-governmental players. The build up of close relationships between NATO & the UN, the EU, & NGOs will be a challenging task in the coming years, but the transatlantic security relationship requires a forum in which Europe & America can both create a dialogue in which the entire spectrum of options, from common threat analysis to military planning, to interventions can be comprehensively coordinated. This forum is currently & for the foreseeable future NATO. L. Reed

Contends that the second Bush administration's invasion of Iraq, in defiance of the UN & much of the NATO alliance, should be viewed as a strategic reaction to gathering threats to US dominance born of the EU/Euro project & the economic rise of the People's Republic of China. Sensing its hegemony imperiled by an emerging multipolar international regime, the Bush administration responded by flexing its unrivaled military superiority in a unilateral pre-emption in defense of US imperial interests. References. K. Coddon

Introduces a special issue on the Atlantic alliance, focusing on the US, UK, France, and Germany.

In this examination of the vital US interests in Asia-Pacific stability, the author examines US objectives & challenges in the region to argue that a continued US military forward presence requires all instruments of national power, & a vigorous network of allies in the region. Analysis of US interests, key flashpoints, key challenges, & the US strategic objectives in the Asian-Pacific region are delineated. Recommendations for achieving the objectives include strengthening air & naval forces over the Taiwan strait with a policy of strategic ambiguity, "force protection plus," reduction of US forces on the Korean peninsula, & shaping forces in the "powder-keg states." A discussion of the US Army's contribution to regional security supports the concluding recommendations for US attention & deterrence in the region. J. Harwell

Discusses the libertarian political philosophies of Ohio Senator (1939-1953) & Republican Party congressional leader Robert A. Taft & studies his brand of isolationism in his foreign policy views. First Taft's political philosophies are laid out, looking at his view of the US as a civil association, his support for a free economy, & desire for rule of law. Taft's foreign policy visions are then examined, in particular his opposition to international commitments & aversion to US involvement in war. The third section speculates on the difference in foreign policy outcome had Taft been chosen for the Republican Party presidential nomination instead of Eisenhower, ie, the response to the Soviet threat & US involvement in the United Nations. Taft's isolationism is analyzed through four distinct foreign policy orientations (national-interest isolationism/interventionism & altruistic isolationism/interventionism). It is concluded that Senator Taft's brand of isolationist foreign policy views would have led the US down a very different path than that of today. 48 References. M. James

During the Cold War, the ever-present Soviet threat helped keep the West united. More recently, however, attempts to mend the transatlantic rift by pointing to present dangers have only deepened the cultural divide. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must accept that "the West" has now split into European & American halves. But both sides still need each other -- now more than ever. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines Thomas Risse's (2003) call for revitalization of transatlantic security associations & the integration of the US in the multilateral institutions of the Western alliances from an optional angle. The difference in development of military potential since the end of the Cold War directed Europe toward a multilateral approach, while the US can proceed unilaterally as well. This choice is the source of US power & European impotence. While Europe & the US share common principles of democracy, freedom, & legitimate governance, disagreement exists about implementation of these values. The US protective shield allows Europe some degree of unconcern with respect to global military challenges, & the EU has focused on reordering their institutional framework. This lack of a common transatlantic strategic vision is problematic, as today's global dangers require long-term cooperation on both sides. Initial steps have been taken during a summit touting a new European realism, although in the longer term, Europe must be taken seriously by the US as a military partner. Europe should be proactive, formulating a common transatlantic strategy for mutual interests, more often pursuing a consistent, agreed upon foreign & security policy. Yet to be resolved however, is the framework & means for further cooperation. L. Kehl